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ABSTRACTzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
The present thesis comprehensively examines the right of any member of the public to
access environmental information held by mainly public bodies and the obligation of these bodies
to provide it upon request. In doing this, we do not claim to present the reader with a brand new
theory. However this thesis is original in the way that it combines in a single piece of work all the
aspects of the subject: both legal and non-legal. With respect to the legal aspects of the subject,
these are analysed in regard of not only national law, but also international, EC law and also the
law of the European Convention on Human Rights. In other words, the present thesis is a synthesis
that has never been done before.
In our introductory chapter we set the limits of our examination by stating that we will
mainly examine the legal rules that grant a right to individuals to access environmental information
upon request. We also examine the historical evolution of the right to access to environmental
information.
Then, in Chapter I, which is the core chapter of the present work, we explain in detail the
substantive provisions of the legal instruments granting a right to access environmental information
upon request: the Aarhus convention, thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA2003/4IEC Environmental Information Directive on
public access to Environmental Information and the Environmental Information Regulations 2004,
which transpose into UK law this Directive and the information provisions of the Aarhus
convention. It should be stressed that we analyse in parallel the equivalent provisions of EC law,
international law and UK law, thus avoiding repeating the identical parts of these instruments. This
parallel examination of all legal rules that grant a right to access environmental information is also
a feature that renders the present work original, since there is no other written work on the subject
adopting such an approach.
In chapter 2 we examine other specific UK enactments that grant a right to access specific
kinds of environmental information which is recorded on registers. Moreover, we highlight the fact
that the statutory provisions on registers serve a different function than the environmental
information regulations, as they also create a statutory duty for some public authorities to collect
and compile certain types of environmental information and place it on registers.
In chapter 3 we examine the relevant ECHR articles which have been interpreted by the
Court of Strasbourg as including a right to access environmental information. Thus, we analyse
how in some limited circumstances the right to access environmental information can be of a
fundamental nature.
Finally, in chapter 4 we examine how the 90/313IEEC Directive (the precursor of Directive
2003/41EC) was transposed in French ,law, in comparison with England. We conclude that the
English method of transposition has been more in conformity with the aim of the right to access
environmental information: environmental protection. We also conclude that this important finding
is also of some relevance today, even after the enactment of the 2003 Directive and the
Environmental Information Regulations 2004.
The present work is concluded by showing that: I) the right of access to environmental
information is what could be called a 'multi-layered' right, which stems from various legal
instruments of different levels (the EC level, international level and UK national level). This is the
reason why the right to environmental information is a right with uncertain boundaries and content,
since, although all these instruments go into the same direction of recognising a right to access
environmental information to any person, they all contain different limitations and exceptions to
the scope of this right; 2) the right to access environmental information is fundamentally different
from the general right to access information held by public bodies, since it aims at achieving better
environmental protection; 3) as a consequence, the correct approach to any analysis of the right to
access environmental information is to understand and acknowledge that, first, this right stems
from various European, national and international legal instruments, and second, that although it is




Nota Bene:zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAthe following list of abbreviations does not include the common
abbreviations widely used in order to refer to various legal journals.
"1990 Directive" : the Council Directive 90/313IEEC of 7 June 1990, on freedom of access
to information on the environment
"2003 Directive" : Directive 2003/4IEC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
28 January 2003 on public access to environmental information and repealing Council Directive
90/313IEEC
"1992 Regulations" : the Environmental Information Regulations 1992
"2004 Regulations" : the draft Environmental Information Regulations 2004 as laid before
Parliament on 22 July 2004. Any reference in the present work to the "Environmental
Information Regulations 2004", should be read as a reference to these draft regulations.
"Aarhus Convention" : the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE)
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to
Justice in Environmental Matters
CFI: Court of First Instance of the European Communities
ECHR: European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
ECJ : European Court of Justice
ECtHR : European Court of Human Rights
EPA: Environmental Protection Act 1990
FOIA : Freedom of Information Act 2000
OJ : Official Journal of the European Union. Formerly known as Official Journal of the
European Communities. Any reference in the present work to the "Official Journal", should be read
as a reference to this journal.
TCPA : the Town and Country Planning Act 1990
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"rJ'fiezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBACourt recognisesfor its part tliat in today's society tlie protection of tlie environment is an
increasingfy important consideration. nzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
ECtHR, Fredin v. Sweden, 1990, Application No. 12033/86, (1991) 13 EHRR 784, at par. 48.
"rJ'fie protection ana preservation of tlie environment is now perceived' as 6eing of crucial importance to the
future of man~nd'; ana pu6lic 60ates, 60tli national ana international; are ta~ng significant steps toward's the
esta6fisliment cif fegisfation wliicli wi{[ promote tlie protection of the environment"
Per Lord Goff, Cambridge Water Co. v. Eastern Counties Leather Pic. [1994] 2 AC 264, at 305.
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INTRODUCTIONzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
When examining access to environmental information, one has to start from a definition of
basic terms such as what is meant by environmental information.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIt is because the meaning of su h
terms may seem evident, that they ought to be defined right at the beginning, in order to prevent
any misunderstanding and inconsistencies further on.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
A) Defmition of access to environmental information.
The definition of "access to environmental information" can be analysed by examining the
meaning of the two components of this phrase: "environmental information" and "access to
environmental information".
1) What is "environmental information" ?
We shall examine further on the extremely detailed definition of environmental
information given by the various legislative instruments that deal with the subject matter. So, at this
point we shall only give a working definition of the term.
Thus, for present purposes, "environmental information" shall be considered to be
information concerning the present or past state of the environment and also information
concerning activities with an adverse or damaging effect to it.
Although the above definition seems pretty straightforward, its scope is dependent on the
meaning given to the term "environment". It can be argued that this word does not have a very
precise meaning, apart from an all-encompassing definition such as that the environment is
everything but the human being itself.' It is indeed very difficult to restrict an idea that can have
such a general, all encompassing, content. In any case, and for present purposes only, we shall
acknowledge that the term "environment" is able to have such a general meaning as to encompass
everything. We shall see further on, how legislators and regulators have restricted the scope of this
term, when legislative access to information regimes are concerned.
!This defmition of course comes from Einstein who said that'zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAThe envi onment is everything that isn't me'. It
is clear that the environment therefore covers other human beings and so the state and the health of human
beings, which is the primary concern of environmental law. Quoted in the Indian Supreme Court Case of
K.M Chinnappa,zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAT.N. Godavarman Thirumalpad v Union of India and Ors (Writ Petition (civil) 202 of
1995, 30/1 0/2002, available from http://judis.nic.inI)inwhichArijitPasayatJ.said " 'Environment' is a
difficult word to define. Its normal meaning relates to the surroundings, but obviously that is a concept which
is relatable to whatever object it is which is surrounded. Einstein had once observed, 'The environment is
everything that isn't me'."
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2) When is there access to environmental information?zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
It is also very important to define what is meant by "access to environmental information".
First of all, it can be said that access to information takes place whenever a person receives
some environmental information from any source (like from the government, private corporations,
local authorities, the media, or even his neighbours). A distin~tion can however be drawn,
depending on the reason why environmental information is communicated to a certain person.
First, environmental information might be imparted to a person because he has previously
requested it. Thus, a private company or a public body might give environmental information
because a person or a group of persons have asked for it. Second, environmental information might
be communicated to people voluntarily by the bodies holding it, in which case recipients of
information have not asked for it before.
In both cases, there is access to environmental information, though not necessarily because
a legal instrument (such as a statute or another piece of legislation) compels that.
3) Access to environmental information through legal means.
Although one can access environmental information in many ways, like by reading a
newspaper, listening to the weather report broadcast over the radio, such means are not organised
through a legal framework laying down legal rules on access to environmental information. Such a
framework could either provide for a legally enforceable right of citizens to receive environmental
information upon a request to bodies that hold such information, or for an obligation for various
bodies to impart information to the general public, without any previous request. We shall examine
further on in more detail such legal instruments. In any case, it is important to note that the present
work will only cover and analyse the concept of access to environmental information as it is
organised through legally binding instruments.
This fundamental conceptual limitation being drawn, it is important to start by examining
how access to environmental information has been evolving through time.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
B) The History of access to environmental information.
Woolley has observed thaf ''the history of the development of the law and practice of
environmental information has, on the whole, been one which shows that polluters, actual or
potential, and those who regulate their activities, have moved from positions exhibiting hostility, or
at least reluctance, to divulge anything about what they were doing, to acceptance, sometimes
17
grudging, that the public must be told enough to inform them of the outlines of the risks to which
they may be subject". This sentence admirably sums up the overall trend, which has been a gradual
liberalisation of the public's right to access environmental information.
The evolution of access to environmental information can be examined in three distinct
phases, which start from a practice of total secrecy and end with general freedom of information
being the general rule. The first phase covers the period from the late 19zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAth century to the ate 60s
during which total secrecy was the rule. The second intermediate phase took place in the late 60s to
the 90s and is characterised by a movement toward greater but not complete openness. The last
phase extends from the early 90s till the present time, when freedom of access to information has
become the general rule. After having examined these three periods of time, we shall examine the
future of environmental information, that consists of international instruments that are in the
process of being implemented into British and European Union legal systems.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
1) The past: secrecy has been the rule.
This period of time starts in 1863, a year which is a landmark for environmental law in
Britain, since it is the year when the Alkali Act 1863 was adopted. This Act, apart from being one
of the first statutes dealing with environmental problems, created the Alkali Inspectorate, the first
national pollution agency. The Alkali Inspectorate adopted a policy of total secrecy concerning
environmental information it came to hold. The only exceptions allowed, were either when
disclosure was demanded by a statute or when the owner of the information permittedzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAif. This
policy was finally transposed into section 28 of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, which
concerned measurements and recordings taken by the Alkali Inspectorate and prohibited disclosure
of these information except where it was a statutory duty to do so or with the consent of the person
who had furnished it."
Furthermore, a statutory requirement for secrecy in general was laid down in the Official
Secrets Act of 1911. This Act' created the offence of wrongful communication of information. This
consisted of the communication of any information which has been obtained by the accusedzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA"o ing
2 David Woolley et a., Environmental Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2000. See Chapter 5 on
Environmental Information, written by Woolley, page 145.
3 As the Alkali Inspectorate put it in its first report: "Of course, all information regarding any work must be
considered private unless publication is demanded by the act, or permitted by the owner.", cited by S. Bell
and D. McGillivray in Ball and Bell on Environmental Law, Blackstone Press, 5th edition2000, page 219.
4 This section is still in force, but the Health and Safety Commission has published in March 2004 proposals
to amend section 28 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, to allow the release of some safety
information whose disclosure is currently prohibited, on the understanding that information to which section
28 applies can be adequately safeguarded, where it needs to be, using the exemptions in the Freedom of
Information Act 2000. See
http://www .hse-consultations.co.ukIconsultlHS WA_section28 _amendrnent/consultationlfome
5 For a more detailed explanation of the implications of this Act in general, see Ewing, K. D. and Keith
David, The struggle/or civil liberties : political freedom and the rule a/law in Britain, 1914-1945, Oxford
University Press, 1999
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to his position as a person who holds or has held office under His Majesty, or as a person who
holds or has held a contract made on behalf of His Majesty, or as a person who is or has been
employed under a person who hold or has held such an office or contract":zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAThis provision was
very general and encompassed virtually any information (including environmental information)
possessed by government officials and agencies. This prohibition was in force until it was repealed
in 1989 by the Official Secrets Act 1989 that limited its scope to "sensitive" information,
concerning state secrets, defence, intelligence, international relations, interception of
communications and information which might be useful to criminals.
At the same time as specific environmental statutes were enacted, many of them have
contained clauses prohibiting the disclosure of environmental information, most of the time relating
to releases into the environment. Thus in the case of water pollution, section 12 of the Rivers
(Prevention of Pollution) Act 19617, provides that disclosure of information is permitted only in
cases where the provider of that information consents, or if there are other statutory requirements to
disclose.
Apart from the existence of various statutes prohibiting disclosure, the courts also showed
a trend in protecting governmental secrecy. Under the law of Crown privilege, the government
could refuse to produce documents in court when they belonged to a class of documents, which the
public interest required to be withheld from production like national defence and security matters,
even if they were necessary for one of the parties to prove his allegations. Before 1942 it seemed
that this executive power was not absolute, though the House of Lords in a 1942 decision," ruled
that a ministerial claim of privilege was unquestionable in law. However, in 1968 the House of
Lords" relaxed its position by deciding that although the principle was still applicable, the courts
had the power to weight the public interest of justice being done against the public interest invoked
by government and it would be for the court, after inspecting the documents shown to the court but
6 Section 2(1) of the Officials Secrets Act 1911 (as amended in 1920).
7 Section 12 of this Act which is still in force provides:
s 12 Restriction of disclosure of infonnation.
( 1) If any person discloses any infonnation--
(a) which has been furnished to or obtained by him in connection with an application for consent, or the
imposition of conditions, under this Act or the principal Act (including the variation of conditions, and
references and applications to the Minister); or (b) which is derived from a sample of effluent taken for the
purposes of this Act or the principal Act, he shall be guilty of an offence, unless the disclosure is made--
(i) with the consent of the person by whom the information was furnished or from whom it was obtaiaed or,
in the case of information derived from a sample of effluent, of the person making the discharge
in question; or
(ii) in connection with the execution of this Act or the principal Act; or (iii) for the purposes of any
proceedings arising out of this Act or the principal Act (including references and applications to the Minister)
or of any criminal proceedings whether so arising or not, or for the purpose of any report of any such
proceedings.
(2) A person guilty of an offence under the foregoing subsection shall be liable on summary conviction to a
fme not exceeding [level 3 on the standard scale] or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding
three months or to both.
(3) Nothing in this section shall prevent the disclosure of information derived from a sample of the waters
into which an effluent is discharged.
8 Duncan v Cammell Laird & Co [1942] AC 624.
9 Conway v Rimmer [1968] AC 910.
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not the parties, to decide whether the documents should be covered by Crown privilege or be
disclosed.
The approach of both public authorities and businesses during this period was vividly
described by the second report of the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution which stated:zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
"In our discussions with representatives of industry, river authorities and local authorities, we
have been struck by the insistence upon confidentiality over the nature and quantities of industrial
wastes released into the air or into rivers and estuaries or dumped on land or at sea". 10zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
2) The move toward greater openness.
It has been argued" that the political reason for imposing limitations on public access to
information, was the belief that such secrecy will prevent the public from being involved actively
in public life and it will make it accept more easily decisions made by authorities in the public
interest. We will discuss further this idea in the following part, where we will be talking about
whether there should be openness to environmental information or not.
However, secrecy in environmental matters started to be criticised in the early 70s by the
Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution.
In its second report" in 1972, the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution
concluded that there was a need for more public openness concerning environmental matters. The
Commission has maintained this position through its subsequent reports, and in its tenth report" in
1984 it recommended that" ... a guiding principle behind all legislative and administrative control
relating to environmental pollution should be a presumption infavour of unrestricted access for the
public to information ...zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA,,14
Meanwhile, at International level, disclosure of environmental information was becoming
an important issue. In June 1972, there was held in Stockholm the United Nations Conference on
"The Human Environment", which led to the creation of the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP). The United Nations Environment Programme has since then been working to
encourage sustainable development through sound environmental practices. To achieve its goals,
the UNEP started promoting the collection and dissemination of environmental data at a very early
10 Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, Second Report: .Three Issues in Industrial Pollution,
London 1972, HMSO Cmnd. 4894, page 1.
11 See John McConnick, The Global Environmental Movement - Reclaiming Paradise, Belhaven Press,
London 1989, page 128.
12 See above no. 10
13 Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, Tenth Report: Tackling Pollution - Experience and
Prospects, London 1984, HMSO Cmnd. 9149. A good summary of this 10 report can be foundzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAin David
Woolley et al., Environmental Law, Oxford university Press, 2000, pages 146-150.
14 Ibid, paragraph 2.77, page 38. .
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stage in its history, by creating the "Earthwatch" programme", which aims to collect and
disseminate information about the current status of the earth's environment.
In the same time, in Europe, after a meeting of European Community heads of state and
governments in Paris in October 1972, it was agreed that economic development had resulted in
inequalities in living conditionszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAin the commu ity and that economic expansion was not an end by
itself. The European Community therefore moved, for the first time, beyond strictly economic
issues and started developing a European Environmental Policy. This led to the First Action
Programme", that ran from 1973 to 1977, and contained some provisions about dissemination of
environmental information and an examination of the application of environmental laws across
European Community states. The Second Environmental Action Programme", that ran from 1977
to 1981, gave a central place to collection and research of data and information and emphasised the
need to monitor the compliance of member states with European Community's environmental
regulations. The third Environmental Action Programme, that ran from 1982 to 1986, included
proposals for environmental coordination and recommendations on European Community foreign
environmental policy and noted the importance of environmental protection as an integral part of
development policy.
It is important to mention that all these Environmental Programmes, are not binding on
member states, and are just political declarations of intent to implement the objectives set forth in
the programmes. However, it was in accordance with the third environmental programme, that the
directive 85/337 on Environmental Impact Assessments was implemented. This Directive provided
that information concerning activities that can have adverse effects on the environment should be
passed to those who might be affected.
This movement at international and European level, alongside calls from the Royal
Commission on Environmental pollution towards greater openness concerning environmental
information, led to the adoption in Britain of certain statutory provisions that allowed access to
specific environmental information. All these provisions will be further discussed in the
following chapters.
Firstly, the Directive on Environmental Impact Assessment was implemented in British
law through The Town and Country Planning (Assessment of Environmental Effects) Regulations"
which were originally passed under the European Communities Act 1972. In 1994 their scope (the
classes of project subject to an impact assessment) was extended beyond the Directive's minimal
IS Detailed information about the UNEP and the "Earthwatch" programme, can be found on the UNEP's
internet website at the internet location:zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAhttp://www.unep.org.
16 First Environmental Action Programme: Declaration of the Council of the European Communities and of
the representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting in the Council of 22 November 1973
on the programme of action of the European Communities on the environment, OJ, No. C 112,2011211973,
rage 1-2.
7 Second Environmental Action Programme: Resolution of the Council of the European Communities and of
the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council of 17 May 1977 on
the continuation and implementation of a European Community policy and action programme on the
environment, OJ, No. C 139, 13/06177, page 1.
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requirements, under s. 71A of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. Through this system, the
public is given access to an environmental statement prepared by the developer itself that contains
information about possible impacts to the environment of some major projects planned to be built."
Secondly, two years after the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution produced its
Second Report, the Control of Pollution Act 1974 was passed containing provisions on air and also
water pollution. As far as air pollution is concerned, this Act gave local authorities discretionary
powers to collect data about air pollution (information could be obtained by various methods, even
by issuing notices to polluters) and publish some of it. This information was available to the
general public through the Register ofInformation on Air Pollution, which was to be maintained by
local authorities, but only if they chose to establish one. As far as water pollution is concerned, the
Act went further by requiring water authorities (namely the National Rivers Authority) to publish
records of effluent discharges into rivers. However, it was not until 1989 that registers of
discharges to rivers were established, since the Secretary of State for the Environment was required
to make regulations to prescribe in detail how these registers would function; these regulations"
were not adopted until 1989. They were made under the Water Act 1989, which restructured the
water industry.
Thirdly, the Environment and Safety Information Act 198821 established public registers
containing certain enforcement notices concerning breaches of health safety and environmental
protection rules.
Fourthly, the Environmental Protection Act 1990 also set up a series of registers of
information to be held by public authorities.
Alongside all these specific statutory provisions allowing the public access to a certain
specific type of environmental information, existed a set of general rules that allowed access to
information held by local authorities. The Local Government (Access to Information) Act 1985, by
amendments to the Local Government Act 1972, not only allowed individuals to access local
authorities meetings but also to inspect, copy and be furnished with documents. Of course, some
exceptions remained concerning sensitive information about individuals and government
information that was under restricted access.
18 The Town and Country Planning (Assessment of Environmental Effects) Regulations, SI 1988, No. 1199.
19 See Stephen Tromans and Karl Fuller,zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAEnvironmental Impact Assessment - Law and Practice,
Butterworths,2003.
20 The Control of Pollution (Registers) Regulations, 1989 (SI 1989 No. 1160).
21 The Bill of the Environment and Safety Information Act 1988 had' been drafted by a pressure group, the
Campaign for Freedom of Information, and it forms part of three Bills drafted by this group that received the
Royal Assent in 1987 and 1988. The other two were the Access to Medical Reports Act 1988 creating the
right for people to access reports produced by their doctor for employers or insurance companies and the
Access to Personal Files Act 1987 creating the right for people to access manually held social work and
housing reports about themselves. Around this date was also enacted the Access to Health records Act 1990,
a private member's bill creating the right for people to access information put on their medical records after
November 1991. There was also the Data Protection Act 1984 which was aimed to protect the personnal data
of individuals from electronic procession, later replaced by the Data Protection Act 1998.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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However, all these particular provisions did not create a general right of access to
information, or even to environmental information. They just allowed, in most cases by creating
public registers, the general public to have access to a certain type of information."
In general, such was the tendency of statutes to prohibit the disclosure of information, that
the 1993 White Paper on 'Open Government?' lists 189 provisions of primary legislation and 62
pieces of secondary legislation prohibiting disclosure of official information.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
3) The present: freedom of information is the general rule.
In the United Kingdom, general freedom of information legislation had long been
overdue. Wilson had summarised the situation in the UK in the mid-80s as " ...zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAof all democratic
countries in the world today [... ] Britain is probably the most secretive'ii" Even though, some have
been asking since the 70s for a freedom of information Act, the central government was opposed to
ifs. Consequently, the first attempt to create a universal freedom of access to information in Britain
was made under pressure from the European Economic Community (as it was called then). It was
Directive 90/313 on freedom of access to environmental information, which was transposed into
British law by the Environmental Information Regulations 199226, which provided that everyone
was entitled to have access to information relating to the environment, subject to certain
exceptions. This community directive was adopted during the fourth environment action
Programme" (1987-1992), that included provisions concerning the "need for, and desirability of, a
Community Freedom of Environmental Information Act".
The closest that the UK came to recognising general freedom of information held by public
bodies before the enactment of the Freedom of Information Act 2000, was the government's Code
of Practice on Access to Government Information which came into force on 4 April 1994 and was
22 For an analysis of the state of Freedom oflnformation laws in the UK in the late 80s - early 90s, see Trevor
Barnes, Open up!, Britain and Freedom of Information in the 1980s, London: Fabian Society, 1980; David
Northmore, Freedon of Information Handbook, London: Bloomsbury, 1991; Patrick Birkinshaw, Open
Government, Freedom of Information and Local Government - a study conducted for the Local Government
Legal Society Trust and the society of Town Clerk's Education and Research Trust, 1985; Irfomung
Education - report of the Committee of Inquiry into Freedom of Information, appointed by the London
Education Authority, London: Inner London Education Authority, 1987; Des Wilson, The Secrets file, the
case for freedom of Information in Britain today, London: Heinemann Educational, 1984.
23 See The Open Government White Paper, Open Government, Annex B, part 1, pages 80-86, (Cm. 2290),
HMSO July 1993.
24 See Des Wilson, above n. 22, at p. 1.
25 See Patrick Birkinshaw, Reforming the Secret State, Series: Studies in law and politics, edited by Norman
Lewis, Cosmo Graham and Deryck Beyleveld, Milton Keynes Open University Press, 1990.
26 Environmental Information Regulations 1992, SI 1992,3240.
27 Fourth environment action Programme, Resolution of the Council of the European Communities and of the
representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council of 19 October 1987 on
the continuation and implementation of a European Community policy and action programme on the
environment (1987-1992), OJ C 328,zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA07/1211987 p.l - 44.
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revised in 1997.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA28 This Code of Practice did not create any legal right of access to information,
since it was a non-binding instrument, but merely laid down a policy of openness. According to this
policy, the government and other bodies caught by the code, ended the policy of secrecy and started
responding to reasonable requests for official information. The approach to release of information
was based on the assumption that information should be released except where disclosure would
not be in the public interest, as covered under a specific exemption to disclosure specified in Part II
of the Code. There is a long list of wide-ranging exemptions to disclosure but the presumption is
that information should be disclosed unless the harm likely to arise from disclosure would
outweigh the public interest in making the information available. The exemptions are grouped in
Part IT of the Code under 15 different headings and concern matters such as defence, security,
international relations, internal discussions and advice, communications with the Royal Household,
law enforcement and legal proceedings, immigration and nationality issues, effective management
of the economy and collection of tax, effective management and operations of the public service,
public employment and public appointments and honours, voluminous or vexatious requests,
information intended for future publication, information held for preparing statistics or carrying out
research, privacy of an individual, third party's commercial confidences, information given in
confidence, and information whose disclosure is prohibited by or under any enactment, regulation,
European Community law or international agreement or covered by Parliamentary Privilege.
Under the Code each public body is to make its own arrangements for charging.
Information is to be provided as soon as practicable. The target for response to simple requests is
20 working days from the date of receipt of the request, subject to an extension for more
complicated requests.
The scope of the Code extends to almost all central government departments and their
agencies, as well as many other public bodies which come within the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman (as listed in Schedule 2 to the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967). It should be
noted that since 1999 the Scottish Executive and the National Assembly for Wales have introduced
their own Codes."
28 The text of the Code can be found on the Department of Constitutional affairs website at
http://www.dca.gov.uklfoilogcode981.htm . It should be noted that the NHS is covered under a different
Code, the 1995zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBACode of Practice on op nness in the National Health Service.
29 The Code of Practice on Access to Scottish Executive Information can be accessed at http://
www.scotland.gov.uklgovernmentlfoil . The Welsh Code of Practice on Public Access to Information can be
accessed at http://www.wales.gov.uklkeypubcodespractice/contentlcodeofpracticecover_e.htm . The Welsh
code is interesting, since it shows that the National Assembly for Wales has tried to be more open than the
UK government, by first providing that the target for responding to a request for information will be 15
working days (instead of the 20 found in the UK. Code or the FOIA 2000) and second, that in applying the
public interest test the National Assembly will use the test of "substantial harm" (unlike the FOIA 2000 or
the UK Code which just operate a simple balance test of competing interests weighted equally). Such a
practice is possible under the FOIA 2000, and thus will be able to continue even after January 2005 when the
Act will come into full force and this code will not be relevant, since section 78 of the Act provides that
noting in the FOIA is to be taken as limiting the powers of public authorities to disclose information held by
them, presumably on a voluntary basis.
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The Code is not very important as far as environmental information is concerned, since
first it will cease to have effect in January 2005 when the Freedom of Information Act 2000 will
have come in full force and second, because the Code, due to its voluntary nature, cannot affect any
legal rights of access stemming under any legal provisions such as the pre-existing Environmental
Information Regulations 1992and any other relevant statutes (examined in detail further on).
In any case, the Labour Government that won the 1997 elections had promised in its
manifesto to legislate on the issue and in 1997 a governmental White paper was produced on
general freedom of information." Then in 1999 a Freedom of Information Bill was passed through
Parliament, and on the 30zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAth No ember 2000, the new Freedom of Information Act 2000 received
the Royal Assent. This Act has created a general right for anyone to consult and receive copies of
almost any information held by public bodies, although some exemptions apply." This Act does
not repeal the Environmental Information regulations or any other special provisions providing
access to specific environmental information (like public registers). In fact, section 39 of the Act
provides that environmental information is not included under the scope of this statute. Further
rights to environmental information are to be made available under regulations made by the
Secretary of State in order to implement the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
(UNECE) Convention on access to information, public participation in decision-making and access
to justice in environmental matters. This is the Aarhus Convention, which the UK signed at Aarhus
in Denmark in 1998 (see below). These Regulations also implement the new EC directivezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
2003/4/EC on access to environmental information and are the Environmental Information
Regulations 2004, examined in detail further on.
Moreover, atzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAinternational level, over this period the importance of access to
environmental information has been emphasised.
Firstly, principle 11 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (agreed at
the 1992 earth summit at Rio) states that at the national level, each individual shall have
appropriate access to information concerning the environment that is held by public authorities,
including information on hazardous materials and activities and the opportunity to participate in
decision-making processes and that States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and
participation by making information widely available. Similarly, in Agenda 21, a document also
agreed at the 1992 earth summit at Rio, it was agreed that all stakeholders in the environment
should have access to information concerning products or activities with a possible adverse effect
on the environment. This commitment in access to environmental information led to various
international conventions concerning exchange of specific environmental information. It also led to
the UNECE Aarhus convention on Access to Information, Public Participation and Decision
30 See Debra L. Silverman, "Freedom of Information: Will Blair be Able to Break the Walls of Secrecy in
Britain?" [1997] 13zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAAmerican University Int rnational Law Review 471.
3! On the Freedom of Information Act 2000, see inter alia John Macdonald and Clive H Jones, The Law of
Freedom of Information, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003; Philip Coppel, Information Rights, London:
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Making and access to Justice in Environmental Matters, mentioned above. However, at the 2003
Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development, no consensus could be reached on
developing global guidelines on access to information, public participation and access to justice
and thus the World Summit just encouraged governments to implement access to information and
participation at the national level so as to further principle 10 of the Rio Declaration."
Secondly, the European Human Rights Court in Strasbourg, has interpreted article 8 (the
right to privacy, home and family life), in a way that creates a right of information for residents
close to hazardous areas",
As far aszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAEuropean Union is concerned, the same year that it enacted the Directive on
access to Information on the environment, it also established the European Environment Agency;"
one of the reasons it was created was to ensure that the public has been properly informed about the
state of the environment. Its mission is to collect national data on the environment and to provide it
to European Institutions in order to help them draft European legislation and assess its
effectiveness. The Agency also draws up reports on environmental issues. These reports are
available to the general public. However, the Agency has never played a major role in the
recognition and the exercise of a right to receive environmental information, such as the one
introduced by Directive 90/313, although this has been advocated by Gorny."zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
4) The future: a move toward even greater openness.
It can be seen from the above that in Britain, the first step was to enact specific statutes
concerning access to certain type of environmental information (usually through public registers).
Then came directive 90/313 creating a right of access to any kind of environmental information,
and finally the Freedom of Information Act 2000, that extended this general right to every sort of
information, not just environmental. However, as it has already been mentioned, this general right
of access, curiously, does not extend to environmental information (although it would have been
simpler and more coherent to unify these regimes). This is because the European and international
SweetzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA& Maxwell, 2004; the commentary of that FOIA 2000 by Paul Stanley,zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBACurren Law Statutes, Vol. 2,
2000, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2000.
32 See on this point Marc Pallemaerts, International Law and Sustainable Development: Any Progress in
Johannesburg?, 12 [2003] 1 R.E.C.I.E.L. 1, at 9.
33 In the case of Guerra v. Italy, 1998. See below the relevant chapter on Human Rights and environmental
information, for an in-depth analysis of how access to environmental information can be based on the ECHR.
34 The EEA has been established by Council Regulation (EEC) No .1210/90 of 7 May 1990 on the
establishment of the European Environment Agency and the European environment information and
observation network (OJ L 120, 11. 5. 1996, p. 1.), as amended. According to article 1(2) of this Regulation,
one of the tasks of the Agency is 'to ensure that the public is properly informed about the state of the
environment'. In conformity with this general statement, the Agency is in charge of ensuring 'the broad
dissemination of reliable environmental information', according to article 2, point (vi) of this regulation.
35 Dietrich Gorny, "The European Environment Agency and the Freedom of Environmental Information
Directive: Potential Cornerstones of EC Environmental Law" [1991] 14 Boston College International and
Comparative Law Review 279.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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rules of general access to environmental information are more liberal than the FOIA 2000 and the
UK government did not want to go as far.
Today, in the European Union, access to environmental information has recently been
modified through the new DirectivezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA2003/4 that has r placed Directive 90/313 on Freedom of
access to Environmental Information and implements the provisions of the Aarhus Convention
concerning access to environmental information",
C) Arguments pro and contra openness of environmental information.
'The Government believes that the public should have a right of access to information held
by pollution control authorities'. This unambiguous statement was made in the Governmental
White Paper 'This Common Inheritance' in 1990. It is clear that access to Environmental
Information is seen as a right, but one can wonder why such a right should be recognised and
whether there could not exist arguments against it.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
1) Arguments favouring the recognition of a legal right to access environmental
information.
The underlying or main reason for a growing emphasis concerning environmental
information is that it can perform a useful function in protecting the environment and thus in the
achievement of the goal of sustainable development. All authors" seem to agree that increased
access to environmental information can contribute towards the following goals.
a) Better implementation and effectiveness of environmental legislation
Increased information allows the monitoring of the effectiveness of environmental
legislation, since it is possible not only for the regulatory authorities and the ones regulated, but
36 Other aspects of the Aarhus Convention will be implemented either individually by member states-or by
other specific EC legislation. For instance, the access to justice part of the convention will be implemented
through a separate Directive; see Commission lays legislative plans on access to justice, ENDS Report, issue
307, August 2000, page 39.
37 See on these points Maurice Frankel "How Secrecy Protects the polluter", in Des Wilson (ed.), The Secrets
file, the case for freedom of information in Britain today, London: Heinemann Educational, 1984, Ch. 3 pp.
22-58; CHona Kimber, Understanding Access to Environmental Information: the European Experience, in
Tim Jewell and Jenny Steele (ed.) Law in environmental decision-making: national, European, and
international perspectives, Oxford University Press, 1998, at pp. 141-144; Patrick Birkinshaw, Freedom of
Information - The Law, the Practice and the Ideal, 2nd edition 1996, Butterworths, at Ch. 1; Jeremy Rowan-
Robinson, Andrea Ross, William Walton, Julie Rothnie, Public access to Information: a means to what end?
[1996] 8(1) JEL 19-42.; Gerd Winter, "Freedom of environmental Information", Ch. 7 in Lomas Owen (ed.),
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also for the greater public to measure whether the particular aims of an environmental rule are
being achieved. This is especially important in the field of environmental regulation of hazardous
activities and substances, since as indicated by Robbins, data that shows weakness in the efficiency
of governmental action, would effectively be an admission of government failure to protect its
citizens and thus this can explain why a government which is not strong on enforcement will not
promote freedom of information."
Also, increased information can assist in the private enforcement of environmental
regulations, because it allows the possibility of private prosecution to be effectively exercised.
Moreover, private individuals or other groups such as Non-Governmental Organisations could also
initiate civil lawsuits or judicial review actions, or just engage in active lobbying towards public
bodies as the Environment Agency, responsible of enforcing environmental legislation,"
This trend of private actors to enforce environmental regulation themselves, without
relying only on state actions, forms part of the principle of shared responsibility and environmental
stewardship. Since public participation in respect of the environment presupposes access to
information, this means that these two principles also need effective circulation of information so
as to operate correctly.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
b) Increased participation in decision-making and better decision-making
qualityzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
..
Reliable, complete and timely information is azyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAsine qua on of ffective public
participation. This is also demonstrated by the Aarhus Convention, which combines access to
information with public participation and access to justice, thus indicating that public participation
is a corollary of environmental information. Increasing public participation in turn leads to
improved regulationary mechanisms and decisions being adopted, since increased information
leads to increased accountability for the decision-maker and also makes the whole process of
regulation seem more legitimate. Thus, information leads to improved decision-making quality. It
also helps avoiding arbitrariness in the enforcement of the law and also helps preventing excessive
industry-bias in decision making. Furthermore, disclosure may help control authorities to detect
and deal with pollution incidents and also to realistically assess the success of the various
pollution-control strategies and mechanisms.
Frontiers of Environmental Law, London: Chancery Law Publishing, 1992, at pp. 102-114. Each author
emphasises different points. ..
38 See Deirde H. Robbins, Doing Business in the Sunshine: Public Access to Environmental Information in
the United States [1994] 3(1) Review of European Community & International Environmental Law 26, at p.
32.
39 See for example the recent case of R v Anglian Water Services [2003] EWCA Crim 2243, where a private
prosecution was brought against a polluter by a member of the public who felt that the Environment Agency
lacked determination in discharging its responsibilities.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
28
c) Assisting individuals and companies in changing their actionszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
Better information on the real state of the natural environment can assist in attaining the
goal of sustainable development, by creating an awareness of the state of the environment and thus
influencing the behaviour of individuals and companies. This is the educational element of freedom
of information. As Bell and McGillivray have put it,zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA'In order t understan the consequences of
our current actions in term of the legacy which is beingpassed tofuture generations there is a need
to ensure greater access to information on those consequences.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA>40 Of course, it nnot be
overlooked, that an environmentally-friendly attitude cannot suffice in itself if there aren't
available practical and legal channels through which to direct these good intentions.
Also, as far as businesses are concerned, access to information would help raise
standards by allowing the comparison of competing firms, as a firm with good environmental
records may increase its business where environmental protection is seen to be important amongst
consumers. Moreover, information would allow companies to police their competitors, so as to
prevent them from benefiting unfairly in a relaxation in environmental protection standards. The
best evidence that industry may benefit from greater disclosure, is the fact that under the U.s.
Freedom ofInformation Act, 71% of requests come from industry."
d) Access to environmental information as a regulatory instrument in its own
right
Access to information can and has been used as another regulatory instrument in order to
achieve protection of the environment. This is demonstrated by the eco-labelling schemes, that
provide consumers with information relating to the environmental impact of various products."
Environmental information labelling can be defined as the use of labels in conjunction with
manufactured products or services, in order to provide some amount of information about the harm
or lack of harm that the existence and further use of this product or service causes to the
environment.
Environmental information labelling aims to use the market force of consumers as a means
to push manufacturers to produce more environmentally friendly products. It is believed that if
consumers are informed about the environmental friendliness or harmfulness of the different
products or services on the market, they will tend to buy the ones that are less harmful towards the
40 Bell and McGillivray, Environmental Law, 5th ed. 2000, Blackstone Press, at page 21S.
41 See Frankel above, at p. 56. The fact that the U.S. FOIA has been mostly used to obtain government data
concerning competitors and private institutions and that an entire industry based on the U.S. FOIA has
appeared in the U.S. since 1974, has been heavily criticised by Scalia since although the U.S. Freedom of
Information Act and its amendments "were promoted as a boon to the press, the public interest group, the
little guy; they have been used most frequently by corporate lawyers[ ...] It is a far cry from JohnzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAQ. P blic
finding out how his government works". See Antonin Scalia, "The Freedom of Information Act has no
clothes", Chapter 4 in Robert G. Vaughn (ed.), Freedom of Information, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000, at p. l l S.
42 See inter alia Ellen Margrethe Basse, Sanford E. Gaines How thinking about trade can improve
environmental performance: trade issues in environmental labelling systems [2000] S(3) Env. Liability 71-S4.
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environment and use them in a more environmentally-friendly way (for instance by trying to use
electrical appliances in a way that will decrease energy consumption).
Environmental information labelling schemes can be mandatory, as with the European
Union energy-labelling scheme created by a Council Directive of 22 September 1992 "on the
indication by labelling and standard product information of the consumption of energy and other
resources by household appliances"." This Directive provides that certain household electrical
appliances should be accompanied by a label mentioning their energy consumption and efficiency.
There is also an EC wide-scheme of voluntary environmental information labelling, the European
Union eco-Iabelling scheme, which was initially established in 1992, by regulationzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA880/92zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA44 a d
provided for a system of awarding labels to goods only. This regulation was repealed and replaced
in September 2000 by regulation 1980/200045 and now also includes services. The aims of this eco-
labelling regulation according to its preamble is "to promote products with a reduced
environmental impact during their entire life cycle and to provide consumers with accurate, non-
deceptive and scientifically based information on the environmental impact of products".
Consequently, the regulation not only tries to protect the environment through consumer
information, but also to address the problem of false or deceptive environmental claims by
manufacturers. The scheme works by allowing manufacturers of environmentally friendly products
to affix a specific label on their products: the eco-Iabel (a flower logo)."zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
e) Encouraging public confidence
Providing information and especially on environmental risks, can also be a factor that will
lead to increased confidence of the general public over issues of 'environmental-scare' such as
dangers from nuclear plants or outbreaks of animal diseases. Infotining the public about
environmental risks, will in turn help the general population to assess such risks. As a consequence
this could lead to reduced fear and greater understanding of the issues at stake involved in an
environmental crisis and more generally will allow individuals to make informed choices about
whether they agree to live in a high-risk area or not. Increased disclosure will also encourage public
confidence in the work of pollution and environmental control authorities.
43 Council Directive 921751EEC of 22 September 1992 on the indication by labelling and standard product
information of the consumption of energy and other resources by household appliances, OJ, L 297 ,
13/10/1992 p. 16 - 19.
44 Council Regulation (EEC) No 880/92 of23 March 1992 on a Community eco-Iabel award scheme, OJ, L
099, 11/04/1992 p.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA1 - 7
45 Regulation (EC) No 198012000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 July 2000 on a
revised Community eco-Iabel award scheme, OJ L 237,21109/2000 p. 1 - 12
46 See for more details the EC Commission website on the eco-Iabel at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/ecolabel/
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2) Arguments against legislation favouring access to environmental informationzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
ItzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAcannot be overlooked that there is also opposition to the development of legal provisions
favouring access to environmental information. However, governments have, largely dismissed
arguments against access."
a) Slower decision-making
It can be argued that, since as analysed above, giving more information to citizens will lead
to increased participation and allow for improved judicial action to be taken by objectors, this will
lead to slower decision-making due to a more cautious approach by decision-makers so as to avoid
challenges (political or legal). However, that is the essence of democratic decision making: that
elected officials who take all decisions on behalf of the electorate body, can be controlled both at
the ballot box and inside the courtroom."
b) Commercial and industrial confidentiality
Another criticism can be that the regime on access to environmental information might be
used by competitors in order to access commercially confidential information. As a consequence,
this leads to fears that the viability of businesses might become affected. Undoubtedly, commercial
and industrial confidentiality is a legitimate interest conflicting with the right to access
environmental information. However, rules providing for access invariably include exclusions for
information commercially confidential. It has also been suggested that if confidential information
in the hands of public bodies is not correctly protected, this might lead to reluctance of companies
to provide any information not required 'to be provided under a statutory provision."
c) Costs
Undoubtedly, a legal obligation for public authorities of having to provide information
upon request, leads to costs for the authorities which will have to be passed on at some stage to the
taxpayers. However, this concern is also partially alleviated by the fact that all regimes on freedom
of information provide that the requester of information has to pay at least part of the costs of
providing it. Of course, it has to be acknowledged that in the end the provision of information will
47 According to Bell and McGillivray, see above n. 40, at p. 218.
48 On the debate about increased public participation in environmental matters, see Lynda M Warren,
"Sustainable Development And Govemance" [2003] Enviro LR 5.2(77).
49 On the effects of the 1990 Environmental Information Directive and of the right to access environmental
information on industry, see Ian Rose, Industry and Access to Information on the Environment, inzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAProtecting
the European Environment: Enforcing EC Environmental Law, edited by Han Somsen, London: Blackstone
Press, 1996, Ch. 13 pp. 251-264.
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still probably cost the authority some money. The objection thus is that the costs for the public (be
it taxpayers, ratepayers or customers), would be out of proportion compared to the benefit that
could be accrued from openness. But in any case, such a balancing exercise is almost impossible to
undertake, as it is hard to quantify in financial terms the 'benefits' of providing information.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
d) Endless litigation and objections
Furthermore, there had been expressed fears that environmental activists might seek access
to environmental information in order to use it in unreasonable and endless enforcement action
against industries and businesses. However, even if access to information has led to increased
litigation, the fear of the so-called 'green-nutters' flooding industry with litigation has not been
realised." And in any case, even if information might be used by environmentalists applying to
courts for injunctions against companies, injunctions can only be granted if there is some merit in
the application."
e) The interpretation of technical data.
Lastly, it could be argued that the provision of environmental information will not have
any useful purpose, since most of the time information concerning the environment is about
complex technical data. So the general public will be unable to interpret and thus use this
information effectively.
3) Conclusion: legislative activity favouring access indicates the predominance
of pro arguments.
Even if the debate is not closed between opponents and proponents of whether there should
be specific legal provisions favouring the provision of environmental information, recent trends
both at UK, EC and international level favour such an approach. This in a way demonstrates that
the current legislative thinking is underpinned by the idea that the benefit of providing
environmental information outweighs its disadvantages and that, in general, providing access to
information protects the environment. It might therefore be thought that the argument has been
won. However, the counter-arguments have not been totally dismissed by legislators (both at
national, EC and international level) as the concerns that they convey have been taken into
consideration when establishing the limits of the right to access environmental information. This is
especially true, when the exceptions to environmental iriformation are concerned. Thus,zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
SO Ibid. at p. 219.
5) See Maurice Frankel "How Secrecy Protects the polluter", in Des Wilson (ed.),zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAThe Secrets file, the case
for freedom of information in Britain today, London: Heinemann Educational, 1984, Ch. 3 pp. 22-58, at pp.
34-36.
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understanding the arguments against access to environmental information, leads to an
understanding of the underlyingzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBArationale for the ex mptions to disclosure.
Finally, it should be noted that all legislation on environmental information does not
directly lead to all the positive aspects of environmental information described above. Since
information allows a person to understand, assess and only as a consequence of that to act, the
positive functions of environmental information are supportive rather than directly acting.52
Environmental information is thus only a means that allows other factors (such as the willingness
of informed citizens to take action in favour of the environment) to achieve a desired objective, as
environmental protection.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
D) The double nature of access to environmental information.
Access to environmental information can be analysed through two different perspectives:
either as a right or a technique.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
1)zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAA techni ue used for implementing environmental law principles.
A chronological analysis of the evolution of techniques use by environmental law in order
to achieve its goal of environmental protection," shows that initially only command and control
techniques were used (consisting of legislation laying down prohibitions and penalties for the
polluters that breach them). Later, came in techniques based on a voluntary co-operation of
industry and governmental agencies in charge of environmental protection, like agreements
between polluters and the government on pollution levels. Such agreements are voluntary
agreements, meaning that there is no legal obligation for polluters to follow them and no penalties
(criminal or administrative) are attached to their breach.
Access to information has been a technique that has been thoroughly used in order not only
to enhance and complement these techniques of environmental protection (both voluntary or not),
but also as a self-standing instrument.
The best example of environmental information being used as a complement of other
environmental protection techniques, is the example of environmental information registers
(examined in detail further on), which contain information on a specific area of environmental
activities. A good example is the planning register, which contains information related to planning
applications for a specific geographical area, which complements the main method provided in
English planning law for planning implementation and development control: the planning
permission system.
52 See CHona Kimber, above n. 37, at p. 140.
53 For a concise introduction of the development of environmental law see inter alia, S. Bell and D.
McGillivray in Ball and Bell on Environmental Law, Blackstone Press, 5th edition 2000, pp. 9-23.
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There are also instances where information has been used as a self-standing tool for
achieving environmental protection. This is the case for eco-labelling schemes that provide
information to consumers through labels affixed on products. Another example, are environmental
statements, prepared by private corporations under the Eco-Management and Audit scheme. 54
These environmental statements are like financial statements which represent the financial situation
of a company, but concern the environmental impact of the activities of a company and describe all
the actions taken in relation to the environment. A major difference is that there is no obligation for
companies to adopt such environmental reporting.
Moreover, environmental information can be seen as a self-standing regulatory instrument
as far as the environmental impact assessment regime is concerned, which places an obligation on
developers to produce an information statement on the possible impact of major projects to the
environment. The production of the "environment statement", a combination of the information
provided by the applicant and any representations made, is the end and the final objective of the
whole process. This statement then has to be taken into account by the decision-maker.
Finally, there is also the Strategic Impact Assessment Directive," which places the same
kind of obligations to assess possible environmental effects, upon regulatory bodies, whenever they
plan to enact a legislative or other regulatory rule.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
2) Access to environmental information as a right.
Apart from the above instances where access to environmental information is seen as a
technique used by environmental law in order to achieve a certain aim, it is also viewed as a self-
standing right for citizens.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIn this respect its justification m y be philosophical or political, just as a
right to life or freedom of expression can be viewed as an inherent right.
54 The Eco-Management and Audit Scheme, was initially established by Council Regulation (EEC) No
1836/93 of29 June 1993 and was originally restricted to companies in industrial sectors. This Regulation was
replaced by Regulation (EC) No 76112001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2001,
which opened the EMAS to all economic sectors including public and private services. In addition, EMAS
was strengthened by the integration of EN/ISO 14001 as the environmental management system required by
EMAS and by the adoption of an EMAS logo to signal EMAS registration to the public. Participation is
voluntary and extends to public or private organisations operating in the European Union and the European
Economic Area. See the EMAS Commission website at: http://europa.eu.intlcomm!environmentlemas
55 The Strategic Impact Assessment Directive (SEA) Directive 2001l42IEC (published in the OJ Ll97 of21
July 200 I, page 30), aims to allow for the assessment of the environmental consequences of certain plans and
programmes during their preparation and before their adoption (by almost exclusively public bodies). The
public and environmental authorities can thus give their opinion and all results are integrated and taken into
account in the course of the planning procedure. After the adoption of the plan or programme it also provides
that the public is informed about the decision and the way in which it was made: In the case of likely
transboundary significant effects the affected Member State and its public are informed and have the
possibility to make comments which are also integrated into the national decision making process. The SEA
Directive aims at helping to achieve the goal of sustainable development. It is not yet implemented in the UK
by specific legislation. See the Commission Environmental impact assessment website at:
http://europa.eu.intlcomm!environmentleialhome.htm . See also William R. Sheate, The EC Directive on
Strategic Environmental. Assessment: A Much-needed Boost for Environmental Integration, [2003] 12
E.E.L.R. 331; Anders S. Mathiesen, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in EC
Environmental Law: the Case of Certain Plans and Programmes, [2003] 2 E.E.L.R. 36
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So, regardless of whether access to environmental information can be a means to achieve
better environmental protection, citizens may be seen to have a right to be informed about certain
information that is vital for their well-being, their health and the environmental risks faced by them
(i.e. of dangerous pollution levels near their homes etc). Even if the law does not expressly set out
such a right, the right to access information may be founded or derived from other fundamental
human rights, such as the right to life and the right to enjoy a peaceful family life. Such a
dimension of environmental information cannot be overlooked, especially since, first, the UK has
incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights in its national law through the Human
Rights Act 1998, and second, because human rights are an integral part of the EC legal order, as
analysed in more detail further on.
Also, apart from this legal basis, a right to access information can also be founded on the
legislation consecrating such a right: the Freedom of Information Act 2000, since this Act creates a
general right to access information held by public bodies, it also as a result encompasses the right
to access environmental information, as it can be analysed as a component of the general right of
access. The general right to access information (thus the one which does not exclusively concerns
environmental information, such as the one consecrated by the FOIA 2000), aims not to protect the
government but to empower citizens in order to protect democracy. As said by Madison in a much-
quoted quotation:zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA"Knowledge will for ver govern ignorance. And a people who mean to be their
own governors, must arm themselves with the power knowledge gives. A popular government
without popular information or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy,
or perhaps both. ,,56 In this context, freedom of information can be linked with the democratic
process ideal, since access to information is necessary for effective political participation. It can
also be linked with the rule of law, since if legal standards are to limit administrative discretion,
then these standards have to be known. 57
In the UK, it is worth mentioning that the right to access information held by public bodies
has been linked with three major constitutional themes. First, it has been linked with the principle
of ministerial accountability (the Carltona principle), the question being whether ministerial
accountability can preclude freedom of information or actually require it. It has also been linked to
the principle of the neutrality of the civil service, since this principle might be affected if advice of
civil servants to the government is disclosed. Thirdly, it has been linked with the principle of
56 James Madison, 4th President of the U.S.A. (1809-1817), in a letter to Lieutenant Governor Barry of
Kentucky on 4 August 1822. Cited by Michael Supperstone, Timothy Pitt-Payne, The Freedom of
Information Act 2000, Butterworths 2001, at p. 1.
57 On the link between freedom of information and the three ideals of the administrative process, namely, the
rule of law, the public purpose ideal and the democratic process ideal, see Thomas D. Sargentich, "The
reform of the American Administrative Process: the contemporary debate" [1984] Winscosin Law Review
385, reprinted in Robert G. Vaughn (ed.), Freedom of Information, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000, as ChapterzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA1.
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effectiveness of governmental action and whether it is improved or not by increased freedom of
information. 58
Until now, we have referred to a "right" to access environmental information. We believe it
is correct to refer to a "right to access information" as opposed to a "freedom", since public
authorities are not just faced with a prohibition on their part from preventing the exercise of access
to information (as for instance when they are faced with issues concerning merely a "freedom"
such as the freedom of association), but they are also under a positive obligation to effectively
answer the request to information and thus actively fulfil the content of the right to access
information. It can be contended that when public authorities are faced with a "right" which is
invoked by a citizen, they are then not only under a duty to simply refrain from preventing its
effective exercise by the person concerned, but have to take positive steps to uphold it and to fulfil
it in the claimants interest. This distinction leads from the difference between a right and a
freedom, which (for present purposes) is that a right guarantees intervention by the state when
protection is required. On the contrary, a freedom guarantees no intervention by the state when an
individual exercises that freedom. S9 It is worth pointing out, that unlike say freedom of expression,
access to information is predominantly a positive right in that you require action on behalf of a
public body." A freedom in this context would be just a right to read information in your
possession.
In any case, authors seem to use either terms such as "freedom of information" or "right of
access to information" without explicitly distinguishing between them. In any case, the present
work would not be suited for a theoretical discussion of the differences between these terms, if any
in practice. Interestingly, empirical examination of articles and monographs in Europe suggests that
scholars from a common law background seem to refer to a "freedom" of access to information
and, on the contrary, scholars from a civil law tradition to a "right" to access information. This
difference is also striking when one examines statute law in various countries: in the UK there is
the "Freedom" of Information Act 2000, whereas in France it's about the law on the "right" to
access information, although both statutes are quite similar in their effects. Moreover, some
58 On these see Vernon Bogdanor, "Freedom of Information: the Constitutional aspects", Chapter 1 in
Andrew McDonald and Greg Terrill (eds.),zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAOpen gover ent - freedom of information and privacy,
Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998.
59 For a theoretical discussion on the differences between a right and a freedom, see Edwin ShortszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA& Claire
de Than, Human Rights Law in the UK, Sweet & Maxwell, London: 2001, Ch. 1 and the bibliography
mentioned at pp. 18-20. ..
60 In a report by the independent human rights organisation JUSTICE, Freedom of Information - a report by
Justice, chairman of Committee Anthony Lincoln, London 1978, it was said that: "'Freedom of Information'
is a misnomer. What we have to consider is in truth not a freedom at all (c.f. freedom of expression or
freedom of choice), but a right of access to official information and whether the public should enjoy such a
right and if so, within what limits. Now that the phrase has become universally accepted, it may appear
pedantic to criticize the use of the word 'freedom' in this context."
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American scholars also use the term of a "community right to know" when referring to freedom to
access information."
A possible explanation of why in common law countries the right to access information
held by public bodies is called a "freedom" rather than a "right", is because of the attempts by
American constitutional and administrative law theorists to find such a right in the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution on the Freedom of the press and expression. Their main
argument being that since without access to information any right to free speech is diminished as
there is nothing to speak about, a freedom to receive information from the government should be
inferred from the U.S. Constitution. However the U.S. Supreme Court has not adopted that there
can be a constitutional right of access to governmental information."zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
El Originality of our research.
In the last part of this introduction we shall explain the interest that our present work has
for the scientific community. In other words we shall explain, why there is a need of such a
research, and in what way it is original. In order to do this, we will review what has been done
before on the same subject, after what we shall explain the approach which we will adopt in
analysing the subject.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
1) Research review.
Environmental Information is a subject that can be analysed from different perspectives,
either a sociological, an economical orzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIi legal one.
The subject of environmental information has been extensively dealt with from non-legal
perspectives. As an example, just in this University since 1990 there has been an average of one
thesis per year submitted for Master's of Science in the Department of Information Science",
61 On the French system of access to information, see below the relevant chapter. On the American term of a
"community right to know", see the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986
(EPCRA) which is a US federal Act; see on this Act, Melinda Cosner,zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBACommunity right to know compliance
manual: Title III (SARA), J J Keller & Associates, 1999.
62 See Herbert N. Foerstel, Freedom of information and the right to know. the origins and applications of the
Freedom of Information Act, Westport, Conn .. London. Greenwood Press, 1999, at pp. 10-14. See also the
U.S. Supreme Court case of Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia 448 U.S. 555 (1980), where Chief Justice
Berger suggested that freedom of expression and speech "share a common core purpose of assuring freedom0/ communication on matters relating to the functioning of government' (at p. 575).
6 All of the following are thesis submitted for Master of Sciences to City University's Department of
Information Science:
Powell S., The development of an information service for the environment agency with a case study of the
Thames region. (2000).
Hanton F., Environmental information available to businesses. (1989)
Norman D., The Environmental Information Needs of the Public. (1990)
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On the contrary, as long as legal research is concerned, there is not any doctoral thesis in
the UK nor an up to date monograph" covering the subject. Of course, every book on
environmental law deals with the subject, but they do not provide an intensive or comprehensive
study. There are also monographs analysing access to environmental information, but they all adopt
a particular approach of dealing with the subject, either from the point of view of international
law", or EC law"zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
2) The approach chosen.
Consequently, since there is no work covering access to environmental information in a
thorough manner, combining both national, international and European legal rules on the topic and
dealing with the latest developments at international and European level, we think there is a need in
this area. The present study aims to cover this need.
In doing this, we do not claim to present the reader with a brand new theory. However our
work intends to be original in the way that it plans to combine in a single piece of work all the
aspects of the subject: both legal and non-legal. Moreover, with respect to the legal aspects of the
Osterloh K., Environmental Information for environmental managers. (1995)
McFadden L., Environmental Coverage in the National Press. (1991)
Hovell S., Evaluating World Wide Web search engines a modelzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA& testing using e vironmental information.
(1996)
Thompson C., The feasibility of a fee based environmental information service at Imperial College centre for
environmental technology library. (1984)
Kinnear C., Green information provision by environmental organisations. (1992)
Moye B., Local authorities and their use of environmental information. (1995)
De Silva D., Online databases and Cd-Roms as sources of environmental information. (1994)
Tippet T., Online retrieval of environmental information: a comparative study. (1992)
Ostle B., Qualitative research into public environmental information needs in relation to attitudes and
motivation (1991)
Morgan R., The role and effectiveness of information in encouraging environmental concerns and action.
(1995)
Owe P., A study of environmental reporting in the UK press.( 1998)
Rose K., The use of environmental and 'green' information source by businesses. (1989)
Bull K, The usefulness of environmental newsletters. (1990)
Favarato G., Web search engines: an evaluation of their performance in retrieving environmental
information, changes between 1996 and 1998 and current trend. (1999)
64 There is a single monograph by Gisele Bakkenist,zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAEn ironmental Information: Law, Policy and
Experience, Cameron May 1994, which is out of date as it does not include any of the ECJ or UK case-law
mentioned in the present study.
65 See the trilingual book: Christine Latssen (ed.), Dix ans d'acces Ii l'information en matiere d'environnement
en droit international, europeen et interne: Bilan et perspectives - Tien jaar toegang tot milieu-informatie
naar internationaal, europees en intern recht : balans en perspectieven - Ten years of access to environmental
information in international, European and Belgian law: stock-taking and perspectives, Bruylant, Brussels
2003.
66 Hallo Ralph (ed.), Access to Environmental information in Europe: The implementation and implications
of Directive 90/3131EEC, Kluwer, 1996.
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subject, we intend to analyse them in regard of not only national law, but also international," EC
law and also the law of the European Convention on Human Rights.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
In other words, we shall be trying to write a synthesis that has never been done before.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
3) Scope of our examination and aim.
The present work intends to be first and foremost an analytical work. We shall be
examining in detail the legal instruments (both statute law and case-law) which create directly or
indirectly a right for individuals in the UK to access information relating to the environment. We
shall try to be as exhaustive as possible and cover all such legal mechanisms. However, we shall
limit our examination to legal instruments that allow access to primary sources of information and
not to secondary sources. The difference between primary sources of information and secondary
ones, as suggested by Rowan-RobinsonzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAet al.,68 is that a primary source of information holds
information in its original form, whether a secondary source takes the information produced by the
primary and recycles it for the benefit of others like for instance in a newspaper etc. As he suggests,
the distinction is really more convenient than rigorous, however we shall adopt it for present
purposes, as our examination aims to concentrate on the specific legal instruments that regulate
access to environmental information and not to adopt a wider approach that would have
encompassed rules like the freedom of the press, which are too remotely connected with the core
subject of this work.
More importantly, all along this work I will focus on the primary objective of freedom of
environmental information legislation, which is the protection of the environment. This is the
central idea of this work and underpins every part of it. The purpose of the right of access to
environmental information is to protect the environment by using informed citizens as means of
pressure on public authorities and private companies. This can be contrasted with the general right
of access to information held by public authorities, which, even if can lead to the indirect protection
of the environment or of other interests, is an end in itself (a right per se recognised to individuals).
This essential difference between these two rights is concretized in the one exemption from
communication which all the relevant freedom of environmental information instruments contain.
This relates to all information the disclosure of which would make it more likely that the
67 According to Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (lCJ) the main sources of
international law, which article 38 directs the ICJ to apply, are: (a) international conventions (or treaties),
whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognised by States; (b) international custom, as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (c) the general principles of law recognised by civilised
nations; and (d) judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various
nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of law. Nevertheless, our analysis of
international law will exclusively cover treaty-law, because in the field of the right to access to
environmental information, it seems that the other sources of international law do not yet have a significant
role to play.
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environment (to which such material relates) would be damaged. As we shall see, a conflict might
arise between general freedom of information legislation and the right to access environmental
information, due to the fact that the ultimate goal of this right is environmental protection through
the provision of information." However, at the same time, the requirement of environmental
protection must be taken into account and the national decision makers must be ready to sacrifice
part of the general right of access in order to allow the right of access to environmental information
to fulfil its role fully and to effectively protect the environment. Thus, we shall also be speaking
about a possible conflict between general freedom of information legislation and specific rules on
environmental information. Since the scope of general freedom of information legislation is much
wider than the scope of specific legislation on the provision of environmental information, this
could lead to the following result: as the scope of environmental information widens, the scope of
general freedom of information will, as a consequence, become more restricted, since the former
stems from EC and international law, while the latter is primarily based on national legislative
provisions. So, we shall also examine the differences between general freedom of information
legislation and rules on environmental information, since the goal of environmental protection can
compete with the goal of general freedom of information legislation. Thus, we shall also examine
the provisions of the Freedom ofInformation Act 2000. This Act created a general right for anyone
to consult and receive copies of almost any information held by public bodies, although some
exemptions apply. This Act does not repeal the Environmental Information regulations or any other
special provisions providing access to specific environmental information (like public registers). In
fact, section 39 of the Act provides that environmental information is not included under the scope
of this statute. Consequently, we will be also describing the overlap (if there is any) between
general freedom of information legislation and provisions on access to environmental
information."
In addition, we will thoroughly examine the provisions of the Environmental Information
Regulations 1992 and of the new 2004 Regulations." As a consequence we will also analyse the
provisions of EC DirectivezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA90/313 on the freedom of access to environmental information, which
was transposed into UK law by the Environmental Information Regulations 1992, and of Directive
2003/4 which has replaced the 1990 Directive and has been transposed by the 2004 Environmental
Information Regulations. We will also examine the provisions of the 1998 Aarhus international
Convention which grants the public rights and imposes on Parties and public authorities obligations
regarding access to information and public participation and access to justice in environmental
68 See J. Rowan-Robinson et al., Public access to Environmental Information: a means to what end?, [1996]
JEL 19, at p. 20.
69 See below, p. 160 and also p. 301.
70 See below, viii) Information prejudicial to the environment, at p. 160.
71 The EC Directive 90/313IEEC on public access to environmental information has been implemented in the
UK through the Environmental Information Regulations 1992, as amended by the Environmental Information
Regulations 1998. The 2003/4IEC Directive on public access to environmental information and repealing
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matters. We will be analysing the provisions of the Aarhus convention concerning access to
environmental information and examine how they combine with the aforementioned UK and EC
legislation on the subject.
More specifically, we shall examine the legal rules dealing with public registers, which are
official compilations of certain specific sort of information required by legislation to be maintained
by public authorities and to be open to public inspection. UK law has for a long time used public
registers as a means of making information accessible to the general public. Public registers
containing environmental information are definitely one of the means that allow the public to have
access to data on the environment and are also important since they were the earliest instruments
regulating, albeit in a very restricted manner, access to environmental information.
Apart from the description of all of the above instruments using all reported case-law, we
shall also adopt a wider approach, by examining the relationship between environmental
information and human rights. The main question we shall try to answer in this respect, is whether
access to environmental information can be qualified as a fundamental right and if so to what
extent. We shall also examine the opposite situation: can access to environmental information be
limited by human rights considerations, even if it is viewed as a fundamental human right, and if so
to what extent?zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
4) Boundaries of our examination
Because it is not possible in this work to treat extensively with every issue that is related to
the right to access environmental information, it is necessary to limit the extent of our work so as to
concentrate on the core parts of the subject. Consequently, two limitations should be placed from
the beginning to our analysis. The first one concerns the difference between active and passive
access to information, and the second one concerns the right to access information held by EC
institutions.
a) Active and passive access to information
The second limitation of our examination, concerns the distinction between active and
passive access to information. Passive access concerns the right of the public to seek information
from public authorities and the obligation of public authorities to provide information in response
to a request. Active access, concerns the right of the public to receive information and the
Council DirectivezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA90/3131EEC, has been implementedzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAin England, Wales and Northern Ireland by the
Environmental Information Regulations 2004.
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obligation of authorities to actively collect and disseminate information of public interest without
the need for a specific request. We shall only examine passive access to information, as relevant
legislative instruments (such as the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and the Environmental
Information Directive and the Regulations) almost exclusively deal with this kind of access, where
a request has to be addressed to the holder of the information, before access to it is granted.
Nevertheless, we shall also examine in detail the relevant legislative provisions on public registers
containing environmental information, since, as we shall see, the provision on public registers are
relevant to both passive and active access to information.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
b)zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAThe right to access information held by the
European Union institutions.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
It is clear from what precedes, that we will include in the scope of our analysis EC law and
especially the 1990 and 2003 Environmental Information Directives. However, for the sake of
completeness it should be noted that EC law also includes the special rules that grant access to
documents of the EC institutions. These rules are of general applicability and do not only concern
environmental information, but any kind of information. We shall only describe them at this point
summarily, as they only indirectly relate to the subject of the present thesis, which is the right to
access environmental information."
A first point to note, is that although the EC imposed in the early 90s an obligation on
member states to grant the right to access environmental information via the 1990 Environmental
Information Directive, there was no such binding right of access to information held by the EC
institutions. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty only contained a non-binding declaration (declaration no.
17) which stressed the importance of transparency and said that:zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA"The Conference considers that
transparency of the decision-making process strengthens the democratic nature of the institutions
and the public's confidence in the administration." This led to the adoption of a joint Code of
Conduct by the Commission and the Council" and setting out the principle that the widest possible
72 Of course, it should be acknowledged that the EC institutions do hold information relating to the
environment, see on this point Kramer Ludwig, Access to Letters of Formal Notice and Reasoned Opinions
in Environmental Law Matters, [2003] European Environmental Law Review 197. For more details on the
rules on access to the EC institution's documents, see inter alia John Macdonald and Clive H Jones, The Law
of Freedom of Information, Oxford University Press, 2003, at 763-780. See also the online case study by
Tony Bunyan, Secrecy and openness in the European Union - the ongoing struggle for freedom of
information, Statewatch September 30,2002, at http://www.freedominfo.orglcase/eustudy/
73 Code of conduct concerning public access to Council and Commission documents 931730IEC, OJ L 340,
31112/1993 p. 41.
access to documents should be granted to the public. This Code was implemented by the Council
and the Commission through separate but similar decisions."
Under these instruments, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the Court of First
Instance (CFI) have rendered some very interesting judgements in which they established
principles that today can either be found in the 2003 Environmental Information Directive or also
in the ECJ case-law interpreting the 1990 Environmental Information Directive.
First, although the Community rules did not provide for partial access to documents when
confidential information could be separated from information that could be disclosed, the ECJ and
the CFI did establish such a principle. The ECJ in thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAHautala case," on an appeal from the CFI,
considered that this principle of partial access was a consequence of the proportionality principle.
This principle of partial access was also reaffirmed in the CFI case of Kuijer v Council," In this
case, the Court also added that in exceptional cases a derogation from this principle can be
possible, where the administrative burden of blanking out the confidential parts is so heavy, that it
exceeds the limits of what can be reasonably required. This last case is also important because the
CFI stressed the principle of transparency, which "is intended to secure a more significant role for
citizens in the decision-making process and to ensure that the administration acts with greater
propriety, efficiency and responsibility vis-a-vis the citizens in a democratic system. It helps to
strengthen the principle of democracy and respect for fundamental rightsr" This can be linked to
the fact that the principle of access to documents of the EC institutions has now been elevated to
the rank of a fundamental right of the EC, since it has been expressly included in article 42 of the
2000 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union"
Second, in the case of Carvel and Guardian Newspapers Ltd v Council." the CFI held that
when the EC institutions (in the present case the Council) exercise their discretion to disclose the
requested documents, they have to apply a genuine balance test between the interest of the public in
gaining access and the interests of the institutions in maintaining confidentiality. Also, the Court
held that the institutions are obliged to exercise their discretion to grant or refuse access and cannot
simply deny the citizens' right to access by refusing to exercise their discretion.
Moreover, the case of Svenska Journalistforbundet v Council" is important, because the
CFI held that the institutions were under a duty to state the reasons for their refusal in some details,
and that a mere repetition of the applicable exception is not enough, as in such a case it is not
74 Council Decision of 20 December 1993 on public access to Council documents 9317311EC OJ L 340
31/12/1993 p. 43. Commission Decision of 8 February 1994 on public access to Commissiod document~
94/90IECSC, EC, Euratom, OJzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAL 046, 18/02/1994 p. 58.
75 Council of the European Union v Heidi Hautala, Case C-353/99, [2001] ECR 1-09565.
76 Aldo Kuijer v Council of the European Union, Case T-211100, [2002] ECR 11-00485.
77 Ibid, at par. 52.
78 Now renumbered as article 11-42 of the Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, OJ C 169, 18
July 2003.
79 John Carvel and Guardian Newspapers Ltd v Council of the European Union, Case T-194/94, [1995] ECR
11-2765. See also the case ofzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAalii Mattila v Counci of the European Union and Commission of the European
Communities, Case C-353/01 P, 22 January 2004.
80 Svenska Journalistforbundet v Council of the European Union, Case T-174/95, [1998] ECR 11-2289.
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possible for the applicant to defend his interests and for the Community courts to exercise their
jurisdiction to review the validity of the decision.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
In the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty a new Article 191a (now renumbered as Article 255) was
added to the EC Treaty. This article establisheszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA"a right of access to European Parliament, Council
and Commission documents ... ". However, a Declaration was added in the Amsterdam Treaty,
which limits this right by asserting the right of a member state to request that a document
originating from it cannot be released without its permission. This article was implemented through
RegulationzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA1049/2001 of 30 May 2001,81 which grants a right of access to European Parliament,
Council and Commission documents to any Union citizen and to any natural or legal person
residing, or having its registered office, in a Member State. This new regulation replaces, with
effect from 3 December 2001, the previous Code and Decisions on public access to Commission
and Council documents, which therefore cease to apply. The new regulation is implemented by
internal rules drawn up for this purpose by the individual institutions."
On the whole, regulation 1049/2001 follows the same lines as the earlier Decisions it
replaces. The right of access is to documents and the definition of a "document" is a broad one and
no category of documents is excluded a priori from the right of access, including classified
documents. Refusal to grant access must be based on one of the exceptions provided for in the
regulation and must be justified on the grounds that disclosure of the document would be harmful.
Refusal is justified where disclosure could undermine the protection of:
- the public interest (as regards public security, defence and military matters, international
relations, or the financial, monetary or economic policy of the Community or a Member State), or
- privacy and the integrity of the individual, in particular in accordance with Community
legislation regarding the protection of personal data.
Also, unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure, refusal is justified where
disclosure could undermine the protection of:
- the commercial interests of a specific natural or legal person, including
intellectual property;
- court proceedings and legal advice;
- the purpose of inspections, investigations and audits.
81Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding
Eublic access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, OJ L 145 , 31105/2001 p. 43.
2 These instruments are: Joint declaration relating to Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and
Commission documents (OJ L 145 of 31.5.2001, p. 43), OJ L 173 ,27/06/2001 p. 5; Bureau Decision on
public access to European Parliament documents, OJ C 374 , 2911212001 p. 1; Council Decision of 29
November 2001 amending the Council's Rules of Procedure, 2001l8401EC, OJ L 313 , 30/1112001 p. 40;
Commission Decision of 5 December 2001 amending its rules of procedure (notified under document number
C(2001) 3714), 2001l937IEC,ECSC,Euratom, OJ L 345 , 29/12/2001 p. 94. Also, Regulation 104912001 is
made applicable to documents held by the European Environment Agency, through Regulation (EC) No
164112003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 July 2003 amending Council Regulation
(EEC) No 1210/90 on the establishment of the European Environment Agency and the European
Environment Information and Observation Network, OJ L 245,29/09/2003 p. 1.
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InzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAaddition, unless t er is an overriding public interest in disclosure, refusal is also
justified where such disclosure could seriously undermine the institution's decision-making process
in respect of any document:
- drawn up by the institution for internal use or received by it, which relates to a matter
where the decision has not yet been taken;
- containing opinions for internal use as part of deliberations and preliminary consultations
within the institution, even after the decision has been taken.
The principle of partial access in included, as if only parts of the document are covered by
any of these exceptions, the remaining parts of the document have to be released. Moreover, if the
requested document originated with a third party, the institution may consult that person or body
before deciding whether to release the document. Similarly, a member state may request the
institution not to disclose a document originating from it without its prior agreement.
Access has to be granted, or reasons for the refusal have to be provided in 15 days. If
access is refused, the applicant can ask the institution to reconsider its decision, by sending a
written request (confirmatory application) within 15 working days following receipt of the
institution's reply or expiry of the time limit if the institution has failed to reply. The institution
then has 15 working days within which to change or confirm its decision. If the refusal is
confirmed, then the institution has to give details of how to pursue the appeal further, by either
submitting a complaint to the European Ombudsman or bringing an appeal before the Court of First
Instance.
It should be noted that even confidential and classified documents are accessible under the
30 year rule, which states that all documents or files which have been closed for more than 30 years
are accessible to the public, under the special rules on Historical Archives of the institutions.f'
Moreover, a very interesting point concerns the relationship between the EC regulation on
access to EC institution's documents and the national legislation on access to information (like the
FOIA 2000 in England and also the Environmental Information Regulations). This is important
since member states and the EC exchange information between them, and thus an applicant might
try to bypass a refusal to provide infonnation by an EC institution by submitting the same request
to a member state, or vice-versa." This is especially true in the field of environmental information,
since under some pieces of EC legislation, member states are under a duty to provide
environmental information to the Commission."
83 This is the Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom) NozyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA354/83 of 1 February 1983 concerning the opening to
the public of the historical archives of the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy
Community, OJ L 043 , 15/02/1983 p. 1, as amended by Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 170012003 of
22 September 2003 amending Regulation (EEC, Euratom) No 354183 concerning the opening to the public of
the historical archives of the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community,
OJ L 243 , 27/09/2003 p. 1.
84 As demonstrated by the facts in the Svenska Journalistforbundet v Council case, see above n. 80.
85 See Council Directive 911689IEEC of 12 December 1991 on hazardous waste, OJ L 377 , 3111211991 p.
20. It is important to note that if a member state fails to provide to the Commission the requested
45
Article 5 of the Regulation provides that where a member state receives a request to
disclose a document in its possession originating in an EC institution, the member state concerned
shall consult with the institution concerned in order to take a decision that does not jeopardise the
attainment of the objective of the Regulation, except if it is clear whether the document could have
been disclosed or not under the Regulation. Alternatively, the member state may transfer the
request to the institution concerned. This provision is in conformity with recital 15 of the
Regulation, which provides that, although the object and effect of the Regulation is not to amend
national legislation on access to documents, under the principle of loyal co-operation between the
EC and member states, the member state should take care not to hamper the proper application of
the Regulation.
A final point to note, is that the Aarhus Convention is undeniably applicable to the EC
institutions. This is because article 2 of it provides that the Convention applies to the institutions of
regional economic integration organisations parties to the Convention and constituted by sovereign
States members of the UNECE, if these States have transferred to them their competence over
matters governed by the Convention, exactly like the European Community, which has signed the
Aarhus Convention and thus its provisions bind its institutions." Thus, it would be interesting to
examine whether the current EC Regulation on access to EC institution's documents complies with
the Aarhus provisions on access to information. It seems that this is not the case, as the EC is
currently amending Regulation 1049/2001 as far as environmental information is concerned in
order to align it with the Aarhus convention, through a Proposal for a Regulation applying the
provisions of the Aarhus Convention."
This proposal provides that Regulation 1049/2001 will continue to apply to any request for
access to environmental information held by Community institutions and bodies, but without
discrimination as to the citizenship, nationality, domicile or registered seat of the applicant. This is
more liberal than what the regulation provides for non-environmental information. It should be
noted that the initial Proposal does not provide for many substantive changes to this Regulation,
except that the right of access is granted in relation to all EC institutions and bodies which perform
information, then this can result in enforcement action in front of the ECJ, as demonstrated inzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBACommission of
the European Communities v Hellenic Republic, Case C-33/01, [2002] ECR 1-05447.
86 Although the EC has signed the Aarhus Convention, technically it is not yet bound by it, as it has not yet
ratified it. To this end, the commission has presented a Proposal for a Council Decision on the conclusion,
on behalf of the European Community, of the Convention on access to information, public participation in
decision making and access to justice regarding environmental matters, 24/10/2003, COM(2003) 625 final.
Available from http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/aarhus/zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
87 See the Commission's Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
application of the provisions of the Arhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in
Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to EC institutions and bodies, 24/10/2003,
COM(2003) 622 final. This proposal will apply the three "pillars" of the Aarhus Convention - access to
information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters - to the
European Community institutions and bodies. Existing provisions in these matters (like Regulation
1049/2001) are taken into account and amended to the extent necessary to comply with the Convention's
requirements. This proposal is currently undergoing the Community legislation-making process.
public functions and not just the ones covered by the Regulation."zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIn addi ion t conforming with
this Regulation, Community institutions and bodies will have to organise environmental
information in their field of competency and make it systematically accessible to the public,
particularly in databases disseminated by computer telecommunications or by other electronic
means. These databases or registers should include reports on the implementation of Treaties,
international Conventions or agreements, Community legislation, national or local legislation,
measures, plans and programmes relating to the environment, reports on the state of the
environment, data derived from the monitoring of activities affecting the environment,
authorisations affecting the environment, environmental impact studies and risk assessments. Also,
it is provided that environmental information made available for public consultation must be up-to-
date, accurate and comparable. To this end, Community institutions and bodies must inform the
public, if requested to do so, on the methods of analysis, sampling and measurement procedures
used in compiling the information. Furthermore, is included a duty to transfer requests not only
between community institutions but also to national authorities, whenever a Community institution
or body receives a request for access to environmental information which it does not hold. When
doing this, the institution must inform the applicant, as promptly as possible, of the Community
institution or body or the member state's public authority which holds the information requested.
Finally, it is provided that in the event of an imminent threat to human health or the environment,
Community institutions and bodies must collaborate with the public authorities concerned in order
to disseminate without delay to the public all information which could prevent or mitigate harm
arising from the threat.
Although this Commission's proposal does not modify very much RegulationzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA1049/2001,
the European Parliament has proposed amendments to it that go much further in integrating the
Aarhus convention in this Regulation and thus in aligning the access to environmental information
regime of the EC institutions with the access to information regime that the EC has imposed on
member states through the 2003/4IEC Environmental Information Directive. It remains to be seen
what position will prevail in the end."zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
5) Justification of a comparative approach
88 For instance, EC bodies not covered by the Regulation 1049/2001 but which perform public functions are
the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions, the Court of Auditors, the
European Investment Bank. Still, bodies acting in a legislative or judicial capacity are excluded, in
conformity with the provisions of the Aarhus Convention.




In the present thesis there will be two different forms of comparisons. First, we will be
comparing side by side the relevant provisions of UK law, together with relevant EC and
international law.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIn this respect, we will be ex mining whether, on the one hand, the UK has
correctly implemented its EC and international law obligations and, on the other hand, whether EC
law itself has correctly followed international law. It should be noted that as far as UK law is
concerned we shall mainly analyse the law of England and Wales and only mention the equivalent
provisions of Scottish and Northern Irish law, since their provisions closely follow the English
rules.
Second, we will also adopt a comparative law approach, in the sense that we will be using
the comparative law method in order to examine the way the EC environmental information
directives have been implemented in France."
As far as the comparative law method that will be used is concerned, we shall limit our
analysis to the written legal rules transposing the EC environmental information directives in
France and in England. There is no real need for us to extend on French case-law, because this is an
area ofEC law, in which due to the principle of supremacy ofEC law, it is ECJ case-law that takes
precedence and this will be covered in the present thesis elsewhere."
Apart from this difference, we shall be following the almost universally accepted
comparative law method elaborated by Zweigert and Kotz." This method can be summarised as
follows: one starts with identifying a legal question he wants to examine; then proceeds to treat it
comparatively; then critically evaluates any discoveries made; and finally draws conclusions. These
conclusions, that stem from the application of the comparative law method, are very important as
they allow the researcher to enhance the understanding of his own legal system by learning new
ways of approaching the same question." This in itself can justify using the comparative method in
the present thesis.
It is also important to explain why France was chosen in order to apply the comparative
law method. It can be contended that it is interesting to see how a civil law country like France has
approached the problem presented by the transposition of the EC environmental information
directives, as opposed to what has taken place in England, a common law jurisdiction. Although
one could argue that the distinction between civil law and common law legal systems is not valid
when public law is concerned," it is still very interesting to compare these two countries because,
as we shall see further on in the relevant chapter, they have transposed the same directives in totally
different ways. This difference is even more interesting to be analysed, if one takes into
90 See below Chapter 4, pp. 278 - 295.
91 See below, pp. 55 - 59.
92 See Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz,zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIntrod ction to comparative law, (translated from German by Tony
Weir), 3rdedition 1998, Oxford: Clarendon Press, Chapter 3, pp. 32 -47.
93 Ibid., at p. 46.
94 Of course, it should be acknowledged that the grouping of legal systems into legal families (like the in the
common law and civil law legal family) is something highly relative and some of these divisions may be
valid only for private law and not for public law. See Zweigert and Kotz, abov~ n. 92, at p. 65.
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consideration the fact that both France and the UK not only are members of the European Union,
but are also signatory states to the ECHR and thus, one could logically expect both countries to
have adopted similar solutions on a matter like environmental information, which involves issues
of both EC and ECHR law.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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CHAPTER 1) The content of the right to access environmental
information as guaranteed by international law. EC law and UK
national lawzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
In this chapter we shall be examining in detail the legal provisions that are applicable in
England and which guarantee a general right to obtain environmental information held by public or
assimilated bodies. As we already discussed in the introduction, there are different legal rules
creating such a right both at national, international and at EC level. At international level it is the
Aarhus Convention of 25 June 1998 onzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAAccess to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters which establishes such a right. At EC level
it is the Directives 90/313IEEC and 2003/4IEC on public access to environmental information, and
at national law it is the Environmental Information Regulations 1992 as amended in 1998 and the
2004 Environmental Information Regulations, which also implement these Directives into British
law. It is also interesting to mention that the EC environmental information directives do not only
extend to the EC member states, but also to all the states members of the European Economic
AgreementzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA(EEA).9s
Instead of examining all these legal instruments separately, we shall be examining their
provisions side by side. This method has the advantage of avoiding any repetition between the
various aspects of the right to access environmental information, since the provisions of these legal
instruments are for the most part of them quite identical. Examining in parallel these legal
instruments will also have the advantage of allowing us to determine whether the new EC Directive
on environmental information conforms to the Aarhus Convention (since the 2003 Directive aims
not only to replace the older Directive 90/313IEEC but also to transpose into EC law the
information provisions of the Aarhus Convention) and whether the 2004 English regulations
transposing this Directive conform to its requirements. Of course, it should be noted that the
Aarhus Convention has not yet been ratified by Britain, though as the Government has widely
suggested" it plans to ratify it in due time and it has been making efforts to adapt English law to its
requirements. In any case the understanding of the Aarhus Convention is necessary since the
European Union has taken it into consideration when drafting the provisions of the 2003
Information Directive.
9S This is because the term "Member States" contained in these directives is to be understood to include, in
addition to its meaning in the relevant EC acts, Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden and
Switzerland, according to the Agreement on the European Economic Area - Annex .xx - Environment - List
provided/or in Article 74, OJ L 1,03/0111994 p. 494. Amended in order to include the 2003/4IEC directive
by the Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No 12312003 of 26 September 2003 amending Annex XX
(Environment) to the EEA Agreement, OJ L 331, 18/12/2003 p. 50.
96 See New draft Environmental Information Regulations: Public consultation, _DEFRA, July 2002, at page 2.
50
Our analysis will also be illustrated by all of the relevant case law both of the European
Court of Justice and of British national Courts so as to have a complete understanding of the legal
mechanisms in place.
Before initiating the parallel examination of these legal instruments, we shall briefly
examine their historical background and also we shall examine what is their place in British law.
After that, we shall examine their provisionszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAin detail.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
A) Binding legal instruments guaranteeing a general right to access environmental
information.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
1) The Aarhus Convention
The 1998 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters introduces new procedural safeguards aiming at
protecting the environment." The Convention imposes on public authorities three main obligations;
first to provide and facilitate access to environmental information to the general public; second to
involve the public in the decision-making process on environmental issues, and third to guarantee
access to justice for individuals and other legal persons in both cases of a breach of environmental
law or of provisions of the convention. Although these three 'pillars' of the convention are closely
related with each other, the EC (as a signatory of the Convention)" is aiming at implementing them
through separate legal instruments." The Convention is divided to six parts: the preamble, general
provisions (art. 3), access to information (art. 4 and 5), public participation in decision-making (art.
6, 7 and 8), access to justice (art. 9) and the final provisions (art. 10 to 22). The preamble recalls
the origins of the Convention, and sets the aims of the Convention. The preamble specifies two
ideas: the link between environmental rights and human rights and the promotion of sustainable
development by public authorities. The general provisions describe the objective, lay down some
principles and definitions which apply to the whole Convention and also impose certain obligations
on states,. More specifically, article 3 compels parties to introduce and undertake such legislative,
enforcement or other measures that would establish a framework for the implementation of the
97 For the historical backgrounds that led to the adoption of the Aarhus Convention and most importantly the
UNECE draft charter of environmental rights and obligations, adopted by the qualified intergovernmental
meeting at Oslo on 31 October 1990, see Stephen Stec, Susan Casey-Lefkowitz, Jerzy JendroskazyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAThe Aarhus
Convention: an Implementation Guide, Economic Commission for Europe, United Nations Publications:
New York and Geneva 2000, pp. 1-4. Also available online at http://www.unece.orglenv/pp/acig.htm
98 The EC signed the Convention following article17 of the Convention which provides that regional
economic integration organisations can become parties to it. The EC has powers to sign International
conventions and agreements relevant to its sphere of competencies, in this case the protection of the
Environment. On the external competencies of the EC see Paul Craig and Grainne De BUTca,EC law text,
cases and materials, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2003, 3rd ed, pp. 128-131.
99 See http://europa.eu.intlcomm!environmentlaarhus/index.htm
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Convention. In this work, as mentioned before, we shall focus exclusively on the information
provisions of the Convention.
The Convention is applicable not only to EC institutions themselves, but the EC also takes
it into consideration when drafting new legal instruments concerning matters covered by it. 100
Consequently, the EC, when examining the proposal for a new Environmental Information
Directive has taken into consideration the Convention's provisions, as expressed by the declaration
the EC made when it signed the Convention according to which:zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA'the Community also eclares that
the Community institutions will apply the Convention within the framework of their existing and
future rules on access to documents and other relevant rules of Community law in thefield covered
by the Convention'zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA.101
A very interesting aspect of the Convention is also that the Preamble to the Convention
provides a clear link between environmental rights and human rights by stating that 'adequate
protection of the environment is essential to human well-being and the enjoyment of basic human
rights, including right to life itself' and also that 'every person has the right to live in an
environment adequate to his or her health and well-being' .102 It then connects this right with the
rights of access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in
environmental matters. However, it is also interesting to note that the United Kingdom government
when it signed the Aarhus Convention, expressly refused to recognise that these provisions were
consecrating a general right to a healthy environment and considered in a Declaration annexed to it
that if the convention recognised any environmental human rights, these rights were confined to the
procedural rights of access to information, public participation and access to justice in
environmental matters.I'"
The Aarhus convention itself entered into force on the 30 October 2001, but as far as EC
states are concerned, it has as yet been ratified, and therefore binding, only in a minority of EC
member states.'?' The majority of states (including Britain) have decided not to ratify the
Convention immediately, but to wait and implement it through the European Directive that will
replace the Directive 90/313. Consequently, the Convention is not yet binding on the British
100 See Vera Rodenhoff, The Aarhus Convention and its implications for the "institutions" of the European
Community, 11(3) R.E.C.I.E.L. 2002, 343-357. The author examines all of the Convention's pillars (access
to information, public participation and access to justice) and deals with their implications for the EC
institutions.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
!O1 See http://www.unece.org/env/pp/ctreaty.htm
102 This statement is the first express recognition of the right to a healthy environment in an international
instrument in the European region, a right that is not expressly provided by the ECHR as explained in the
relevant chapter on Human Rights and Environmental Information,
!O3 In a Declaration made upon signature the British government stated that: 'The United Kingdom
understands the references in article 1 and the seventh preambular paragraph of this Convention to the "right"
of every person ''to live in an environment adequate to his or her health and well-being" to express an
aspiration which motivated the negotiation of this Convention and which is shared fully by the United
Kingdom. The legal rights which each Party undertakes to guarantee under article 1 are limited to the rights
of access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental
matters in accordance with the provisions of this Convention' .
104 Information about the status of ratification of the Aarhus Convention can be found on the UNECE's
website at the address: http://www.unece.org/env/pp/ctreaty.htm .
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government,zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAlOS however it has een taken into consideration when drafting the revised regime of
the Environmental Information Regulations.
Finally, the Convention has been criticised for the methods it contains for ensuring
compliance.l" The Convention does not provide for a mechanism that would allow individuals or
other organisations to complain or even lodge claims to a supra-national body (such as to the
ECtHR in Europe). It should always be kept in mind that the Aarhus Convention is an international
legal instrument and thus has no direct effect in national British law, unlike the position with EC
law which has been directly incorporated into UK law.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
2) The ECzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAEnvironmental Information Directive
a) Legislative history and overview.
The historic basis for Directive 90/313IEEC were laid in 1985, by a draft-resolution of the
European Parliament, which invited the Commission to draft a proposal for legislation concerning
the right to receive environmental information.l'" Such a proposal was drafted in 1988108 and after
consultation of the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, the 1990
Directive was adopted by the Council on the 7th June 1990. The legal basis of this Directive was
the procedure of article 130S of the EEC Treaty, which concern the competencies of the EEC
concerning environmental protection. This is consistent with the preamble of the 1990 Directive,
which mentions that 'access to information on the environment held by public authorities will
improve environmental protection'. The link between access to information and environmental
protection is not explained, though -the 2003 Directive in its preamble address this issue by
mentioning that 'Increased public access to environmental information and the dissemination of
such information contribute to a greater awareness of environmental matters, a free exchange of
views, more effective participation by the public in environmental decision-making and, eventually,
to a better environment.' It is interesting to note, that the 2003 Directive mentions that increased
transparency will 'eventually' contribute to a better environment, whereas the 1990 Directive
mentioned that access to information 'will' improve environmental protection. Thus, certainty over
the goals of the Directive seems to have been replaced by a mere possibility.
105 It should be noted that in British law, international Conventions are not part of national law until they are
expressly incorporated by a specific legislativeprovision, since the UK is a dualist country.
106 See J. Ebbesson, The Notion of Public Participation in International Environmental Law, 8 Yearbook of
International Environmental Law (1997) 51, at 96.
107European Parliament, 1985. Resolution Document B2-736/85 of 16 July 1985, introduced by Ken Collins,
MEP (UK) and Beate Weber, MEP (Germany).
108 Proposal for a Council Directive on the freedom of access to information on the environment,
COMl88/484 FINAL, 28/11188, OJ C 335,30/12/1988 p. 5.
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Environmental protection was not, however, the only aim of these Directives. As they both
indicate in their preamble, they also aim to ensure equal conditions of competition in the common
market aszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA'Disparities between the laws in force in the Member States concerning access to
environmental information held by public authorities can create inequality within the Community
as regards access to such information [and/jor as regards conditions of competition'.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIn this
context environmental information is viewed as a good that has a certain financial value and that
can be bought and sold.l'"
The 1990 Directive provided at article 8 that four years after entering into force, Member
States would have to report to the commission on the experience gained and on the basis of these
national reports the Commission would make a report to the European Parliament and to the
Council incorporating proposals for revision."? This report identified shortcomings in the 1990
Directive and included a proposal aiming at amending the Directive. III
This proposal was based on the procedure provided for at Article 175(1) of the EC
Treaty'" and justified the revision of the 1990 Directive on three grounds. The first of these
grounds were to correct the shortcomings of the 1990 Directive (concerning mainly the imprecise
definitions of environmental information and public bodies; the wide-ranging list of exemptions to
disclosure; costs and time-limits) taking into account the Aarhus Convention. The second ground
was the alignment of the proposal to the relevant provisions of the Aarhus Convention so as to
enable the Community to ratify that Convention, and the third one to adapt the 1990 Directive to
developments in computerised information technologies which saw in the 90s the booming of the
internet and wireless communications.!"
The 2003 Directive as adopted, has fulfilled most thoroughly the second of these aims as
its provisions were drafted and amended in a way as to stay as closely as possible in strict
conformity with the provisions of the Aarhus convention. As a consequence, the 2003 Directive
departs significantly from the provisions of the 1990 Directive and we shall analyse in detail these
differences further on. Generally speaking, the major improvement over the 1990 Directive is that
109 See below on DirectivezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA2003/98IEC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 November 2003
on the re-use of public sector information. See i) Limitations on the subsequent use of disclosed information
110 Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the experience gained in the
application of council directive 90/313IEEC of 7 June 1990, on freedom of access to information on the
environment, 29.06.2000, COM(2000) 400 final.
III Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on public access to environmental
information, 29.06.2000, COM(2000) 402 final, 2000/0169 (COD) , OJ C337, 28 Nov. 2000, at p. 156.
112 Which provides that 'The Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251 and
after consulting the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, shall decide what
action is to be taken by the Community in order to achieve the objectives referred to in Article 174'. The
objectives referred at article 174 concern the protection of the environment.
113 It has been contended that "The real challenge ahead is not just putting the terms of the Directive and
similar legal instruments to use, as important as that is. The real challenge lies in anticipating and adjusting to
future demands and technological innovation. The paper paradigm of Directive 90/313IEEC appears
increasingly archaic in today's world of modems and megabytes, where monitoring, retrieval and
transmission of data can take place with a precision and rapidity not commonly known even a few years ago',
Public Access to Environmental Information, Expert's comer No 111997, Prepared by: Ralph E. Hallo
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the scope of the exemptions has been narrowed, since a refusal to disclose information can now
only be refused when disclosure would adversely affect a protected interest. The word 'adversely'
was missing from the 1990 Directive. Also, the definitions of environmental information and
public bodies used in the 2003 Directive represent an improvement over the ones in the 1990
Directive since they are wider. Moreover, in the new Directive time limits for disclosure have been
reduced from two to one months and has been included a requirement to supply information in the
form requested, if available in that form. Finally, the new Directive expressly covers apart from
information held by public bodies, information held by any other person for public authorities and
also it specifies that inspections of documents are to be free.
Since the 2003 Directive stays very close to the Aarhus Convention, the question that
arises is the difference in nature between these two instruments. The environmental information
directives are part of EC legislation and as such can have direct effect, thus creating rights for
individuals that can be directly enforced through national courts, if they satisfy thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAVan Gend test
(i.e. if their provisions are sufficiently clear, precise and unconditionalj.!"
On the other hand, the Aarhus convention is an international agreement, which although
has been signed by the EC, probably has not direct effect, as it does not seem to be clear and
unconditional enough, especially since it leaves great discretion to signatory states to implement its
provisions.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIn any case, a finding that any of the Aarhus provisions are of direct effect, would seem
unlikely, due to the current trend of the ECJ to show great reluctance to find direct effect in respect
of international agreements. liS
A further issue that arises, is that since according to article 10 of the 2003 directive, the
1990 directive will be repealed at the date by which member states are required to implement the
2003 directive (14 February 2005), what will be the effect of this repeal in event of late or
incomplete implementation by a member state?1I6Most probably, national measures that have been
adopted under the previous 1990 directive will not be automatically repealed too, but rather they
will constitute an incorrect implementation of the 2003 directive and thus will have to be
interpreted in light of the 2003 directive according to the principle of indirect effect. 117 In any case,
the member state concerned could also have under the principle of state liability to pay
compensation to an aggrieved party for its failure to fully implement the EC directive.!"
A final point to consider, is what would be the situation in UK law if the EC ratified the
Aarhus convention and thus became bound by it, but not the UK? Would then the UK be bound
Stichting Natuur en Milieu (Netherlands Society for Nature and Environment), European Environment
A_fency, 1997, at p. 2. Available from http://reports.eea.eu.inti
11 On direct effect see inter alia, the ECJ cases of Van Duyn v Home Office, [1974] ECR 1337; Van Gend &
Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration [1963] ECR English special edition 1.
115 On direct effect ofintemational agreements, see Horspool, infra n. 159, at par. 7.7.
116 See Hallo, below n. 306, at p. 13, footnote 66.
117 See the EeJ case of Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA [1990] ECR 1-
04135.
55
and to what extent? It can be contended that in such a situation and on the understanding that the
Convention cannot have direct effect as examined above, the UK courts would not be bound by
it.119 However, the courts would still be bound by measures taken by the EC to implement Aarhus,
if these measures were of direct effect.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
b) European Court of Justice proceedings.
Although specific matters addressed by the ECJ on the basis of Directive 90/313 will be
addressed in detail in the relevant parts of this chapter, there is still a need for a general overlook of
the relevant ECJ case-law.
Until today there have been eleven times where an action involving directive 90/313 was
filed in the ECJ, however only four of them reached the hearing stage, as all others were removed
from the register at an earlier stage in the proceedings. There is no case involving the 2003
directive yet.
As far as the actions that have been removed from the register are concerned, the first of
them concerned an enforcement action brought by the Commission against Greece (under article
226 of the EC Treatyj.!" whereby the Commission was claiming that Greece had completely failed
to transpose directive 1990 in Greek law within the time-limit mentioned in article 9 of the
Directive (by 31 December 1992). However, probably because Greece transposed the directive in
the meantime, the action was later withdrawn.
The second of these cases concerned a question asked to the ECJ by a German court under
the preliminary reference procedure (article 234 of the EC Treaty).'!' The question asked was
whether the third indent of paragraph 2 of article 3 of the 1990 directive which mentions as a
ground of exclusion from disclosure matters which are "the subject of preliminary investigation
proceedings", encompass proceedings of an administrative authority that end with the issue of an
administrative act which can eventually become the subject of judicial proceedings. The case was
subsequently removed from the register.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
118 SeezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAFrancovich v Italian Republic [1995] ECR 1-3843; Brasserie du Pecheur SA v Bundesrepublik
Deutschland and The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte F actortame Ltd and others [1996]
ECR 1-1029.
119 However, it seems that the UK Government (as opposed to the UK courts) would still be bound to apply
the parts of the Aarhus Convention that fall within the EC's sphere of competencies like the information
provisions of Aarhus, as it would be bound by way of the EC's ratification of this Convention. For an analogy
with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1833 UNTS 396), ratified by both the EC and
some Member States, see Churchill Robin, Scott Joanne, The Mox Plant Litigation: The First Half-Life, 53
[2004] International and Comparative Law Quarterly 643.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
120 Commission v Greece, (C-159/95), OJ C 208, 12/08/1995 p. 4. Removed from the Register by an order of
the President of the ECJ, OJ C 158,01/06/1996 p. 12.
121 Ulrich Gloger v. Bergamt Kamen, Reference for a preliminary ruling by the Oberverwaltungsgericht fur
das Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, (C-296/97), OJ C 318, 18/10/1997 p. 6. Removed from the Register by an
order of the President of the ECJ, OJ C 20 of23/1/1999, p.29.
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The third of these actions concerned an enforcement action by the Commission against
Portugal.!" According to article 8 of the 1990 directive member states had to submit to the
Commission by the 31 st of December 1996 a report on the experience gained in the application of
the directive in the member state concerned. The Commission was arguing that although the
prescribed time-limit had expired the Portuguese Republic had still not submitted this report. The
action was also latter withdrawn by the Commission, presumably because the Portuguese
government did submit the report. This case seems to indicate that the Commission views the
requirement found in both directives for states to submit reports on the application of the directives
in their territories, as important enough to justify bringing enforcement actions based solely on this
ground.
The fourth of these actions concerns an enforcement action brought by the Commission
against Spain (under article 226 of the EC Treatyj.!" The Commission brought an action before
the EC] arguing that Spain had failed to fulfil its obligations under the 1990 Directive due to
incorrect implementation of the directive in its national law. The Commission claimed that the
Spanish transposing legislation did not comply with DirectivezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA90/313, because th re were no
specific provisions in Spanish law concerning charging for the provision of environmental
information and providing that these charges may not exceed a reasonable cost, as article 5 of the
Directive provides. Also the Commission argued that the Spanish transposing legislation did not
conform with article 3(2) of the 1990 directive as it permitted public authorities to refuse to provide
information where it related to files which had been the subject-matter of actions in the past. Also,
for the Commission this law was falling short of the directive's requirements as it recognised
silence on the part of the administration as being sufficient to be an implied rejection of a request
for information. This case was also subsequently dropped.
The fifth of these actions is about an enforcement action brought by the Commission
against Belgiunr'" claiming that the Belgian legislation had not properly transposed article 3(2) of
the 1990 Directive (on the acceptable exemptions). The Commission considered that the present
position under Belgian law did not ensure that the competent authorities could never justify
refusing access to environmental information, on the basis of exceptions found in a Belgian law but
not found in the directive and concerning the protection of a federal economic or financial interest,
of the currency, or of public funds, or the duty of confidentiality. Also the Commission was
complaining that the Belgian legal system did not provide a clear guarantee that any body hearing
an appeal would automatically consider unlawful an implied refusal where reasons had not been
formally provided, and thus for the Commission article 3(4) of the 1990 Directive had also been
breached. The case was subsequently removed from the register too.
122 Commission v Portugal, (C-106/99), OJ C 160,05/06/1999 p. 10. Removed from the Register by an order
of the President of the ECJ, OJ C 333, 20/1111999 p. 22
123 Commission v. the Kingdom of Spain, an action filled on 21 May 1999 (C-189/99), OJ 1999/C 226126,but
later withdrawn from the register, OJ C 118, 21104/2001p. 28.
57
The sixth case concerned an enforcement action brought by the Commission against
Germany!" in respect of the practices of certain authorities in fulfilling their duty to "respond" to a
request for information within the two month time period. The Commission was arguing that the
practice of some German authorities to only provide an interim answer within the two-month
period, stating that access to the information can be granted at a later date, does not accord with
article 3(4) of the directive, since such a practice goes against the aim of the directive and the
effectiveness of the opportunities for the persons concerned to obtain legal protection. This action
has also been abandoned.
The seventh and last of these cases, concerned an enforcement action brought by the
Commission against Austria, 126 whereby it was argued that in certain of the Austrian Lander, the
1990 Directive had not been transposedzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAin the time-limit provided for in the Act of Accession of
Austria to the European Communities (1 January 1995, according to article 168 of this Act). This
case was latter withdrawn by the Commission.
As far as the cases that have been decided by the ECJ are concerned, we shall only
summarily mention them at this stage in a chronological order, as we shall look at them in more
detail later on.
The first case, thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAMecklenburg case.!" was a preliminary reference question submitted by
a German court. It concerned a request of a copy of a statement of views submitted by a
countryside authority in connection with planning approval for the construction of a road section.
The request was rejected by the public body holding the information on the grounds that the
statement of views was not "information relating to the environment" within the meaning of Article
2(a) of the Directive, and that also it felled under the exemption for "preliminary investigation
proceedings" since it concerned development consent procedures. The ECJ held that a statement of
views by a countryside authority was "information relating to the environment" within the meaning
of Article 2(a) since it showed that Community law intended the concept of "information relating to
the environment" to be a broad one. Also, the ECJ held that exceptions should be interpreted
narrowly and thus article 3(2) only covered proceedings of a judicial or quasi-judicial nature, or at
least proceedings which would inevitably lead to the imposition of a penalty if an administrative or
criminal offence were established.
The second judgement delivered by the ECJ and involving the interpretation of a provision
of the 1990 directive was the case of Commission v Germanyl"zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
124 Commission v Belgium, (C-402/99), OJ C 6, OS/01l2000 p. 17. Removed from the Register by an order of
the President of the ECJ, OJ C lIS, 21104/2001 p. 24.
125 Commission v Germany, (C-29/00), OJ C 149,27/05/2000 p. 14. Removed from the Register by an order
of the President of the ECJ, OJ C 144, 15/06/2002 p. 30
126 Commission v Austria, (C-S6/01) OJ C lIS, 2110412001 p. 17. Removed from the Register by an order of
the President of the ECJ; OJ C 233, 2S/09/2002 p. 20
127 Wilhelm Mecklenburg v Kreis Pinneberg - Der Landrat [199S] ECR 1-3S09.
128 [1999] 3 CMLR 277, case C-217/97.
This case is an enforcement action initiated by the Commission against Germany, in which
it was argued that the German laws enacted specifically to transpose the 1990 directive, did not
transpose it correctly. The EC] held that the general exclusion of courts and criminal prosecution
and disciplinary bodies from the definition of public authorities was not contrary to the Directive,
as the Commission had failed to show that in Germany these authorities, when acting normally in
the exercise of their judicial powers, could also have responsibilities or information relating to the
environment
The EC] also held that the German exclusion of information relating to "administrative
proceedings" exceeded the scope of the derogation of article 3(2) of the Directive on "preliminary
investigation proceedings", since this term included only administrative proceedings which
immediately preceded a contentious or quasi-contentious procedure and which arose from the need
to obtain proof or investigate a matter prior to the opening of the procedure.
Also, the EC] held that Germany had failed to transpose in a clear and precise enough
manner the obligation of public authorities to partial communication of information when only a
certain part of the information concerned is covered by an exemption. Moreover, the EC] held that
article 5 of the directive which provide that charges for information should be reasonable had been
breached, as the German transposing law provided for a charge to be made even where a request
for information was subsequently refused.
The third case, the case ofzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAEva Glawischnig v Bundesminister fUr soziale Sicherheit+ " was
another preliminary reference case, in which a question was asked by an Austrian court on the
interpretation of article 2(a) of the 1990 directive on the definition of environmental information.
The EC] held that this article is to be interpreted as meaning that the name of the manufacturer and
the product description of foodstuffs which have been the subject of administrative measures for
controlling compliance with an EC Regulation on the labelling of foodstuffs produced from
genetically modified organisms, as well as the number of administrative penalties imposed
following those measures, and the producers and products concerned by these penalties, do not
constitute information relating to the environment.
The fourth and most recent of these case, is the case of Commission v Francel" which was
an enforcement action brought by the Commission against France arguing the incorrect
implementation of the 1990 directive. The EC] held that France had failed to correctly transpose
article 2(a) of that directive by restricting the obligation to supply information relating to the
environment to "administrative documents." Moreover, the EC] found that articles 3(1), (2) and (4)
of the directive had been breached because French law provided an exception not found in the
directive on "generally, secrets protected by legislation" and also because French law lacked a
provision under which information relating to the environment had to be supplied in part where it
129 Eva Glawischnig v Bundesminister fUr soziale Sicherheit, Case C-316/01, 12 June 2003, OJ C 184,
02/08/2003 p. 10. Available from http://curia.eu.int
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was possible to separate out information on exempt matter and finally because in the case of
implied refusals no reasons had to be provided to the applicant.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
3) The transposition of the Directive inzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAnational law.
Purdue has contended that the extent to which increased openness was compelled by the
1990 Directive is debatable since many UK measures such as rules on public registers were
introduced long before there was any EC obligation. However, it can be safely argued that these
provisions were insufficient to constitute a correct transposition of the Directive."! We shall
therefore examine how the two Environmental Information Directives have been transposed in each
part of the United Kingdom. We shall also examine the position in Gibraltar too, which is also a
member of the EC as the UK is responsible for its international relations.
a) England and Wales
The 1990 Directive was implemented in Great-Britain through the Environmental
Information Regulations 1992, which were made on the 18th of December 1992 and entered into
force on the 31st of December 1992, on the last day of the time-limit provided by the Directive for
its implementation by member-states. These 1992 Regulations were amended in 1998 by the
Environmental Information (Amendment) Regulations 1998. These regulations applied to England,
Scotland and Wales, and were made by the Secretary of State of for the Environment under powers
conferred on him by the European Communities Act 1972,132after an affirmative resolution of each
House of Parliament.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
130zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBACommission of the European Communities v French Republic, Case C-233/00, 26 June 2003, OJ C 184,
02/08/2003 p. 2. Available from http://curia.eu.int
131 See Michael Purdue, 'The Impact of Environmental Law on Planning Law in the United Kingdom', in
Jane Holder (ed.), The impact ofEC environmental law in the United Kingdom, Wiley, 1997, at pp. 231-2.
132 More specifically, section 2(2) of the EUropean Communities Act 1972 provides that: 'Subject to
Schedule 2 to this Act, at any time after its passing Her Majesty may by Order in Council, and any designated
Minister or department may by regulations, make provision-- (a) for the purpose of implementing any
Community obligation of the United Kingdom, or enabling any such obligation to be implemented, or of
enabling any rights enjoyed or to be enjoyed by the United Kingdom under or by virtue of the Treaties to be
exercised; or (b) for the purpose of dealing with matters arising out of or related to any such obligation or
rights or the coming into force, or the operation from time to time, of subsection (1) above; and in the
exercise of any statutory power or duty, including any power to give directions or to legislate by means of
orders, rules, regulations or other subordinate instrument, the person entrusted with the power or duty may
have regard to the objects of the Communities and to any such obligation or rights as aforesaid. In this
subsection "designated Minister or department" means such Minister of the Crown or government
department as may from time to time be designated by Order in Council in relation to any matter or for any
purpose, but subject to such restrictions or conditions (if any) as may be specified by the Order in Council.'
Under this section was made the European Communities (Designation) (No.2) Order 1992 (SI 1992/1711)
which provides in its Schedule 1 that the Secretary of State and any Northern Ireland Department is
designated in respect of 'Measures relating to freedom of access to, and dissemination of, information on the
environment held by public authorities or bodies with public responsibilities for the environment and which
are under the control of public authority'. This Order was repealed by .the European CommunitieszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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The new 2004 Environmental Information Regulations, which transpose thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA2003/4IEC
Directive on public access to environmental information, have been made under powers conferred
to the Secretary of State under section 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972 (as with the
previous regulations) but also under powers conferred upon him by section 74(3) of the FOIA
2000.133 This section allows the Secretary of State to make regulations'" implementing the Aarhus
Convention and repealing to that extent any other enactment, including the 1992 Regulations. The
regulations apply to the whole of Great Britain and also include Northern Ireland, but do not
include the Scottish administration, since pursuant to section 80 of the FOIA the regulation-making
power conferred by section 74(3) on the Secretary of State does not include the power to make
provisions in relation to information held by any Scottish public body.!" Special regulations are
made by the Scottish executive concerning these bodies, as analysed briefly below. These 2004
Environmental Information regulations, come into force on January the 1st 2005, even if the
deadline for the implementation of the 2003/4IEC Directive is February the 14th 2005. This is
because the government wants the regulations to come into force in parallel with the
implementation of the remainder of the Freedom of Information Act 2000, which also comes into
full force on the 1st of January 2005.
At this point, there is no need to explain in any more details the substantive provisions of
these regulations, since they will be examined thoroughly in the course of this chapter which
concentrates on the position in England and Wales. However, as we shall see, most of these
provisions are very similar (if not identical) to the ones in force in the rest of the United Kingdom.
(Designation) (No.4) Order 2003 (SI 2003/2?01), whic? now ~rovides that the Secretary of State is
exclusively designated in respect of access to environmental information,
133 More precisely, all regulations are made under the powers conferred to the Secretary of State by section
74 of the FOIA 2000, except for regulations 4, 12(S), 1~(10), 1S(11) and 19, which are made under section
2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972. Accordmg to the Explanatory Memorandum submitted to
Parliament by DEFRA
(available at http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uklsilsi2004/draftiemluksidem_011049610S_EN.pdf ), this is
because regulation 4 implements article 7 of the Directive and deals with the dissemination of information
other than in response to a request, an issue that is not part of the access to information provisions of the
Aarhus Convention, which is implemented through section 74 of the FOIA 2000. Similarly, regulation 12(S)
implements article 4(2) of the Directive whose provisions on emissions are wider than those in the Aarhus
Convention on certain exceptions to disclosure that do not apply when the request for information relates to
information on emissions. Finally, regulations IS (10) and 1S(11) and 19 deal with criminal offences that are
not within the powers conferred by section 74 of the FOIA 2000. However, neither the 2003/4IEC Directive
mentions that criminal offences have to be created for the correct transposition of this Directive, and thus
these three regulations seem to bezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAultra vires as ade outsi e the powers conferred to the secretary of State
by both s. 74 of the FOIA 2000 and the European Communities Act 1972. Finally, it should be noted that the
FOIA provisions implementing the 2003 Directive were brought into force by the Freedom of Information
Act 2000 (Commencement No.4) Order 2004 (SI 200411909).
134 According to s. S2 of the FOIA 2000, these regulations have to be made by a statutory instrument and a
draft of this instrument has to be laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.
13S These are listed in s. SO(2) of the FOIA as including the Scottish Parliament, any part of the Scottish
Administration, the Scottish Parliamentary Corporate Body, any Scottish public authority with mixed
functions or no reserved functions (within the meaning of the Scotland Act 1995).
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b) Northern IrelandzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
The 1990 Directive has been applied to Northern Ireland by the Environmental Information
(Northern Ireland) Regulations 1993,136which came into force on the 31st of March 1993, three
months after the deadline for the transposition of the Directive. These Regulations were made by
the Northern Ireland Department of the Environment under delegated powers conferred by the
European Communities Act 1972.137
There is no need to examine in detail these Northern Ireland provisions since they are
identical in content to the English 1992 Regulations (save for the usage of different words in some
instances without any alteration of the overall meaningj.l"zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
In 1998, these Regulations were amended by the Environmental Information (Amendment)
Regulations (Northern Ireland) 1998,139so as to reflect the changes made to the 1992 English
regulations by the 1998 Regulations.
As long as the transposition of the Aarhus Convention and the 2003 Directive in Northern
Ireland is concerned, this has taken place through the English Environmental Information
Regulations 2004 that extend to England, Wales and Northern Ireland and repeal the above-
mentioned Northern Ireland Regulations. This is possible under section 74 of the FOIA 2000
which enables new Environmental Information Regulations to be made by affirmative resolution,
in line with the requirements of the Aarhus Convention for England, Wales and Northern Ireland.l"
c) Scotland
The 1990 Directive was initially implemented in Scotland through the 1992 Regulations,
which provided at reg. 1(3) that they extended to Great Britain.
However, the Aarhus Convention and the new Directive, will be implemented in Scotland
through specific provisions made by the Scottish Executive. To that extent, the Freedom of
Information (Scotland) Act 2002, introduces a general right of access to information held by
Scottish public authorities, supervised by an independent Scottish Information Commissioner. This
Act is more or less similar to the FOIA 2000, the biggest differences being the harm-test used in it,
which favours even more disclosure in Scotland. Under the Scottish Act, when a harm-test applies
information can only be withheld if disclosure would, or would be likely to 'prejudice
substantially' the protected interest by the exemption, whereas in the FOIA 2000, the exemption
136StatutoryRule 1993/45.
137See above, n. 132.
138 See the Annex for a table of equivalence of the provisions of these two regulations.
139Statutory Rule 1998/238.
140This is possible since section 88(2) of the FOIA 2000 provides that this Act extends to Northern Ireland
and also because of the European Communities (Designation) (No.4) Order 2003 analysed above at footnote
n.132.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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applies merely if disclosure would, or would be likely to 'prejudice' the public interest protected by
the exemption. Section 62 of the Act empowers Scottish Ministers to make specific Regulations on
public access to environmental information so as to implement the Aarhus Convention.!"
Concerning the 2003 Directive, it will also be implemented in Scotland by regulations made by the
Scottish Executive pursuant to the European Communities Act 1972 as it applies to Scotland.'? As
with England there will be a single set of regulations transposing both Aarhus and the 2003
Directive in Scotland.
To this effect, in May 2002 the Scottish Executive Environment Group issued a
consultation paper inviting comments on the principles that should underlie the new regime on
access to environmental information for Scotland.!" In April 2004, a new consultation paper was
issued inviting comments on the draft of the new Environmental Information (Scotland)
Regulations 2004.144As with the English regulations, these regulations aim to be as close as
possible with the general freedom of information regime so as to help Scottish public authorities
administer the two regimes and to make it easier for the public to understand.
These Scottish regulations and the new 2004 English environmental information
regulations are very similar, since they both implement the same international instruments: the
141 S. 62 of the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 provides that: '(1) In this section "the Aarhus
Convention" means the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision making and
Access to Justice in EnvironmentalMatters signed at Aarhus on 25th June 1998. (2) For the purposes of this
section, "the information provisions" of the Aarhus Convention are Article 4, together with Articles 3 and 9
so far as relating to that Article. (3) The Scottish Ministers may, in relation to information held by or
requested from any Scottish public authority, by regulations make such provision as they consider
appropriate-- (a) for the purpose of implementing the information provisions of the Aarhus Convention or
any amendment of those provisions made in accordance with ~icle 14 of.the Convention; and (b) for the
purpose of dealing with matters arising out of, or related to, the implementation of those provisions or of any
such amendment. (4) Regulations under subsection (3) may in particular-- (a) enable charges to be made for
making information available in accordance with the regulations; (b) provide that any obligation imposed by
the regulations in relation to the disclosure of information is to have effect notwithstanding any enactment or
rule of law; (c) make provision for the issue by the Scottish Ministers of a code of practice; (d) provide for
sections 43 and 44 to apply in relation to such a code with such modifications as may be specified in the
regulations; (e) provide for all or any of the provisions of Part 4 to apply, with such modifications as may be
so specified, in relation to compliance with any requirement of the regulations; and (t) contain such
transitional or consequential provision (including provision modifying any enactment) as the Scottish
Ministers consider appropriate.' This section came into force on the 30th September 2002, according to reg. 2
of the Freedom ofInformation (Scotland)Act 2002 (CommencementNo 1)Order 2002 (SSIzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA2002/437).
142 Interestingly the Scottish Executive can transpose with Scottish Statutory Instruments European
Legislation on all matters within its exclusive competence, according to section 2(2) of the European
Communities Act 1972 which was amended by the Scotland Act 1998, Schedule 8, paragraph 15(3). The
functions conferred upon the Minister of the Crown under section 2(2) of the European Communities Act
1972, insofar as within devolved competence, were transferred to the Scottish Ministers by virtue of section
53 of the ScotlandAct 1998.
143 See Scottish Executive Environment Group, Proposals for a new regime on Public Access to
Environmental Information A Consultation, May 2002, Paper 2002/16, available at
http://www .scotland.gov.ukllibrary5/environmentipaei-00.asp
A summary of responses received was published in April 2004, see Scottish Executive Environment Group,
Proposals for a new regime on Public Access to Environmental Information - Summary of responses to a
Consultation Paper 2002116- May 2002, available at
http://www.scotland.gov.ukllibrary5/environmentlppaei.pdf
144 See Scottish Executive EnvironmentGroup,Access to Environmental Information - A Consultation, April
2004, Paper 2004/5, available at http://www.scotland.gov.uklconsultations/environmentiateic-OO.asp
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Aarhus Convention and thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA2003/4 Directive. Thus there is no need to analyse in detail all the
provisions of the Scottish regulations, but only to refer to the main differences.
The main difference is that the Scottish regulations are more detailed than the English
ones.
As far as charging for disclosing information is concerned, the Scottish regulations are
extremely detailed as, unlike their English counterpart, they contain a definition of what is to be
considered as "reasonable charges" that can be levied. First, as in the 2004 English Regulations, it
is made clear that no charge can be made for merely allowing an applicant to access public
registers or lists of environmental information or for allowing an applicant to inspect the
information requested on the premises of the a~thbrity. But in contrast, the Scottish Regulations are
more detailed, since they mention that a reasonable charge is considered to be a fee which does not
exceed the costs to the authority of producing the information requested, except where the
information requested is also made available on a commercial basis by the authority and the
continued collection and publication of such information would be prejudiced if the authority did
not charge a market-based fee. In this last case, it's.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAthe market-based fee th t can be charged.!"
Also, as in the 2004 English Regulations, there is a provision for Scottish public authorities to
require payment of charges in advance of making information available, if this is reasonable.
Furthermore, although both regulations contain the same exemptions to disclosure, the
Scottish ones are more liberal in the sense that they favour greater access to information as they
.explicitly mention that exceptions are to be interpreted in a restrictive way and also that when the
public interest in maintaining the exception is weighted against the public interest in making the
information available, Scottish public authorities are to exercise a presumption in favour of
disclosure. This presumption is also present in the 2004 English Regulations.
Finally, a very interesting point is that the Scottish regulations mention that "Any statutory
bar or rule of law (apart from these Regulations) which would prevent the making available of
information in accordance with this regulation shall not apply" .146 This means that only the
exemptions to disclosure found in the regulations are to be applied and any statutory bars to
disclosure found in any other enactments are to be disregarded. This is a statement that
acknowledges the fact that the regulations stem from EC law and as such take precedence over any
contradictory piece of UK or Scottish legislation (such as the Freedom of Information (Scotland)
Act 2002) due to the principle of supremacy of EC law. As we shall see further on, a similar
statement is also contained in the 2004 English Regulations.!"
It should also be noted that the 2004 English Regulations provide at reg. 2(I) that they do
not apply to Scottish public bodies as defined by s. 80(2) of the FOIA and s. 3 of the Scotland Act
145 These provisions can be found in the preamble to the 2003/4 Environmental Information Directive, at par.
18.
146 At reg. 4(4).
147 See below, 5) Do the environmental information regulations supersede other enactments prohibiting
disclosure?zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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1998. These Scottish public bodies are mainly the Scottish Parliament, any part of the Scottish
Administration, the Scottish Parliamentary Corporate Body, or any Scottish public authority with
mixed functions or no reserved functions as these are defmed by the Scotland Act 1998. This
separation by functions rather than geographical area is necessary, since the new English
regulations are still applicable in Scotland but only when they concern public bodies which are
exercising competencies not devolved to the Scottish Ministers and thus are not part of the Scottish
Administration. This is also true for Scottish public authorities operating outside Scotland, to which
the Scottish regulations are still applicable. Such a solution is equivalent to the one adopted by the
FOIA 2000 which applies to authorities situated in Scotland, provided they are public authorities
whose sole functions are reserved ones within the defmition of the Scotland Act 1998.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
d) Gibraltar.
Gibraltar is a British dependent territory inside the European Union for most purposes and
thus citizens of Gibraltar are also European Union citizens. Gibraltar is not a member-state of the
EC but is within it under Article 299(4) of the EC Treaty which applies the Treaty to 'the European
territories for whose external relations a Member State is responsible' and thus it joined in 1973 as
a UK Dependant Territory. As a result, European Legislation applies in Gibraltar as it does in any
other Member State but for four domains which are exempt: 1) Gibraltar is outside the scope of the
European Common Agricultural Policy; 2) it is outside the area of the Common Customs Tariff; 3)
the rock is exempt from the common' rules on the VAT on goods and services and, 4) it is exempt
from the provisions on the free movement of goods (but not services). Since Gibraltar is in the EC
as part of the UK, it is the UK Government that retains ultimate responsibility for the application of
EC law in Gibraltar even if it has delegated to the Government of Gibraltar responsibility for giving
effect to EC legislation in the territory.!" Because the legal system in Gibraltar is based on the
common law and statute law of England, it is interesting to examine how the Environmental
Information Directives have been transposed, as one would expect the transposition to be similar.
However, as we shall see, the way the Directive was transposed was quite different from the one
adopted in England.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAC
148 On the constitutional status of Gibraltar and other related matters see House of Commons, Foreign Affairs
Committee, Fourth Report, June 8, 1999, available online at:
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cmI99899/cmselect/cmfaffl366136602.htrD
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The 1990 Environmental Information Directive has been transposed in Gibraltar by the
Public Health (Freedom of Access to Information on the Environment) Rules 1992,149 an order
made by the Governor of Gibraltar which came into effect on the 1SI November 1992. This order is
extremely interesting since it sticks very closely to the wording of the 1990 Directive, probably in
an effort to avoid an erroneous transposition.
An extremely interesting feature is that no definition is given of the terms of
'environmental information' and of 'public authority' and instead the Order refers directly to the
definitions present in the 1990 Directive, since rule 2(2) provides thatzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA'Expre sions used in these
rules have the meaning they bear in the Directive'. This has the advantage of preventing challenges
of definitions not in conformity with the Directive's.
As long as the practical provisions on access are concerned, the Order merely repeats the
provisions of the Directive and provides that any natural or artificial legal person can requestzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
,
environmental information from public authorities or from a body with public responsibilities forzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
I
the environment and under the control of a public authority, without having to prove an interest.
Information has to be provided as soon as possible and at the latest within two months, and only a
charge not exceeding the reasonable costs for providing the information may be made. Reasons for
refusals shall also be given in writing and partial disclosure of exempt information shall be
performed wherever possible.
Similarly to the structure adopted under the English 1992 Regulations, the Gibraltar Order
divides exemptions to disclosure into discretionary and mandatory exemptions. ISO However, the
Gibraltar Order almost identically repeats the wording of the exemptions mentioned in the
Directive, thus avoiding the problem that arose with the 1992 English Regulations which had to be
amended in 1998 because the European Commission considered that the scope of the exemptions
had been extended beyond what was permitted under the 1990 Directive.'!'
Rule 4(1) of the Order provides that a request to provide environmental information may
be refused where it affects the confidentiality of the proceedings of public authorities, international
relations and national defence, public security, matters which are, or have been, subjudice, or under
enquiry (including disciplinary enquiries), or which are the subject of preliminary investigation
proceedings, commercial and industrial confidentiality, including intellectual property. Also rule 5
provides that a request can be refused if it would involve the supply of unfinished documents or
data or internal communications or where the request is manifestly unreasonable or formulated in
too general a manner.
Rule 4(2) of the Order provides that a request to provide environmental information must
be refused where it affects the confidentiality of personal data or files or both, or if it affects
149Legal Notice No. 143 of 1992, Gibraltar Gazette No. 2,697 of 12/1111992 Legal Notices Second
Supplement.
ISO On the academic discussions about whether such a distinction not provided for by the Directive is
compatible with it, see below.
lSI All these matters are discussed in detail below.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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material supplied by a third party without that party being under a legal obligation to do so,
provided the third party concerned or who supplied this information has not consented to
disclosure. Also, information the disclosure of which would make it more likely that the
environment to which it relates would be damaged, has to be excluded from disclosure under rule
4(3).
From the above, it is clear that the Gibraltar 1992 Order transposing the 1990 Directive
sticks closely to the text of the Directive and only departs from it when it puts exemptions into two
categories. This method of transposition has the added advantage of ensuring a correct
transposition. However, the drawback, is that the 1990 Directive contains very general terms (such
a 'public authoritieaand most of the exemptions to disclosure) that are left for member states to
define in more detail. If the transposing legislator does not do that, then this is left for the
implementing public authorities to do which could lead to possible diverging practices. But such a
risk might be minimal in a 'country' like Gibraltar whose public administration is relatively small
in size.152 All in all, it can be contended that the method chosen in Gibraltar for the transposition of
the 1990 Directive is superior to the one adopted by the British Government in respect of Great-
Britain and Northern Ireland, which led to inconsistencies with the Directive that had to be
corrected with subsequent amendments in 1998.
There seem to be no plans yet for an early transposition of the 2003 Environmental
Information Directive in Gibraltar, as in England, though the time limit for its incorporation into
national laws is the 14thFebruary 2005.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
4) The Freedom of Information Act 2000 and the Data Protection Act 1998
The purpose of the Freedom of InformationAct 2000 is to create a right for every person to
access any information held by public authorities which is not exempt from disclosure. The Act
amends the Data Protection Act 1998 and the Public Records Act 1958, so as to make their
provisions compatible with this new right. As discussed previously, before the Act, there was no
such general right, as the Code of Practice on Access to Government Information was a non-
binding voluntary scheme, which only required government departments and other public
authorities under the jurisdiction of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration to make
certain information available to the public. The Act, on the contrary, not only creates a binding
right of access, but also provides for a wider scheme for accessing information as it covers a larger
range of public authorities including the local government, the National Health Service bodies,
schools and universities, the police and other public bodies such as quangos and executive
agencies. It should be noted that the FOIA comes into full force in 2005.
152 It is the Environmental Agency that is responsible for the enforcement of the Environmental Information
DirectivezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAinGibraltar. The Agency acts as agents for the Government of Gibraltar. See their web-site:zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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The Act is divided into parts. Part I of the Act creates the general right of access to
information held by public authorities and by other relevant bodies for the Act's purposes. The
technique adopted for determining the Act's coverage is not, as in the case of the Environmental
Information Regulations, to give a general definition of the types of public bodies to which it
applies. Rather, the Act simply lists the bodies subject to its provisions in a Schedule (Schedule 1)
and confers upon the Secretary of State (now the Lord Chancellor)!" the power to add to the
Schedule or remove bodies from it. This part also lays down time limits for the provision of
requested information, generally 20 working days, and guidelines concerning charges that can be
levied.
Part II lists the exemptions from the right to access information held by public bodies.
There are 22 separate sections, each one establishing a specific exception from disclosure. Public
authorities have a legal duty to release information and also to confirm or deny the existence of
sought information, unless it is covered by an exemption. The exemptions fall into two categories:
those whose use has to be justified under a harm test weighting the public interest to disclosure
versus the interest protected by secrecy, and absolute exemptions.!" Under the former category,
public authorities can withhold information if it causes prejudice to matters such as international
relations, national security, defence, the economy, law enforcement and commercial interests. In
contrast, absolute exemptions do not have to be justified and cover areas like information provided
in confidence, information supplied by or relating to bodies dealing with security matters, court
records, personal information and parliamentary privilege.
PartszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAN and V deal with arrangements for enforcements and appeals, and create a new
independent administrative body, the Information Commissioner (which combines the role of the
Data Protection Commissioner under the Data Protection Act 1998) and a special administrative
tribunal, the Information Tribunal. This new Information Commissioner oversees the correct
application ofthe Act. An appeal against a decision to refuse to disclose information by a public
authority lies to the Information Commissioner, ~hose decisions are binding on the authority
concerned, subject to an appeal to the Information Tribunal. However, under section 53 there is a
power for the executive to override the Information Commissioner's decisions that oblige the
public authority concerned to disclose the information withheld. A Minister can issue a certificate
with the result that the Commissioner's decision "shall cease to have effect". The underlying
rationale for this executive power seems to be that Ministers better understand the public interest
http://www.gibraltar.gov.gi/gov_depts/public_services/environment.htm
153zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIt should be noted that a l references in the FOIA 2000 to the Secretary of State have been replaced with
references to the Lord Chancellor, since all functions under the Act have been transferred to the Lord
Chancellor under the Transfer"of Functions (Miscellaneous) Order 2001 (SI 200113500), which carne into
force on the 26 November 2001. There is however one exception under which the Secretary of State still
retains his powers, concerning the power of the Secretary of State under s. 74 of the Freedom of Information
Act 2000 to make regulations implementing the information provisions of the Aarhus Convention.
154 These two subdivisions are referred to by Macdonald as prejudice-based and class-based exemptions,
depending on whether disclosure would be likely to prejudice particular interests. See Macdonald below, at
578. We shall also refer to them further on as absolute and qualified exemptions.
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and are accountable to Parliament for the exercise of such political judgments. Such a certificate
may be issued only where the information concerned is exempt information and only if the minister
concerned has on reasonable grounds formed the opinion that the public authority concerned has
not failed to comply with its obligations. This executive power is limited to requests addressed to
governmental departments and some other bodies.
Section 19 of the Act also obliges public authorities to adopt publication schemes relating
to the publication of information held by the authority. Such schemes have to be approved by the
Information Commissioner, and specify the classes of information which the authority publishes,
the manner of publication and whether the information is available to the public free of charge or
on payment. This duty on public authorities, can be said to go a step beyond the core access right
created by the Act, since if all of the information a body possesses is published (especially online),
then there is no need for a right of access. This is reflected in section 21 of the Act, which provides
that material made generally available in accordance with a publication scheme is exempt from the
right of access. Thus, the authority is not obliged to respond to requests for it. As only a relatively
small percentage of public authorities have not yet adopted publication schemes, from this point of
view alone, the Act has been considered to be a success.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAISS
The procedures on access to information and appeal procedures, as well as the role of the
Information Commissioner are mirrored in the new environmental information regulations. As we
shall examine further on these provisions, there is no need at this point to analyse in more detail the
operation of the FOIA 2000.
As far as the relationship between the FOIA 2000 and the Regulations is concerned, as we
shall see further on section 39 of the FOIA tries to avoid any overlap between these twozyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA,
instruments by providing that the Act does not apply, in principle, in the case of environmental
information. This is to avoid the concurrent application of the two regimes and to allow the
environmental information regime to apply in preference to the FOIA 2000.
In any case, it should be noted that, overall, if the FOIA 2000 is compared with the new
2004 environmental information regulations (but also the new 2003/4 Directive), the environmental
information regime is more liberal than the general access to information regime. This is mainly
due to two major differences.
Firstly, although both regimes contain a similar list of exemptions to disclosure, the
environmental information regime has no absolute (class) exemptions, since all exceptions are
subject to a public interest test. Thus, public bodies always have to weigh up whether the public
interest in favour of disclosure might outweigh the public interest favouring secrecy.
Secondly, the coverage of the 2004 Regulations is much wider than the FOIA, since the
definition of public bodies is wider in the Regulations, as we shall see in detail further on.
ISS According to Cinzia Biondi, Freedom of Information in Practice - Part I, [2003] Privacy & Data
Protection 3.7(10). On publication schemes in general see the Campaign for Freedom of Information Report,zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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It is clear from the above, that the 2004 environmental information regulations are a more
powerful legal instrument than the FOIA 2000, at least in the field of environmental information.
Thus the environmental information regime in England can be considered as being more liberal
than the general regime. This finding contrasts with what Wilcox had predicted in 2001, thatzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
''passage of the Freedom of Information bill should render the 1992 regulations a secondary,
rather than a primary, information search toolfor the British public". IS6
Apart from the FOIA 2000, there is also the Data Protection Act 1998, which sets out rules
for processing personal information.!" The Act requires data controllers to comply with the data
protection principles, which require, inter alia, that personal data is processed fairly and lawfully.
More importantly for present purposes, the Act also creates the right of subject access, which
allows every person to find out what information is held about them (personal information) on
computer and in some paper records.
The Information Commissioner oversees not only the FOIA 2000 but also the Data
Protection Act 1998, as both Acts relate to information policy and do overlap where personal
information is considered for disclosure under the FOIA 2000.
As we shall see further on, .the FOIA 2000, tries to avoid any overlap between the two
Acts, by providing that a request by an individual for his own personal information will be exempt
under the FOIA and will continue to be handled under the Data Protection Act. However, when an
applicant requests personal information concerning a third party, or where responding to a request
would involve the disclosure of personal information about a third party, the request falls within the
remit of the FOIA. However, in that case the public authority must apply the safeguards found in
the Data Protection Act (the Data Protection Principles), when handling and releasing such
information.
The Data Protection Act 1998 is also a statute that creates a right to access information,
however it is limited to private individuals about whom personal data are kept. It also protects the
dissemination of such data to other third parties without the consent of the concerned individual.
However, in order to avoid the Act becoming a barrier to the provision of information under other
statutory provisions providing for disclosure (such as the provisions on registers or the
Environmental Information Regulations), section 34 of the Data Protection Act 1998 states that
most of the provisions of the Act are to be disapplied when personal information is to be made
available to the public by or under any enactment other than the FOIA 2000. Of course, this does
not mean that personal data confidentiality is disregarded when environmental information is
concerned, since as we shall see further on, there is an exemption to disclosure covering personal
information in the Environmental Information Regulations.
commissioned by the Department for Constitutional Affairs, Central Government Publication Schemes -
Good Practice, February 2004, available at: bttp:llwww.cfoLorg.uk/pdf/ps_report.pdf
156 William A. Wilcox Jr, Access to Environmental Information in the United States and the United
Kingdom, [2001] 23 Loyola ofLos Angeles InternationalzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA& Comparative Law Review 121, at p. 245.
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5) Do the environmental information regulations supersede other enactments
prohibiting disclosure?zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
As we have seen, the Aarhus Convention and the 2003 environmental information directive
have been implemented in the UK through the relevant (English or Scottish) environmental
information regulations. Before examining the provisions of the English regulations in depth, a
question that arises is whether these regulations can supersede other enactments prohibiting
disclosure. In fact, the November 2002 Lord Chancellor's Second Report to Parliament on the
Review of Legislation Governing the Disclosure of Information.!" contains a list of 381 items of
primary or secondary legislation containing explicit provisions prohibiting disclosure of
information. All these statutory exemptions to disclosure supersede the provisions of the Freedom
of Information Act 2000, since section 44 of the Act creates an absolute exemption to disclosure,
when the disclosure of the information requested is prohibited by or under any enactment (except
than under the FOIA 2000) or disclosure is incompatible with any Community obligation. The
Lord Chancellor's report indicates that it is planned that most of these instruments will be repealed
in the near future.
As far as the environmental information regulations are concerned, these statutory
provisions of the FOIA prohibiting disclosure pose no problem in theory, since the regulations stem
from EC law and as such take precedence due to the principle of supremacy of EC Iaw'" over not
only the FOIA 2000, an Act of the UK parliament, but also any other enactment.
This can also be inferred from section 74(4) of the FOIA which mentions that the new
environmental information regulations may provide that any obligation imposed by these
regulations in relation to the disclosure of information, is to have effect notwithstanding any
enactment or rule of law. This section merely acknowledges the impact of the principle of
supremacy of EC law, a well-established principle, and thus this section aims to make this clear to
public officials applying the regulations, rather than introducing a new legal rule. This is also made
clear in reg. 5(6) of the 2004 Regulations, which mentions thatzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA'Any enactment or rule of law that
would prevent the disclosure of information in accordance with these Regulations shall not apply' .
The problem with this statement is that, although it is correct that the environmental information
regulations do take precedence over any other piece of domestic legislation prohibiting disclosure,
some of these prohibitions have been enacted in pursuance of EC law provisions or international
157 The Data Protection 1988 is discussedzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAin more details further on. See also Rosemary Jay and Angus
Hamilton, Data Protection - Law and Practice, Thomson - Sweet & Maxwell, 2nd edition 2003.
158 See below n. 160.
159 See Margot Horspool, European Union Law, London: Butterworths, 3rd edition 2003, pp. 167-179. Also
see R. v. Secretary of Statefor Transport, exp. Factortame Ltd [1999] 4 All ER 906 (HL).
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treaties requiring secrecy in certain areas.l"zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIn these cases, it is not correct to say that the
regulations should take precedence, since the principle of supremacy of EC law only applies
between EC law and national law, but not EC law and other international law. However, the correct
approach in this situation is impossible to ascertain, since if the environmental information
regulations are said to take precedence as they stem from the Aarhus convention and an EC
directive, then the UK might still be in breach of other international obligations it has. On the
contrary, if these other international obligations are given precedence over the regulations, then the
UK might breach the Aarhus Convention and the 2003 environmental information directive ! In
any case, it is evident that the UK government has chosen to favour disclosure, by giving
precedence to the regulations over any other enactment, even those adopted in pursuance of an
international obligation.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
Bl The content of the right to access environmental information.
In this section we shall describe in detail the requirements of all of the relevant legal
instruments that provide for a right to environmental information. They will be described in parallel
and their respective provisions will be compared with each other so as to see if the norms of a
higher rank are compatible with the norms of a lower rank. Namely it should be analysed whether
English law is compatible with the Convention and the Directive, and whether the Directive is
compatible with the Aarhus Convention."!zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
1) The extent of the right to environmental information.
a) Definition of environmental information
The right of access is to environmental information, but' environmental information' is not
an easy concept to define. Moreover, after a general definition has been established, there arises the
160 The Lord Chancellor'szyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBASecond Report to Parliament on the eview of Legislation Governing the
Disclosure of Information, November 2002, identifies 57 items of legislation prohibiting disclosure that fulfil
international obligations of the UK. Available online at http://www.dca.gov.ukJfoilfoidoirpt2.htm
Some of these provisions directly concern environmental irtformation such as section 174 of the Merchant
Shipping Act 1995, which relates to protection of information obtained in implementation of the International
Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage 1992,
or reg. 17 of the Plant Protection Products Regulations 1995 (now repealed) which implemented a specific
European obligation of confidentiality for member states under article 14 of Council DirectivezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA91/414 of 15
July 1991 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market.
161 We take as granted that the Aarhus Convention has binding effects on EC law as expressed by the
Community when it signed the Convention (see above n. 101). We shall not enter into the theoretical debate
of the relationship and ranking between EC law and international law.
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issue of whether the right of access extends only to the environmental information contained in
documents or to the documents that contain it too. Finally, there is the issue of whether information
not directly held by a relevant authority for the application of the environmental information
regime, but by a different person, is still accessible under this regime.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
i) Environmental informationzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAratione materiae.
The concept of environmental information is a pivotal one not only because it prescribes
the boundaries of applicability of the environmental information regime but also because, as stated
in Stec et al. "it is logical to interpret the scope of the terms "environment" and "environmental"
accordingly in reference to the detailed definition of "environmental information" wherever these
terms are used in other provisions of the [Aarhus] Convemioni''" Thus these terms also help us
define which "environment" environmental information regimes aim to protect, since none of them
provides a definition of the environment. Also, it can help in providing for a legal definition of the
environment for other legal instruments, which do not define it but include a reference to it. In that
sense, the examination of this definition has a wider significance for environmental law.
I) In the Aarhus Convention
The Aarhus Convention defines this concept in paragraph 3 of article 2 and splits
environmental information into three categories (in three subparagraphs) 163 and within each
category illustrative lists are provided.
First, in subparagraph (a), environmental information includes any information in any
material form relating to the state of the elements of the environment. The Convention provides a
non-exhaustive list of such elements which can be "air and atmosphere", "water", "soil, land,
landscape and natural sites", and "biological diversity and its components, including genetically
modified organisms". These terms are not defined though some of them such as air, atmosphere,
soil and land can be interpreted as bearing their everyday meaning. For some other terms it might
be helpful to look at the definitions given to them by other instruments at international and
162 See above n. 97, at page 35.
163 Art. 2 par. 3 of the' Aarhus Convention mentions: "3. "Environmental information" means any information
in written, visual, aural, electronic or any other material form on:
The state of elements of the environment, such as air and atmosphere, water, soil, land, landscape and natural
sites, biological diversity and its components, including genetically modified organisms, and the interaction
among these elements;
Factors, such as substances, energy, noise and radiation, and activities or measures, including administrative
measures, environmental agreements, policies, legislation, plans and programmes, affecting or likely to affect
the elements of the environment within the scope of subparagraph (a) above, and cost-benefit and other
economic analyses and assumptions used in environmental decision-making;
The state of human health and safety, conditions of human life, cultural sites and built structures, inasmuch as
they are or may be affected by the state of the elements of the environment or, through these elements, by the
factors, activities or measures referred to in subparagraph (b) above;"
European level.l" For instance, the Council Directive on the deliberate release into the
environment of genetically modified organismszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA(2001l18IEC) provides the following definition of
a genetically modified organism:zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA"'genetically modifi d organism (GMO)" means an organism,
with the exception of human beings, in which the genetic material has been altered in a way that
does not occur naturally by mating and/or natural recombination ,165. Also, Article 2 of the
Convention on Biological Diversity gives the following definition of biological diversity: "the
variability among living organisms from all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and
other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are part; this includes
diversity within species, between species and of ecosystems= l'" The list also includes "the
interaction among these elements", which reflect the current trend in environmental law towards
recognising that the interaction between various elements is important in protecting the
environment, as demonstrated by the integrated pollution prevention and control regimes (notably
the IPPC EC Directive!").
Second, the Convention in the second group of environmental information described in
subparagraph (b), mentions two categories of information which are to be considered as
environmental information. This group is concerned with substances and activities that can affect
the environment.
It covers any cost-benefit and other economic analyses used in environmental decision-
making. This reflects the trend towards the usage of economic analysis and cost-benefit
calculations in modem environmental law and policy.!" The Convention however does not define
the term "environmental decision-making", which might seem problematic since some decisions
even if they have environmental consequences might have also other aims and so this could include
almost any aspect of governmental policy.!" For instance, economic analyses on affordable
housing might take into consideration the environment, so could be considered as environmental
decision-making.
On the other hand, the Convention considers as environmental information any information
on 1) factors, 2) activities or 3) measures that affect or are likely to affect the elements of the
environment, as mentioned in the previous subparagraph. The Convention lists some of these
factors which can be substances such as energy, noise and radiation. These factors are any natural
agents and there is no distinction as to whether they are produced by human actions or natural
causes. There is also a list of the activities and measures and these can be any administrative
164 As mentioned in Stec et al., above n. 97, at p. 36.
165 Art. 2 of Directive 2001l18IEC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 March 2001 on the
deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms and repealing Council Directive
90/220lEEC OJ of the EC, L 106 , 17/04/2001 p. 1.
166 For the full text of the Convention on biological Diversity of June 1992, see http://www.biodiv.org/
167 Council Directive 96/61IEC of24 September 1996 concerning integrated pollution prevention and control,
OJ of the EC, L 257,10/10/1996 p. 26.
168 See inter alia, S. Bell and D. McGillivray in Ball and Bell on Environmental Law, Blackstone Press, 5zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAth
edition 2000, page 15.
169 See Wilsher, above n. 304, at page 682.
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measures, environmental agreements, policies, legislation, plans and programmes, thus covering
every action of public bodies. They are not expressly linked to human activities but would be
normally such in practice.
Third, in subparagraph (c) the Convention explicitly considers as environmental
information the state of human health and safety, cultural sites, and other aspects of the built
environment. However, since this could be a far reaching provision, they are only included to the
extent that they are or may be affected by the elements of the environment, or by the factors,
activities or measures outlined in subparagraph (b). Since subparagraph (b) refers to subparagraph
(a) the elements mentioned therein are also included for the interpretation of paragraph (c).
Subparagraph (c) matters are environmental information only if potentially affected by the factors,
activities or measures in (b), whichzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAin turn have to affect the environment through an
environmental element mentioned in subparagraph (a). This is a very complicated wording, but it
was deemed necessary when drafting the Convention in order to prevent a whole range of human
health and safety information unrelated to the environment falling under the definition.!"
2) In the 2003 Directive and the Environmental Information Regulations 2004.
The definition in the 2003 Directive sticks very close to the definition in the Aarhus
Convention.!" This is due to the fact that the European Commission considered during the adoption
stage that it was more appropriate to stick as closely as possible to the definition of the Aarhus
convention.l" However, there are differences in that the Directive provides more detailed
illustrative lists of what can be environmental information, and which complete, without
modifying, the meaning of the definition used in Aarhus. These differences are undoubtedly useful,
since they help in the understanding of what is environmental information, though we doubt if they
170 Such as information relating to specific medical procedures or safety mechanisms. SeezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAStec et al., above n.
97, atp. 38.
171 At art. 2 par. I of the 2003 Directive: " 'E~vironmental information' shall mean any information in
written, visual, aural, electronic or any other matenal form .on:
(a) the state of the elements of the environment, such as air and atmosphere, water, soil, land, landscape and
natural sites including wetlands, coastal and marine areas, biological diversity and its components, including
genetically modified organisms, and the interaction among these elements;
(b) factors, such as substances, energy, noise, radiation or waste, including radioactive waste, emissions,
discharges and other releases into the environment, affecting or likely to affect the elements of the
environment referred to in (a);
(c) measures (including administrative measures), such as policies, legislation, plans, programmes,
environmental agreements, and activities affecting or likely to affect the elements and factors referred to in
(a) and (b) as well as measures or activities designed to protect those elements;
(d) reports on the implementation of environmental legislation;
(e) cost-benefit and other economic analyses and assumptions used within the framework of the measures
and activities referred to in (c); and
(t) the state of human health and safety, including the contamination of the food chain, where relevant,
conditions of human life, cultural sites and built structures inasmuch as they are or may be affected by the
state of the elements of the environment referred to in (a) or, through those elements, by any of the matters
referred to in (b) and (c) ".
172 See the Opinion of the Commission, below n. 226.
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add anything that was not already impliedly included in the general definition of the Aarhus
Convention.
First, as analysed before, the state of the elements of the environment are considered as
environmental information and an example of these elements are natural sites. The Directive
defines natural sites as expresslyzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA'including wetlands, coastal and marine areas'.
Second, the 2003 Directive adds to the definition of measures and elements affecting or
likely to affect the elements of the environment (which are considered as environmental
information), 'waste, including radioactive waste, emissions, discharges and other releases into the
environment'. What is waste is not defined, though reference could be made to Directive 75/442
on waste'" which defines waste as any substance or object which the holder disposes of or is
required to dispose of pursuant to the provisions of national law in force.
Also, the 2003 Directive adds to the definition of measures and elements affecting or likely
to affect the elements of the environment, all 'measures or activities designed to protect those
elements'.
Moreover, expressly considered as environmental information by the 2003 Directive are all
'reports on the implementation of environmental legislation' .
Finally, the 2003 Directive also expressly includes under the definition of the state of
human health and safety, which is environmental information, 'the contamination of the food chain,
where relevant'. The usage of the phrase 'where relevant' is confusing and difficult to understand.
However, if one looks at how this phrase was adopted, it seems that it indicates that not all of the
information on the contamination of the food chain is environmental information, but only those
that are relevant to the elements of the environment. Initially, the European Parliament had
included an amendment in the European Commission's proposal of the Directive that was seeking
to introduce into the definition of environmental information food safety. However, both the
Council of the European Communities'" and the European Commission'" refused this amendment,
considering that food safety was outside the scope of environmental information. Still, at the
conciliatory stage the above-mentioned median position was adopted at the expense of clarity. In
any case, it will be almost impossible to distinguish which information on the contamination of the
food chain is relevant and which is not, thus probably resulting in diverging approaches between
various member-states or public authorities. However, an attempt to indicate where such a
distinction could be has been made by the ECJ in the case of Eva Glawischnig v Bundesminister for
soziale Sicherheit, is examined later.
173 At art. 1 of the Council DirectivezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA751442IEEC of 15 July 1975 on waste, OJ L 194,25/07/1975, p. 39. See
also Ludwig Kramer, The distinction between product and waste in Community law, [2003] 11(1) Env.
Liability 3-13.
174 See Common Position (EC) No 24/2002 of28 January 2002 adopted by the Council, acting in accordance
with the procedure referred to in Article 251 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, with a view
to adopting a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on public access to environmental
information and repealing Council Directive 90/3131EEC, OJ C 113E/l.
175 See Opinion of the Commission, below n. 226.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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The new 2004 Regulations mention at reg. 2( 1) that environmental information "has the
same meaning as in article 2(1) of the Directive" and then repeat verbatim the same definition
found in the 2003 Directive.
3) Comparison with the 1990 Directive and the Environmental Information Regulations 1992.
It is interesting to note, that even if the definition of the 1990 Directive already
encompassed a broad definition of environmental information, it was considered that this definition
had to be made more comprehensive and explicit (in the new Directive) so as to encompass certain
categories of environmentally-relevant information which had been excluded by various restrictive
interpretations in member states.!" The scope of application of the 90/313 Directive covered any
available information in written, visual, aural or data-base form on the state of water, air soilzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA, ,
fauna, flora, land and natural sites, and on activities (including those which give rise to nuisances
such as noise) or measures adversely affecting, or likely so to affect these, and on activities or
measures designed to protect these, including administrative measures and environmental
management programmes."? The 1992 regulations used a similar wording.!" Since this definition is
similar to the new ones mentioned above (in the 2003 Directive and the 2004 Regulations), apart
from the fact that it is less detailed, the ECJ decisions which have interpreted it are still relevant
today and thus shall be examined further on.
4) Specific references to the environmental information directives in other binding EC legislation
It should also be noted that apart from the general definition of environmental information
found in the environmental information directives, a multitude of other pieces of secondary EC law
contain references to these directives.
First, a great number of Commission decisions which grant financial assistance to specific
projects (mainly the building of various infrastructure projects like motorways, airports etc) also
provide a clause that the Member State concerned shall ensure transparent and open access to
appropriate information requested by the public in relation to that project and that with regard to
176 See the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on public access to
environmental information,zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBACOMl2000/0402 f nal, 28/1112000, OJ C 337 E, p. 156.
177 At art 2 par (a): ' "information relating to the environment" shall mean any available information in
written, visual, aural or data-base form on the state of water, air, soil, fauna, flora, land and natural sites, and
on activities (including those which give rise to nuisances such as noise) or measures adversely affecting, or
likely so to affect these, and on activities or measures designed to protect these, including administrative
measures and environmental management programmes;'
178 Regulation 2(2) which provides that: ' ... information relates to the environment if, and only if, it relates to
any of the following, that is to say-- (a) the state of any water or air, the state of flora or fauna, the state of
any soil or the state of any natural site or other land; (b) any activities or measures (including activities giving
rise to noise or any other nuisance) which adversely affect anything mentioned in sub- paragraph (a) above or
are likely adversely to affect anything so mentioned; (c) any activities or administrative or other measures
(including any environmental management programmes) which are designed to protect anything so
mentioned. '
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environmental projects the provisions of Council DirectivezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA90/313IEEC have to be respected. As an
example, a 1993 Commission Decision on the grant of financial assistance for a sewage treatment
project, contains the provision that "The Member State concerned should ensure that the general
public are aware of the role played by the Community in financing the project. The following
measures, inter alia, should be undertaken with this end in view: [. ..} from the outset, the Member
State concerned shall ensure that there is transparent and open access to appropriate information
requested by the public".179 This is a standard clause, contained in all of these decisions. 180
Second, many binding community acts (mainly directives and regulations) adopted by
community institutions in the field of environmental protection contain a specific reference to the
provisions of one of the environmental information directives, usually explicitly extending or
limiting the scope of the right to access environmental information to cover the information
gathered by state authorities in the application of the directive or regulation containing this
reference."! As an example, article 17 of Directive 2003/87 IEC establishing a scheme for
179 In: Commission Decision of 6 October 1993 concerning the grant of assistance from the cohesion
financial instrument to the following project in Ireland: Dublin (Ringsend) sewage treatment (stage 1) No
CF: 93/07/611014, 931708IEEC, OJ L 331, 3111211993 p. 29.
180 There are approximately 188 Commission Decisions adopted between 1993 and 1994 that concern the
grant of assistance from the cohesion financial instrument to the realisation of a specific project. All these
measures contain the above-mentioned clause. This clause has been inserted in accordance with Council
Regulation (EEC) No 2082/93 of 20 July 1993 amending Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88 laying down
provisions for implementing Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 as regards coordination of the activities of the
different Structural Funds between themselves and with the operations of the European Investment Bank and
the other existing fmancial instruments, OJ L 193, 31/07/1993 p. 20, which provides in its preamble that
when providing fmancial assistance from community structural funds "there should be greater transparency
in the implementation of structural assistance whereas, to that end, care should be taken to ensure
compliance with Council Directive 9013131EECof 7 June 1990 on the freedom of access to information on
the environment'.
181 Reference to thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA2003/4IEC directive is made in the following acts: Regulation (EC) No 85012004 of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on persistent organic pollutants and amending
Directive 79/1171EEC, OJ L 158,30104/2004 p. 7; Directive 2003/87IEC (see below); Directive 2003/35IEC
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 May 2003 providing for public participation in respect
of the drawing up of certain plans and programmes relating to the environment and amending with regard to
public participation and access to justice Council Directives 85/337IEEC and 96/611EC, OJ L 156,
25106/2003 p. 17, and also in the following proposals of EC acts still in the course of adoption: Proposal for a
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the Registration, Evaluation,
Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (Reach), establishing a European Chemicals Agency and
amending Directive 1999/45IEC and Regulation (EC) on Persistent Organic Pollutants [SEC(2003 11710E],
COMl2003/0644 fmal - COD 2003/0256; Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council amending the Directive establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within
the Community, in respect of the Kyoto Protocol's project mechanisms [SEC(2003) 785], COMl2003/0403
fmal - COD 2003/0173; Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
management of waste from the extractive industries COMl2003/0319 final- COD 2003/0107; Proposal for a
Council Decision on the signature, on behalf of the European Community of the Protocol on civil liability
and compensation for damage caused by the transboundary effects of industrial accidents on transboundary
waters, COMl2003/0263 final; Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council
establishing an infrastructur.e for spatial information in the Community (INSPIRE), [SEC (2004) 980], COM
(2004) 516 final, 2004/0175 (COD).
Reference to the 90/313IEEC directive is made in the following acts: 2003/2411EC: Commission Decision
of 26 March 2003 amending Commission Decision 1999/391IEC of 31 May 1999 concerning the
questionnaire relating to Council Directive 96/61IEC concerning integrated pollution prevention and control
(IPPC) (implementation of Council Directive 911692IEEC), OJ 2003 L89/17; Regulation (EC) No 304/2003
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 concerning the export and import of
dangerous chemicals, OJ 2003 L63/1; Directive 2002/49IEC of the European Parliament and of the CouncilzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community mentions thatzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA"decisions
relating to the allocation of allowances and the reports of emissions required under the greenhouse
gas emissions permit and held by the competent authority shall be made available to the public by
that authority subject to the restrictions laid down in Article 3(3) and Article 4 of DirectivezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
2003/4/EC".182
These two groups of secondary EC legislative acts which explicitly make reference to the
environmental information directives, can be seen as being a specific list of what constitutes
environmental information, alongside the general definition provided for in the information
directives. Although most of the times such information would still be covered by the general
definition, the community institutions, probably in an attempt to clarify things, expressly refer to
the environmental information directives. Thus, for the sake of completeness, one cannot just stop
at the general definition of the environmental information directives, but also has to examine
whether the specific information he is asking for, is not expressly being characterised as
environmental information falling under the scope of the environmental information directives, by
an explicit provision found in one of the many directives or regulations adopted in the field of
environmental protection.
of 25 June 2002 relating to the assessment and management of environmental noise, OJ 2002 Ll89/12;
Directive 2000176IEC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 December 2000 on the incineration
of waste, OJ 2000 L332/91; 1999/3911EC: Commission Decision of 31 May 1999 concerning the
questionnaire relating to Council Directive 96/61IEC concern~g integrated pollution prevention and control
(IPPC) (implementation of Council Directive 9116921EEC) \notIfied under document number C(1999) 1395),
OJ 1999 L148/39' Council Directive 1999/31IEC of26 Apnl1999 on the landfill of waste,zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAOJ 1999 Ll8211'
Council Directiv~ 1999/13IEC of 11 March 1999 on the limitation of emissions of volatile organi~
compounds due to the use of organic solvents in certain activities and installations, OJ 1999 L85/1; Council
Directive 98/83IEC of 3 November 1998 on the quality of water intended for human consumption, OJ 1998
L330/32; Council Directive 98/81IEC of26 October 1998 amending Directive 90/219IEEC on the contained
use of genetically modified micro-organisms, OJ 1998 L3~0/13; Directive 98/8IEC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 1998 concernmg the placing of biocidal products on the
market, OJ 1998 Ll2311; 961733IEC: Commission Recommendation of 9 December 1996 concerning
Environmental Agreements implementing Community directives, OJ 1996 L333/59; Council Regulation
(EC) No 338/97 of 9 December 1996 on the protection of species of wild fauna and flora by regulating trade
therein, OJ 1997 L6111; Council Directive 96/61IEC of 24 September 1996 concerning integrated pollution
prevention and control, OJ 1996 L257/26; Council Directive 94/67IEC of 16 December 1994 on the
incineration of hazardous waste, OJ 1994 L365/34; Council Directive 911414IEEC of 15 July 1991
concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market, OJ 1991 L230/1; Council Directive
911271IEEC of 21 May 1991 concerning urban waste-water treatment, OJ 1991 L135/40; and also in the
following proposals of EC acts still in the course of adoption: Proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council on persistent organic pollutants and amending Directives 791117IEEC and
96/591EC, COMl2003/0333 final - COD 2003/0119; Proposal for a Council Regulation concerning the export
and import of dangerous chemicals, COMl2001l0803 final - ACC 2002/0026, OJ 2002 C126E/291;
Amended Proposal for a European Parliament and Council recommendation providing for minimum criteria
for environmental inspections in the Member States, COMl99/0652 fmal - COD 99/0358; Amended proposal
for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the incineration of waste OJ 2000 C 150E/l; Proposal
for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an infrastructure for spatial
information in the Community (INSPIRE), 231712004, COM(2004) 516 final, 2004/0175 (COD).
182 Directive 2003/87IEC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a
scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council
Directive 96/611EC, OJ L 275, 25/10/2003 p. 32.
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5) In European Court of Justice case law.
There are only three European Court of Justice cases so far which have construed the
definition of environmental information: thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAMecklenburg case.!" the Commission v. France'"
case, and the case of Eva Glawischnig v Bundesminister for soziale Sicherheit/"
In the Mecklenburg case, the European Court of Justice had the occasion to reiterate the
widest possible reading of the general definition of what is environmental information. The Court
first affirmed that the wording of the definition of environmental information makes it clear that the
Community legislature intended to make that concept a broad one, embracing both information and
activities relating to the state of the sectors of the environment. The EC] proceeded to note that in
order to constitute information relating to the environment, for the purposes of the directive, it is
sufficient for a statement of views put forward by an authority to be an act capable of adversely
affecting or protecting the state of one of the sectors of the environment covered by the directive
(water, air, land etc). That is the case, where a statement of views is capable of influencing the
outcome of development consent proceedings as regards interests pertaining to the protection of the
environment. As a consequence, the Court ruled that the definition of environmental information of
Directive 90/313 is to be interpreted as covering a statement of views given by a countryside
protection authority in development consent proceedings (concerning planning approval for the
construction of a bypass), if that statement is capable of influencing the outcome of those
proceedings with respect to interests pertaining to the protection of the environment.
In the case of Eva Glawischnig v Bundesminister for soziale Sicherheit, the issue was
whether details of examinations carried out by the national administrative authorities to monitor
compliance with the rules on the labelling of certain foodstuffs produced from genetically modified
organisms established out in the regulation on the labelling of food-products containing GMO
ingredients'" can constitute information relating to the environment within the meaning of the
1990 directive. The Advocate General, in his opinion.!" first considered that information on
whether complaints have been made or what penalties have been imposed with respect to the
marketing of products whose labelling does not comply with these Community provisions, does not
in itself describe or give any indication as to the present situation of the "state of water, air, soil,
fauna, flora, land and natural sites." Second, he considered that the information in question does
not relate to activities or measures capable of adversely affecting the environment, since
examinations carried out by the Austrian authorities to monitor compliance with the labelling ofzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
183 Wilhelm Mecklenburg v Kreis Pinneberg - Der Landrat[1998] ECR 1-3809.
184 Commission of the European Communities v French Republic, Case C-233/00, [2003] ECR 1-6625.
18S Eva Glawischnig v Bundesminister for soziale Sicherheit, Case C-316/01, [2003] ECR 1-5995.
186 Council Regulation (EC) No 1139/98 of 26 May 1998 concerning the compulsory indication of the
labelling of certain foodstuffs produced from genetically modified organisms of particulars other than those
provided for in Directive 79/1121EEC (OJ 1998 L 159, p. 4). Regulation No 1139/98 was amended by
Commission Regulation (EC) No 49/2000 of 10 January 2000 (OJ 2000 L 6, p. 13).
187 Opinion of the Advocate General Tizzano, delivered on 5 December 2002 on Case C-316/0 I, at par. 15.
Available from http://curia.eu.int
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foodstuffs containing GMOs is an activity that is clearly not, in itself, capable of adversely
affecting the environment. Thirdly and most importantly, the Advocate General referred to the
judgement inzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAMecklenburg, where it was established that in orderto constitute information relating
to the environment, the activity of public authorities must consist of acts capable of protecting the
state of one of the sectors of the environment covered by the directive, such as air water, land etc.
Then he referred to the purpose of the GMO labelling regulation, as laid down in its preamble,
which is not about protecting human health or protecting the environment (even if the environment
is taken as including human health), but the free movements of goods and the interests of
consumers. He based his interpretation strictly on the preamble of the GMO labelling regulation
and its legal basis, which concern the removal of potential obstacles to the free movement of
products containing genetically modified soy and maize, and the provision of information to
consumers about the content of foodstuffs so as to enable them to make a rational choice when
buying them. He then concluded that since the information sought concerned examinations carried
out to ensure compliance with the GMO labelling regulation, such information does not relate to
activities or measures designed to protect the environment within the meaning of the directive. This
interpretation is undoubtedly restrictive and is based strictly on a literal interpretation of the aim of
the GMO labelling regulations, which is an economic one and one aiming at protecting consumers.
These regulations are undoubtedly an economic instrument, though they aim at protecting
indirectly, the environment, since GMOs are seen by some as a threat to the ecosystem. It is thus an
economic and market device which aims at empowering consumers to oust from the market GMO
products and thus limiting their cultivation and expansion.!" The inherent environmental objective
towards the protection of the state of land and the eco-system is evident though the Advocate-
General only concentrates on the aims of the regulations as set out in them, without looking further
on. Such literal, interpretation ~f what is in fact an environmental protection instrument, is a very
restrictive interpretation, different from the interpretation given by the BCJ in general, where a
teleological approach prevails. The ECJ in its judgement, upheld this interpretation and ruled that
the name of the manufacturer and the product description of foodstuffs which have been the subject
of administrative measures for controlling compliance with Regulation 1139/98 concerning the
compulsory indication in the labelling of certain foodstuffs produced from genetically modified
organisms and the number of administrative penalties imposed following those measures, and the
producers and products concerned by such penalties, do not constitute information relating to the
environment within the meaning of article 2(a) of the 1990 Directive. The Court even if it accepts
that the concept of environmental information is a broad one, adds that it is not an all encompassing
concept as it states that: 'Directive 901313 is not intended, however, to give a general and unlimited
right of access to all information held by public authorities which has a connection, however
188 On economic and market devices aiming at indirectly protecting the environment in general, see
Alexandre Kiss and Dinah Shelton, Principles of European Environmental Law, 2zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAnd edition 1999, Cambridg
University Press, Ch. 5: Techniques of Environmental Law, at pp. 112 et seq.
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minimal, with one of the environmental/actors mentioned in Article 2(a)'.189zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIn any case, it should
be noted that under the new Directive, the state of the elements of the environment expressly
include GMOs, and thus any measures which concern them (as the ones in this case) should be
considered as environmental information.!"
In the case of Commission v. France, the EC] had to examine whether France had correctly
transposed the Environmental Information Directive in its national law by only providing for a
general regime to access administrative information."! This was considered as possible, in
principle, as long as the whole of the Directive is correctly transposed in a precise and binding
manner. As far as the definition of environmental information is concerned, the Advocate
General,"? first examined whether the definition of information that is accessible under the 1978
general freedom of information regime was sufficient so as to cover at least all environmental
information covered by the 1990 environmental information Directive. She considered that the
definition of 'administrative documents' of the French general freedom of information regime
could not be considered as equivalent to the Directive's definition, since under this French generic
definition are only accessible documents that have a certain link with the exercise of public
functions, thus leaving out documents totally unrelated to duties performed by public authorities.
The Advocate General arrived to this conclusion by referring to the interpretation of the EC] in the
Mecklenburg case, where it was decided that the notion of environmental information had to be
interpreted widely and that consequently any information on the environment is covered and not
only information relating to the protection of it. So, she concluded that information simply referring
to the state of the environment, such as general information documents, are covered by the
Directive but not by the general freedom of information regime. It is also important to stress, that
the Advocate General rejected the argument put forward by the French government that an
interpretation of the definition of 'administrative documents' in conformity with the definition
given by the Directive, by the competent administrative body supervising the correct application of
the French regime, 193 was sufficient so as to be a precise transposition of the Directive. This is
important since it indicates that even if the Environmental Information Directive could be
189 At par. 25 of the judgement.
190 However, as the ECJ indicates at par. 5 of its judgement, the new 2003 Directive cannot be taken into
account since '..; as Directive 2003/4 replaces Directive 90/313 with effect only from 14 February 2005, the
latter directive is the one which applies to the main proceedings in this case'.
191 See for more details the relevant chapter on the French system of access to information. France, only in
2001 and due to the commencement of legal action in front of the ECJ transposed the 1990 Directive.
However, the European Commission has a right to pursue an action for incorrect transposition of EC law,
even if the member-state has transposed the legislation in question after the time-limit given in the reasoned
opinion addressed by the Commission under article 266 'of the EC Treaty, if there is still an interest in
pursuing the action in order to establish the basis of liability which a Member State may incur, as a result of
its default, towards other Member States, the Community or private parties (Case C- 29/90 Commission v
Greece [1992] ECR 1-1971, par. 12, and Case C-207/00 Commission v Italy [2001] ECR 1-4571, par. 28,
Case C-166/00 Commission v Greece [2001] ECR 1-9835, par. 9).
192 See the Opinion of the Advocate General Christine Stix-Hackl, delivered on 14 January 2003 on Case C-
233/00. Available from http://curia.eu.int (in French)
193 This body is the Commission on Access to Administrative Documents, examined in detail in the relevant
chapter on the French system of freedom of environmental information.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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transposed through general freedom of information legislation, such legislative instruments should
precisely define accessible information so as to encompass beyond any doubt environmental
information and not require any 'external' interpretation by a court oflaw or other body.l" so as to
cover the Directive's requirements.
The EC] upheld this interpretation and it also added that it follows from the use of the
phrase 'including administrative measures' in the defmition of environmental information found in
article 2(a) of DirectivezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA90/313 that this definition must be of a wider scope than all the activities of
the public authorities. As a consequence, the Court ruled that the 1990 Directive applies to any
measure, of whatever kind, which is likely to affect or protect the state of one of the sectors of the
environment covered by that directive, so that information relating to the environment must be
understood to include documents which are not related to carrying out a public service.!"
One has to acknowledge that the EC] seems to have taken two opposing views of
the scope of environmental information in the respective cases of Commission v France
and Eva Glawischnig v Bundesminister for soziale Sicherheit.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIn the former case we are
told that environmental information covers any measure likely to affect or protect the state
of one of the sectors of the environment but in the latter we are told that this is not totally
true and that there are limits to the definition of environmental information. It is difficult to
explain why the EC] has reached these opposing views. However, it can be argued that it is
not very important because these 2 cases were decided under the old 1990 directive, and now,
under the 2003 directive, the scope of the definition of environmental information has been
widened even further and expressly includes information on GMOs.
6) In United-Kingdom case law.
There are also two English cases which decide issues evolving around the definition of
what is environmental information under the definition of the Environmental Information
Regulations 1992.
The case of R v. British Coal Corporation ex parte Ibstock Building Products Limited/"
concerned the information given to British Coal by a member of the public that naval munitions
had been dumped down in about 1947 in one of the Ibstock mineshafts for disposal. A request was
made for the name of the informant under the 1992 regulations and this was refused by British
Coal, arguing inter alia that the name of the informant was not information relating to the state of
the land and thus was not environmental information and so the regulations were not applicable.
194 As held in the EC] case of Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of the Netherlands, 10
May 2001, Case C-144/99: at par. 21: 'even where the settled case-law of a Member State interprets the
provisions of national law in a manner deemed to satisfy the requirements of a directive, that cannot achieve
the clarity and precision needed to meet the requirement of legal certainty'. Available from http://curia.eu.int
195 At par. 46 and 47 of the judgement.
196 [ 1995] Env. L.R. 277.
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Harrison J., expressly stated that the definition of what is environmental information has to be
interpreted broadly. He also considered that the source of any information relating to the dumping
ofthe munitions can be said to 'relate to' the state of the land because it directly affects the quality
of that information and that it was necessary to know the source of the information in order to
assess the credibility of the information and to assess how much weight can be attached to it. He
also mentioned that since the purpose of the legislation was to provide for freedom of access to
information on the environment, it would have been strange if the legislature had intended that
only the bare information itself should be disclosed, without it being possible to ascertain whether
it was right, wrong or indifferent. Therefore, he concluded that the source of the information which
relates to the state of the land is capable of being information which 'relates to' the state ofthe land
and thus is environmental information. This case, which was the first English case applying the
1992 regulations, is important since it established the principle that environmental information is a
concept that has a broad meaning, even before the ruling of the ECJ in thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAMecklenburg case. It
also establishes the principle that the source of environmental information, is environmental
information itself and cannot be separated from it (except when it falls into one of the exemptions).
The second English case that dealt with the definition of environmental information, was
the case of the Birmingham Northern Relief Road. 197 This case concerned the challenge by way of
judicial review of a refusal by the Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the
Regions to disclose under the 1992 regulations a copy of the concession agreement made between
him and Midland Expressway Ltd for the construction of the Birmingham Northern Relief Road,
the first toll-financed motorway in Britain. Sullivan J., stated that whether information relates to the
environment, is a factual issue that has to be decided by the Court and there is no discretion
involved in this classification on the part of public authorities. The Court also accepted that the
definition of environmental information in Article 2 of the Directive was very broad, and that this
broad definition had been carried through into the 1992 Regulations and expressly endorsed the
same interpretation given in the Ibstock case. Then the Court ruled that the concession agreement
was in fact environmental information since it contained information relating to the environment.
The Court also accepted that even if an agreement can be described as a 'commercial document'
this does not mean that it does not contain information, which relates to the environment. This
seems to indicate that it is the content of a document, rather than its title or its description, which
are important when determining whether it is covered or not by the Regulations.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
ii)zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAThe form of accessible informationzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
197 R. v. Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions & Midland Expressway Limited,
ex parte. Alliance against the Birmingham Northern Relief Road & Others [1999] JPL 231.
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Has the information to be in a specific physical or immaterial form so as to be considered
as information which ought to be disclosed if it is requested?
The Aarhus convention indicates that environmental information may be in any material
form either existing today or yet to be discovered'" and provides examples of written, visual, aural
and electronic forms. SteczyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAet al.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA199 consider t at t e 'any other material form' phrase used in the
Convention is not meant to restrict the definition of enviro~ental information to finished products
or other documentation and that therefore information in raw and unprocessed form is obtainable as
well as documents. The new 2003 Directive as well as the new Regulations'" expressly mention in
identical terms that accessible environmental information can be in any form whatsoever. They also
add that the information might also be in any "format" apart from any "form". The term of "form"
refers to the physical appearance of information such as paper, oral, video or electronic, whether
"format" refers to the different ways of presenting information within a particular form.i"
The 90/313 Directive'f took a similar approach since it applied to any information in
written, visual, aural or data-base form, even if there was no express reference to forms not yet
discovered. The 1992 regulations transposed this requirement by being applicable to information
contained in 'any records' .203 This was interpreted by the Government as any information held by a
body in documents, pictures, maps, records, registers, reports, returns, computer records and other
non-documentary records.i"
One further issue that arises is information in an incomprehensible or illegible form. This
could especially be information stored in an obsolete computer format, which cannot be read
anymore by modem computers. Could this information be communicated? The answer seems to be
yes. If illegible or incomprehensible information can be reproduced on a paper format (or another
digital format that can be 'read' by existing machines) then it would have to be communicated.
However, if supposedly, the information was held on media (disks etc) so technologically obsolete
as to have become de facto illegible by existing machines and computers, then this data should be
treated as being non-existent, and thus there would be no obligation to disclose it, as examined
below.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
iii) Is there a right to access documents or only information?
198 Art. 3.
199 36See Stec et al., above n. 97, at p. 35- .
200 )Aarhus art. 2(1) and at Reg. 2( 1 .
201 See Ralph Hallo, Proposal for a new directive on public access to environmental information: An




204 See the Guidance, below n. 269, at par. 15.
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The requirement that copies of actual documents should be provided, and not only the
information requested in extracts or abstracts, is an important one, since it ensures that members of
the public are able to see the specific information requested in full, in the original language and in
context.F" without being subject to arbitrary 'editing' of information by civil servants. Otherwise,
this could lead to possible attempts by public authorities to censor requested information before
disclosing it.
The Aarhus Convention explicitly addresses this issue and provides'" that public
authorities must disclose copies of the actual documents containing the information requested,
rather than excerpts or summaries. The only exception to this requirement is when the requested
information is available in another form, though this is a different issue and means that the
documents requested might not necessarily be in a paper form or a specific form requested. The
right of access under the Convention extends to the documents themselves, even if the person that
makes the request does not necessarily have a right to obtain the documents he asks in a paper form
(since the same document can be in various forms).
The new 2003 Directive, also mentions'" this requirement of access to documents rather
than the information itself. However there can be a possible confusion in this area. The Directive
instead of clearly speaking about 'documents' containing the information requested as the
Convention, merely refers to 'copies' of the information requested. In view of the clear intention of
the Aarhus Convention, the usage of the word 'copies' in the Directive should not be taken as
referring to a paper format in which the requested information can be disclosed, but to the actual
copies of the documents containing the requested information, even if these documents are not in
paper form.
This issue also applies in the United-Kingdom, where both the 1992 regulations and the
present Freedom of Information Act 2000, are not about a right to obtain documents themselves,
but to information contained in them.
Concerning the 1992 Regulations, it is not clear at all whether they include the right to
access documents, or only extend to information. In a 1996 report by the House of Lord's Select
Committee on the application of the regulations, this issue was picked up, and the Committee
recommended clarification on the issue of whether access to information includes the right of
access to documents.F"
The government's response to this question was that the Regulations and the Code of
Practice on access to information made it clear that there was no commitment to make documents
205 SteczyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAet al. above n. 97, at p. 54.
206 At art. 4 par. 1: public authorities have to provide information ' ...including, where requested and subject
to subparagraph (b) below, copies of the actual documentation containing or comprising such information .. .'
207 At art. 4: 'Where an applicant requests a public authority to make environmental information available in
a specific form or format (including in the form of copies), the public authority shall make it so available
unless ... '
208 House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities: Freedom of Access to Information on
the Environment (with Evidence), 1996-97, HL Paper 9, at 6.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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available as opposed to information in response to requests for information.i" This seems to be the
approach implicitly adopted by the Court of Appeal in the case ofzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBALondon B rough o Tower
Hamlets ex parte Tilly.210 This case concerned a request to disclose under the 1992 regulations of a
report from the South End Institute of Public Health of a study on high volatile organic compounds
found in the air in a specific area. This report was incorporated in a second report produced by the
London Borough of Tower Hamlets. The Council after judicial proceedings had commenced,
disclosed the second report, which it claimed contained all of the information found in the initial
report, in addition to further information. The claimant, however, insisted on having the initial
report disclosed. The Court of Appeal refused to grant leave to move for judicial review (as
previously refused in the High Court) relying on the fact that the applicant had got the report she
was asking for and that there was no evidence suggesting that the Council had any other report in
their possession which was at variance with the report that had been produced. This reasoning,
even if not explicit, suggests that since an applicant has got all of the information contained in a
document he asks, he is not entitled to see thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAinitial document in which that information was
contained. So, the Court of Appeal seems to adopt the view that the 1992 regulations recognise a
right to access information rather than to the. documents themselves. The problem with this
approach is that there is no guarantee as to whether all of the information present in the initially
requested document has been disclosed. The new Regulations seem to address this problem through
criminal sanctions, though they do not solve the difficulty of finding out whether information has
been withheld.
The new 2004 regulations are evasive on this issue and do not provide a clear answer, but
merely mention that information should be provided in the form requested if it is 'reasonable', 211
thus making it possible to provide summaries or extracts of documents when deemed unreasonable
to do otherwise. It is thus probable, that this could lead to the recognition of a right to access
information rather than documents themselves, especially since this was also the case under the
previous regulations and the FOIA. The FOIA provides at s. 11 that public authorities can disclose
requested information in a different form than the one requested if this is reasonable in the
circumstances and if disclosure in the requested form is not reasonably practicable. One of the
acceptable forms for communication is digests or summaries of the information. Thus, summaries
or digests are acceptable when this is reasonable, and this indicates that the FOIA is not about a
right to access documents but about a right to obtain information.
In conclusion, if it is clear in Aarhus that there is a right of access to the actual documents
and not just the information contained in them, it seems that this requirement is not expressly and
unambiguously transposed in EC law nor in the new Regulations. This, if combined with the fact
209 Government Response to the House of Lords Select Committee Report on Freedom of Access to
Information on the Environment, Feb. 1997, at par. 18. Available from http;llwww.parliament.the-stationery-
office.co.ukipalld 199697 Iidselectiideucoml069xiilec 1233 .htm
210 [1996] Env. L.R. D23, [1996] 6(6) PELB 45.
211 Reg.6.
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that there isn't a right of access to documents themselves neither in the FOIA nor in the 1992
regulations as applied in thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBATilly case, might mean th t the requirement of accessing documents as
well as information won't be upheld in a legal challenge because of the vague provisions of the
new Directive and Regulations. However, the English courts ought to interpret the Regulations in
the light of both Aarhus and the Directive and so the courts ought to also allow access to
documents containing the information requested.
iv) Environmental information ratione loci: information held by a public
authority.
When it has been established that the requested information is environmental, an important
issue is where is the information being held and by whom. A logical answer to this is that since
environmental information is to be provided by public authorities, the requested information has to
be in the possession of the public body to which a request is made. This in tum raises the issue of
information held on behalf of a public body by another person and on information held by a public
authority but not produced by it. These issues are somewhat important since public bodies do not
always keep physical possession of their records.i" This is especially true concerning computer
records, as some private companies provide secure off-site storage of computerised disks for
backup purposes. In England, this is also important since some information can be passed for
safekeeping to the National Archives (formerly the Public Record Office) and until it is released for
general inspection, the ownership remains with the providing body?"
First it should be noted that the Aarhus Convention does not explicitly address any of these
issues, thus leaving it for the transposing legislators to provide. Only par. 3 of art. 4 provides that
requests might be refused when the information is not held by the public authority. This if analysed
a contrario, would seem to indicate that when a public authority holds information, then there is a
duty to provide it. However, there is no indication of when information is deemed to be held by a
public authority and if this includes information merely received by it and not produced by that
body. This was also the case under the 1990 Directive that spoke about 'available' data, without
defining it.214 This term was transposed in the 1992 Regulations as information in an 'accessible
form?" This was interpreted by the Government as any information held by a body whether or not
it was obtained as a result of that body's environmental responsibilities and located 'within the
212 Stec et aI, above n. 97, at p. 56.
213 See the Guidance, below n. 269, at par. 15.
214 At art. 2(a).
215 At reg. 2(l)(b).zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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body's buildings or elsewhere'. 216 This interpretation by the Government, has no binding effect
and the provisions do not expressly address this issue.
The new Directive is on the contrary, vel)' precise and indicates that information held by a
public authority shall be defined as information either in its possession or physically being held by
a natural or legal person on their behalf and which has been produced or received by that
authority."? These provisions have now been transposed in English law, through the new 2004
Regulations."!zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
v) Accuracy of information.
A further issue that arises, is whether information can be withheld on the basis of its
accuracy. Such a criterion, does not appear neither expressly nor impliedly in any of the legal
instruments that deal with the general right of accessing environmental information examined
herein. Consequently, one could expect any information held by public authorities to be available
regardless of its accuracy, since that would be the only interpretation that would not restrict access,
in conformity with a purposive approach.!" This is the approach impliedly taken by the
Government in its Guidance on the application of the 1992 Regulations:zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA'Bodie are adv sed to
consider the accuracy of any information they hold [...] In all cases validation could be costly. For
these and other reasons, bodies would be well advised to protect themselves by issuing a disclaimer
where appropriate about the accuracy of information that they release to the public and its
source' .220 It is clear from this phrase, that if some information is deemed inaccurate, authorities are
not to withhold it but rather to issue a warning to the applicant.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA,
However, this was not the approach taken by Eady J. in Maile v. Wigan Metropolitan
Borough Council/" This High Court case, concerned a challenge under the 1992 Regulations of
the refusal by a local authority to disclose an incomplete list of potentially contaminated sites that
could in some respects be misleading to the public and which could cause unnecessary alarm and
despondency among the local citizens and landowners. The judge mentioned as obiter dicta'" that
'The regulations are concerned with the availability of information (and I emphasise that word)
216 See Guidance, below n. 269, at par. 15.
217 Art. 2 par. 3 and 4.
218 At reg. 3( 1) and 3(2).
219 Since the Environmental Information Regulations stem from an EC Directive, they have to be construed
using a purposive approach. See for an example concerning an Act of Parliament the case of Campbell v
Mirror Group Newspapers [2002] EWCA Civ 1373 at par. 97, where it was stated that since the Data
Protection Act 1998 was based on an EC directive, the English courts had to adopt a purposive approach to
construction.
220 See the Guidance, below n. 269, at par. 21.
221 [2001] JPL 193. The case and its facts are discussed elsewhere in full.
2221b·d 81 ,at par ..
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and not speculation or preliminary thoughts based on limited research'P'zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAEven if this is not a
binding statement, it expresses a certain interpretation of the 1992 Regulations, which seems to
contradict the purpose and the clear word of the Directive and the Government's analysis of the
Regulations. All in all, it can be contended this statement is simply erroneous.f"
Even if information has to be disclosed regardless of its accuracy, the 2003 Directive does
contain an innovative provision dealing with the quality of environmental information. Article 8 of
the Directive provides that member states must ensure 'so far as within their power' that
information compiled by them or on their behalf is up to date, accurate and comparable.f" To
enable the public to verify that, public authorities must also disclose on request information on the
measurement procedures, including methods of analysis, sampling, and pre-treatment of samples,
used in compiling environmental information. First, it should be noted that this quality requirement
for environmental information does not apply to information not compiled by member states (or on
their behalf) and thus does not apply to information compiled by private or non-governmental
bodies,226even if held by authorities that are under a duty to provide it to the public upon request.
This requirement seems only to apply to member states themselves, thus only public authorities
stricto sensu as defined before. Second, the exact scope of this requirement is unclear since it is
only addressed to member states and does not seem to be formulated in binding terms. It can thus
be contended that it has no direct effect. 227
The new 2004 Regulations, seem to correctly transpose this requirement by providing in
reg. 5(4) that when the information made available is compiled by the public authority it shall be up
to date, accurate and comparable, but only "so far as the public authority reasonably believes".
Also, reg. 5(5) provides that as information on releases into the environment are concerned, if the
applicant requests it, it has to indicate, if this is possible, of the place where information can be
found on the measurement procedures, including methods of analysis, sampling, and pre-treatment
223As we shall examine further-on, the Court ruled that information did not have to be communicated since it
was incomplete information. This statement, though, seems to refer to the accuracy of the information
regardless of it being in the course of completion or not.
224As Bakkenist indicates 'Arguments that the public will misinterpret data causing unwarranted alarm and
ill-founded "remedial" actions are not accepted as an excuse for withholding detailed and technical data,
especially as environmental and consumer organisations increasingly employ specialists able to interpret such
data.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIn general it may be expected that abuse of information in order to cause alarm is actually less possible
if actual data on risk is available and explained'., see below n. 311, at p. 83.
225At par. 1 of art. 8: 'Member States shall, so far as is within their power, ensure that any information that is
compiled by them or on their behalf is up to date, accurate and comparable'.
226As the European Commission indicated when refusing amendments by the European Parliament intended
to extend this requirement to all available information.v/r is not up to the public authority to guarantee that
the content of the information is of a good quality when the information originates from other sources than
from the public authority itself. See the Opinion of the Commission pursuant to Article 251 (2), third
subparagraph, point (c) of the EC Treaty, on the European Parliament's amendments to the Council's
common position regarding the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
public access to environmental information amending the proposal of the Commission pursuant to Article
250 (2) of the EC Treaty, COMl2002/0498 final, 5/9/2002. Available from http://europa.eu.int
227And thus the only competent authority to bring a legal action against an incorrect transposition of this
requirement would be through the EC Commission. See Horspool, .op. cit.
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of samples, used in compiling the information, or refer the applicant to the standardised procedures
used.
vi) Environmental informationzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAratione· tempor s - Historical records and
transferred recordszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
An interesting issue that should be briefly examined is whether the Directive and the
Regulations have retroactive effect. Is information that came into the possession of public
authorities before the entering into force of the Regulations accessible? A possible rationale for
such information not being accessible would be that information given to public authorities in
belief it would never be made public, should remain confidential, even if not covered by one of the
exemptions.f" However, since such an interpretation would certainly undermine the purpose of
access to environmental information, what is accessible data should be interpreted in conformity
with its literal meaning, thus including any information regardless of its date of acquisition.
This leads to the question of whether there is a time-limit for environmental information to
be accessible? Such time-limits can either concern the future or the past. Concerning the future, as
we shall examine in more detail further on, there is no right to access and therefore ask for
information that has not yet been created, since there is an exemption relating to materials in the
course of completion. If materials not yet completed are not to be disclosed, then a fortiori
materials whose creation process has not even started are not to be disclosed either. In any case,
such materials would be inexistent at the time of the request and could not be considered as
environmental information either way.
As a consequence of the above, the environmental information regime does not allow a
request requiring the periodic and regular provision of information to be honoured, as when one
subscribes to a magazine for it to be sent periodically in the future.
Concerning the past, the question that arises is whether very old archives are accessible.
Since neither Aarhus nor the Directive provide for such a limitation, it can be safely concluded that
even if materials have been transferred in historical archives, this does not affect the rights of
individuals to access them.
A further question that arises is under which statutory provisions is environmental
information present in such archives accessible. Is it accessible under the regulations, or under the
specific provisions governing and limiting access to such archives (e.g. the Public Records Act
1958)? Since the Environmental Information Regulations stem from EC law, this indicates that the
Regulations override less liberal (more restrictive) provisions of such other regime governing
access to information. This means that the Environmental Information Regulations, in conformity
228 See Bakkenist, below n. 311, at p. 50.
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with the fact that the Environmental Information Directive is a minimum threshold for member-
states to achieve.f" cannot supersede more liberal provisions even if it is an EC law instrument.
In any case, the new 2004 Regulations provide at reg. 17 that they also apply to archived
historical records, but that the bodies that are in charge of such records have to be involved in the
decision-making process. To this end, reg. 17(1) mentions that when a request relates to
information contained in a historical record and the public authority concerned considers the public
interest test might favour a refusal of disclosure, then it cannot accept or refuse to disclose it
without consulting the Lord Chancellor, if it is a public record within the meaning of the Public
Records Act 1958, or the appropriate Northern Ireland Minister, if it is a public record to which the
Public Records Act (Northern Ireland) 1923 applies. However, the public body concerned seems to
be free not to follow the result of this consultation, but this will be rare in practice. The definition
of a "historical record" can be found in s. 67( 1) of the FOIA 2000 and is any record that is more
than 30 years old.
Sometimes, some records are transferred to the National Archives for safekeeping before
they become historical records. These records are referred as "transferred public records" by s.
15(1) of the FOIA 2000. Since the ownership of these record remains with the providing body, reg.
17(2) provides that the appropriate records-keeping authority shall consult the responsible authority
on whether there might be an exception to disclosure of that information under regulation. Reg.
17(3) and 17(4) provide that it is for the authority who owns the information to make a
determination and apply the public interest test, but that the decision on whether disclosure should
take place or not, cannot be reached without consulting the Lord Chancellor, if it is a public record
within the meaning of the Public Records Act 1958, or the appropriate Northern Ireland Minister, if
it is a public record to which the Public Records Act (Northern Ireland) 1923 applies. This is
logical, since it is for the public body who owns the information to make the final decision on
disclosure and apply the public interest test. 230
However, this solution seems to be unnecessarily complex and time-consuming, especially
when transferred records are concerned. For instance, if one wants to get a copy of a record not
older than 30 years originally held by DEFRA but since then transferred to the National Archives,
then the request has to be addressed in the first place to the National Archives. If this record has not
been previously designated by DEFRA as being freely accessible under the Environmental
Information Regulations, then the National Archives cannot release the record, but have to consult
the responsible authority DEFRA. Then DEFRA has to make a determination by applying the
public interest test, but before doing so, they have to consult the Lord Chancellor! After all that,
229 This stems from paragraph 24 of the preamble of the 2003 Directive, which mentions that 'The provisions
of this Directive shall not affect the right of a Member State to maintain or introduce measures providing for
broader access to information than required by this Directive'.
230 For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that if the Information Commissioner issues a decision in
relation to transferred records, the public body that can appeal against this decision is not the records
authority, but the responsible authority that owns this information and is responsible for deciding to grant
access or not. See reg. 18(6)(t).
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DEFRA has to communicate its determination back to the National Archives, which then has to
apply that determination and release the record or inform the applicant of the refusal. All this seems
to be very time consuming and this is why no specific time-limits are set for these procedures. Reg.
17(3)(b) only mentions thatzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA"the re ponsib e authority shall communicate its determination to the
appropriate records authority within such time as is reasonabl~ in all the circumstances". This
seems to be an incorrect transposition of the 2003 Directive, because the time-limits mentioned in
the Directive are not flexible and cannot be subject to the "reasonableness" of the circumstances
and have to be abided by in any case without exceptions. However, one could argue that it is
implicit that it is the time-limit of 20 days provided by the regulations (extendable to 40 days for
complex or voluminous requests) that has to be applied. Nevertheless, such an interpretation seems
to be at odds with reg. 17(3)(b) which provides for a time-limit based on what is "reasonable". But
in any case, it seems unlikely that all these bureaucratic procedures could be finished in 20 or even
40 days, especially if the request is complex or concerns voluminous amounts of information.
It could also be contended that these provisions on transferred records are not compatible
with the 2003 Directive, since the duty to provide environmental information applies to any
information a public body holds, even if it holds it on behalf of another person. Thus, in regards of
EC law it is the records holder who is ultimately responsible to correctly apply the Directive,
something that the 2004 Regulations do not acknowledge for transferred records, since they grant
the power to provide access or not to the original owner of the record.
vii) Non-existent information.
Lastly, it should be examined what happens when requested information is non-existent
because either it has been lost (misplaced etc) or has been destroyed. This might sound like an
oxymoron, since it is impossible to provide what does not exist, but one could think that public
bodies have a duty to recreate destroyed or lost information and a duty of archiving information for
future reference. However, since the right to information only applies to information that is held or
available, this indicates that there is no right to access non-existent information, since it is simply
not held any more, neither by or on behalf of the public authority. This is also the approach taken
by the Government in its Guidance on the application of the 1992 Regulations, where it is
mentioned that the right to access environmental information does not extend to information
destroyed in accordance with established office procedures and does not extend to non-existent
information that could be only created by manipulating existing information.i"
However, destroying records could be a way subversively to circumvent the requirements
of the freedom of information regime. On the other hand, legal provisions restricting the
destruction of records might result in huge storage and archiving costs, especially since now there
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is also digital data to conserve, which requires special techniques. Bakkenist.f" would welcome a
revision of public authorities' procedures on destruction of documents containing environmental
information and long set times for maintaining data.
The new Regulations partially address this issue by creating the offence of altering records
with intention to prevent entitled disclosure (examined in detail below). This offence is only
committed if a request for information has been made to the public authority and so as to prevent
disclosure, records etc. are destroyed or altered. This indicates that from the moment a request has
been made, public authorities in a strict sense (and only they since this offence does not apply to
private individuals) have a duty to disclose whatever has not been ~ destroyed and thus have a
duty to keep it till it is disclosed. This approach seems to be a balanced one, taking both into
consideration the legitimate expectations of the public to access existing information at the time of
their request, and the costs for public authorities of having to perpetually or for very long periods of
time to archive their data sets. However, there seems to be a loophole which would allow public
authorities to destroy information in advance of any request. The FOIA 2000 tries to address this
issue by providing in s. 46 that the Lord Chancellor is to issue a code of practice setting out
practices which he considers public authorities and other authorities whose records are subject to
the Public Records Act 1958 should follow in relation to the keeping, management and destruction
of their records. In doing so, he is to have regard to the public interest in public access to such
records. Indeed, the Lord Chancellor's Code of Practice on Record Management indicates that the
destruction of records should be delayed if it is known to be the subject of a request for
information, until either disclosure has taken place or all possible Appeal procedures have been
exhausted. 233zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
b) The necessity of a request - active dissemination of
environmental information.
As we have seen, the Aarhus Convention, the Environmental Information Directives and
the implementing regulations all provide for a mechanism under which public authorities owe a
231 See the Guidance, below n. 269, at par. 15.
232 See Bakkenist, below n. 311, at p. 51.
233 The Lord Chancellor's Code of Practice on the Management of Records, Issued under section 46 of the
Freedom of Information Act 2000zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAin November 2002, was b rought into force by the Freedom of
Information Act 2000 (Commencement No.2) Order 2002 (SIzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA20(2/2812) a d is available at
http://www.dca.gov.uklfoi!codesprac.htm
Also, the Government in the Explanatory Notes to the FOIA 2000 indicates at par. 159 that 'The requirement
to have regard to the public interest in access to records reflects the intention that the code will establish
standards of good practice in relation to record-keeping. Good practice would increase the efficiency with
which information can be located and retrieved by authorities in response to requests for information, and
therefore increase the amount of information which will be available under Part I of the Act consistent with
the imposition of cost limits'. It should be kept in mind that Codes of Practice do not legally bind as such
public authorities.
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duty to citizens to provide information when requested to do so. This duty is also a right for anyone
to receive such information, as long as it has been requested.
The question that arises is whether this right to obtain environmental information can be
relied upon under Aarhus and the Directive, even when there has been no request made. Of course,
as we examine elsewhere, there is a duty under the ECHRzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAfor public authorities to provide
environmental information motu proprio in some cases.
The case under the old Directive and the implementing 1992 regulations is simple.
Although, article 7 of Directive 90/313 provides that member states shall take all necessary steps to
provide "general information" on the state of the environment through means such as periodic
publication of reports, any other information is accessible only if previous requests are made. Also,
this requirement of article 7 does not cover active dissemination of information when health risks
are involved, neither does it seem to be of direct effect since it is clearly directed towards states
only and not towards individuals. Moreover, the transposing Environmental Information
regulations 1992 do not explicitly transpose this requirement. They do not contain any provisions
creating any obligations for public authorities to disseminate information. Consequently, it seems
clear that under the 1992 regulations there is no right to access information unless a specific request
is made to a public authority. This has been confirmed in R v. The Secretary of State for the
Environment Transport and Regions Ex p. Anthony Marson.i" in which Jowitt J. blatantly ruled
that "It simply does not lie in the mouth of the applicant to complain of a failure to disclose that
which he was entitled to but did not ask for. "
The situation seems to be in theory different under the Aarhus Convention and the new
Directive. Article 5 of the Aarhus Convention, deals with the active access to information, thus
disclosure of information without a request having been made. This article requires states to keep
and update such information relevant to their activities. Also, states shall ensure that there exists a
mandatory system, which would monitor and disperse among public authorities information on
activities affecting the environment. This could be achieved by either creating bodies like the
Environment Agency which monitor the state of the environment, or through legislation requiring
companies to monitor and report their polluting and potentially dangerous activities, as already in
place in the United Kingdom.i" Moreover, public authorities have to inform the public in the event
of any imminent threat to human health or the environment. In such a case, the information that
public authorities must release includes anything that could enable the public to take measures to
prevent or lessen harm arising from the threat. There already exist more detailed legal instruments
that provide for such emergency information dissemination in cases of major industrial accidents
23423 March 1998, CO/911198 (unreported application for leave, available from http://www.casetrack.com).zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
235 See generally on these points the comprehensive book by David Woolley et al., Environmental Law,
Oxford University Press, Oxford 2000, or any other textbook on Environmental law cited in the Bibliography
section.
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both at EC and at international level,236thus this provision seems to generalise the emergency
information requirement to any accident.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
In addition to these requirements, public authorities have to ascertain that the public is
aware of the information they possess and under what conditions environmental information may
be obtained. Provisions on access to information have to be transparent and effective. The
Convention provides a list of practical measures for achieving the public is informed of its right to
access environmental information upon request: creating public lists, registers or files, establishing
and maintaining information points, and requiring officials to support the public in its searches.F"
States are also asked to support the dissemination of environmental information through electronic
databases through the internet, by disseminating in particular reports on the state of environment,
texts of relevant legislation, policies, programs, plans and performance indicators of public bodies
relating to the environment. In addition, each party is asked to progressively take steps to establish
a coherent nation-wide system of pollution inventories or registers on a structured computerised
and publicly accessible database, completed through standardised reporting. This requirement is
very vague, though states can adhere to the facultative protocol to the Aarhus Convention under
which companies will be required to publicly disclose information on their output of pollutants and
this information will be placed on a register.?"
In general, it can be concluded that article 5 of the Aarhus Convention requires parties to
collect and disseminate environmental information, clarifying in detail what information shall be
collected and disseminated, and lists methods through which information shall be collected or
disseminated. However, it is drafted in clearly imprecise terms leaving to states the freedom to
choose between the time and manner of implementing it and thus other binding legal instruments
are needed.
It is article 7 of the 2003 Directive that transposes the above-mentioned dissemination
requirement of the Aarhus Convention. This article, similarly to Aarhus, contains a non-exhaustive
list of the kind of environmental information which should as a minimum be disseminated to the
public throughout the Community by member-states.i" Also, it is required that public authorities
236In the EC there are the Seveso Directives of the European Council on the major-accident hazards of
certain industrial activities and major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances, see above n. 235. At
international level there is amongst many others the 1992 UNIECE Convention on the Transboundary
Effects of Industrial Accidents, see Philippe Sands,zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAPrinciples f international environmental law, vol. 1,
Manchester University Press 1995, at Ch. 16: Environmental Information.
237Information about how information can be accessed is referred to in some works under the term meta-
information. See e.g. Stec et al., aboven. 97, at p. 72.
238This Protocol on pollutant release and transfer registers to the Aarhus convention on access to
information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters, was
adopted in May 2003 in Kiev at the Fifth Ministerial Conference 'Environment for Europe'. The legal basis
for the adoption of this piece of "secondary international legislation" is article 5, paragraph 9, and article 10,
paragraph 2 of the Aarhus Convention. The Protocol, which has been signed by 36 States and the European
Community, concerns the establishment and public access to nationwide pollutant release and transfer
registers, which are defined as inventories of pollution from industrial sites and other sources. See for more
details http://www.unece.orglenv/pp/prtr.htm
239Art. 7 par. 2(2) of the 2003/4 Directive provides that: 'The information to be made available and
disseminated shall be updated as appropriate and shall include at least: .
96
have tozyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA'take he necessary measures' to maintain environmental information, especially of the
kinds listed, in forms or formats that are readily reproducible and accessible by computer
telecommunication networks such as the Internet. However, there is a clear exception to this
requirement: the information that has to be made available by electronic means need not include
information collected before the entry into force of the 2003 Dir~ctive unless it is already available
in electronic form.i" The rest of the detailed practical arrangements of how information is
effectively made available and disseminated through the internet, is left up to the Member states.
Public authorities are also required to disseminate, immediately and without any delay, all
information held by them which could enable people likely to be affected by an imminent threat to
human health or to the environment to take measures to prevent or mitigate harm arising from the
threat. All these dissemination obligations are, however, subject to the same exceptions as apply to
requests for information.i"
These Directive requirements, do not seem to be precise enough so as to be of direct effect,
and thus cannot be relied upon by individuals seeking access. However, the list of what has to be
disseminated is important since it can be used as an indication of what is deemed to be
environmental information under the Directive. The only binding effect of this article seems to be
that member states are under a duty to disseminate via the internet the minimum elements that have
to be disseminated under this article and mentioned above. This dissemination has to take place by
the date limit for implementation of this Directive, which is set by articlezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA10 at the 14thof February
2005. There is also a requirement under art. 8(1) that all such information which is compiled by
public authorities, has to be as far as possible up to date, accurate and comparable.
As already mentioned, these provisions do not seem to create any right for individuals and
so have no direct effect. As a consequence, the only way through which a breach of these
requirements could be enforced, would be through the bringing of a procedure in front of the
ECJ under articles 226 or 227 of the EC treaty for failure of transposition of the above-mentioned
a) texts of international treaties, conventions or agreements, and of Community, national, regional or local
legislation, on the environment or relating to it;
b) policies, plans and programmes relating to the environment;
c) progress reports on the implementation of the items referred to in (a) and (b) when prepared or held in
electronic form by public authorities;
d) the reports on the state of the environment referred to in paragraph 3;
e) data or summaries of data derived from the monitoring of activities affecting, or likely to affect, the
environment;
f) authorisations with a significant impact on the environment and environmental agreements or a reference
to the place where such information can be requested or found in the framework of Article 3;
g) environmental impact studies and risk assessments concerning the environmental elements referred to in
Article 2(l)(a) or a reference to the place where the information can be requested or found in the framework
of Article 3'.
240 As provided by art. 7 par. 1. The 2003 Directive entered into force according to its art. 12 on the day of its
f,ublication in the OJ of the EC, which waszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA14/2/2003.
41 Since according to par. 5 of art. 7 of the 2003 Directive' The exceptions in Article 4(1) and (2) may apply
in relation to the duties imposed by this Article'. This limitation is laid in similar terms by art. 5{10) of the
Aarhus Convention.
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provisions.i" However, apart from the dissemination of the information present in the above-
mentioned list, there does not seem to be any other obligation sufficiently precise so as to be legally
enforceable through this way.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIn any case, this list s very vague, since even if it mentions what
kinds of information has to be disseminated, it does not mention the quantity of such information,
thus reluctant member-states could simply disseminate limited amounts of each kind of information
listed in the Directive (but up to date, accurate and comparable), in order to escape a finding of
non-compliance by the ECJ.
It is reg. 4 of the 2004 Regulations that transposes these EC requirements. This regulation
repeats with a different wording article 7(1) of the 2003 Directive and mentions that a public
authority shall in respect of environmental information that it holds progressively make the
information available to the public by electronic means which are easily accessible and take
reasonable steps to organize the information relevant to its functions with a view to the active and
systematic dissemination to the public of the information. However, it is provided that the use of
electronic means to make information available or to organize information shall not be required in
relation to information collected before 1st January 2005 in non-electronic form: This is in clear
breach of the 2003 Directive in which this date is the date of 'entry into force of this Directive?",
which is according to article 12 of the Directive the date of its the publication in the Official
Journal, which iszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA14/2/2003. The re ulations also mention that the information covered by this duty
to disseminate are all the types of information mentioned in article 7(2) of the 2003 Directive to
which reg. 7(4) expressly refers, in addition to facts and analyses of facts which the public
authority considers relevant and important in framing major environmental policy proposals. Apart
from this last type of information, the UK government did not want to go any further than sticking
to the Directive's requirements and thus missed an opportunity to expand this dissemination duty.
This would have been useful, since the more information actively disseminated, the fewer
resources public authorities have to allocate to respond to requests.?" But the advantage of the
current approach, is that the 2004 Regulations do not go any further than the dissemination duty
contained in the FOIA 2000 (at sections 19 to 20) and concerning the publication schemes that
have to be maintained by authorities caught by the Act. So, public authorities that already comply
with these FOIA requirements, automatically also comply with the dissemination requirements of
the Regulations.i" Thus, this duty will be new only for bodies not subject to the FOIA, but only
subject to the Regulations.
242 On the details of this procedure, which can be initiated by either the Commission or another member-state,
see Horspool, op. cit.
243 Art. 7 par. 1.
244 See on this point, the Draft Governmental Guidance on the 2004 Environmental Information Regulations
at Chapter 5 (as of24 July 2004), http://www.defra.gov.uk!corporate/consultlenvinfo/index.htm
245 Ibid. at Ch. 5.3. It should be noted the publication scheme provisions of the FOIA have been brought into
force by the Freedom ofInformation Act 2000 (Commencement No.2) Order 2002 (SI 2002/2812) and have
been extended by the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Commencement No.3) Order 2003 (SI 2003/2603).
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InzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAconclusion it can be said that thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAright o receive environmental information without
making a prior request (active access to information) is still at an embryonic stage, since the
relevant provisions of the 2003 Directive have no direct effect and the 2004 Regulations do not go
very far.
In any case, it should be noted that the duty to actively disseminate environmental
information is very limited, since nothing in the 2003 Directive or the 2004 Regulations requires
public bodies to collect data or otherwise create information of any kind. However, this aspect of
voluntary reporting will inevitably become of great importance in the future, since whenever some
information has already been disseminated publicly, the right to access it upon request does not
arise any more. Consequently, in theory, it could be suggested that dissemination of environmental
information would render the right to access it upon request obsolete when all publicly held
information would be remotely available through the internet. However, in practice, this would
never happen, since there will always exist information covered by an exemption for which a
balance test would be required on a case by case basis.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
c) Which persons can request information?
Can anybody request environmental information or can there be some restrictions based on
grounds of nationality or any others? Can legal persons be excluded or possibly NOO's? This is
important since a right to access environmental information only recognised to a limited category
of persons would be less effective than a right recognised to anyone.
The Aarhus Convention provides, in its article 4, that the right to access information is
recognised to any member of the public. The term "public" is defined in article 2 and includes any
natural or legal persons. This means that any natural or artificial legal person can request access
and that he cannot be discriminated 'on grounds of nationality. Such an interpretation is consistent
with article 3, paragraph 9, which requires that for the application of the Convention no person
shall be excluded on the grounds of nationality, domicile, citizenship, or for artificial legal persons,
place of registered seat and centre of its activities. This is very liberal and the Convention does not
stop here. It also mentions that associations, organisations or groups of natural or legal persons are
also to be considered members of the public if this is the case under national legislation. This
seems to cover the situation where these groups even though they have no legal personality
(because if they had they would be considered as legal persons) are nevertheless considered as
members of the public by some national legislation and are granted some rights contained in the
Convention.Pi.However, these groups can only be considered to be members of the public where
the requirements established by national legislation are met. Thus these groups without legal
personality can only exercise their rights in the particular legal systems where they are expressly
246 See on this point, SteczyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAet al., above n. 97, at p. 40.
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allowed to do SO.247 This provision is important for Non-Governmental Organisations, as it allows
them to access information regardless of them gaining legal personality or nor'" but it remains
dependent on national law.
Both the new and the old environmental information Directive, expressly mention that the
right to access environmental information is recognised both to natural and artificial legal
persons.?" The directives do not indicate which legal persons are covered, though this term should
be interpreted in the light of the Aarhus convention, so as to include groups with no legal
personality, on the terms discussed above.
The 1992 regulations provided that environmental information was to be made available to
'every person' requesting it.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA2sO The regulations did not expressly provide whether this term
included artificial legal persons, though since the Directive did, it ought to have been interpreted
that way. In any case, even if supposedly artificial legal persons were not included, as analysed in
the case ofzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAStirrat Park Hogg v. Dumbarton District Council/zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA51 since they can only exist through
acts of other natural persons representing them, they can also indirectly benefit from the right of
access granted to individuals, thus making this discussion of little practical significance. In any
case, even if the new Regulations do not repeat the definition of an applicant as being any natural
or legal person requesting environmental information found in the 2003 Directive, but only
mention a reg. 2(1) that an applicant is 'the person who made the request', the definition of the
2003 Directive applies.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
d) From whom can information be requested?
This issue is a fundamental one, since an environmental information regime to be effective
needs as many bodies with environmental responsibilities as possible to owe a duty to provide
environmental information. The issue is also especially important in Britain where in the recent
past it was uncertain whether privatised utilities were covered by the Environmental Information
247 In British law, this would extend the right to clubs and other unincorporated associations. On these, see
Sue Arrowsmith (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Public and Private Partnerships, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1999.
248 On the importance of the Aarhus Convention for NGOs, see Jonas Ebbesson, Background Paper No.5:
Information, Participation and Access to Justice: the Model of the Aarhus Convention, delivered at the Joint
UNEP-OHCHR Expert Seminar on Human Rights and the Environment, 14-16 January 2002 Geneva,
available online at http://www.unhchr.chienvironmentlbp5.html. See also Sean T. McAllister, "Human
Rights And The Environment: The Convention on Access to' Information, Public Participation in Decision-
Making, and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters" 1998 Colorado Journal of International Law and
Policy, 1998 Yearbook, 187.
249 Directive 90/313IEEC provided at art. 3(1) that environmental information was to be made available to
'any natural or legal persons'. The Directive 2003/4IEC speaks about 'any applicant' in its article 3(1), but




Regulations 1992.252zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIn all of the regimes establishing a duty to provide environmental information,
such a duty is limited to public authorities. This leads to the logical question as to what is a public
authority and to why should only public and not all private bodies too, be under a statutory duty to
provide environmental information.
i) Which persons are considered as public authorities?
The obligation to provide environmental information on request applies to all public
authorities, but some private bodies are also included for the application of the Directive and the
implementing regulations. This distinction is similar to the one made under the FOIA 2000, though
different in scope. Also, as we shall see bodies acting in a judicial or legislative capacity are
excluded altogether, though this exclusion might be problematic.
1) Public authoritieszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAstricto sensu.
The whole system of access to environmental information can only be effective if it applies
without exceptions to all bodies through which the State exercises its powers and duties, referred to
as public authorities. So, first Directive 90/313 included all such bodies by defining them in a wide-
ranging definition as 'any public administration at national, regional or local level' .2S3
The same bodies are also covered by the more recent international instruments, even if they
use more elaborate definitions. The Aarhus convention clearly covers all governmental and public
administration authorities of whatever function and level.i" The same bodies are also covered by
the 2003 Directive in slightly different terms.i" The term 'public administrative functions' which is
used in the Convention and in the Directive, is not expressly defined in neither of these instruments
but it is stated that it should be determined according to national law. Such a reference to national
law is problematic since it might result in different transpositions of the Convention and promote
basic differences in interpretation.i" However, this also has the advantage of allowing some
flexibility to States over some matters that cannot be dealt satisfactorily in an international
convention due to the very different nature of each national legal system. However, there is a
2S1 (1996) SLT 1113. See the relevant chapters on Registers for a discussion of this case, which was about the
Scottish planning registers.
252 See on this point Richard Burnett-Hall, Environmental Law, Sweet & Maxwell, London 1995, page 918.
253 At art. 2(b).
2S4 Art. 2, par. 2(a) and 2(b): ' "Public authority" means: (a) Government at national, regional and other
level; (b) Natural or legal persons performing public administrative functions under national law, including
sEecific duties, activities or services in relation to the environment;'
2 S At art. 2, par. 2(a) and 2(b) of the Directive, which are almost identical to art 2(a) and 2(b) of the
Convention, the only difference being that the Directive also expressly includes in public administration
bodies all 'public advisory bodies'.
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certain limit to this ability of national law to define what are public administrative functions, by
making express references to specific duties, activities or services in the environmental field which
have to be considered as such.
The old 1992 Regulations included all Ministers of the Crown, government departments,
local authorities and other persons carrying out the functions of public administration at such levels
but who have responsibilities relating to the environment.i" The new 2004 Regulations similarly
include all bodies carrying out functions of public administration, but without the limitation that
these bodies must have responsibilitieszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAin relation to the environment.i" Also they include, by
reference to the FOIA 2000, all public authorities which are considered as such by s. 3( 1) of that
Act, with some minor differences, that mainly aim to exclude some limitations found in the FOIA,
so as to make the definition wider in the Regulations.i"
The definition used in the FOIA Act is narrower, as we shall see further on, than the one
under the regulations. The Act designates as public authorities all authorities listed in Schedule 1 to
the Act or are designated as such by an order of the Secretary of State, or are considered as
'publicly-owned companies'. More precisely, Schedule 1 to the 2000 Act using where appropriate
generic descriptions, names the principal authorities in national and local government, together
with the principal public authorities relating to the armed forces, national health service, education,
the police and other public bodies and organisations. Bodies can be added to this lisf60 through two
categories of orders. First, section 4(1) of the Act gives power to the Secretary of State to make an
order to add to Schedule 1 a reference to any body or the holder of any office which is not listed
and which is established by the Crown or by an enactment or by subordinate legislation or by a
Minister in his capacity as Minister or by a government department or by the National Assembly
for Wales. Second, section 5 of the Act gives power to the Secretary of State to make an order, to
add any person that appears to exercise functions of a public nature or is providing under a contract
with a public authority any service whose provision is a function of that authority. Finally,
considered as public authorities are all publicly-owned companies, as defined by section 6. These
are all corporate bodies, either wholly owned by the Crown, or wholly owned by any public
256 See on this point, SteczyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAet al., above n. 97, at pp. 30-31.
257 Reg. 2(1).
258 At Reg. 2.
259 From the application of the FOIA 2000 are excluded altogether the Special Forces, the Security Service,
the Secret Intelligence Service, the Government Communications Headquarters, any unit or part of a unit
which is for the time being required by the Secretary of State to assist the Government Communications
Headquarters in the exercise of its functions, the National Assembly for Wales, the Scottish Parliament, any
part of the Scottish Administration, the Scottish Parliamentary Corporate Body, and any Scottish public
authority with mixed functions or no reserved functions (within the meaning of the Scotland Act 1998).
These exclusions can be found in s. 84, s. 80(2) and par. 6 of Sched. 1 to the FOIA 2000. These bodies are,
however, caught by the 2004 Regulations, since although the defmition found in reg. 2(1) makes reference to
the defmition found in the FOIA 2000, it explicitly mentions that these exclusions do not apply as far as the
Regulations are concerned.
260Also, these two sections provide for the Lord Chancellor to remove public authorities from the list of
Sched. 1, whenever they cease to fulfil the conditions set by the Act for them to be considered as such.
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authority listed in Schedule 1261 other than a government department or an authority which is listed
only in relation to a particular kind of information.
2) Private bodies with public environmental responsibilities.
However, limiting the duty to provide information on the above-mentioned public bodies,
would leave out a lot of private bodies exercising public administration functions, following the
modern tendency of privatising and de-regulating public services'" and would undermine the
effectiveness of the right to access environmental information.
For this reason, the 1990 Directive provided that bodies with public responsibilities for the
environment which were under the control of public authorities were to be treated for the purposes
of the Directive in the same way as public authorities.r" However, this was criticised as being a
wide and unclear definition.t" leading to possible misinterpretations by some private bodies so as
to avoid having to provide information.
So, to avoid difficulties with the applicability of the Aarhus Convention to privatised
utilities.i" the Convention also specifically applies to any person (even natural legal persons) that
has public responsibilities or functions, or provides public services, in relation to the environment
and is under the control of the above-mentioned categories ofzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAstricto sensu public authorities.P?
This is a far-reaching category since it includes any entity either private or public, as long as it is
controlled by the bodies mentioned before (which do not necessarily have to be public ones since
they include both governmental bodies and private persons performing public administrative
261 Section 6(2) defines a company wholly owned by the Crown as a company having no members except:
Ministers, government departments or companies wholly owned by the Crown or any person acting on their
behalf and also defines a company wholly owned by a public authority other than a government department
as having no members except: that public authority or companies owned by that public authority; or any
other person acting on their behalf.
262 See Patrick Birkinshaw, Reforming the Secret State, Open University Press, Milton Keynes: 1990, at p.
48.
263 Art. 6.
264 See between many others William Birtles, The European Directive on Freedom of Access to Information
on the Environment, [1991] JPL 607, at p. 609.
265 This has been especially true in Britain, where privatised water utilities had unsuccessfully contended in
Griffin v South West Water Services Ltd [1995] IRLR 15 that they were not "emanations of the State" for the
purposes of Directive 751129 (the Collective Redundancies Directive). The court applying the criteria laid
down by the ECJ in Foster v British Gas (CI88/89) [1991] C.L.Y. 1672a, held that the privatised water
utility was a "State authority " since it was required by legislation to carry out a public service, namely the
supply of water and sewerage undertaking, it possessed "special powers " conferred by legislation and the
legislative provisions and the conditions of its licence indicated that it performed its public service duties
under the "control" of the State.
266 Art.2 par. 2(c): '(c) Any other natural or legal persons having public responsibilities or functions, or
providing public services, in relation to the environment, under the control of a body or person falling within
subparagraphs (a) or (b) above' .
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functions) and it has a public function towards the environment. The 2003 Directive also uses
exactly the same definition as Aarhus for these bodies.i"
The 1992 Regulations included a provisiorr'" that all bodies with 'public responsibilities
for the environment' being under the control of a public body as defined by the Regulations and
analysed above, were covered. The term 'control' was left undefined, though the accompanying
Guidance defined it as being 'a relationship constituted by statute, rights, contracts or other means
which either separately or jointly confer the possibility of directly or indirectly exercising a
decisive influence on a body' .269 This definition being in any case vague, the Government in its
1992 consultation paper on the proposed regulations included a long list of bodies thought of being
covered by the Directive.F" However, after the regulations were adopted, the accompanying
Guidance rejected the idea of providing a list of covered authorities on the ground that
"circumstances vary and change", adding that "organisations will need to take a view themselves as
to whether they fall into any of the above categories and that "in cases of dispute, it will be for the
Courts to decide".271This change of approach, however, has left it open for these bodies included in
the first list to deny they are covered, thus creating much uncertainty, as we shall examine in detail
below.
The new 2004 Regulations, also adopt a similar definition of any body, office holder, or
person having public responsibilities or exercising functions of a public nature or providing public
services, in relation to the environment and is under the control of a public person (as defined
above). The difference between this definition and the one present in the 1992 regulations is that
the 2004 regulations also expressly add as relevant bodies all persons which carry out functions of
a public nature or provide public services in relation to the environment. This makes clear that
public services run by private companies are now included (like electricity, gas and water utilities
companies, which perform their duties subject to various specific statutory requirements and under
the control of regulatory public bodies), even if they would also be under the 1992 regulations
since such private bodies are controlled by public authoritles.t"
It is clear that the new regulations intend to solve much of the issues concerning which
private bodies are covered, that had arisen under the 1992 regulations. However, they still remain
vague on one issue: they do not define what are public responsibilities or functions of a public
nature or public services. Therefore, this will have to be interpreted in view of the existing general
267 At art. 2( c).
268 Reg. 2(3)(b).
269 Department of Environment, Guidance on the Implementation of the Environmental Information
Regulations 1992, par. 10. This text is a sort of a circular with no legally binding effect. Available from
http://www.defra.gov.uklenvironmentlpubaccess/guidance/index.htm
270 Department of Environment Consultation Paper, January 1992, annex D. This list has been reproduced in
[1993] JPL 623-626.
271 Guidance, par. 12.
272 However, under the 1992 regulations, as we examine further on, such privatised utilities companies have
firmly refused that they were covered.
principles of English administrative law, as laid down in cases such aszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAFoster v British Gas Pl ,273
in which it was held that an emanation of the state could be defined as a body who had been made
responsible, pursuant to a measure adopted by the state, for providing a public service that was
under the control of the state and which exercised special powers for the purpose, beyond those
which operated between individuals.
All in all, it is unambiguously clear that the new 2004 regulations are of a much wider
scope than the old 1992 regulations'?' and also than the current Freedom of Information Act 2000,
since they expressly include all private bodies performing public environmental responsibilities.
3) The issue of bodies acting in a legislative or judicial capacity
Starting from the 1990 Directive, bodies acting in a legislative or judicial capacity were
specifically excluded from providing any environmental informatlon.f" This is also the case in the
2003 regulations which provide in reg. 3(b) that 'these Regulations shall not apply- (b) to any
public authority acting in a judicial or legislative capacity'. It is clear from these wordings, that
these bodies are only intended to be excluded when acting in their judicial or legislative capacity
(and thus information held in this capacity is not to be disclosed) and not when they are acting in
another capacity, such as an administrative one. An example of this distinction could be the House
of Commons Library Department, which although is part of the House of Commons, a legislative
body, is not acting in such a capacity, and therefore should disclose any environmental information
it holds. This interpretation was the one adopted by Justice Jowitt in the Marson case,276where he
considered that the term 'legislative function' found in the 1992 Regulations refers to those things
done in relation to the preparation and enactment of legislation and not to any function carried out
in pursuance of a power conferred by primary or secondary legislation. In his view, this
interpretation was demonstrated by article 1(b) of the 1990 directive which, given a purposive
construction, excepts from the scope of the directive information held by a public body acting in a
legislative capacity, that is, in its capacity as a legislative body.
The Aarhus Convention, also expressly excludes all bodies or institutions acting in a
judicial or legislative capacity. This exemption applies at any level, thus not only national courts or
parliaments are subject to it but also regional parliaments and even local councils when exercising
legislative functions. Stec et al. explain this exclusion by reference to the fundamentally different
character of decision making of bodies acting either in a legislative capacity, where elected
273 See above n. 265. See also Fidge v Governing Body of St Mary's Church of England (Aided) Junior
School [1997] 3 CMLR 630.
274 This is consistent with the fact that the 2003 Directive is widerzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAin scope than the 1990 on , when covered
bodies are concerned.
275 Art. 2(b) of the 1990 Directive.
276 R. v. The Secretary of State for the Environment Transport and Regions Ex p. Anthony Marson, 23 March
1998, CO/911198 (unreported application for leave).
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representatives are more directly accountable to the public through elections, or in a judicial
capacity, where tribunals must apply the law impartially without regard to public opinion?" We
cannot see how this argument can explain this exclusion, since environmental information is not
about accountability of elected officials to the public or impartial justice, but about environmental
protection. In any case, access to environmental information can help support accountability. It can
be contended that as long as legislative or judicial functions are not harmed by disclosure, then
openness should prevail. Nothing seems to justify such a broad exemption, which is not even
counterbalanced by a public-interest test as with the other sorts of exclusions.
The 2003 Directive, in conformity with all of the above, expressly provides that member-
states may exclude from the definition of public persons, bodies 'when acting' in a judicial or
legislative capacity.?" However, the Directive also continues and adds that
If their constitutional provisions at the date of adoption of this Directive make no
provision for a review procedure within the meaning of Article 6, Member States may
exclude those bodies or institutions from that definition.
This seems to indicate that if at the date of adoption of this Directive.?" some member-
states have not provided for a review procedure within the meaning of article 6 (which speaks
about both a judicial and administrative review procedure, as analysed further-onj.P" then member-
states can altogether exclude these bodies even when not acting in ajudicial or legislative capacity.
This, for instance, could lead to administrative departments of judicial or legislative bodies being
excluded from providing any environmental information, even if they do not perform any such
functions. This however, seems to be a breach of the Aarhus Convention, which does not provide
for such a blanket exception, and only exempts from the definition of public bodies, bodies acting
in a judicial or legislative capacity. In any case, the conditions for the application of this provision
would not have been fulfilled in England and Wales, since the Freedom of Information Act 2000
expressly provides for the existence of review procedures within the meaning of art. 6 of the 2003
Directive.
The effect of this specific provision in the UK seems to be academic, since as we have
mentioned before, the 2004 Regulations expressly exempt bodies acting in a judicial or legislative
capacity only when acting in such a capacity."! The 2004 Regulations also expressly exclude both
Houses of Parliament in order to avoid an infringement of their privileges.i" This provision aims to
prevent a conflict between the constitutional privileges of the Houses of Parliament and the
Environmental Information Regulations. However, it is doubtful whether this exception, not found
in the 2003 Directive, is compatible with it, especially since the ECl has indicated in the case of
277 See above n.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA97 at page 34.
278 Art. 2(2).
279 This date is 14 February 2003, since according to art. 12 the directive shall enter into force on the day of
its publication in the OJ.
280 See below, and also Michael Purdue, Current Topics - The new European Directive on public access to
environmental information, [2003] JPL 516.
281 At Reg. 3(3)(a).
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Commission v France'"zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAthat member states cannot add to the list of exemptions. The fact that the
privileges of Parliament are norms of a Constitutional nature in the UK, is insufficient to justify
this limitation, since the EC] has held that EC law is supreme even over national norms of a
constitutional rank.284
However, this provision could be construed in confo~ity with EC] case-law which seems
to accept that judicial authorities could be totally excluded from the duty to provide information,
provided they did not hold any environmental information. This seems to be possibly implied from
the case of Commission v Germany/8S which concerns thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA1990 Directive. In this case, the
Commission claimed that the German transposing legislation was incompatible with the Directive
since courts, criminal prosecution authorities and disciplinary authorities were excluded from the
definition of public authorities and this even in the exercise of administrative activities. The
Commission submitted that a court or criminal prosecution authority might have information on the
environment, in particular in the form of statistics, not necessarily obtained in the context of
judicial activities. The counter-claim advanced by Germany was that its courts, criminal
prosecution authorities and disciplinary authorities could not have responsibilities relating to the
environment otherwise than in the context of their judicial activities. The Court noted that it was
for the Commission to prove the existence of the alleged failure to fulfil obligations and that it
could not rely on any presumption for that purpose. The EC] rejected this ground of action on the
basis that insufficient evidence had been provided to establish that such authorities had information
on the environment obtained outside their judicial activities and therefore was falling within the
scope of the Directive. This ruling seems to indicate that an exemption to exclude judicial
authorities when acting both in a judicial or administrative capacity is acceptable, only if such
authorities do not hold any environmental information in relation to their administrative activities.
In any case, Krame~86has criticised this decision on the basis that courts do hold statistics relating
to prosecutions and convictions for environmental offences, and this data can be evidence of how
well environmental protection laws are enforced in practice. We can only agree with this view.
282 At Reg. 3(3)(b).
283 Examined in detail further on.
284 See the case of Internationale Handelsgesel/schajt mbH v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle Fur Getreide und
Futtermittel, (Case 11-70), [1970] ECR 1125, in which the ECJ stated that "the law stemming from the
Treaty ... cannot ... be overridden by rules of national law ... {Tjhe validity of a Community measure or its
effect within a Member State cannot be affected by allegations that it runs counter to either fundamental
rifhts [inJ. .. the constitution of the State or the principles of a national constitutional structure."
28 Case C-217/97 Commission v Germany. For a summary of the case see [2000] Env Law 12(93) or [1999]
Env LM 8.11(10).
286Ludwig L. Kramer, Casebook on EC environmental law, Oxford: Hart, 2002, at p. 141.
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4) The issue of authorities denying being covered by the regulations and the
problem of lists of relevant bodies287
The application of the 1992 regulations in practice has shown that a number of bodies have
stated that they considered they did not fall within the Regulations' definition of a 'relevant
person', and thus have refused they have a legal duty to provide any sort of information other that
through gestures of good-willingness. Most surprisingly, as we shall see, some of these bodies had
either been included in the 1992 Government's list of bodies thought being covered by the
Directive.i" or could be considered as bodies of the public sector. However, when faced with
requests to disclose information, they, sometimes persistently, refused to accept they were covered
by the regulations. These bodies can be put into two categories, bodies that formally belong to the
public sector and bodies that formally belong to the private sector.
The first category of such bodies, are corporate bodies that are set up as private
corporations, which are public limited companies in the following examples. The first of such
bodies was British Nuclear Fuels Ltd (BNFL), a public limited company wholly owned by the UK
government.i" which considered that it did not have any 'public responsibilities for the
environment'. This argument has been fully and successfully, in our view, proved as
unsubstantiated by Frankel and Ecclestone.i" We shall not re-examine herein all the arguments and
counter-arguments, since the 2004 Regulations, by making an express reference to bodies caught
by the FOIA in which publicly-owned companies are included, have therefore included
nationalised industries like BNFL that are wholly owned by the government.
Alongside these bodies are included all the privatised water public limited companies that
in the 1980s took over the sewerage and water supply functions of the former water authorities.
Interestingly, as we examine elsewhere, these bodies have statutory responsibilities to provide
information through the maintenance of statutory registers.?" though they have considered
themselves not to be caught by the regulations.f" This was also the case for the former Railtrack
plc.293 The 2004 regulations seem to cover these companies (even though the 1992 ones were
287 This issue will not be dealt here in every detail, since it is a policy issue regarding primarily information
sciences, though more details and empirical data can be found in Peter Roderick, United Kingdom, inzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAAccess
to Environmental Information in Europe, ed. By Ralph E. Hallo, Kluwer Law, London: 1996, at pp. 261-268;
also in Maurice Frankel and Andrew Ecclestone, The Environmental Information Regulations and THORP,
published by the Campaign for Freedom of Information, London: 1993, also available at
http://www.cfoi.org.uk
288 See above n. 270.
289 This is still the case according to BNFL's 2002 annual report, where it is stated (p. 28) that the unique
shareholder is the Secretary of State of the Department of Trade and Industry. Available from
http://www.bnfl.co.uk
290 See M. Frankel andzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAA. Eccle tone, above n. 287.
291 See the relevant chapter on registers.
292 On the relevant claims and counter-arguments see Roderick, below n. 313, at p. 266-267.
293 Ibid. Today replaced by Network Rail, a company limited by guarantee.
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covering them toozyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAizyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA94 since reg. 2(1) expressly includes persons carrying out functions of public
administration.
The second category of such bodies, are public bodies that are related to the government
and exist in order to assist its course of affairs by performing various public functions. These
bodies are the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), the Radioactive Waste Management Advisory
Committee (RWAC), the Crown Estate, the Ordnance Survey and British Coal. All these bodies
have denied in the past being caught by the 1992 regulations, so as to be able to refuse to provide
environmental information.i" All these bodies are now caught under the new regulations. Some of
them are covered because they are expressly included in the list provided for in Schedule 1 of the
FOIA 2000, and others are caught as being persons carrying out functions of public administration
or have public responsibilities or provide public services, in relation to the environment, under the
control of another public body caught by the Regulations.i"
These examples show one of the major difficulties of transposing Aarhus and the
Environmental Information Directives in the British context of administrative law. These
international legal instruments use general definitions so as to cover public authorities. Such
definitions can be easily transposed in legal systems, like France, where there are already general
definitions of public bodies and public services, however it is more difficult in the British public
law context where such legal definitions do not exist. Thus in Britain, where no certain legal
definitions exist and therefore public bodies appear in lists compiled by the Government,"? such
general definitions when transposed in national law as such, and not as legally binding lists (as for
instance the list included in Sched. 1 to the FOIA) are problematic because they allow for some of
these bodies to argue they are not covered by the regulations. This can lead to the result illustrated
by the previous examples, in which bodies that are considered by the Government as relevant
bodies.i" consider themselves not to be bound by the regulations. The new regulations have tried to
address this issue by referring to the list of bodies under the FOIA, and thus refer to a legally
binding list of bodies. However, not all of the bodies with public responsibilities towards the
environment are included there (notably privatised public services) and so, these practices of
denying being covered by the regulations might still arise in the future.
294 Ibid.
295 On all of these bodies, see Roderick, op. cit.
296 More precisely, the HSE, the RWAC and British Coal Corporation, are cited as being relevant public
authorities in Sched. 1 to the Freedom of Information Act 2000.
297 For the latest publication of such lists, in which the Government indicates that: 'A public body is not part
of a government department, but carries out its function to a greater or lesser extent at arm's length from
central government. [...] The term "public body" is a general one which includes: Nationalised Industries,
such as the British Waterways Board; Public Corporations, such as the BBC; NHS Bodies, which comprise
NHS Trusts and Special Health Authorities; and Non-Departmental Public Bodies (NDPBs)" see Cabinet
Office, Public Bodies 2002, The Stationary Office, London: 2003, at p. iv.
298 By inclusion, for some of them, in the 1992 list of bodies subject to the regulations.
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To remedy this Bakkenist would welcome a list of all relevant bodies covered by the
regulations, either at UK or at EC level.i" This would be an interesting and useful idea, which
however would impose some inflexibility on the system, since this list would probably not be
updated as quickly as developments are taking place in the public-private sector and could thus
leave out bodies which temporary exercise responsibilities for the environment, thus leading to
confusion.f" However, it should be noted that if such lists are not legally binding, they would
probably not provide a final solution to the problem shown here, since it would still be open for
public bodies (especially privatised ones) to argue they were not caught under the general
definition of public bodies. On the other hand, providing in the regulations an extensive list of
covered authorities, would present the danger of leaving out some bodies that only temporarily
exercise public functions, such as some contractors providing public services for a short period of
time on behalf of another public authority.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
In any case, even if the 2004 regulations, which combine a binding list with a general
definition, have these defaults, they provide an inexpensive and rapid mechanism through which
claims by various authorities that they are not covered, could be assessed, without having to go to
the courts. It should be noted that the UK government has again indicated in 2004 that there can be
no list of such bodies.'?' There seems to be no other way round the problem except the present
approach of mixing a general definition with lists of covered bodies.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
ii)zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAWhy public authorities only?
As we have seen, all of the general regimes on environmental information are applicable
only to information held by public bodies or equivalent ones. The main question that arises is what
can justify such a limitation? Why not provide that any private person too has to provide
environmental information he holds and make any undue refusal a criminal offence? This is not
299 See Bakkenist, below n. 311, at p. 60. This is also the solution welcomed byzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAStec et al., above n. 97, at p.
34. And also by the Campaign for Freedom of Information, in its Response to the Public Consultation on
New draft Environmental Information Regulations (10 Oct. 02), accessible online from
http://www .cfoi.org. uk
300 The Government has clearly indicated in 1997 that there would be no list of authorities covered by the
regulations: 'The Government remains reluctant to provide a non-exhaustive list for two main reasons. First,
only those organisations which indisputably fall within the eligibility criteria given in the Directive could be
included in such a list. Such a list would serve no useful purpose since those organisations likely to be on it
already accept that they are covered by the Regulations. Second, the Government believes that organisations
excluded from such a list would argue that their exclusion is an admission that they are not obviously covered
by the Regulations. They might then decide to respond to requests for environmental information. On
balance, the Government believes that more organisations are likely to provide access to environmental
information in the absence of such a list than would be the case if such a list existed'. Above n. 209, at par. 8.
30l See the Draft Guidance, above n. 244, at Ch. 2.6: "There can be no comprehensive list of those bodies that
are under the control of another body because such relations are dynamic and are prone to frequent change.
This means that bodies may move out of or into the scope of these Regulations. Organisations will need to
take a view as to whether they are a public authority covered by the Regulations.".
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something new, since a lot of particular statutory provisions concerning certain specific types of
information, make compulsory the provision of information from any person that has it.302 Usually
information collected this way is made publicly available through registers compiled and
maintained by public agencies. Why not bypass this stage and allow the public to access directly
any environmental data? Indeed, many private compan~es, especially large multinational
corporations, can be in possession of very significant environmental information. It seems logical
that since the right to access environmental information exists in order to protect the environment,
it would be even better for the environment if anyone holding such information was legally bound
to provide it. Thus, a limitation to public bodies only, seems unjustified in environmental
protection terms.
A possible explanation for such a limitation is the fact that the regime on environmental
information was based on general freedom of information regimes, which are limited to public
bodies only?" One of the main conceptual underpinnings of general freedom of information
legislation is that the people should be entitled to access information held by public authorities,
since the state is a creation of the people for the people and thus any information it holds is the
people's. However, the right to access environmental information is based on a totally different
idea: environmental protection. Thus the limitation to public bodies only can only be justified if it
would better serve the environment, which does not seem to be the case. On the contrary, as we
have seen, the Aarhus Convention extends to any private person if it performs public duties in
relation with the environment and is controlled by a public entity. As contended by Wilsher:zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA"these
institutions hold vast amounts of important information and make decisions which can be as
Significant as decisions taken by the traditional organs of 'state'. This can be seen to be
particularly so in environmental matters, because so many private bodies have environmental
responsibilities. Bringing these. bodies within the framework of freedom of environmental
information legislation is thus a key issue.,,304 In a similar way WoolfzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBALJ has argued extra-judicially
that judicial review proceedings should be extended to the actions of large corporations.?" So, why
not extend the access to environmental information regime, which already applies to some private
bodies, to any private person? This could allow the public to directly access data only held by some
302 For instance various Acts of Parliament (such as the Environmental Protection Act 1990) oblige any
private entity that makes discharges to air, water etc to provide such information to public authorities which
rJ~ce it on publicly availabl~ registers. See th~ r~levant Chapte~ on registers, " .
With the notable exception of South Africa s freedom of information legislation, which also creates an
individual right of access to information held by any private person whenever the requested information is
required for the exercise or protection of any rights. As private persons for the application of these provisions
are considered all persons which are not public bodies, with the exception of natural persons acting in their
private capacity as opposed to their professional capacity. See Currie lain, South Africa's Promotion of
Access to Information Act, 9 [2003] 1 European Public Law 59.
304 See Daniel Wilsher, Freedom of Environmental Information: Recent Developments and Future Prospects,
7 (2001) 4 European Public Law 671, at p. 680.
305 See Harry Wolf, Public Law - Private Law: Why The Divide? - A Personal View, [1986] Public Law 220
at 225: "Powerful bodies, whether they are public bodies or not, because of their economic muscle may be in
a position to take decisions which at the present time are not subject to scrutiny and which could be unfair or
adversely affect the public interest".
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private corporations and that are crucial for environmental protection, such as some information on
pollutant emissions held by big industries. However, there would be a problem in defining which
private bodies are so powerful that have to be subject to such a duty.
Of course, extending environmental information regimes in this way should not be a way
to ignore issues of confidentiality or privacy. Though these issues can easily be addressed by
exceptions to the types of information that have to be disclosed, in the same way as the current
environmental information regimes do.
In any case, it seems that there is no theoretical legal barrier to prevent an extension of the
right to access environmental information to information held by any person (either artificial or
natural private legal persons), or at least to any private corporation with responsibilities towards the
environment.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
2) How can information be accessed
In this part we examine, the legal provisions that provide for the practical arrangements for
access to environmental information held by public bodies.
The important conclusion that can be drawn from the examination of how the practical
arrangements for access are dealt by the various legal instruments recognising a right to
environmental information, is that the first in time provisions (such as the 1992 regulations and the
1990 Directive) considered these as technical details of secondary importance left to public
authorities and member states to implement. In contrast, the latest of such legal instruments (as the
1998 Aarhus Convention, the 2003 Directive and the new Regulations) regulate in greater detail
some practical arrangements of access, such as the form in which information is disclosed or the
form of requests and refusals, due to the fact that diverging practices in various public bodies or
between various member states,306has lead to the transformation of a theoretically common right to
environmental information, into a right varying in effectiveness in practice due to the different
policies either restrictive or permissive to accessing information.
a) The definition of the practical arrangements for access.
306As Hallo indicates: 'The practical arrangements are, in fact, an essential component of effective access to
information, Where the practical arrangements have been organised indifferently or poorly, the usefulness of
access to environmental legislation is substantially diminished. Unfortunately, this is all too often the case.
[... ] The public is also not well served by leaving it entirely to individual public authorities within member
states to defme the practical arrangements. This leads to such diversity in arrangements that confusion is the
rule.' In Access to Environmental Information in Europe, ed. By Ralph E. Hallo, Kluwer Law, London:
1996,atp.15.
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The issue that is examined first is whether the practical arrangements under which
environmental information is effectively made available are defined at supra national level (and if
so to what extent) or if such arrangements are delegated at state level. Also, it shall be examined if
whenever such arrangements have been left for states to decide, states are allowed to further
delegate the definition of practical arrangements to other bodies mainly at local level.
1) At supranational or at national level?
Interestingly, the two international legal instruments that provide for access to
environmental information both make the choice only to regulate some aspects of the practical
arrangements for access and leave all the rest to states to regulate. This has the advantage of
allowing great flexibility to member states to adapt the requirements of Aarhus and the Directive to
their particular legal systems and especially to the existing general regime on access to information
(if any).
It was DirectivezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA90/313IEEC that was the less detailed and left most of the practical issues
for member states to decide. However, this led to criticisms since apparently there were some
abuses of this vagueness and both the subsequent Aarhus Convention and the new Directive
became more specific by containing detailed provisions on forms of access, costs, time-limits, and
appeal procedures. These shall be examined further on in detail, though it should be noted that the
new Directive, without being very different from the text of the Convention, is more detailed.
In any case, implementing at international level an extremely detailed scheme on
environmental information access, would have been unrealistic and any advantages of it would
have been outweighed by the complexity of imposing it into various legal cultures with different
access to information regimes already in place. So, both Aarhus and the 2003 Directive remit some
detailed and of secondary importance matters for states to decide."? During the adoption of the
2003 Directive, the Commission rejected European Parliament amendments seeking to specify in
great detail the practical arrangements for providing the information, on the grounds that the
proposed Directive is a framework directive, which should give Member States a certain degree of
flexibility when transposing the Directive into national law.?"
2) Can states further delegate their competencies?
This question is mainly of theoretical and of academic interest, at least in England, since
the new Regulations, implementing the Directive and the Convention and aligning the
307 Analysed infra.
308 See Opinion of the Commission pursuant to Article 251 (2), third subparagraph, point (c) of the EC
Treaty, on the European Parliament's amendments to the Council's common position regarding the proposal
for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on public access to environmental information,
5.9.2002, COM(2002) 498 final, at p. 6.
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environmental information regime with the FOIA, define most of the details of the implementation
of information access. They also provide that for any details not dealt with in the Regulations, the
Secretary of State may issue a Code of Practice providing guidance to public authorities on the
application of the Regulations.l" Thus, there is no room for further delegation, since it is for the
Government to arrange the practical arrangements for access.
However, this was not the case under the previous 1992 regulations. Reg. 3(2) provided
that it was the duty of every relevant person, who held information to which the Regulations apply,
to make such arrangements for giving effect to them. It did not provide any more details than that
information was to be provided in a reasonable form, time and place; all other matters being left for
every individual public authority to decide. The reason for this according to the UK Government,
was that due to the wide range of functions, responsibilities and procedures it is "not possible" to
prescribe a uniform way for information access.l" It seems that this has become "possible" in case
of the FOIA and the new regulations ...
There has been a controversy on whether Directive 90/313, which provided by art. 3(1),
par. 2, that practical arrangements for access were to be dealt by member states, allowed member
states to further delegate this competence to lower-level public authorities. All authors seem to
agree that adding this extra layer, is an incorrect transposition of the Directive. For Bakkenist,"! the
wording of the Directive (member states "shall define" practical arrangements) imposes a direct
duty on states themselves, that cannot be passed to others. Waite,312is of the same opinion and also
states that this can lead to a plethora of different arrangements by various authorities making the
system very complex for the wider public at which it is aimed. Roderick"! also shares these views,
adding that even if such a transfer of the Directive's obligation was permissible, the regulations do
not require public authorities to define practical arrangements so as to achieve effective
accessibility. We believe these views to be correct and these criticisms might have been one of the
reasons why the new regulations have abandoned this system of further delegating.!"
b) The form of requests to access information
309 Reg. 16.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAOn the 27th July 2004, DEFRA published azyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBADraft Code of practice on the discharge of the
obligations of public authorities under the Environmental Information Regulations 2004, available at:
http://www.defra.gov.uklcorporate/consultlenvinfo/index.htm
310 As stated in DOE's guidance on the implementation of the 1992 Regulations, at par. 22.
3ll See Gisele Bakkenist, Environmental Information: Law, Policy and Experience, Cameron May 1994, at p.
66.
312 See AndrewWaite, The United Kingdom, at p. 235, in M. Prieur op cit.
313 See Peter Roderick, United Kingdom, inAccess to Environmental Information in Europe, ed. By Ralph E.
Hallo, Kluwer Law, London: 1996, at p. 256.
314 Also, as we analyse elsewhere (see the Chapter on the French transposition of Directive 90/313), it is
interesting to compare with the situation in France where the defmition of practical arrangements of access
was not passed on to each public authority, but always was directly provided in legislative instruments.
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A request for information in practice can be made orally or in writing. However does a
request to access information legally have to be made in writing or is a verbal request sufficient for
the public authority to be obliged to respond to it?
The first question that arises is whether the relevant international legal instruments
expressly provide an answer to this question, or leave the ma~er unregulated and let it for national
legislators to decide.
The Aarhus convention does not directly provide an answer to this question though
paragraph 7 of article 4 mentions that if the request for information is in writing, the refusal must
also be in writing. This, if analysed a contrario, would seem to indicate that the Convention
accommodates any form of request as long as the refusals to written requests are in writing. Also
the same paragraph 7 provides that if the request was made verbally and the applicant requested an
answer in writing, the refusal must be in writing.
The Directive 2003/41EC adopts exactly the same approach. Thus, it does not expressly
provide that requests have to be in writing, though it indicates that refusals are to be notified to the
applicant in writing or electronicallyzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA"ifzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAthe request was in writing or if the applicant so
requestsr?" On the Contrary, the old Directive 90/313 does not contain any such provision, thus
leaving the matter entirely to member states to decide.
Consequently, it has been shown that at supranational level, it is not considered important
whether the request itself is oral or written, as long as refusals are in writing whenever written
requests are involved. It seems difficult to understand this approach, since it would have been
simpler to say that all refusals have to be in writing, so as to avoid differences between oral and
written requests. The requirement for written refusals is understandable since it might be useful to
have a written answer so as to be informed of the reasons for refusal and to be able to challenge
them on appeal. When a refusal is given orally an appeal might be difficult to be brought against it,
since the existence of the refusal and the reasons of it might be hard to prove since idem est aut non
esse aut nonprobari/"
The new Regulations do not expressly provide for written requests, neither do they
disallow oral requests to be made. This was also the case under the previous regulations. This
would indicate that oral requests could be made under the 2004 Regulations."? On the contrary, s. 8
of the FOIA 2000 provides that requests have to be in writing, state the name of the. applicant and
an address for correspondence and describe the information requested. The same section also
provides that a request is to be treated as made in writing where the text of the request is
transmitted by electronic means, is legible and is capable of being used for subsequent reference
(thus it is not just a scrap of paper). The contrast between these over-detailed provisions and the
315 At art. 4 par. 5.
316 What does not exist and what cannot be proven are the same.
317 This is made explicitzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAin the Draft C de of Practice, which mentions that oral requests are acceptable under
the Regulations. See above n. 309, in Part II.
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silence of the regulations is striking but is necessary to ensure the correct application of the UK's
international and EC obligations.
In any case, even if oral requests are acceptable under the 2004 Regulations, it is difficult
to believe that oral requests will be made in great numbers due to the fact that public authorities
might insist on receiving written requests in accordance with the FOIA, as it might be difficult to
ascertain, before the request is looked upon in detail, whether the information requested has to be
disclosed under the FOIA or the regulations. However, there might be some cases in which the
regulations are undoubtedly applicable and so oral requests could be made without any difficulties.
c) The contents of the request to information
The Aarhus Convention.l" identically to the new"? and the previous'" Environmental
Information Directive, provides that any applicant is not obliged to state the reason the information
is wanted, or to which use he intends to put it. The initial proposal for the 2003 Directive also
contained a provision according to which, although it was unnecessary for an applicant to state the
reasons for his request, he was able to do so. In such a case, public authorities would have been
required to make reasonable efforts to provide the information in time for it to be available for a
specific use.321 This reflects the fact that sometimes, even if time-limits for the provision of
information are respected, information might still be provided too late for it to be useful in specific
administrative proceedings that take place into short time periods (such as public enquiries and
consultations etc). Unfortunately, the 2003 Directive in an effort to stick as closely as possible to
the wording of Aarhus, does not contain that provision and merely mentions that the applicant is
not obliged to state the reason the information is requested.
Interestingly, this seems also to be the case under any UK statutory provision that grants a
right to access information, since according to Elias J.,zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA"ifzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAa person has a right to inspect, the
motive with which he exercises that right is irre/evanf'.322
Furthermore, a request should not be formulated in a too general manner since this can be
a reason for rejection.f" The definition as to what is too general is not given in the Convention nor
the Directives. Thus, it is a matter left to either the implementing legislators to decide or the courts.
318 Art. 4 par. I(a).
319 Art.3 par.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA1.
320 Under art. 3 par. I of Directive 90/3131EEC, public authorities were required to make available
information relating to the environment to any natural or legal person at his request and without his having to
"prove" an interest. The word "prove" having lead to some difficulties, it was replaced with the word "state"
in the 2003 Directive. See the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
~ublic access to environmental information, COM 2000 402 final, OJ C 337, 28/11/2000, p. 156.
21 Art. 3(3) of the initial proposal provided that: 'If the applicant states that he is requesting information for a
specific purpose, the public authority concerned shall make reasonable efforts to make available such
information within such time-period as is necessary to enable the applicant to fulfil that purpose'. Ibid.
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The implementing new Regulations.P' similarly to the position before.l" also provide that
requests ought not to be too general in which case they might be rejected. However, what can be
reasonably considered as a too general request is left undefined and thus it will be for each public
authority to decide.l"
In line with the 2003 Directive, the 2004 Regulations do not expressly provide for other
details that have to be includedzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAin the requests. On t e contrary, s. 8 of the FOIA 2000 provides that
requests also have to state the name of the applicant and an address for correspondence in order
that the request is dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Act.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
dl Time-limits
There are two different sorts of time-limits: time-limits concerning the provision of
information, and time-limits for refusals. In all of the instruments examined herein their
requirements are identical, in the sense that the periods of time for refusal or disclosure are
identical, though there is no need for them necessarily to be the same.
The Aarhus Convention requires as a principle that public bodies provide the information,
or either refuse any request,zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA"as soon as possibl = ", It also sets a maximum time limit of one
month for normal requests and for voluminous and at the same time complex requests'" it allows
an extension of up to two months. The Convention, however, does not define when the clock starts
ticking, but says only after the request has been "submitted'. The details of when a request is
deemed to have been submitted (this is important for requests remotely sent by postal or electronic
means) or how the period is to be measured (i.e. are bank holidays and weekends to be taken into
account or not), are left to national legislators. Any use of the provisions permitting an extension of
time has to be justified by reasons given to the applicant as soon as possible and at the latest at the
end of the first month. The new Directive 2003/4 exactly mirrors these provisions.
On the contrary, Directive 90/313 also provided that public authorities were to provide
information requested in principle as soon as possible, and that in any case public authorities were
to "respond" until a maximum period of two months.?" Interestingly, the Directive did not provide
322 The Queen on the Application ofHTV Limited v. Bristol City Council [2004] EWHC 1219, at par. 59. This
case concerns section 15 of the Audit Commission Act 1998, which grants a right to any "interested person"
to inspect and make copies of audit accounts and related documents of Local Authorities.
323 Art. 4 par. 3(c) of the Aarhus Convention and art. 3(4) of Directive 90/313EEC, and art. 4(1)(c) of
Directive 2003/41EC.
324 Reg. 12(4)(c).
325 Reg. 3(3) of the Environmental Information Regulations 1992 and also s. 1(3) of the FOIA 2000.
326 However, the Draft Code of Practice, does provide some guidance on that and mentions that the applicant
cannot reasonably be expected to possess identifiers such as a file reference number, or a description of a
particular record, unless this information is made available by the authority for the use of applicants. Se
above n. 309, at par. 11.
327 Art. 4, par. 2 for provision of information; par. 7 for refusals.
328 The wording of the Convention is "unless the volume and the complexity of the information justify an
extension", thus indicating these two conditions are cumulative for the extension to be justified.
329 Art. 3, par. 4.
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for any extension of this time limit in complex cases, the two-months limit being deemed as
sufficient in all matters. In the withdrawn EC] case ofzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBACommi sion v. Germanyf" the Commission
brought an action against Germany arguing that the use of word "respond" in the first sentence of
Article 3(4) must be interpreted as including either the communication of requested information or
the notification of a refusal. The Commission bases its interpretation on the efficiency of the whole
system. It argued that if authorities were merely required to give interim answers within the two-
month period, stating that access to the information would be granted at a later date, the system
would not be effective. This interpretation seems to be correct, and compatible with a purposive
interpretation of the Directive, though unfortunately the case was removed from the register,
probably because the adoption of the new Directive was imminent and resolved this issue. Even
though this case was withdrawn, it demonstrates that public authorities are not to give interim
answers and that time limits are to be strictly abided by.
The 1992 regulations specified that requests should be responded to as soon as possible and
no more than two months after the request was made."! The new regulations also provide at reg. 7
that requests are to be dealt as soon as possible and set the time limit for refusals as well as supply
of environmental information to 20 working days after the request has been received, even if the
new Directive allows for onezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAmonth.?" The Government decided to use the 20 days formula, as in
the FOIA, for the sake of simplicity. Also it should be noted that the 2004 Regulations (as with the
FOIA) provide that where the provision of information or the refusal will take longer than 20 days,
the public authority must inform the applicant of this within 20 working days.?" The actual
decision as to whether or not to grant access may take longer than 20 working days in cases where
the complexity or the amount of information justifies that, but in any case this time cannot be
longer than 40 days. It seems that this might be a breach of the Aarhus Convention and the new
Directive, which both provide, as analysed above, that time-limits can be extended to two months if
both the complexity and the volume of information justifies that extension and not just one of this
two alternatives as permitted by the new regulations.f" In any case, the 2004 Regulations do not
indicate in any detail in which cases the complexity or the volume of information might justify a
refusal, but leave that to what each public authority considers is 'reasonable'r'" Surprisingly, even
330 See above n. 125.
331 Reg. 3(2)(b).
332 Reg. 5(2).
333 Working days are not defined by the Regulations themselves, but s. 10(6) of the Freedom of Information
Act 2000 defines them as 'any day other than a Saturday, a Sunday, Christmas Day, Good Friday or a day
which is a bank holiday under the Banking and Financial Dealings Act 1971 in any part of the United
Kingdom.' This interpretation is also binding under the Regulations which have been made under powers
conferred to the Secretary of State by this same Act, since according to section 11 of the Interpretation Act
1978 "Where an Act confers power to make subordinate legislation, expressions used in that legislation have,
unless the contrary intention appears, the meaning which they bear in the Act'. In any case, reg. 2(1) of the
2004 Regulations mentions that a 'working day' has the same meaning as in the FOIA 2000.
334 This different position adopted by the Regulations, even if in breach of the Directive as more restrictive
for access to information, can be explained by the fact that sometimes there could be very complex requests
even if they concern only a small amount of information.
335 At. Reg. 7(1).
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the Draft Code of Practice does not mention anything more detailed, as it merely indicates thatzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
'Authorities may find it helpful to formulate a policy about how to apply the provision on making a
time extension. ,336
A further issue is what if an extended period of time is only needed concerning a small
number of the information requested. Should the remainder .be disclosed in the shorter period of
time? The answer seems to be yes, since such an approach would be compatible with the purpose
of the Directive, to open up as much as possible the files of public bodies.
A final issue, is that according to reg. 9(4) of the 2004 Regulations, when the request is
deemed too general and the public authority asks for further particulars in relation to it (it has 20
days to do that), then the 20 day time-limit to provide the information or issue a refusal (which is
also extendable to 40 days on the terms examined before) starts over when these further particulars
are received by the demanding public body.
e) Costs
This is an important issue, since prohibitive costs can render any right to information
ineffective in practice. Also, providing for free access to information on the one hand might lead to
huge costs for public authorities and ultimately for taxpayers, and on the other hand might deprive
public bodies from information of great financial or commercial value that could have been
charged at market value price thus preventing them of making potential benefits."?
The Convention merely provides that any charge for the 'supplying' of information cannot
exceed a 'reasonable amount'r'" States are not under an obligation to charge, though if they decide
to do so, the Convention imposes procedural requirements obliging public authorities to provide a
schedule for charges. These sc~edules must include (i) cost of charges; (ii) criteria for when
charges may be levied or waived and (iii) criteria for when the supply of information is conditional
on the advance payment of a charge. This indicates that the Convention allows disclosure of
information to be conditional on payment in advance. However, the Convention does not indicate if
charges can be levied merely for inspections of documents, though it can be considered that
charging for such inspections is not reasonable. This issue has been answered, as we shall see, by
Directive 2003/4.
The old Directive was very laconic on the issue of charging and only provided that member
states were free to impose or not a "reasonable" charge for supplying information.!" The 1992
regulations were also very brief and provided that public authorities were free to charge costs
336 See above n. 309, at par. 17.
337 For instance the Chief Executive of the Ordnance Survey has stated that the Regulations "could result in
the rights of Ordnance Survey in its maps being seriously and unreasonable prejudiced, with equally serious
adverse consequences for its business. The very future existence of Ordnance Survey in a capacity capable of
maintaining the nation's map database would be jeopardised". Cited by Peter Roderick, see above n. 313, at
p.271-272.
~38Art. 4 par. 8.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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reasonably attributable to the supply of information and also to make the supply of any information
conditional on the payment of such a charge.l" These vague provisions have been heavily criticised
because they allowed for costs to be a possible barrier to effective access to information."! For
instance, as Hallo indicates.l? DirectivezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA90/313 does not xplicitly rule out the possibility of
charging for the mere search of information by public authorities. The European Court of Justice
has been interpreting these provisions on charges (as the entire Directive) in a way leading to
increased openness.r" In Commission v. Federal Republic of Germony'" the Court ruled that the
term 'reasonable fees' for the purposes of Article 5 of the Directive 90/313 must be understood as
meaning that Member States are not authorised to charge the entire amount of the costs actually
incurred in conducting an information search.l" Also, the ECJ ruled that a charge made where a
request for information is refused, cannot be described as reasonable, since in such a case no
information has in fact been supplied. The ECJ clearly ruled that charges can be reasonably levied
only for the supply of information and 'not for the administrative tasks connected with a request for
information' _J46 The most important finding of the ECJ however, is the way in which all provisions
of the Directive (including the term of 'reasonable charges') must be interpreted. The Court
indicates that 'the purpose of the directive, which is to guarantee freedom of access to information
on the environment and to avoid any obstacles to that freedom, precludes any interpretation which
is liable to dissuade those wishing to obtain information from making a request to that effect'i"
This purposive approach and method of interpretation has to be adopted by national courts and
legislators and is still relevant for the construction of the new 2003 Directive. If this purposive
interpretation is applied to the phrase 'reasonable costs', this means, according to the court, that
any interpretation which may have the result that persons are dissuaded from seeking to obtain
information or which may restrict their right of access to information must be rejected.?"
The new 2003 Directive in its article 5 (albeit repeating the same formula that public
authorities may make reasonable charges for supplying information) is very detailed on some
339 Art. 5.
340 Reg.3(4)(I).
341 See inter alia Bakkenist, above n. 311, at p. 39. Also as a research has pointed out, charging provisions
for the provision of the same quantity and type of information by different public authorities can vary
considerably and sometimes exorbitant charges can be made. See J. Rowan-Robinson et al., Public access to
Environmental Information: a means to what end?, [1996] JEL 19, at p. 34-35.
342 See Hallo, above n. 306, at p. 16.
343 Also in Commission v. the Kingdom of Spain, an action filled on 21May 1999 (case C-189/99, OJ 1999/C
226/26) but later withdrawn from the register (OJ C 118, 21/04/2001 p. 28), the Commission argued the
failure of transposition into Spanish law of Directive 90/313 because there were no specific provisions in
Spanish law concerning charging for the provision of environmental information and providing that these
charges may not exceed a reasonable cost. '
344 Judgement of the European Court of Justice (Sixth Chamber) of 9 September 1999 in Case C-217/97:
Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany, OJ C 352, 04/12/1999 p. 3
345 Par. 48 of the judgement: ' ... the term ''reasonable'' for the purposes of Article 5 of the directive must be
understood as meaning that it does not authorise Member States to pass on to those seeking information the
entire amount of the costs, in particular indirect ones, actually incurred for the State budget in conducting an
information search'.
346 Ibid. at par. 57 and 59.
347 Ibid. at par. 58.
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points aiming at resolving some of these issues. First, it clarifies that inspections of information by
members of the public at the offices of public authorities are free of charge. There is also free
access to public registers established under article 3(5) of the directive. These are not the equivalent
of public registers established under British law which contain environmental information.!" They
are registers not containingzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAstricto sensu environmental information, but information aiming at
assisting the public with its requests: lists of public authorities and registers, or lists of the
environmental information held by public authorities or other information points. This
demonstrates the importance for the effectiveness of the right to access information to allow for
free and easy access to data indicating where the information sought can be found. Second, the
Directive also repeats the provisions of the Aarhus Convention, that it is a prerequisite for any levy
of charges to have previously published and circulated a schedule of charges detailing their level
and the circumstances in which they are levied or waived. This obligation to clarify in a schedule
how charges are to be calculated counterbalances the uncertainty of the phrase "reasonable
charges", since in any case for charges to be levied they have to be known beforehand.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIt is
interesting to mention that during the adoption stages of the new directive the European parliament
had proposed to replace this phrase with the unambiguous one "actual costs of reproduction".
However, the UK government opposed this amendment considering that being able to levy charges
for other services than reproduction costs facilitates greater access to environmental information
through the provision of customer services such as research.l" This view is totally unconvincing
since article 3 of the Directive provides for a duty to provide advice and assistance to the public in
accessing information. The government was more concerned about passing as much as possible of
the costs of providing information to the enquirers, than of facilitating greater access without cost
being a potential barrier. Finally, the 2003 Directive, explicitly allows for charges to be payable in
advance."!
The new 2004 Regulations, at regulation 8, mirror the above-mentioned provisions of the
new Directive. However, they do not explicitly provide that unless a schedule detailing charges is
made available, no 'reasonable charges' may be levied, but only mention that public authorities
'shall' publish such a Schedule. This seems to be a potential breach of the 2003 Directive, which
3481bid. at par. 47.
349 These registers and the provisions and policy on the costs of accessing information existing on them are
examined elsewhere in this work. See the relevant chapter on registers.
350 See on these, New Draft Environmental Information Regulations: Public Consultation, DEFRA, July
2002, p. 7. available from http://www.defra.gov.uk
351 Recital 18 of the 2003 Directive provides that' ... Instances where advance payment will be required
should be limited. In particular cases, where public authorities make available environmental information on
a commercial basis, and where this is necessary in order to guarantee the continuation of collecting and
publishing such information, a market-based charge is considered to be reasonable; an advance payment may
be required' (our emphasis). This should be contrasted with the initial proposal of article 5(1) of the
Directive which contained an explicit prohibition of all advance payments: 'The supply of any information
shall not be made subject to the advance payment ofa charge' (see above n. 111).
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makes the levy of fees conditional on the existence of such a Schedule of Charges. 352 Also, when a
charging scheme is in force, the provision of information might be made conditional to the
payment, thus allowing public authorities to delay disclosure until the full amount requested is
paid.
There are however three important differences between the charging scheme adopted by
the new Regulations with the one adopted by the FOIA. First, the Act provides that the level of
charges is to be uniformly set by Fees Regulations'" made by the Secretary of State (now the Lord
Chancellor). On the contrary the new environmental information regulations provide that what is
reasonable is to be set by each public authority, thus permitting diverging practices, as existing
under the previous regulations. However, the new regulations provide for some mechanisms that
might remedy these divergences if they appear, even if it should be accepted that what is
reasonable could be interpreted differently by various authorities. Fees can be uniformly set by the
Code of Practice made by the Secretary of State under reg. 16. Also, if some authorities were to
charge unreasonable amounts in violation of the Regulations, the Information Commissioner has
the power to issue an enforcement notice indicating how charges should be applied.l" However,
the Commissioner can only issue such notices if the regulations have been breached and not if the
Codes of Practice have not been complied with, since the latter are not binding for public
authorities. Hence, the commissioner could not intervene if charges were higher than what
suggested by the Codes of Practice, but still 'reasonable'. In such instances, the Information
Commissioner could only issue 'practice recommendations', which are not mandatory for public
authorities.l" Still, the Codes of Practices could serve as a basis on which reasonableness of costs
could be assessed by the Commissioner thus preventing great variations in charging schemes,
especially since the Commissioner has to be consulted by the Lord Chancellor before he issues
them.
Second, section 12 of the FOIA exempts public authorities from the duty to provide
information if the cost of complying with such a request would exceed an appropriate limit set by
the Fees Regulations.l" This exemption does not exist in the environmental information
regulations, since both Aarhus and the new Directive do not contain such a provision.
A final question that arises is what happens in practice if a person having requested
environmental information under the regulations omits to pay and the time limit for answer lapses.
Is the public authority bound to provide the information requested since they have a duty to do that
352 Neither the Draft Code of Practice mentions that the existence of such a Schedule is compulsory for public
authorities wishing to charge an applicant.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAOn the contrary, t ey merely mention thatzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA'Where a public
authority proposes to make a charge, a schedule of charges should be made available (including, e.g. a price
list for publications, or the charge per unit of work which will be incurred to meet a request). ' (our emphasis)
See above n. 309, at par. 20.
353 See the draft Freedom of Information (Fees and Appropriate Limit) Regulations made under s. 9(3) of the
FOIA 2000, available from the Lord Chancellor's website at http://www.lcd.gov.uklfoildftfees.pdf
354 On the powers of the Commissioner see below.
355 See on these, below part d) The Information Commissioner
356 Actually set at £550 by reg. 6.
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in the prescribed time limits? The logical answer would be that where required fees have not been
paid then the public authority is not bound to disclose the information requested but should inform
the applicant that the information is ready to be collected or sent as soon as the fees are paid. This
interpretation is consistent with the fact that a failure to answer a request (either with a written
refusal or with disclosure) amounts to a breach of the regulations. Reg. 8(5) solves this issue by
mentioning that once the applicant is notified of the charges, he has to pay them in 60 working
days. If this period of time lapses without payment, then his request is void and he has to reapply?"zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
o The form in which information is disclosed
First of all, it should be examined whether it is possible for applicants to choose in which
form they would like to receive any requested information (such as inspections on site, paper
copies, electronic disks, or remote electronic access), or if it is a matter solely left to public
authorities to decide.
Both the 1992 Regulations and Directive 90/313, did not expressly mention anything about
the form in which information is to be disclosed, probably because this was being considered as a
technical detail of secondary importance, left for member states and public authorities to decide.
However, the newest legal instruments do contain some provisions on the issue.
The Aarhus Convention and in identical terms Directive 2003/4 provide that in principle,
members of the public may request information in a specific form and the public authority must
honour the request for such specific form. 358 This indicates that the Convention obliges states not to
exclude certain types of forms of communication but to allow the public to choose. This could be
very onerous on public authorities by allowing the applicant to request some unusual or expensive
forms. So, the Convention and the new Directive mention two exceptions to this requirement. First,
the public authority may decide to communicate information using another form than the one
requested if it is 'reasonable'. What is reasonable is not defined anywhere in the Convention and it
is a term indefinitely flexible, depending upon individual interpretation. Second, the public
authority is not required to give the information in the form requested if it is alreadyzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA"publicly
available in another form", such as published on a public internet web-site or in a published leaflet.
A difficulty arises as to the interpretation of the term "publicly available in another form". This
term should be interpreted in conjunction with the Convention's requirement that access to
information should be effective in practice.l" Thus, "publicly available" would mean that the
information is easily accessible to the member of the public requesting it, and "another form"
would mean that the amount of available information in the publicly available form, is of same
357 See the Draft Code of Practice, above n. 309, in par. 20.
358 Aarhus, art 4 parzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA1. DirectivezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA2003/41EC, art. 3(4). Directive 90/313EEC does not provide that applicants
may request information in a specific form.
359 54At art. 3. See Stec et al., above n. 97, at page .
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amount than in the form requested (i.e. that what is publicly available is not merely a summary).
This would also indicate that electronic information which is in a format that requires the use of
special commercial software to be read by computers should be provided in a different format,
which could easily be read using standard home-computers and not requiring the purchase of
specific professional computer equipment or software.
Identically, the 2004 Environmental Information Regulations indicate that members of the
public may request that information be communicated in a specific fornr'" and so it has to be
indicated which form is preferred by the applicant. As we have seen, the public authority must in
principle honour the request for a specific form but for the two exceptions already mentioned above
(unreasonableness and information publicly available and accessible in another form).
The importance of the exception to communicate information already publicly available in
another form and, as the 2004 Regulations add, 'easily accessible?" can be seen by linking it with
the requirement of article 3(4) of the 2003 Directive'" which indicates that public authorities
should 'make all reasonable efforts' to make available environmental information through
electronic telecommunications networks, i.e. the internet. If the requested information is freely
accessible through the internet, then there is no duty for public authorities to provide it in another
form. So we can imagine a distant future, where all information would ideally be accessible
through the internet, then there won't be either applicants nor applications since everything will be
accessible on screen. However, the Directive does not make the organisation of availability through
electronic channels a legal duty for public authorities, but rather a goal to achieve without any legal
consequences if they fail to do it. Thus, this might never be totally achieved, without the prospect
of legal challenges from aggrieved people.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
g)zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAThe form and content of refusals - partial refusals
What should refusals indicate, and whether they can be made orally or in writing is an
important issue, because oral refusals can lead to difficulties in appeals since it might be difficult to
prove when did the refusal take place and what were the exact reasons of it. This is also the case for
refusals not containing reasons for the refusal.
The old DirectivezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA90/313 indicated in its article 3(4) that reasons for refusals were to be
given, but did not provide for written refusals, so they could be in oral form. However, the 1992
360 Reg. 6( 1).
361 At Reg. 6(1)(b).
362 This is the equivalent of art. 5 of the Aarhus Convention. See the relevant discussion on electronic
registers containing environmental information in the Chapter on Registers.
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regulations provided at reg. 3(2)(c) that not only must reasons for refusals be given but that refusals
had to be in writing.t" thus resolving this issue.
Both Aarhus and the new 2003 directive are very protective of applicants since they
provide that refusals have to be in writing whenever the request was in writing or the applicant
requested it that way.364Thus, oral refusals are still possible in the case of oral requests when the
applicant did not request a written answer. Interestingly, an electronic refusal (probably meaning
via electronic mail) is considered as equivalent to a written refusal by the Directive. Refusals have
to contain two things: first, as with the previous Directive, the reasons for the refusal, and second,
and this is a new requirement, the refusal must indicate information on the appeals mechanisms that
exist in order to contest the refusal. This last requirement is important so as to inform applicants of
available appeal procedures and in a way indirectly invite them to use them. Also, as stated in thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
Birmingham Northern relief road case, the reasons that are mentioned in the refusal decision have
to be sufficient and as such cannot be considered a mere repetition of the wording of one of the
exemptions. Thus, the specific circumstances have to be mentioned in some detail. Sullivan J.
mentioned that the aim of the provision indicating that reasons have to be indicated 'is to enable an
individual who is refused information to ascertain whether the refusal is well founded in fact and
law, or whether it is susceptible to challenge. That purpose is not fulfilled by the bare assertion
that the Agreement is confidential under a particular regulation. It should be possible to provide
some, albeit brief, explanation as to why the information sought is confidential, without breaching
that confidentiality'. 365
Also, if the refusal is due to the fact that the application was made to a public authority not
holding the information requested, then the refusal can be one of two things. First, if the public
authority does not know which other authority might hold the information requested, then no
further action is needed (apart from a promptly written refusal explaining this fact). Second, if on
the contrary the authority does know which authority might hold the requested information, then
the authority can either transfer the request to that authority and inform the applicant of that
transfer, or can inform the applicant of which public authority might hold what he requests.!" It
seems that the time limit for replying to the applicant starts ticking again from the beginning when
the transferred demand is received by the competent public authority, since there is no specific
provision in Aarhus or the Directive indicating that this is not the case and both these texts indicate
that time limits start on the date when the request is received.
All these requirements for refusals (written refusals.!" the mention of reasons'" and appeal
possibillties.i" transfers to the competent authority'") appear in the 2004 environmental
363This also applied for refusals made under other statutory provisions, such as statutory registers, according
to reg. 5(c).
364Aarhus art. 4(7) ; DirectivezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA2003/4IEC art. 4(5) and art. 3(4).
365[1999] Env.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAL.R. 447, at p. 469. This requirement is also explicitly mentioned in the Draft Code of
Practice, at par. 46. See above n. 309.
366Aarhus art. 4(5) ; Directive 2003/4IEC art. 4(1)(a).
367 Reg. 14(1).
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information regulationszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAin the ame manner as above. The regulations are somewhat more detailed
and only add two details to the above mentioned mechanisms. First, they indicate that when a
request is transferred from one public authority to another holding the information requested, then
the time limits for answer by the second authority starts on the day on which the request is received
by that authority."! Second, concerning the transfer of requests, the Draft Code of Practice
provides that requests are not to be transferred to another authority if the applicant has stated in his
requests that there should be no transfer.!" It is difficult to foresee in which cases an applicant will
make such a request, since what he is after is access to information, thus the policy of this provision
is hard to conceive.
It is clear that if a public authority fails to provide adequate reasons for the refusal, then
this means that it has actedzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAultra vi es and thus the refusal is invalidated, as both the 2003 Directive
and Aarhus seem to make the provision of reasons a substantive requirement of the right to access
information. However, the question arises of whether a failure to mention appeal possibilities,
would also make the refusal invalid, even if written reasons are provided. A strict interpretation of
this requirement in conjunction with the spirit of the Directive and Aarhus could indicate that such
a procedural failure would be enough to invalidate the refusal. However, we believe that there can
be a different approach which would equally safeguard the right to an effective remedy as
guaranteed by article 6 of the ECHR, but would also prevent a decision correct in substance to be
invalidated because of a mere procedural error. It could be argued that a refusal which does not
mention the possible appeal procedures would not be automatically considered as invalid, but that
an appeal against such a refusal, would never be dismissed as brought out of time. Thus, the rights
of appeal would never be 10st.373
A further question that arises is the question of implied refusals. This is important because
in some legal systems (like France'?' or Greece'") there is an administrative law principle which
368 Reg. 14(3). It should be noted that in English law, there is no general duty for administrative bodies to
give reasons for their decisions, but there are classes of cases where such a duty arises either under a statute
or under the common law. See on thii point Sedley J. in the case of R v Higher Education Council, ex p
Institute of Dental Surgery [1994] 1 WLR 242 at 263.
369 Reg. 14(5).
370 Reg. 10.
371 Reg. 14(2). This is not expressly mentioned in Aarhus nor the 2003 Directive, but can be safely concluded
from their provisions on time-limits, as mentioned before.
372 See the Code of Practice, above n. 309, at par. 27.
373 See for a similar interpretation of the equivalent provisions of the FOIA 2000, Macdonald, below n. 578,
at pp. 127-128.
374 See Rene Chapus, Droit Administratif General, ed. Montchrestien, Paris 2001 (in French). This period is
in general two months. However, especially for refusals to provide access to information held by public
bodies, it is set to one month by Article 2 of French Decree No 88-465, which provides that failure by the
competent authority to reply' within one month to a request to supply administrative documents is to be
deemed to constitute a refusal. See the ECJ case of Commission v. France. Also, there seems to have been a
similar situation in Spain, as in Commission v. the Kingdom of Spain, an action later withdrawn from the
register (See above n. 343), the Commission argued the failure of transposition into Spanish law of Directive
90/313 because, the relevant Spanish statute recognised silence on the part of public authorities as being
sufficient to be an implied rejection of a request for information.
375 See E. Spiliotopoulos, Droit Administratif Hellenique, ed. Librairie generale de droit et de jurisprudence,
Paris 1991 (in French).
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provides that whenever a request is made to a public authority and a set period of time lapses
without an answer, then this is considered as an implied refusal. Would such a principle be
acceptable under Aarhus or the new Directive? Even if implied refusals were permissible under the
1990 Directive if reasons were nevertheless communicatedzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAin a two-month time limit, as accepted
by the EC] in the case ofzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBACommi sion v. France, it seems that such a practice would now be in
breach of the written refusals and reasons requirements of Aarhus and the 2003 Directive.l" There
is no such issue in British law, where first, there is no such a principle and second, both the 1992
and the new 2004 Regulations expressly provide for written refusals.
Lastly, when not all of the requested information falls under one of the exemptions to
disclosure, then the refusal must be partial and the remainder of the information must be
communicated. This requirement of partial communication (or partial refusals) explicitly exists in
the 1990 Directive, the 1992 Regulations, the Aarhus Convention, the 2003 Directive and the 2004
Regulations."? This is a very important requirement, since the EC] has held twice, in the cases of
Commission v. Germany and of Commission v. France, that the obligation to supply information in
part has to be guaranteed in national law in a manner sufficiently clear and precise to ensure legal
certainty and to enable persons who may submit a request for information to know the full extent of
their rights. Thus, this has to be undertaken by explicit statutory provisions to that extent. 378zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
h) Practical considerations of access.
Matters that at first sight seem trivial like adequate reading conditions and copying
facilities are important since they can enable or prevent the exercise of the right of access or at least
376 Under Directive 90/313 according to the interpretation given to the reasons requirement and the two-
month time limit by the ECJ in the case of Commission v. France at par. Ill: ' ... it must be held that, in
contrast to what the Commission claims, the fiction by which the failure of the authorities to reply is deemed
to constitute an implied refusal cannot, as such, be considered incompatible with the requirements of
Directive 901313 on the sole ground that a tacit refusal by definition does not include any reasons. Moreover,
as Community law currently stands, the wording of that directive does not provide sufficient justification for
the alleged necessity that the refusal be accompanied by the reasons for it'. The Court found, however, that
France was in breach of the Directive's requirement to provide reasons since in the case of implied refusals
of requests for information relating to the environment, there was no legal requirement for public authorities
to provide automatically the reasons for the refusals and at the latest within two months of the submission of
the initial request. The Court reached this decision by interpreting Article 3(4) of the 1990 directive as
requiring public authorities to provide automatically the reasons for refusing a request for information
without the applicant having to submit a request for that purpose, even if, where the authorities fail to reply,
those reasons are notified to the applicant at a later date. Also, the Court seems to suggest that the position
can only be different under the new 2003 Directive (see par. 106).
377 Article 3(2) of Directive 90/313; Article 4 par. 4 of Directive 2003/4; Reg. 12(10) of the Environmental
Information Regulations 2004.
378 The ECJ found that both Germany and France had violated this requirement by failing to expressly
provide in their national laws that information were to be disclosed in part where possible. See Commission
v. Germany at paragraphs. 33, 34 and 35 and Commission v. France at paragraphs 66, 67 and 68.
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restrict the exercise of the right. As Bakkenist indicateszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA'such matters as li hting, seating and noise
levels should ideally be considered and provided to make perusal of documents tolerable' .379
Both the 1990 Directive and the 1992 regulations did not mention anything about such
practical considerations. However, both the Aarhus Convention and the new Directive innovate by
containing such provisions. This is surprising since one would expect such provisions not to be
found in supra national legal instruments, since they are technical details, but rather to be left for
states to regulate. This indicates that practical considerations of access are not seen by the
European legislator as mere technicalities but as an important aspect of the right of access.
The new 2003 Directive and the Aarhus Convention similarly provide that member states
shall ensure that the practical arrangements are arranged by member states so as to ensure the
effective and transparent exercise of the right of access to environmental information.t" The same
provisions also mention some examples of such practical arrangements, as the designation of
information officers, the establishment and maintenance of facilities for the examination of the
information required and even mention the possibility of creating 'information points' where
registers or lists of the information held by public authorities could be available. It is also
mentioned that member states shall ensure citizens know the rights they enjoy under the Directive
and that public authorities 'to an appropriate extent?" provide information, guidance and advice in
accessing environmental information.
Interestingly, even if these matters were not seen as technical details by the drafters of
Aarhus and the Directive, the British government does not appear to consider them important as it
does not repeat all of these provisions in the regulations and consequently leaves them for the
Secretary of State to include in the Code of Practice he can make under reg. 16. The problem is that
the Code of Practice is not legally binding. However, it has been suggested that complete failure to
take this Code into account, would constitute an error in law and thus the adoption of an alternative
approach would have to be justifled.i"
In any case, the regulations do expressly include one of these provisions: the requirement
to provide advice and assistance to persons who propose to make or have made requests for
information, which is even called a 'duty' of public authorities.l" The same regulation also
provides that when a request is too general then the public authority has to ask the applicant in 20
379 See Bakkenist, above n. 311, at p. 75.
380 Aarhus art. 5(2); DirectivezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA2003/4IEC art. 3 par. 5(c).
381 This limitation appears only in the Directive at art. 5, but can also logically be implied from the text of
Aarhus.
382 According to Macdonald, see below n. 578, at p. 13l. This suggestion is based on the Court of Appeal
case of De Falco, Silvestri vCrawley BC (1980) QB 460, concerning the Code of Guidance adopted under
the (then applicable) Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977. In this case it was held that although this Code
should not be regarded as a binding statute, the council had to have regard to the code, since section 12 of the
Act provided that housing authorities "shall have regard" to it. However, the court held that having done so,
they could depart from it if they thought fit. This case might be distinguished from the situation under the
FOIA 2000, since there is no equivalent to this s. 12 in the FOIA that directs the public authorities to have
regard to the Lord Chancellor's Codes of Practice.
383 Reg. 9(1).
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working days after the request is made to specify the request and assist him.384It is unclear what the
extent of such a duty is, since it only applies so far as it is reasonable, this last term being
indefinitely flexible and vague.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIn any case the regulations do provide an indication of the extent of
this duty/8s by mentioning that a public authority shall have been taken to have complied with this
duty if it has conformed to the provisions on advice and assistance present in the Code of Practice
(mentioned above). The vagueness of this 'duty', will probably strip from any serious legal
consequences the breach of it, since it will be difficult to assess when will there be a breach of it.
i) Limitations on the subsequent use of disclosed information
A legitimate question that arises is once information has been disclosed in application of
the environmental information regime, to which use that information can be put. None of the legal
instruments that provide for the environmental information regime give an answer to this
question.l" This is explainable since their aim is to protect the environment through the widest
dissemination possible of information. Therefore a requirement that information which has been
disclosed under the environmental information regime, would have to be kept secret, would
undermine the whole rationale of the system, since if the use of information was to be restricted ,
then it couldn't be used as a means to achieve the protection of the environment, or at least its
usefulness to that end would be greatly undermined. Also, if the use of disclosed information was
to be restricted, this could be against the principle that information is to be disclosed without the
applicant having to state reasons why the information is needed, since public authorities might be
tempted to ask to which use will the information be put, which would be an indirect question on the
reasons for the request. In other words, asking to which use will disclosed information be put, is
almost equal to asking why is the request being made. It seems that scholars have not yet dealt with
that issue. However, in the case ofzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAThe Queen on the Application ofzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA/ITV Limited v. Bristol City
Counciii" which concerned section 15 of the Audit Commission Act 1998, a provision that grants
to any "person interested" the right to inspect and receive copies of local authorities' accounts and
related documents, Elias J. held that since this statute did not limit the purpose for which the
information could be used, it followed that there was no basis on which the court could properly
impose limitations on the claimant but that information had to be used lawfully. Thus, if this
precedent is applied to the environmental information regime, it follows that public bodies cannot
withhold information because they feel that it will be used for an unlawful purpose. For instance,
we could imagine the case where someone asks a local planning authority for copies of plans
accompanying a planning application. It seems that the local authority could not refuse to provide
384Reg.9(2).
38S Reg.9(3).
386Neither does the FOIA 2000.
387[2004] EWHC 1219.
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them, even if it had reasons to suspect that the copies would be used in a manner contrary to
copyright laws, for example in order to design identical buildings.
Still, there exist other legal rules that can limit the subsequent use of information. These
are copyright rules and rules protecting privacy and confidentiality.
As far as copyright restrictions are concerned, it should be noted that if information sought
qualifies for copyright protection.?" then the normal restrictions on its use (copying, transmitting,
broadcasting etc) apply. In oversimplified terms, this would mean that copyrighted information,
even if disclosed under the access to environmental information regime, could be copied only for
purposes of private study and reference and not for further dissemination to the public. However,
s. 47 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 provides three exceptions to allow for the
copying of material that is available for public inspection, in order to facilitate the use of such
material and promote access to it.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA389
The first exception relates to material which is open to public inspection pursuant to a
statutory requirement or which is on a statutory register. Under this exception, any copyright in the
material as a literary work is not infringed by the copying by the person being under a duty to
provide it for public inspection of so much of the material as contains factual information, and does
not involve the issuing of copies to the public. A statutory requirement is defined as a requirement
imposed by a provision made by or under an enactment and thus includes both the Environmental
Information Regulations and the Freedom of Information Act 2000. Also, statutory registers are
defined as registers maintained in pursuance of a statutory requirement, and thus include all
registers examined in this work.
The second exception is confined to material open to public inspection pursuant to a
statutory requirement. Provided that the person being under a duty to provide it has given their
authority, copyright in any work will not be infringed by the copying or issuing to the public of
copies if this is for the purpose of enabling the material to be inspected at a more convenient time
or place, or if this otherwise facilitates the exercise of any right for the purpose of which the
statutory requirement of availability for inspection is imposed. This undoubtedly applies to
requests, which ask for copies of the information to be provided, since in most cases involving
environmental information the holder would have no choice as he would be required by law to
disclose it. This is important, since the copyright owner cannot ask for a copyright fee to be paid
388 Not all works can qualify for copyright protection, see Part I, eh. IX, of the Copyright, Designs and
Patents Act 1988. Also under s. 163 of the same Act, any work made by an officer or a servant of the Crown
under his duties, qualifies for extended copyright protection referred as 'Crown Copyright'. Moreover, under
s. 165 of the same Act works made by or ..under the direction or control of either House of Parliament are
protected by special 'Parliamentary copyright', but commissioned works are excluded from it. On all
copyright matters referred herein see for more detailszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBACopinger and Skone James on Copyright, Sweet and
Maxwell, London: 1998. Specifically on Crown Copyright of official information see the still relevant to
some extent article of Sol Picciotto 'Towards Open Access to British Official Documents' [1996] 2 The
Joumal of Irformatton; Law and Technology, at http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/jiltlleginfo/2picciotldefault.htm
389 As analysed by Copinger and Skone James, op. cit., at Ch. 9, 6, C, 9-54. Till now, there have been no
Court decisions involving this section. These three exceptions are provided for by s. 47 and ss. 1, 2 and 3 of
the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, respectively.
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and thus cannot block disclosure on this ground. However, if this exception is construedzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAa
contrario, it explicitly excludes the right to make further copies of the obtained information, since
this would not facilitate the exercise of the right to access environmental information provided for
by the Regulations.
The third and the most important, to our view, exception, relates like the first one both to
material which is open to public inspection pursuant to a statutory requirement and material which
is on a statutory register. If such material' contains information about matters of general scientific,
technical, commercial or economic interest, copyright is not infringed by the copying or issuing to
the public of copies of the material, by or with the authority of the appropriate person, for the
purpose of disseminating that information' .390 This indicates that when information is of general
interest to the public (but only scientific, technical, commercial or economic) then the information
can be freely copied so as to disseminate it, provided the person being under a duty to provide it
gives its authority, and thus not the copyright owner. This provision is fundamental, since it permits
for further copies of the obtained information to be made regardless of a refusal of the copyright
owner, if the. public authority that holds that information gives its authority. In this case the
authority would have a discretion. However, it is unclear whether the permission given under these
copyright provisions is deemed granted when a request to disclose environmental information is
granted, or whether there is a need of a separate decision for copyrighted material, apart from the
decision to disclose. If a purposive interpretation is made, it would seem that the decision to
disclose under the Environmental Information Regulations equals to an authorisation to further
copy the information under s.47(3) of the Copyright Act 1988, since a different interpretation
would limit access to information in a way not expressly provided for in the Directive.
An interesting technical detail is that when copies of maps are concerned the second and
third exceptions mentioned above, only apply to copies which have been previously marked with a
copyright warning. Similarly, when copies of plans or drawings are concerned the second
exception mentioned above (but not the third too as with copies of mapsj.?" only applies to copies
which have been marked with a copyright warning.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIn both cases, the warning is similar and
indicates that no further copies of the copy are to be made without the prior permission of the
copyright owner."? The rationale of these provisions is presumably to warn other persons that the
390 At s. 47(3). 'Appropriate person' is defined by ss. 6 as 'the person required to make the material open to
Eublic inspection or, as the case may be, the person maintaining the register'.
91 This difference of treatment between copies of plans and drawings and copies of maps is simply
inexplicable. See the Copyright (Material Open to Public Inspection) (Marking of Copies of Plans and
Drawings) Order 1990 (SI 1990/1427) and the Copyright (Material Open to Public Inspection) (Marking of
Copies of Maps) Order 1989 (SI 1989/1099). All these orders have been adopted under s. 47(5) of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, which provides that the Secretary of State may provide that these
three exceptions are only to apply to copies marked in a specified manner. There is no information on the
degree of compliance of public authorities with these technicalities, even though it seems important that they
are abided by, since otherwise there is a breach of copyright since these exceptions do not apply if the
warning is not affixed on such copies.
392 Ibid. The warning is: 'This copy has been made by or with the authority of [insert the name of the person
required to make the map, plan or drawing open to public inspection] pursuant to section 47 of the Copyright,
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material is protected by copyright, however it is unclear why they only apply to maps, plans and
drawings and not to any copyrighted material. It can be contended that these provisions have been
renderedzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAde facto bso ete, sin e now one can access maps, plans and drawing present on
electronic registers and can make as many copies as he likes.l"
However, these provisions limit the possibilities of the reuse of copyrighted information to
private use and only permit wider dissemination of information when it is in the general interest
and the public authority consents to such dissemination. The question of the re-use of accessible
information is crucial and is an issue underlying every freedom of information regime. At present,
the free reproduction of all official information is not allowed. 394 The EC has adopted a Directive
on the re-use and commercial exploitation of public sector documents.?" This directive, which has
to be implemented by member states by the I st July 2005, aims at establishing a minimum set of
rules governing the commercial and non-commercial exploitation of existing documents held by
public sector bodies of the Member States which are generally accessible under current freedom of
information rules. Generally speaking, the Directive maintains the discretion of member states and
public bodies to decide whether to allow the re-use of information obtained through information
regimes. The principle that is laid down is that if public bodies decide to allow the reuse of
disclosed information, they must do so on the same terms to every person who asks to re-use it.
Also, exclusive arrangements for the exploitation of public sector information between public
bodies and other persons are prohibited. The directive also sets out a 20 days unified time-limit for
dealing with requests and provides that charges for allowing re-use have to be published and can
only consist of the cost of producing and disseminating the information together with a reasonable
return on investment.
As far as the law relating to the protection of confidentiality is concerned, it should be
noted that these issues have been dealt in the relevant chapter on human rights. Also, it should be
noted that the Regulations (like the FOIA) do protect confidentiality, since they include exemptions
to communications on such grounds. However, the new Regulations (in pursuance of the
requirements of Aarhus and the 2003 Directive) provide for information to be disclosed even if it is
confidential under some circumstances, mainly if the information concerns emissions or the public
interest in disclosure outweighs confidentiality concerns. Could it be argued that even if the initial
Designs and Patents Act 1988. Unless that Act provides a relevant exception to copyright, the copy must not
be copied without the prior permission of the copyright owner' .
393 See for an example the electronic planning register of the London Bor~ugh of Wandsworth, which holds
in electronic form all planning applications and all related documents and drawings online and accessible
from virtually anywhere at anytime. Their website address is:
http://www.wandsworth.gov.uklHomelEnvironmentandTransportlPlanningService/default.htm
394 See one of the rare articles dealing with the legal and policy issues of the re-use of disclosed information
held by public bodies, Stephen Saxby 'Information Access Policy And Crown Copyright Regulation In The
Electronic Age - Which Way Forward?' [1998] 6(1) International Journal of Law and IT 1. See also the
HMSO Guidance Note No. 19 - Freedom of Information Publication Schemes, available at:
http://www.hmso.gov.uklcopyrightlguidance/gn_19.htm
395 Directive 2003/98IEC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 November 2003 on the re-use
of public sector information, OJ L 345,31112/2003 p. 90.
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disclosure is not a breach of confidentiality (if correctly done according to the procedures
prescribed by the Regulations), that there would be a breach of confidentiality if that particular
information was further circulated by the person that requested it and obtained it? The answer
seems to be no, since according to the common law of confidentiality there is no breach of
confidence if there is disclosure of information already in. the public domain.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA396 Info mation
publicly available through freedom of information mechanisms should be deemed as such. A
different interpretation would be against the spirit of Aarhus and the Directive, which aim to
facilitate access and dissemination of environmental information, by removing legal barriers
preventing the free flow of it. However, the rules on copyright would still have to be abided by.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
3) Limitations on information which can be accessed.
It is logical that not every bit of information may be accessed, since there are other
interests to be considered apart from protecting the environment, such as the correct performance
of duties by public bodies and protection of important secrets of the state and privacy. So, all
freedom of information regimes, both general ones and environmental ones, contain exceptions as
to the information that can be accessed. These exceptions can be categorised into two broad
categories depending on the particular interest they try to protect: the efficient operation of
administrative bodies or the protection of some important secrets. Most of these exemptions are
accompanied by a public interest test which has to be applied before information is excluded from
communication.
We shall compare the w~y each exemption appears in Aarhus, the new Directive and the
new 2004 Regulations and also reference will be made to the equivalent provisions of the 1992
Regulations and the FOIA 2000 whenever interesting comparisons can be made. It should be noted
that member-states cannot add to or even widen the scope of the exemptions present in the
Directive. That would constitute a clear breach of the Directive, since as the ECJ has ruled in the
case ofzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBACommission v France, member-states cannot add to the restrictive list of exemptions
provided by the Directive, and transposing legislation should only provide for exemptions listed in
the Directive."? The issue in that particular decision concerned the general exemption provided in
396 See Patrick Birkinshaw, below n. 623, at p. 51 et seq.
397 The ECJ stated at par. 59 to 61 that: ' ... the last indent of the first paragraph of Article 6 of[the French
law on general freedom of information] Law No 78-753 also authorises public authorities to refuse to allow
consultation of or to provide an administrative document who~e ~issemination would prejudice, generally,
secrets protected by legislation. Such a ground for refusal, which IS not mentioned in the exhaustive list of
exceptions in the first subparagraph of Article 3(2) o~ Directi~e 90/313, therefore clearly exceeds the scope
of those exceptions. Moreover, the ground for refusal ID question merely makes reference to legislation, with
no further details. As the Commission rightly maintains, that ground is worded in such a general manner that
it is not clear which cases are being referred to - other than those in the preceding indents of the first
paragraph of Article 6, which already cover all the exceptions listed in Article 3(2) of Directive 90/313 - so
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the general French freedom of Information legislation that a request could be refused if disclosure
would be a prejudice to secrets protected by law, without providing for any list of such secrets?"zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
a) Exceptions aiming at protecting the correct
operation of public bodies.
First, we shall start by examining the exceptions to the right to information that aim to
protect the correct and efficient operation of public authorities and are present in the Aarhus
Convention, the 2003 Directive and the new Regulations.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIt sho ld be noted that all of these
exceptions, as the usage of the phrase 'may be refused' suggests, are not mandatory, and national
legislators and public bodies are granted discretion as to implement them or not.
i)zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAInformation not being-held by the public authority receiving a request.
The first subparagraph of the Aarhus Convention excludes from communication
information which the public authority does not hold. This should be read in conjunction with
article 4, paragraph 5, which makes it a duty for a public authority, which receives a request for
information it does not hold, to either inform the applicant in its refusal of which other authority
might hold the demanded information, or to transfer the request to the correct authority and notify
the applicant of this transfer. The 2003 Directive contains an identical provision, as well as the new
Regulations.i"
Interestingly, the 1990 Directive and the 1992 Regulations did not provide for such an
exception. However, since the right to access information only applies to information held by or on
behalf of public authorities, it can be logically concluded that there was and there still is not a need
for a specific exception to this regard. The fact that such an exception is mentioned in the most
recent legislative instruments demonstrates an effort of improving clarity and certainty, which does
not modify the position existing before.
ii) Unreasonable or too general requests to information
All the legislative instruments on access to environmental information provide in
equivalent terms that a refusal is possible for requests formulated in a too general manner or which
are 'manifestly unreasonable' .400 These two exemptions will be examined together as they are
related, since a too general request that does not allow public authorities to understand what is
that that ground for refusal is likely to create legal uncertainty by failing to ensure that public authorities will
afgply it in accordance with the spirit of the directive'.
3 8 On more details see the relevant chapter on the French system of access to environmental information.
399 Article 4(1)(a) of the 2003 Directive; Reg. 12(4)(a).
400 Aarhus art. 4(3)(b);zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA2003/4IEC Direct ve art. 4(l)(b) and (c); 2004 Regulations reg. 12(4)(b) and 12(4)(c).
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sought could be deemed unreasonable. This is also the only potential limitation to the right of
access based on reasons personal to the enquirer.
These two terms ('unreasonable' and 'too general') are not defined in the Convention and
if they were to be interpreted in too wide a manner this could severely limit any right of access.
While the application and definition of these terms is left to national legislators by the relevant
international instruments and to public authorities by the Regulations, it can be contended that
interpretations that extremely limit the right to access i.e. by requiring that a request describes in
detail which specific documents are asked for, contravenes the underlying principle which is to
guarantee as much freedom of information as possible. In other words, the presumption should be
in favour of providing the information.'?'
Moreover, this provision should be counterbalanced with the provisions requiring that
guidance has to be provided to the public seeking information, The 2003 Directive, expressly
provides that in refusing a request formulated in a too general manner, the provisions of article 3(3)
have to be taken into account. This article provides that when a too general request is made, public
authorities must as soon as possible and at the latest within one month, ask the applicant to specify
his request and assist him in doing so. This, if taken alone, would suggest that the possibility to
refuse a request as too general only arises when the applicant has previously been warned his
request is too general and he has been given assistance in making it more precise. However, the
same provision also mentions that public authorities may nevertheless refuse the request as too
generalzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA'where they deem it appropriate' .402 This last phrase, if interpreted correctly in a sense that
does not annihilate the obligation to ask the applicant to specify his too general request, seems to
indicate that there should be two categories of too general requests. The first one is requests that are
simply formulated in a general manner and which the public authority cannot refuse to entertain
before having asked the applicant to give more details and assisting him under article 3(3). The
second category, are requests which are so general that there is no use in asking the applicant to
specify his request and the public authority deems it appropriate they can be refused immediately.
In both cases, it will be a matter of judgement on a case by case basis. An alternative interpretation
could be that it is always a precondition of refusal that the public authority has already warned the
applicant that his request is too general. This is the position adopted in the 2004 Regulations, which
only allow this exception to be used if the duty of advice and assistance has been complied with.?"
As far as manifestly unreasonable requests are concerned, it is more difficult to distinguish
which requests are manifestly unreasonable and can be rejected and which are simply unreasonable
401 This is also the view adopted by the Government in its Draft Code of Practice, see above n. 326.
402 Art. 4(1)(c) of the 2003 Directive provides that: 'Member States may provide for a request for
environmental information to be refused if: ... (c) the request is formulated in a too general manner, taking
into account article 3(3)' and art. 3(3) provides that 'If a request is formulated in too general a manner, the
public authority shall as soon as possible, and at the latest within the timeframe laid down in paragraph 2(a),
ask the applicant to specify the request and shall assist the applicant in doing so, e.g. by providing
information on the use of the public registers referred to in paragraph 5(c). The public authorities may, where
they deem it appropriate, refuse the request under Article 4(1)( c)'.
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(but not manifestly) and thus can be honoured. This is a matter of degree, best dealt on a case by
case basis. However, an indication of what could be considered as manifestly unreasonable
requests can be provided by the defmition given to vexatious legal proceedings in the case ofzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
Attorney General v Barker.404zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIn this case Lord Bingham of Cornhil stated that' The hallmark of a
vexatious proceeding is in my judgement that it has little or no basis in law (or at least no
discernible basis); that whatever the intention of the proceeding may be, its effect is to subject the
defendant to inconvenience, harassment and expense out of all proportion to any gain likely to
accrue to the claimant'. In the light of this opinion, we believe that manifestly unreasonable
requests should be the ones that intend to subject the public authority to inconvenience, harassment
and waste of time and resources, when it is undeniable that the applicant has no real expectation to
know what he is asking for.40s Also, could be considered as manifestly unreasonable, all requests
that are repetitive or substantially similar to previous ones and are not made at a reasonable interval
and ask for the same information, as provided by s. 16(2) ofthe FOIA.
However, it is submitted that the reasonableness of a request should depend on the enquirer
and not on administrative resources of the body which receives the request. The 1992 regulations
also contained an exception for manifestly unreasonable requests'?" and the Government's
Guidance had interpreted this as including financial and resource factors relating to the body
providing the information.t" This interpretation is inconsistent not only with the FOIA (which does
not mention unreasonable requests but only vexatious or repeated ones), but also with the spirit of
the Directive. Thus, a restrictive interpretation of this exemption should mean that the
reasonableness of a request cannot depend on the special administrative difficulties of a particular
authority in honouring it. However, there will be cases where on an overall objective test, the
request is so burdensome to any authority that it would have to be refused as manifestly
unreasonable.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
iii) Unfinished documents
403 See Reg. 12(4)(c).
404 [2000] Fam. Law 400. This case concerned an application by the Attorney General to make a civil
proceedings order under the Supreme Court Act 1981 s. 42(1) against the defendant who had initiated 20
actions over a three month period and so had instituted vexatious civil proceedings without any justifiable
gound in law, and most of those actions had been struck out.
5 This interpretation is consistent with the interpretation made by Stanley of 'Vexatious requests' that under
s. 14(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 can be refused. He mentions that: 'the hallmark of the
vexatious request, it is suggested. is that the applicant has no real expectation or desire to know the
substance of the information, but is making the requestfor some other purpose '. See Stanley, above n. 608,
at p. 36-23.
406 At reg. 3(3) and in the 1990 Directive at art. 3(3).
407 The Guidance also lists examples of manifestly unreasonable requests, when the amount of information
sought is excessive, when extensive scans of historic files prove necessary, or when significant processing of
information is necessary before it can be released, see above n. 269, at par. 42.
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Supply of unfinished documents or any other record, is also exempt under the
environmental information regimes. More specifically, the Aarhus Convention provides that public
authorities may refuse to disclose 'materials in the course of completion' after taking into account
the interest served by disclosure.t" The 2003 Directive, in similar terms provides that such material
can be withheld, together with 'unfinished documents or data~, adding an obligation for authorities
when refusing to disclose information under this exemption, to state the authority responsible for
preparing the material and an estimate of the time needed for completion.t" The new 2004
Regulations transpose in identical terms this requirement, stating that unfinished documents or
records may not be disclosed when in all of the circumstances of the case, the public interest to
refuse the request outweighs the public interest to disclose.t" The new 2004 Regulations transpose
the requirement that public authorities have to advise the applicant of the possible time for
completion at reg. 14(4). This requirement is important, since it impliedly indicates that
information on incomplete projects which have been stopped has to be disclosed, since no date for
their completionzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA.can be indicated.
The term of 'materials in the course of completion' is difficult to define. InzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAStec et al., 411 it
is suggested that this refers to documents which are in the process of being actively worked on by
the public authority and that will have more work done on them in a reasonable time-frame. The
authors base this analysis on the fact that the Convention has moved away from the equivalent
provision of Directive 90/313IEEC which was 'unfinished documents' thus demonstrating a will to
only include unfinished documents that are still actively being worked upon. However, the
Environmental Information Regulations 1992 in regulation 4(2)(d) had transposed the Directive's
term 'unfinished documents' as 'document or other record which is still in the course of
completion', which is a wording almost similar to the Convention's terms. The English case of
Maile v. Wigan Metropolitan Borough Council"? is interesting in this aspect since Eady J. held that
408 At art. 4(3)(c).
409 At art. 4{l)(d) and (e). Interestingly, the 2003 Directive does not mention, as in the Aarhus Convention,
that when refusing to disclose unfinished documents, the public interest to disclose has to be accounted for.
This seems to be an omission. It is art. 4(3)(c) of the Convention which mentions that unfmished documents
and internal communications are exempt and provides that the public interest has to be taken into account for
both of these exemptions. However, this article was transposed in the 2003 Directive by splitting its
provisions into two subsections, art. 4{l)(d) and (e), but the requirement to take the public interest into
account was only included in the second of this subsection concerning internal communications.
410 At reg. 12(4)(d): 'the request relates to material which is still in the course of completion, to unfinished
documents or to incomplete data'.
411 See above n. 97, at p. 58.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
412 Maile v. Wigan Metropolitan Borough Council [2001] Env. L.R. 11. The case concerned a request to
access a database of potentially contaminated sites compiled in order to fulfil at sometime in the future the
Council's obligation of 'remediation' as laid down in s. 78 of the Environmental Protection Act 1990. The
Court also found that "any deliberations as to how the Council and its officers should prepare for fulfilling
the anticipated obligations of 'remediation' needs to be conducted in confidence", and so it considered it also
fell under the exception to communication provided by reg. 4(2)(c) on matters which would affect the
confidentiality of deliberations of any relevant person. This view has also been criticised by Harwood (see
below) as a too-broad interpretation of the confidentiality of deliberations exemption, since almost all
information held by councils is relevant to the exercise of some power or other. He adds that 'the wide
drawing of "deliberations" does not accord with the obligation to interpret domestic law "as far as possible,
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an incomplete database containing a list of potentially contaminated sites was exempt from
disclosure under regulation 4(2)(d) of the Environmental Information Regulations 1992, even if
development of the database had been halted. The judge held that:zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA'the fact that an operation may
have been put, as it were, "on ice" at a preliminary stage does not mean that it should therefore be
regarded as having been completed't" The problematic underlying issue in this case was that since
the database was incomplete, the local authority contended that its disclosure would result in
release of information which could be misleading to the public, as analysed before. The approach
taken by the court in this issue has been heavily criticised by Richard Harwoodt" since a database
of potentially contaminated sites will always be incomplete and not entirely accurate and so under
this ruling it should have to remain eternally inaccessible to the public. We can only agree with
such an interpretation that the exception of 'materials in the course of completion' cannot be
construed as encompassing materials whose 'completion' has been halted (either temporarily or
permanently), since it would be an interpretation contrary to the aim of access to environmental
information regimes which is that, wherever possible, information should be provided.
The difficulty however, is distinguishing information that is not incomplete or whose
process of completion has been halted. Thus, this could lead to abuse by public authorities which
could consider that some information is continuously in the course of completion, as to never
disclose it. The exemption in the Regulations is far wider than the equivalent found in the FOIA
2000 at s. 22. This section only exempts information, which is in the course of publication at a later
date, if it is reasonable that the information should not be disclosed until publication. Examples of
such cases include information relating to research projects which it would be inappropriate to
publish until the project had been completed, or statistical information which is usually published
to a specific timetable.t" This is one of the few examples where the FOIA is more liberal than the
Regulations on a specific point.
iv)zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAInternal communications
Any materials concerning internal communications are also exempt from disclosure. This
is not a new exemption, since it was present in the 1990 Directive and the 1992 Regulations, and
has been repeated in the 2003 Directive and the 2004 Regulations.i" Neither of the two Directive
in the light of the wording and the purpose of the Directive in order to achieve the result pursued by the
latter" (Marleasing S.A. v. La Commercial Iniemacional de Alimentacion S.A. [1990 J ECR /-4135)'.
4J3 Ibid. at pp. 207-208. .
414 [2001] JPL 193, at p. 196. The commentator stresses that "the principle that greater openness would help
Erotect the environment was not one shared by the local authority or the High Court."
IS As mentionedzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAin the Explanatory Notes to the Freedom of Information Act 2000 under s. 222, at p. 16.
Available from http://www.hmso.gov.uklacts/en/00en36-a.htm
416 Art. 3(3) of the 1990 Directive; Art. 4(1)(e) of the 2003 Directive; Reg. 4(2)(d) of the 1992 Regulations;
Reg. 12(4)(e) of the 2004 Regulations. It should be noted that the 1992 Regulations originally referred in reg.
4(2)(c) to 'information relating to ... the contents of any internal communications of a body corporate or
other undertaking or organisation'. This having been criticised as illegitimately extending this exemption
from internal communications of public bodies to any internal communications (See Bakkenist, above n. 311,
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specify whose internal communications are to be protected, though the Aarhus Convention'!'
specifies it is those of public authorities. This would seem to be the obvious interpretation.
The Aarhus Convention specifies that this exemption only applies when national law or
'customary practice' specifically provide for such an exemption. Concerning customary practice,
the use of the word 'customary' in addition to the word 'practice', when the sole word practice
would suffice, seems to suggest that it has to be a long-established practice considered as
mandatory. Such practice might be embodied in quasi-legal rules such as Codes of Conduct or
Circulars. Such an interpretation iszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAin conformity with t e French version of the Convention, which
uses the single word ofzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA'coutume' a d means custom. In any case, the practical implications ofthis
limitation seem minimal at least in the BC, where the 1990 Directive has long been providing for
such an exception.
The definition of 'internal communications' also poses problems since the boundaries of
this term are unclear and none of the above mentioned international and British legislative
instruments define it. Only the 1992 Government's Guidance indicated that this exemption could
apply to Information relating to Ministerial and MP's correspondence.t" letters to and from
members of the public, information passed between officials in the course of their duties.?" internal
minutes and submissions to Ministers and MP.420 Stec et al.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA421 mention that this x eption in some
countries is intended to protect the personal opinions of governmental personnel. They also add
that once particular information has been disclosed by the public authority to a third party, it cannot
be claimed to be an 'internal communication'. The basis of this interpretation is not explained,
though it seems quite logical due to the fact that exemptions have to be construed narrowly so as to
not empty the right to access environmental information of its substance. The argument is
presumably that an internal, private communication, becomes public if given to a member of the
public
Both the Convention and the new Directive expressly subject this exemption to the
limitation that the public interest served by the disclosure has to be taken into account when
exercising it, a counterbalance which did not previously exist. The new Regulations implement this
requirement by indicating that this exemption can only be applied if the public interest in secrecy
outweighs the public interest in disclosure. However, there is a policy issue on whether internal
at p. 106) was amended by the Environmental Information (Amendment) Regulations 1998 to 'any internal
communication of a relevant person', where relevant persons are only public bodies caught under the
Regulations. The new Regulationsmention' internal communications within a public authority'.
417 At art. 4(3)(c).
418 Such letters appears to be covered, depending on the circumstances, by either parliamentary privilege or
qualified privilege in the law of defamation. See on these Stanley de Smith and Rodney Brazier,
Constitutional and Administrative Law, Penguin Books, 8th edition: 1998,pp. 316-323.
419 This refers to the old tradition of secrecy in Britain which was coupled with 'a deep-seated belief that any
exposure of the process of departmental decision-making would tend to cause trouble and reduce
administrative efficiency', ibid. at p. 205. However, since the coming into force of the FOIA 2000 this is
~dually changing.
20See the Guidance, above n. 269, at par. 52.
421 See above n. 97, at p. 58.
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communications of a public body should be deemed private. It seems that as well as any
information on the environment has to be disclosed to the public, internal communications should
be also included, subject to the same lists of exemptions.
This exemption can be criticised, because it applies regardless of the type of information in
question. Bakkenist'" had suggested in 1994 that it would have been preferable if this exemption
would only apply to matters of opinion and advice. We feel that today, at least in Britain, this
exemption should have been omitted altogether, since the FOIA 2000 on the one hand does not
contain such an exemption.?" and on the other hand section 35(4) provides that in making a
decision to disclose under the Act,zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA'regard shall be ad to the particular public interest in the
disclosure of factual information whichzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAhas been used, or is intended to be used, to provide an
informed background to decision-taking'.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
b) Exceptions aiming at protecting important secrets
Apart from the above-mentioned technical set of exemptions to communication, there are
also other exceptions, which aim to protect important secrets relating either to the public or the
private sphere of affairs.
Such exemptions are contained in the Aarhus Convention in paragraph 4 of article 4 which
provides that for the exemptions to apply, the disclosurezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAmust result in a negative impact to the
interest the exemption tries to protect. The wording used is 'if disclosure would adversely affect'
which should be contrasted with the usage of the word 'may' in the previous paragraph on
technical exemptions. Both the 2003 Directive and the new Regulations adopt these two categories
of exemptions: the ones that 'may' be applied by public authorities (examined before) and the ones
that still 'may' be invoked by public authorities but only 'if disclosure would adversely affect' the
interest served by secrecy.'"
We shall therefore examine herein the second set of exemptions to disclosure of
environmental information, which apply when disclosure would adversely affect the interest served
by the exemption.
422 See Bakkenist, above n. 311, at p. 105.
423 The closest exemption to be found in the FOIA 2000 is the one present at s. 36 which exempts
information whose disclosure would or would be likely to prejudice the effective conduct of public affairs, in
the reasonable opinion of a qualified person. Subsection 5 contains a list of persons which are qualified for
this purpose and provides that Ministers may delegate this responsibility to particular authorities or officers.
In any, case this limitation intends to make sure that this decision is taken at a fairly high level and thus
exercise parsimoniously. This exemption seems to be more restrictive that the one concerning internal
communications found in the Regulations.
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i)zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAConfidentiality of proceedings of public authoritieszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
Any information, which would adversely affect the confidentiality of proceedings of public
authorities, is also exempt from disclosure. This is similar to the exemption on internal
communications though it only applies to confidential proceedings and thus not any proceedings
whatsoever. It is not a new exemption, since it was present in the 1990 Directive and the 1992
Regulations.
The new element, apart from the fact that this exemption only applies if release would
adversely affect the confidentiality of proceedings, is that confidentiality has to be established by
law. This condition is present both in the Aarhus Convention and the 2003 Directive.f" which
provides that information affecting the confidentiality of proceedings of public authorities is
exempt information, if such confidentiality is provided for under national law. The term
'proceedings' is not defined though it should be interpreted restrictively, since otherwise, as
Harwood has pointed out, almost any information held by public authorities relates to its
proceedings.t" Thus, a possible narrow interpretation of 'proceedings of public authorities' would
be that these are proceedings concerning the internal operations of a public authority and not
substantive proceedings conducted by the public authority in its area of competence.f" Also, it
should be noted that this exemption must be provided for under national law, thus indicating that
national law must clearly indicate which particular proceedings are concerned and cannot merely
repeat the general terms of the Convention. This interpretation stems from the fact that since all of
the Convention and of the Directive have to be implemented by national laws, these words did not
need to have been expressly included in this particular exemption, if the intention was not to
indicate that national law must provide with certainty which specific proceedings are covered.
To this extent, the 2004 Regulations provider" that a public authority may refuse a request
where the interest in disclosure would be outweighed by the confidentiality of the deliberations of
any public authority being adversely affected by disclosure. This is more liberal than the previous
regulations which did not include such a balance test and did not mention the requirement that the
confidentiality of proceedings has to be 'provided for by law'. Only proceedings that are already
confidential following an explicit enactment or the common law are to be protected under this
exemption and not any proceedings which public authorities arbitrarily consider should be kept
confidential. Such legislative provisions do exist in English law,429but referring to them in such
424This second category of exemptions that only apply if disclosure would adversely affect the interest
protected by the exemption, are to be found in par. 2 of art 4 of the 2003 Directive and in reg. 12 (5) of the
2004 Regulations.
425Art. 4 par. 4 of Aarhus; art. 4(2)(a) of the 2003 Directive.
426See above n. 412.
427As suggested byzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAStec et al., see above n. 97, at p. 58.
428At reg. 12(5)(d).
429For instance, as long as meetings of local council, and some other health authorities, are concerned, under
the Local Government Act 1972, as amended, the public can access committee meetings and related paper
and background papers, but not when such meetings are closed to the public following s. 100A of the Act
because this would involve release of confidential information. Generally speaking, confidential information
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general terms by the Regulations, does not delimit with certainty which proceedings are
confidential and which are not and thus leaves it totally to public authorities to decide. This
exemption is so general in its terms that is even more restrictive than the equivalent exception
found at s. 30 of the FOIA 2000 on investigations and proceedings conducted by public authorities.
This section, generally speaking, exempts as a class, any information concerning criminal
investigations or criminal proceedings, and information relating to the obtaining of information
from informers. It also includes information relating to investigations into whether circumstances
exist or may arise justifying regulatory action under any enactment, regulatory investigations
relating to unfitness or incompetence of company directors, investigation of persons in regulated
professions or who carry out activities which require a licence, investigations into accidents, action
relating to charity management, action relating to health and safety. Finally, is exempted all
information concerning civil proceedings which arise from such investigations. Even if the above
delimitation of which proceedings are deemed exempt, may seem almost all-inclusive, at least it
has the clarity of specifying which proceedings of public authorities are to be covered by secrecy
and thus it does not refer to an almost catchall provision ofzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA'confidentiality of th proceedings of
that or any other public authority where such confidentiality is provided by law' which could
include almost anything.
In any case, it can be contended that a construction of the Regulations in conformity with
EC law, would require that for the confidentiality of proceedings exemption to apply, this
confidentiality would have to be set out under a precise enactment or be a clear common law rule.
It could be suggested that the aforementioned provisions of the FOIA could be used as such a legal
basis. Otherwise, this exemption could lead to vast amounts of information being withheld.
This danger can be demonstrated in a recent case which involved the Environmental
Information Regulations 1992. In R v. The Secretary of State for the Environment Transport and
Regions Ex p. Anthony Marson,430 the High Court ruled that a refusal to disclose the issues that the
Secretary of State had taken into consideration before taking the decision that an Environmental
Impact Assessment was not necessary, are to be considered confidential information relating to
confidential deliberations and internal communications and as such are not to be disclosed.t" Jowitt
J. distinguished between the determination (which had to be disclosed) and the briefing documents
which did not and indicated that 'The Secretary of State is not required by the regulations to open
up his files so as to make available the advice he has received from his own officers and documents
is defmed in section 100A(2) of the Act and is also listed in-Schedule 12A to the act. For more details on this
enactment and for other examples, see Birkinshaw, Government and Information - The law relating to
Access, Disclosure and Regulation, op. cit.
43023 March 1998, CO/911198 (unreported application for leave, available from http://www.casetrack.com).
This case was appealed but the point concerning the 1992 Regulations was not raised in front of the Court of
Appeal, see [1998] JPL 869.
431 The Court did not expressly indicate whether information was confidential on grounds of it being internal
communications or related to confidential deliberations, but merely referred to regulation 4 of the 1992
regulations which contained both of these exemptions (before the 1998 amendments). However, the
judgement seems to impliedly refer to matters relating to confidential deliberations.
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which record his own thinking about the matter leading up to his actual decision'.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAThis case was
decided under the 1992 regulations and so now the balance test between disclosure and secrecy
would have had to be applied before any refusal of disclosure under this exemption. Also, now
such advice should have to be expressly categorised as confidential under a specific enactment and
thus this finding seems to be of little importance under the ne~ regulations.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
in State secrets
1) The Scope of the exemption: international relations, defence, national security,
public safety
Both the 2003 Directive and the Aarhus Convention.t" exempt from disclosure information
whose disclosure would adversely prejudice international relations, public safety and national
defence. These terms, which are left undefined both in Aarhus, the Directive and also in the 1992
and 2004 Regulations.?" aim to protect the heart of governmental work: state secrets.?' These
terms are unsurprisingly left undefined and are problematic since due to their vagueness, they give
a high-degree of discretion to public officials to designate information as secret, and thus can
substantially undermine the aim of greater transparency.t" It also raises the important question as
to who is to determine whether disclosure will cause adverse prejudice, the public authorities or the
courts. The wording ''would adversely prejudice" suggests that it would be ultimately for the courts
to decide.
432 At article 4(4)(b) of the Aarhus Convention; art. 4(2)(b) of the 2003 Directive
433 However, it is possible to understand the content of these terms by reference to s. 1 of the Security Service
Act 1989: '(1) There shall continue to be a Security Service (in this Act referred to as "the Service") under
the authority of the Secretary of State. (2) The function of the Service shall be the protection of national
security and, in particular, its protection against threats from espionage, terrorism and sabotage, from the
activities of agents of foreign powers and from actions intended to overthrow or undermine parliamentary
democracy by political, industrial or violent means. (3) It shall also be the function of the Service to
safeguard the economic well-being of the United Kingdom against threats posed by the actions or intentions
of persons outside the British Islands. (4) It shall also be the function of the Service to act in support of the
activities of police forces, the National Criminal Intelligence Service, the National Crime Squad and other
law enforcement agencies in the prevention and detection of serious crime [...]'
434 It is interesting to note that some countries have decided that environmental information cannot be limited
even by state secrets. See Stec et al., above n. 97, at p. 59. Article 50 par 2. Of the Ukrainian Constitution of
1996 provides that: "Everyone is guaranteed the right of free access to information about the environmental
situation, the quality offood and consumer goods, and also the right to disseminate such information. No one
shall make such information secret'. Source: the Ukraine's parliament website:
http://www.rada.gov.ualkonstiCONENGL.HTM
435 See on this point Doors to Democracy: A Pan-European Assessment of Current trends and Practices in
Public Participation in Environmental Matters, The Regional Environmental Center for Central and Eastern
Europe: Hungary 1998, Chapter 1: Access to Environmental Information (by Jeremy Wates), at p. 23. Also
available online at http://www.rec.orglREClPublicationslList.html
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A similar approach seems to have been taken in the case ofzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAR v. British Coal Corpor tion
ex parte Ibstock Building Products Limited.r" Although it was argued by the public authority, that
the information relating to the dumping in 1947 of naval ammunition secretly by night down
mineshafts, was information relating to matters affecting national defence or public security, the
Court decided to examine whether this was the case and found that there was no evidence to
suggest the dumping of munitions in mineshafts in 1947 was a matter which affected National
Defence or Public Security in 1994. This was supported by the fact that the Ministry of Defence
had not raised any issue in relation to National Defence or Public Security when consulted.
Consequently, the Court rejected the argument that such information was exempt. This case was
decided under the original 1992 Regulations, which provided that information relating to matters
affecting international relations, national defence or public security could be treated as
confidential.t" This exemption was amended in 1998 and would only apply where disclosure
would affect international relations, national defence and public security.?" where of course
deference is given by Courts for such matters.
This is also the position under the new 2004 Regulations, which provide similarly to the
1998 Regulations that a public authority may refuse a request where disclosure of information
'would adversely affect international relations, defence, national security or public safety' and
disclosure would not be in the public interest.f"zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIn addition, reg. 12(6) contains a novel provision
according to which a public authority does not even have to confirm whether it holds or not the
information requested, if this confirmation or denial would by itself lead in the disclosure of
information and this disclosure would not be in the public interest and would adversely affect
international relations, defence, national security or public safety. To put it simply, this regulation
allows a public authority to refuse to acknowledge whether it holds information related to national
security matters, when what is confidential is also whether this information exists or not and who
holds it. This type of answer to a request to information is not provided at all neither in the 2003
Directive nor in Aarhus, but the Government considers it is 'implicit' given the nature of this area
of confidentiality.t" Although the Government's position seems to be arguable, we do not see how
this 'neither confirm nor deny response'?" can be compatible with the duty to provide reasons. If a
public authority does not even have to confirm or deny it holds the information requested, how can
it be obliged to provide detailed reasons for its answer without at least impliedly indicating whether
it holds the information or not?
Generally speaking, the FOIA 2000 does exempt from disclosure, subject to a harm test,
information whose disclosure could prejudice national security, defence or international
436 Analysed above, see n. 196.
437 Regulation 4(2)(a) of the Environmental Information Regulations 1992.
438 Regulation 4(2)(a) of the Environmental Information Regulations 1992 as amended by the Environmental
Information (Amendment) Regulations 1998.
439 At reg. 12(5)(a) of the 2004 Regulations.
440 See the UK Government's Explanatory Memorandum, above n. 133, at par. 4 part ix.
441 As the Government calls it. Id. -
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relations.r" It also exempts, as a class exemption and thus not subject to a harm test information
directly or indirectly supplied by, or relating to certain bodies dealing with security matters.r"
These provisions can be said to be similar with the equivalent ones of the Regulations with the
exception that in the later all exemptions are subject to a harm test.
Also, section 2 of the Intelligence Services Act .1994, which applies to the Secret
Intelligence Service (MI5, MI6 and the Government Communication Headquarters), states that
these services have a duty not to disclose any information at all, except for the proper discharge of
their functions, the interests of national security, the prevention or detection of serious crime, or in
the purpose of criminal proceedings.t" The Environmental Information Regulations 1992, even if
they existed at the time of passage of this Act, are not included as a lawful authority for disclosing
information. There seems to be an inconsistency here, because under the new Regulations there can
be no blanket exemption (as in the FOIA 2000 or the Intelligence Services Act 1994), but in all
cases a balance test has to be exercised, which would involve at least indicating whether the
information sought exists or not, since a reasoned balance test could not be exercised on inexistent
information. Even if the Regulations which stem from EC law undoubtedly supersede these
provisions of the Intelligence Service Act 1994, it can be doubted if this could have any practical
effects, due to the ever-lasting tradition of total opacity and secrecy in these areas.t" In any case, as
the Government has suggested, it seems unlikely that there will be many instances where
environmental information not only would relate to national security or international relations'
issues but would also be held by the Secret Security Services.?"
442 See s. 24, 26 and 27 of the FOIA 2000.
443 See s. 23 of the FOIA 2000. These bodies are various Governmental and military bodies dealing with
security maters like the Security Service, the Secret Intelligence Service etc, all listed in subsection 3.
444 Intelligence Services Act 1994, s. 2(2) and 2(3): '(2) The Chief of the Intelligence Service shall be
responsible for the efficiency of that Service and it shall be his duty to ensure-- (a) that there are
arrangements for securing that no information is obtained by the Intelligence Service except so far as
necessary for the proper discharge of its functions and that no information is disclosed by it except so far as
necessary-- (i) for that purpose; (ii) in the interests of national security;zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA(iii) for the purpose of the prevention
or detection of serious crime; or (iv) for the purpose of any criminal proceedings; and (b) that the Intelligence
Service does not take any action to further the interests of any United Kingdom political party.
(3) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (2)(a) above, the disclosure of information shall be
regarded as necessary for the proper discharge of the functions of the Intelligence Service if it consists of--
(a) the disclosure of records subject to and in accordance with the Public Records Act 1958; or (b) the
disclosure, subject to and in accordance with arrangements approved by the Secretary of State, of information
to the Comptroller and Auditor General for the purposes of his functions'.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
44S For a more detailed historical and political analysis of this issue, see Patrick Birkinshaw, Reforming the
Secret State, Open University Press, Milton Keynes 1990. Also, generally speaking the Official Secrets Act
1989 prevents disclosure by making it a criminal offence all disclosures by any person of information relating
to security, international relations and defence without lawful authority. Concerning civil servants, section 7
of the Act provides that disclosure is made with lawful authority if it 'is made in accordance with his official
duty'. This seems to indicate that if disclosure is made in application of the Environmental Information
Regulations, then disclosure is lawful and no criminal offence is committed, since in a democratic state, the
most important and fundamental official duty is to abide by the rule of law.
446 The Government in its 1992 Guidance, suggested, that it would be unlikely that there were going to be
many cases of environmental information whose release could compromise public order. See the Guidance,
above n. 269, at par. 48. This statement, in our view, could be extended to national security and international
relations.
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Additionally, apart from the above specific provisions, it should be noted that in the event
of 1) serious internal disturbances affecting the maintenance of law and order, 2) war, 3) serious
international tensions constituting a threat of war, or 4) in order for an EC state to carry out
obligations it has accepted for the purpose of maintaining peace and international security, article
297 of the EC Treaty provides'" that states can take measures derogating to the Treaty and thus to
any EC legislation made under it, such as the Environmental Information Directive. Similarly,
article 296 EC provides that no provision of the Treaty can oblige a member-state to supply
information 'the disclosure of which it considers contrary to the essential interests of its security'
and that any necessary measure can be taken for the protection of the essential interests of security
connected with the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material. These exemptions
apply to EC law as a whole since they are provided for in the Treaties and exist so as to
accommodate extreme crisis situations. Thus theoretically, they could be directly invoked by
member-states so as to avoid providing any information whatsoever and to disapply the
Environmental Information Directive when extreme matters affecting national security arise.
2) National Security Ministerial certificates
It cannot be overlooked that reg. 15 of the 2004 Regulations provides that a certificate
signed by a Minister of the Crown'" is conclusive proof that the disclosure of the requested
information would adversely affect national security and would not be in the public interest. The
issue of such certificate prevents the Commissioner from dealing with the matter'" and therefore
the Commissioner or any person whose request for information is affected by the issue of the
certificate may directly appeal to the Information Tribunal against the certificate. Also, if a public
authority claims in any proceedings under the FOIA or the 2004 Regulations that certain
information is covered by a national security certificate, any other party to the proceedings may
appeal to the Tribunal on the grounds that the certificate does not apply to that information. In these
cases, the Information Tribunal applies a special procedure in consideration of the fact that securityzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
447 Art 297 of the EC Treaty: 'Member States shall consult each other with a view to taking together the steps
needed to prevent the functioning of the common market being affected by measures which a Member State
may be called upon to take in the event of serious internal disturbances affecting the maintenance of law and
order, in the event of war, serious international tension constituting a threat of war, or in order to carry out
obligations it has accepted for the purpose of maintaining peace and international security'. A special
procedure is provided under article 298 for cases of improper use of this general exemption clause. On these
issues see Martin Trybus, 'Defence: at the borderline between Community and Member State competence',
paper presented at the W. G. Hart Legal Workshop 2003 EC Law for the 21st Century: Rethinking the New
Legal Order, 25-27 June 2003, I.A.L.S. London.
448 A Minister of the Crown is defined in reg. 15(6) by reference to s. 25(3) of the FOIA, which only confers
this power to a Minister who is a member of the Cabinet or to the Attorney General, the Advocate General
for Scotland or the Attorney General for Northern Ireland.
449 According to reg. 18(5).
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issues are at stake.t" In general, the Tribunal may allow the appeal and quash the certificate if it
finds, that applying the principles of judicial review only, the Minister did not act reasonably in
issuing the certificate.?" The Information Tribunal in cases involving the similar provisions of the
Data Protection Act 1998, has held that the principles of judicial review to be-applied are the ones
applied by the courts, which include the impact of the individuals rights under the European
Convention on Human Rights and the concept of proportionality and also that the intensity of the
review is guaranteed by the twin requirements that the limitation of convention rights is necessary
in a democratic society, in the sense of meeting a pressing social need and the question whether the
interference is really proportionate to the legitimate aim being pursued. However, the Tribunal has
also acknowledged that in the context of national security judges and tribunals traditionally defer
more to the executive view and so the TribunalzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA'must ap ly judicial review principles in a manner
appropriate to the national security context: no less, but no more'Y" These appeal mechanisms
seem to be in breach of the Directive and Aarhus, because these instruments do not provide that
there can be a limitation of rights of appeal in cases of national security.?" and on the contrary
provide that a judicial procedure has to be available in addition to an administrative procedure.
When a national security certificate is issued, the Information Commissioner is prevented to deal
with the matter and thus, there is no administrative procedure in this case, in breach of EC and
international law.
450 Special procedural rules apply for such appeals under section 60 of the FOIA 2000, according to s. 61 of
the Act which refers to the special procedure under Schedule 6 to the Data Protection Act 1998.
451 According to the relevant provisions on national security appeals under s. 60 of the FOIA 2000, to which
reg. 18(9) of the 2004 Environmental Information Regulations explicitly refers.
452 See the first case of the Tribunal involving a national security certificate (but made under the equivalent
provisions of s. 28 of the Data Protection Act 1998) Baker v Secretary of State for the Home Department
[2001] UKHRR 1275, at paras. 57 to 76. In all of the subsequent cases (all dealt under the equivalent
provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998), this restrictive view of the powers of the Tribunal in cases of
National Security has been upheld. See the case of Tony Gosling v Secretary of State for The Home
Department, 1 august 2003, unreported, at paras. 33 to 48; and the case of Peter Hitchens v Secretary of State
for The Home Department, 4 August 2003, unreported, at paras. 35 to 50. All these cases are available on the
Department of Constitutional affairs website at:
http://www.dca.gov.uklfoilinftrib.htm
To sum up these cases, in the Baker case the Information Tribunal quashed a Ministerial Certificate
issued under s. 28 of the Data Protection Act 1998 because this certificate imposed a blanket exemption on
all information held by the Security Services, regardless of whether a potential issue of national security
arose on a case by case basis, allowing for no differentiation between the acquisition of information and its
disclosure, to which different issues of national security risk could apply. Since, there was no justification for
such an all encompassing provision the certificate was considered as unreasonable and was quashed. The
Secretary of State in conformity with that decision, issued a new Certificate which individuates the different
functions of the Security Service and specifies the extent to which each is said to require exemption from the
Data Protection Act 1998 for the purposes of safeguarding national security, in a manner that is intended to
be proportionate to the perceived risk to national security if particular provisions on disclosure of the Data
Protection Act were applied to each category of data specified in the Certificate. The Security Service is also
given discretion to decide in each case whether disclosure is prohibited on national security grounds. The
Tribunal in the subsequent cases of Gosling and Hitchens clearly indicates that once the Security Service has
exercised its discretion, their decision is unchallengeable either before the Tribunal or before the Courts. In
par. 50 of the Hitchens decision, the Information Tribunal indicated that 'The Data Protection Act, in our
view, does not provide any means of challenging the Security Services' decision, either before this Tribunal
or before the Courts'.
453 See the relevant discussion on what rights of appeal are imposed by the 2003 Directive and the Aarhus
Convention, below at part 4) Appeal and review procedures.
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It should be noted that this power of Ministers to issue national security certificates
bypassing the competence of the Information Commissioner is wider in the FOIA than in the 2004
Regulations, since in the FOIA such certificates can also be issued for information which either
relates to bodies dealing with security matters or is required to safeguard national security.t" The
importance of this should not be overlooked, since it might allow disclosure of environmental
information related to military or other sensitive activities such as nuclear and biological weapons,
which could have been unobtainable under the 2000 Act. Thus, when environmental information is
concerned the claim made in 2003 by Wadham and Modi thatzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA'There is a long way to go before
freedom of information becomes a reality in the United Kingdom. Unfortunately the claim of
national security remains a trump card in the hands of the executive, a card that is not subjected to
any real independent assessment and little control by the courts,455 has to be qualified.
iii) Judicial and analogous criminal or disciplinary proceedings
The Aarhus Convention, identically to the 2003 Directive and the new Regulations'"
provides that information whose disclosure would adversely affect either the course of justice, the
ability of any person to receive a fair trial or the ability of a public authority to conduct an enquiry
of a criminal or disciplinary nature, can be withheld. These provisions contain three specific
exemptions to communication of information related to judicial proceedings.
The first, is information concerning the 'course of justice.' This term is unsurprisingly left
undefined even if it is a very vague one. It can be contended that it refers to actual judicial
proceedings only, otherwise the course of justice could not be prejudiced.i" Thus, this exception, if
analysed narrowly, means that information cannot be excluded only because in the past it was part
of court proceedings. The 1990 Directive and similarly the 1992 Regulations'" were less liberal
since they excluded all information affecting matters which have been sub judice both at present or
in the past. This is also the position adopted by the FOIA 2000, which contains an absolute
454 According to s. 60(2) of the FOIA 2000. However, reg. l8(9)(b) of the Environmental Information
Regulations 2004 provides that this provision shall be omitted regarding environmental information.
455 John Wadham, Kavita Modi, National security and open government in the United Kingdom, paper
delivered at the National Security and Open Government: Striking the right balance symposium, organised
on May 5&6 2003 in Washington, D.C. by the Campbell Public Affairs Institute and the Justice Initiative
Oren Society Institute, available from http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/campbeIVopengov/index.html
45 Aarhus Convention: article 4, par. 4, 3rd subparagraph; 2003 Directive art. 4(2)(c); 2004 Regulations reg.
l2(5)(b).
457 'According to Stec et al., above n. 97, at p. 59.
458 The 1990 Directive at art. 3(2) provided that a request for information may be refused where it affects '
matters which are , or have been, sub judice, or under inquiry (including disciplinary inquiries), or which are
the subject of preliminary investigation proceedings'. This was transposed in reg. 4(2)(b) of the 1992
Regulations as a possibility for public authorities to disclose 'information relating to, or to anything which is
or has been the subject- matter of, any legal or other proceedings (whether actual or prospective)'. However
this was considered as too broad and was later changed by. the amending 1998 regulations to information
whose disclosure 'would affect matters which are, or have been, an issue in any legal proceedings or in any
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exemption for all information relating to proceedings.t" This could be stretched as including
present, past and pending proceedings. This is another example of the more liberal nature of the
Environmental Information regime.
The second is information which would adversely affect the ability of a person to receive a
fair trial. It can be safely contended that the notion of a fair trial should not be restricted to Court
proceedings, but also to all other assimilated proceedings including -disciplinary, civil and
administrative proceedings, in the same way as article 6 of the ECHR has been construed as to
cover such proceedings. The notion of a fair trial can be said to be more important than the
provision of environmental information aiming at protecting the environment. For instance, this
could include information that if disclosed might influence the decision of a popular jury. In any
case, after the proceedings are over, communication should take place, as analysed above.
Thirdly, information is exempt from disclosure if it would adversely affect the ability of a
public authority to conduct an enquiry of a criminal or disciplinary nature. Only criminal and
disciplinary proceedings are covered, so information about civil or administrative investigations by
public authorities would not be covered under this exemption.t" This is extremely important in the
UK, where public inquiries are commonly used, especially in planning and environmental law,
before some decisions are made (e.g. planning appeals to the Secretary of State),"! An interesting
question is whether information relating to enforcement proceedings which are not strictly speaking
criminal in nature are covered. Such an example could be planning enforcement, since enforcement
notices are not of a criminal nature, at least before the concerned individual is prosecuted for
failure to comply with them.462 The answer seems to be yes, since this provision also aims at
protecting individuals from potentially harmful disclosures. This is consistent with the
interpretation given to this exception in thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAMecklenburg case, where it was ruled that the
exemption covers proceedings which will 'inevitably lead to the imposition of a penaltyzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAif the
offence (administrative or criminal) is established' and that therefore 'preliminary investigation
enquiry (including any disciplinary enquiry), or are the subject-matter of any investigation undertaken with a
view to any such proceedings or enquiry.'
459 At section 32 of the FOIA 2000. According to Stanley, the rationale for such a blanket exemption is that
since there already exist comprehensive rules governing access to Court records, this system is to be left
untouched. See above, n. 608, at p. 36-43.
460 This was not the case under the 1992 Regulations, which provided at reg. 5 that 'In this regulation "legal
or other proceedings" includes any disciplinary proceedings, the proceedings at any local or other public
inquiry and the proceedings at any hearing conducted by a person appointed under any enactment for the
purpose of affording an opportunity to persons to make representations or objections with respect to any
matter'. This far-reaching provision covered all types of enquiries was criticised as being contrary to the
spirit of public inquiries in the UK which is to allow access to information and was subsequently repealed in
1998. On a critic, see Bakkenist, above n. 311, at p. 107.
461 For a brief description of the system of planning public enquiries, see Bell and McGillivray, below n. 593,
at pp. 335-6. Also see between many other examples the Town and Country Planning (Major Infrastructure
Project Inquiries Procedure) (England) Rules 2002 (SI 1223/2002); the Town and Country Planning
(Enforcement) (Determination by Inspectors) (Inquiries Procedure) (England) Rules 2002 (SI 2685/2002);
the Town and Country Planning (Enforcement) (Inquiries Procedure) (England) Rules 2002 (SI 2686/2002).
462 According to section 171A(l) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. Also see on this point M.
Purdue - E. Young - J. Rowan-Robinson, Planning Law and Procedure, Butterworths, 1989, Chapter 12 The
Enforcement of Planning Control.
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proceedings must refer to the stage immediatelyprior to thejudicial proceedings of the enquiry' .463zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
However, since a harm test has to be applied, disclosure of this type of information should only be
withheld if it could reasonably be expected to interfere with the enforcement proceedings (or if it
would jeopardise the individual's concerned right to a fair trial, as seen above). As the ECJ ruled in
the Mecklenburg case, the exemption on intending proceedings (as with all exemptions) 'may not
be interpreted in such a way as to extend its effects beyond what is necessary to safeguard the
interests which it seeks to secure't":
A further question that arises is relative to prospective legal proceedings. The 1992
regulations expressly referred to them as covered under this exemption. The new Regulations do
not do so expressly, but mention the need to protect the 'ability of a public authority to conduct an
enquiry of a criminal or disciplinary nature', which clearly covers prospective proceedings. What
can constitute prospective legal proceedings was considered in the Ibstock case and it was found
that there cannot be prospective legal proceedings from the mere existence of a planning
application, since the planning application may be granted or may be refused without an appeal and
thus there is not yet a prospective appeal when a planning application is made. In this case the
planning application had not even been determined. This seems to indicate that prospective
proceedings are covered, but there should be some degree of certainty of them being initiated and
not just a possibility. This interpretation is consistent with the findings of the Mecklenburg case,
which concerned the disclosure of a statement of views on a bypass road scheme submitted by a
countryside protection authority, in the course of planning permission proceedings. The ECJ ruled
that preliminary investigative procedures'" do include administrative procedures merely preparing
the way for an administrative measure, but only if these procedures 'immediately precede[sJ a
contentious or quasi-contentious procedure and arises from the need to obtain proof or to
investigate a matter prior to the opening of the actual procedure' .466 Macrory has interpreted this as
indicating that in the UK, ordinary public inquiries, in opposition to legal enquiries leading to
judicial implications, are not included under the terms of the exemption.t"
The interpretation reached by the ECJ in the Mecklenburg decision was confirmed in the
Commission v Germany case, in which the ECJ applied the above Mecklenburg ruling and found
that the German law transposing the Regulations and providing that all administrative procedures
463 At par. 27 of the judgement. This is also problematic with some of the notices that are served by local and
other public authorities requiring the recipient to undertake some specific actions, otherwise he could be
prosecuted, like planning enforcement notices.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIn such case, the recipient can still comply with the notice and
thus avoid prosecution. So, these proceedings are not covered by the exemption, as they will not 'inevitably'
lead to the committal of an offence and the imposition of a penalty.
464 At par. 25 of the judgement.
465 Although this term is not any more used in the new Directive and Regulations, the way in which it was
interpreted by the ECJ is important since it also shows how this exemption, taken as a whole, has to be
construed.
466 At par. 30.
467 See the commentary by Richard Macrory on the Mecklenburg decision, 283 The ENDS Report, 8/1998,
45.
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were covered altogether, exceeded the scope of the Directive's exemption on preliminary
investigation proceedings.
iv) Commercial and industrial confidentiality.
Both the Aarhus Convention, the 2003 Directive and the new Regulations, 468 exempt
information whose disclosure would adversely affect commercial or industrial confidentiality.
However, since this might encompass a great amount of important data, the scope of this
exemption is narrowed by the limitations that a) national law (or Community law) must expressly
protect the confidentiality of that information, and b) the confidentiality must protect a legitimate
economic interest. This last condition clearly indicates that not all commercially confidential
information is included, but only if it fulfils an economic aim, which has to be legitimate and not
merely trivial.t" The 2003 Directive provides two examples of such types of interest: statistical
confidentiality and tax secrets. Also, the confidentiality of commercial or industrial information
must be protected in national or community law.?" This seems to indicate that for this exemption to
apply there must be a specific provision of national or EC law that considers the information in
question to be confidential, otherwise the reference to national law or Community law would not
make any sense. The English courts have had the opportunity, under the 1992 Regulations, to
examine the extent of the scope of this exemption in the case of thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBABirmingham Northern Relief
road, examined before. The findings of the Court are still relevant to some extent, since the new
position is very similar to the position under the previous Directive and Regulations."! The main
difference is that now for the exemption to apply, a legitimate economic interest has to be protected
by it and confidentiality has to be provided by law.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
In our view, there are SQIOeimportant points raised in this case that are still applicable
today. First, it is necessary to follow the approach taken by the court in interpreting the commercial
confidentiality exemption found in the then 1990 Regulations. The Court stated that the
Regulations did not require information to be treated as confidential merely because the parties
have agreed that it should not be disclosed. Thus, an agreement between a public authority and the
provider of some information that it should be treated as confidential cannot, by itself, prevent
disclosure. However, the Court indicated that the existence of such an agreement was relevant for
the applicability of the exemption and ruled that for the exemption to apply, the information in
468 Aarhus Convention: article 4, par. 4, (d); 2003 Directive: article 4(2)(d); 2004 Regulations reg. 12(5)(e).
469 This is consistent with the aim of this exemption: to protect the secrets of businesses. On the policy issues
relating to the need to protect secret environmental information relating to private businesses from disclosure,
see Donald Stever, The Private Sector's need for Environmental Secrecy: Product Regulation and the
Secrecy of Proprietary Information, [1993] 2 New York Environmental Law Journal 224.
470 2003 Directive art. 4(2)( d): '2. Member States may provide for a request for environmental information to
be refused if disclosure of the information would adversely affect: [...]d) the confidentiality of commercial or
industrial information where such confidentiality is provided for by national or Community law to protect
a legitimate economic interest, including the public interest in maintaining statistical confidentiality and tax
secrecy' . (our emphasis)
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question must be both capable of being treated as confidential according to the Regulations and the
parties must have agreed that it should be so treated, so that its disclosure would involve a breach
of agreement. The Court also concluded that a blanket exemption concerning commercially
confidential documents could not be justified as being proportionate to the objective of ensuring
freedom of access to environmental information, whilst protecting commercial and industrial
confidentiality. The court also acknowledged that it was common sense that a commercial
document and, in particular, a contract (between a public body and a private company), would
contain commercially confidential information. The Court was concerned with a compensation
provision indicating that the private company would be entitled to compensation if the public body
subsequently decided not to proceed with the project. Sullivan J. ruled thatzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA'evenzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAif one ado ts a
very restrictive view of what information is to be regarded as confidential in a commercial
agreement, a compensation provision of that kind is, in my view, a paradigm of information to
which commercial confidentiality attaches'f"
All of the above seem to indicate that for the commercial confidentiality exemption to
apply, the commercially affected person should clearly indicate which information should be
confidential, either when providing the information or when consulted on the issue at a later date.
This is consistent with the approach adopted in the 1992 Governmental Guidance on the issue
(characterised by Sullivan J. as setting out 'a sensible approach to a practical problem?") which
indicate that in the case of information received from a third party under contract or statute, there
should be two ways of proceeding, either to classify information when it is received or to classify it
when access is first requested.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIn both cases it is for th provider to justify which parts and for
which reasons have to be treated as confidential and for how long, either when he provided the
information or when he is consulted after a request to disclose has been made.
Moreover, the Draft Code of Practice provides that public authorities should reject, where
possible, confidentiality clauses in contracts and that in any event they should not agree to hold
information 'in confidence' that is not in fact confidential. Also, it is provided that any acceptance
of confidential provisions in contracts must be for good reasons and capable of being justified to
the Information Commissioner.f"
A final point that is important to make, is that if the new Regulations and the 2003
Directive are compared to the FOIA 2000 concerning the exemption on commercial confidentiality,
it is clear that the former are more liberal since they allow for greater access. More specifically,
section 43(2) of the 2000 Act, provides that 'Information is exempt information if its disclosure
under this Act would, or would be likely to, prejudice the commercial interests of any person
(including the public authority holding it)'. This exemption is clearly very broad and is not limited
as the equivalent provisions found in the Regulations and discussed above. Also, even if both in the
471 1990 Directive art. 3, par. 2 fourth indent; 1992 Regulations reg. 4(3)(e).
472 [1999] Env. L.R. 447, at p. 478.
473 Ibid.
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Regulations and in the FOIA 2000 a harm test has to be applied when applying this exemption, as
we shall see more in details further on, under the 2004 Regulations when the information concerns
emissions and is relevant for the protection of the environment, then the balance test cannot be
applied but the information has to be disclosed regardless of any commercial or industrial
confidentiality concerns.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
v)zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIntellectual property.
Two separate issues have to be distinguished. First, whether disclosure of copyrighted or
otherwise patented information under the Regulations can constitute copyright infringement, and
second whether information already disclosed under the Regulations can be further copied and
circulated legally. These issues, involving section 47 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act
1988, have already been dealt and thus we shall concentrate on a description of the relevant
provisions contained in the specific legal instruments providing for a right to access environmental
information.t"
The Aarhus Convention identically to the 2003 Directive and the new Regulations provide
that information adversely affecting intellectual property rights is exempt from disclosure.f" A lot
of information deposited in public authorities' files is protected by intellectual property laws, which
make any unauthorised use or duplication a criminal offence. For instance, all drawings made by
architects are intellectually protected and thus cannot be copied, however this should not mean that
they should not be communicated-l"
Intellectual property rights are already protected in a sense through the exemption dealing
with commercial secrets, since such information can be of economic and commercial significance
to its copyright owners. However, intellectual property rights can also protect non-commercial
information (such as drawings or texts with no commercial significance), but since a harm test has
to be applied when exercising this exemption, this type of information should not be able to
outweigh the interest in disclosure. Consequently, it seems that the inclusion of such an exemption
is redundant and unnecessary duplicates the commercial secrets one. This is also the position under
the FOIA 2000, which does not contain a specific exemption on intellectual property rights (this
term is totally absent in the Act) and thus these matters are left to be protected by section 43 which
exempts from disclosure information on trade secrets or prejudicial to the commercial interests of
474 See the Draft Code of Practice, above n. 309, at paras. 38, 39, 40 and 43.
475 See above, i) Limitations on the subsequent use of disclosed information
476 Aarhus Convention: article 4, par. 4, (e); 2003 Directive: article 4(2)(e); 2004 Regulations reg. 12(5)(c).
477 These drawings as forming part of planning permissions are part of planning registers and have to be
disclosed. See the relevant chapter on registers.
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any person. The interrelation between intellectual property and commercial confidentiality can be
demonstrated by the position adopted by the 1992 Regulations, which mentioned that information
which would affect the confidentiality of matters relating to commercial or industrial
confidentiality, including intellectual property, could be withheld.
Thus, both in the 1992 Regulations and the FOIA 2000, intellectual property rights are only
protected in relation to commercial or industrial confidentiality, and not independently. Thus, the
protection in these instruments is more limited than in the present Directive and Regulations. This
means that the current provisions on environmental information are more restrictive to that extent.
However, the current provisions should be interpreted in conformity with the equivalent provisions
of the FOIA 2000, so that disclosure under the intellectual property exemption should only be
refused when trade secrets or commercial interests are jeopardised by communication of
information.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIn any case, it can be contended that since both the 2003 Directive and the 2004
Regulations contain specific provisions protecting commercial interests, these could have sufficed
and the UK regulations could have omitted to transpose this exception. This would have also had
the added advantage of simplicity, since it would have aligned the new Regulations with the FOIA
2000.
vi) Personal data confidentiality.
As under the 1990 Directive and the 1992 Regulations.l" the Aarhus Convention, the 2003
Directive and the new Regulations.f" all provide that information whose disclosure would
adversely affect the confidentiality of personal data or files relating to a natural person who has not
consented to disclosure, may be withheld. Moreover, the 2003 Directive, following the Aarhus
Convention, has added that the confidentiality of personal information must be protected in
national or community law.480 This seems to indicate that for this exemption to apply, there must be
a specific provision of national or EC law that considers the personal information in question to be
confidential, otherwise the reference to national law or Community law would not make any sense.
Such provisions do exist in EC law and the 2003 Directive expressly includes such an example."!
4781990 Directive art. 3, par. 2 fifth indent; 1992Regulations reg. 4(3)(b).
479 Aarhus article 4, par. 4(f); 2003 Directive art. 4(2)(f); 2004 Regulations reg. 5(3), reg. 12(3) and reg. 13.
There is also a difference with the equivalent provisions' of the 1990 Directive and 1992 regulations that
while previously the words 'would affect' was used, in these new instruments it has been replaced by the
Ehrase 'would adversely affect' thus favouring even more disclosure of information.
802003 Directive art. 4(2)(f): '2. Member States may provide for a request for environmental information to
be refused if disclosure of the information would adversely affect: [...] the confidentiality of personal data
and/or files relating to a natural person where that person has not consented to the disclosure of the
information to the public, where such confidentiality is provided for by national or Community law'.
(our emphasis)
481 The last indent of art. 4(2) of the 2003 Directive states that: 'Within this framework, and for the purposes
of the application of subparagraph (f), Member States shall ensure that the requirements of Directive
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The Information Directive indicates that for the application of the personal data confidentiality
exemption, Directive 95/46 that protects individuals from processing of personal information.t"
shall be taken into consideration and applied. This Directive has been transposed into UK law by
the Data Protection Act 1998, which also contains provisions prohibiting the disclosure of personal
data to a third party without the consent of the individual concerned.?" The main difference with
the previous regimes is that under the 1992 Regulations this was a mandatory exemption, and
public authorities had to refuse disclosure of information affecting personal data confidentiality in
all cases, whether under the new 2003 Directive this would not be possible as a balance test has to
be applied.
The 2004 Regulations, similarly to the FOIA, create a very complicated mechanism for the
disclosure of personal data. First, under reg. 5(3) if the applicant making the request for
information requests personal information relating to himself, then this information is totally
unavailable under the Regulations. The right to know whether this information is held, and if so to
have access to it, is covered instead by the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998. This is
identical to what is provided in s. 40(1) of the FOIA, which exempts, as an absolute exemption,
personal information relating to the applicant that requests it and thus, he cannot use the FOIA to
access this information but the Data Protection Act 1998 only. However, there seems to be some
inconsistency with the 2003 Directive in this regulation, since any reference to a public interest test
is totally omitted, whereas the Directive mentions that the public interest test has to be applied to
all exemptions, including the personal data confidentiality one. The 2003 Directive mentions that
the public interest test has to be appliedzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA'in eve y particular case,484 and there can be no doubts that
member states cannot derogate to this principle.
Also, reg. 12(3) exempts from disclosure personal information relating to a third party, if
its disclosure would contravene the Data Protection Act 1998 or if that information would have
been exempt from disclosure under that Act. 485 Personal information to which the relevant
provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998 Act do not apply, is treated for these purposes as if they
did.
95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data are complied with'.
482 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, OJ of
the EC, L 281 , 23/1111995 p. 31.
483 E.g. for sensitive personal data (such as racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious beliefs or other
beliefs of a similar nature, membership of a trade union, physical or mental health or condition, sexual life,
the commission or alleged commission of any offence, proceedings for any offence committed or alleged to
have been committed, the disposal of such proceedings or the sentence of any court in such proceedings),
disclosure to third parties without the consent of the individual concerned is prohibited by Sch. 3 to the Data
Protection Act 1998.
484 Art. 4 par. 2 of the 2003 Directive.
485 According to reg. 12(3) of the 2004 Regulations 'To the extent that the information requested includes
personal data of which the applicant is not the data subject, those data shall not be disclosed otherwise than in
accordance with regulation 13'.
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Reg. 2(2) of the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 define the terms of 'data'
and 'personal data' by reference to the Data Protection Act 1998,486 which defines in section 1(1)
'personal data' as
... data which relate to a living individual who can be identified--
(a) from those data, or
(b) from those data and other information which is in the possession of, or is likely
to come into the possession of, the data controller,
and includes any expression of opinion about the individual and any indication of
the intentions of the data controller or any other person in respect of the individual487
The 2004 Regulations extend this definition to any personal data held on manual files, even
if they are not covered by the Data Protection Act 1998.488 This does not seem incompatible with
the principle that exemptions to the right of access are to be interpreted restrictively, since this
exemption aims to protect the right of privacy, which as analysed elsewhere is a fundamental
human right and has started to be recognised in English law.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA489
In any case, reg. 13(2)(3) provides that when responding to a request to access information
which would involve the disclosure of personal information about a third party, that information is
486 As amended numerous times. Generally speaking this Act provides that any public or private person
processing personal data must comply with the eight enforceable principles of good practice which consist of
personal data being fairly and lawfully processed, processed for limited purposes, adequate, relevant and not
excessive, accurate, not kept longer than necessary, processed in accordance with the data subject's rights,
secure, and not transferred to countries without adequate data protection. Not all personal data falls within the
scope of the Act since its provisions only apply to automatically processed data (computerised data) and data,
forming part of a relevant non-computerised filing system (manual data). Also the Act grants to the person
concerned by the data, right to access it and have it corrected if inaccurate and a right to compensation to an
individual who suffers damage, or damage and distress, as the result of any contravention of the requirements
of the Act. For a detailed analysis of the Act and the numerous pieces of subordinate legislation made under
it, see David Bainbridge,zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAData P otection Law, CLT Professional Publishing, 2000. Also see the Data
Protection Act 1998 - Legal Guidance, version 1, published by the Information Commissioner, 2001,
available from http://www.informationcommissioner.gov.uki
487 'Data' is defined in the same section as: " ... information which-
(a) is being processed by means of equipment operating automatically in response to instructions given for
that purpose,
(b) is recorded with the intention that it should be processed by means of such equipment,
(c) is recorded as part of a relevant filing system or with the intention that it should form part of a relevant
filing system, or
(d) does not fall within paragraph (a), (b) or (c) but forms part of an accessible record as defmed by section
68".
According to the landmark case of Durant v Financial Services Authority [2003] EWCA Civ 1746,
data will relate to a living individual if it " is information that affects [someone's] privacy, whether in his
personal or family life, business or professional capacity ... The information should have the [individual] as
its focus rather than some other person with whom he may have been involved or some transaction or event
in which he may have figured or have had an interest".
488 According to reg. 13(12)(b) of the 2004 Regulations. Not all manual data is covered under the Data
Protection Act 1998. Generally speaking is only covered data held on a relevant filling system which is
structured, either by reference to individuals or by reference to criteria relating to individuals, in such a way
that specific information relating to a particular individual is readily accessible. For an in-depth analysis of
what sort of manual data is covered see, Helen Barnard, 'Data Protection Act 1998-manual data' [2002] 152
New Law Journa17036, 925. InDurant v Financial Services Authority [2003] EWCA Civ 1746 the Court of
Appeal held that manual files are data "only if they are of sufficient sophistication to provide the same or
similar ready accessibility as a computerised file system".
489 See between many others, Rhona Smith, 'Is There A Right To-Privacy?' [2002] Human Rights & UK
Practice 3.1, 11.
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exempt from disclosure if its disclosure would be exempt under any exemption found in Part IV of
the Data Protection Act 1998,490and in all the circumstances of the case, the public interest in not
disclosing the information outweighs the public interest in disclosing it.
Similarly, reg. 13(2)(2) provides that when responding to a request to access information
which would involve the disclosure of personal information about a third party, that information is
exempt from disclosure if its disclosure would contravene any of the data protection principles.
These eight data protection principles can be found in Schedule 1 to the Data Protection Act 1998
which provides that personal data shall be processed fairly and lawfully; that personal data shall be
obtained only for one or more specified and lawful purposes, and shall not be further processed in
any manner incompatible with that purpose or those purposes; that personal data shall be adequate,
relevant and not excessive in relation to the purpose or purposes for which they are processed; that
personal data shall be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; that personal data processed
for any purpose or purposes shall not be kept for longer than is necessary for that purpose or those
purposes; that personal data shall be processed in accordance with the rights of data subjects under
the Data Protection Act; that appropriate technical and organisational measures shall be taken
against unauthorised or unlawful processing of personal data and against accidental loss or
destruction of, or damage to, personal data; and that personal data shall not be transferred to a
country or territory outside the European Economic Area, unless that country or territory ensures
an adequate level of protection for the rights and freedoms of data subjects in relation to the
processing of personal data. This provision implements art. 4(2) of the 2003 Directive which refers
to compliance with DirectivezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA95/46IEC on t e protection of individuals with regard to the
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. In this regulation too, there
seems to be some inconsistency with the 2003 Directive, since any reference to a public interest
test is totally omitted.
Also, the same regulation provides that if the third party who is concerned by this personal
data has given notice to the public authority under section 10 of the Data Protection Act 1998 that
the release of those data is causing or is likely to cause substantial damage or substantial distress to
him or to another, or that he would not have a right to know about the information relating to
himself or a right of access to it, then the public body concerned is required to apply the balance
test and consider whether release of the information would be in the public interest.
Interestingly, reg. 13(5) mentions that public authorities do not even have to confirm or
deny whether the requested information exists or is held by them, if giving this information would
contravene any of the data protection principles or would be covered by one of the exemptions of
Part IV of the Data Protection Act 1998. Again, this provision is clearly in breach of the 2003
Directive, since any reference to a public interest test is totally omitted.
490Part IV of the Data Protection Act 1998 contains no less than 12 sections each containing various
exemptions, such as national security, the prevention or detection of crime, regulatory functions, danger to an
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The reason for these breaches of the 2003 Directive as far as the personal data
confidentiality exemption is concerned, seems to be the effort of the Government to align the
Environmental Information regulations 2004 as closely as possible with the FOIA 2000. However,
it was overseen that under the FOIA personal data confidentiality is an absolute exemption not
subject to any ham test, whereas in the 2003 Directive all exemptions are subject to a public
interest test. This solution demonstrates how the right to information can supersede, in some cases,
the right to protection of personal information, but the 2004 Regulations do not seem to accept this
idea.
One last point to note, is that this exception on personal data which aims to protect the
privacy of third parties, does not apply to artificial legal persons, since the 2004 Regulations speak
about personal information relating to a 'data subject"?' which is defined in s. 1 of the Data
Protection Act 1998 as an 'individual' who is the subject of personal data. Similarly, art. 4(2)(t) of
the 2003 Directive refers to a 'natural person' only. This seems to be contrary to the ECtHR's
jurisprudence in the case ofzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAStes Colas Est and others v. France.t" in which the ECtHR held that it
can be possible under certain circumstances to recognise the right to a home to artificial legal
persons.t" This finding is though of little practical significance, since it seems that their rights
would still be protected under the commercial confidentiality exemption.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
vii) Information voluntarily provided by third parties
The Aarhus Convention, similarly to the 2003 Directive.t" exempts information whose
disclosure would adversely affect the interests or the protection of any person who has provided the
information without being obliged to do so and does not consent to the release. The Convention
does not define what is a 'third party' (the 2003 Directive speaks about 'any person') and when is
he under a legal obligation to provide information. The overall context would indicate that a 'third
party' is any legal person (either artificial or natural) who is not a public authority and thus owes no
duty to the public to provide information. This interpretation is consistent with the fact that public
authorities have to provide any information they hold as well as information they have produced
themselves.r"
The issue of when is there a legal obligation for a third party to provide information seems
quite straightforward. However, what if a public authority had the legal powers to require that
individual's physical or mental health, armed forces, honours and legal professional privilege. None of these
exemptions is subject to a public interest test. '
491 At reg. 2(2), which refer to the definition of this term found in the Data Protection Act 1998.
492 Stes Colas Est and others v. France, 16 Apri12002, App. No. 37971197.
493 See the relevant discussion in the chapter on Human Rights: A, ii, (d) The problem of artificial legal
Eersons and the right to environmental information.
94 Aarhus article 4, par. 4(g); 2003 Directive art. 4(2)(g). The only difference is that whether Aarhus only
speaks about the 'interests of a third party', the Directive speaks about 'the interests or protection of any
person' who supplied information voluntarily. The Directive merely includes an example of a person's
interests, its protection, and thus does not add anything not already encompassed in Aarhus.
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certain information be reported to it, but had not exercised them, because that information was
already being reported to it on a voluntary basis? Since exemptions have to be construed narrowly
in a way favouring disclosure, it seems that this exemptions applies only when public authorities
have not the legal power to oblige certain information to be reported to them, irrespective of the
fact whether this power was used when gathering the information in question.?" This is in any case
the view adopted in the 2004 Regulations which explicitly consider that if the person that provided
the information could have been put under an obligation to supply it, then this exemption does not
apply.497The same regulations also add that this exemption does not apply if the person supplied
this information in circumstances which enable the public person to disclose it in compliance with
some other, than the regulations, enactment. This refers to other statutory provisions providing for
access to certain specific information, such as registers which may contain, apart from the
information that a person is bound to disclose, information voluntarily provided by third parties.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAAn
example of this is the planning register, which contains between other, applications for planning
permission. Some developers, in support of their application might decide to give voluntarily more
information than what is legally required for the application to be examined, so as to help planners
reach a decision. Thus, such information is not covered by this exemption, even if voluntarily
provided.
It is interesting to note that this exemption is quite liberal, since when the person concerned
has consented to disclosure, this exemption does not apply. Also, since the balance test has to be
applied, this indicates that there could be some cases where the public interest in disclosure would
lead for this type of information to be disclosed regardless of the refusal of the concerned person to
give his consent.
The rationale for such an exemption on voluntarily provided information is that it would
'inhibit the present open and constructive discussions between environmental control authorities
and industry and the gathering of information on which environmental studies are based'r'" This
has been heavily criticised by Birtles,499due to the long-existing criticisms about the close and far
too friendly relationships between environmental regulators and polluters. He feels that this
exception could exclude enormous quantities of environmental information which affected people
should have a right to know. He also adds that it is difficult to see how the honest exchange of
495 See above, Which information is covered?
496 See on this pointzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAStec et al., above n. 97, at p. 61.
497 Reg. 12(5)(t) provides that: ' ... a public authority may refuse to disclose information to the extent that its
disclosure would adversely affect - [...]
(t) the interests of the person who provided the information where that person-
(i) was not under, and could not have been put under, any legal obligation to
supply it to that or any other public authority,
(ii) did not supply it in circumstances such that that or any other public authority
is entitled apart from these Regulations to disclose it, and
(iii) has not consented to its disclosure;'
498 According to the 1992Governmental Guidance, see above n. 269, at par. 67.
499See William Birtles, 'A right to know: the Environmental Information Regulations 1992', [1993] JPL 615,
at p. 619. It has also been criticised by Bakkenist on similar rounds, see Bakkenist, op. cit. At p. 86-88.
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information and views between Government and industry can be inhibited by the publication of
that kind of information, and concludes by contending that 'this exception smacks of the old law of
Crown privilege which was frequently used to cover up the incompetence of ministers and civil
servants'. All these criticisms were indeed justified in the context of the 1992 Regulations and the
1990 Directive, which applied tozyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAany information voluntarily supplied and not to any information
whose disclosure would adversely affect the interests of the person that supplied it voluntarily.
Also, this was a mandatory exemption under the 1992 Regulations when now a balance test has to
be applied before disclosure is refused.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIn contra t, Hallosoo would have welcomed an exception for
information voluntarily supplied that would have expressly provided for the protection of
''whistleblowers'' and thus would have allowed people aware of environmentally damaging
activities to report them to the authorities without fear of their identity being revealed."!
However, this exemption still excludes, unnecessarily, more information than is ideally
necessary, since it is still drafted in very general and imprecise terms by comparison to the FOIA.
To that extent, the equivalent provision of the FOIA 2000, even if it is an absolute exemption and
thus gives no discretion to public authorities to disclose by applying the balance test, is more
precise. Section 41 of the 2000 Act requires that disclosure of the information should constitute an
'actionable breach of confidence' so as to be exempt from disclosure. This means that the person
who gave the information could bring an action in court for breach of confidence if it was released
and could apply for an injunction to stop the release of information under the specific common law
rules on breach of confidence. It should be noted that even if it is an absolute exemption, the
common law of breach of confidence allows communication of confidential data, if that is in the
public interest.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA502 Thu the general exception found in the new regulations, could have been framed
in regard to this section of the 2000 Act, which is more liberal to this extent.
viii) Information prejudicial to the environment
Finally and most importantly, both the Convention, the 2003 Directive and the new
Regulations, exempt from disclosure any information whose disclosure would adversely affect thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
500 See Hallo, above n. 201, at p. 9.
501 Such provisions already exist in UK employment law and were introduced by the Public Interest
Disclosure Act 1998. This Act encourages employees to raise concerns about malpractice in the workplace
through protecting whistleblowers from dismissal and victimisation. Only disclosures that relate to specified
types of malpractice may qualify for protection under the Act. These include inter alia dangers to health,
safety and the environment and the cover-up of any such malpractice. For details see Yvonne Cripps, The
Legal Implications of Disclosure in the Public Interest - An Analysis of Prohibitions and Protections with
Particular Reference to Employers and Employees, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2nd ed 1994. However, this
Act does not protect a whistleblower's identity to be withheld from disclosure by public bodies.
502 See on the common law of breach of confidence, the recent case of Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers
Ltd [2004] UKHL 22.
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environment to which the information relates/?' The Convention and the 2003 Directive also
mention an example of such type of information: the location or breeding sites of rare species,
probably so as to prevent poachers from hunting them down.f" Other such examples can be found
in the 1992 governmental guidance such as information about the location of nesting sites, rare
habitats or endangered or protected species, information about possible Sites of Special Scientific
Interest until a formal notice is served and in general whenever making information available
prematurely could run the risk of pre-emptive damage being caused to the site before it was
protected.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA50S Thi c uld inclu e information about which buildings could potentially be listed, so
owners could 'modify' them so that there would not be any more grounds for listing. This
exemptions safeguards the major aim of freedom of environmental information legislation,
environmental protection, by allowing public authorities to take harm to the environment into
consideration, when releasing information. Interestingly, the 1992 Regulations classified this
exemption as a mandatory one, making it an obligation for public authorities to withheld that kind
of information.f"
The FOIA 2000 does not contain at all any such exemption. The rationale of this
exemption is, undoubtedly, to protect the environment by preventing releases of information that
could be harmful to it. The drafters of the FOIA did not see the environment as an important factor
so as to justify a separate protective exemption. On the contrary, the environmental information
regime, aims at protecting the environment, so it is logical (and necessary) to contain such an
exclusion. Otherwise, if such harmful information could be accessed, it would undermine the
essential goal environmental information regimes aim to achieve in the first place: the protection of
the environment.
An important point that arises is whether the FOIA 2000 could be used to get such
information? When information cannot be accessed under the Regulations, then the FOIA becomes
applicable since, even if section 39 exempts from disclosure under the 2000 Act environmental
information, this is not an absolute exemption. Thus, a balancing test will be required under the
FOIA where the requested information falls under the Regulations. This leaves the room for the
request to succeed when the public interests in balance favours disclosure. However, in practice, it
is doubtful whether information not accessible under the Regulations could be made accessible
under this provision of the FOIA, since a balancing test would have already taken place in
503 Aarhus article 4, par. 4(h); 2003 Directive art. 4(2)(h); 2004 Regulations reg. 12(5)(g).
504 See also par. 6 of art. 15 of Council Regulation (EC) No 338/97 of9 December 1996 on the protection of
species of wild fauna and flora by regulating trade therein, OJ L 61,03/03/1997 p. 1, which mentions that "In
accordance with Council Directive 90/313/EEC of 7 June 1990 on the freedom of access to information on
the environment, the Commission shall take appropriate measures to protect the confidentiality of
i~[ormationobtained in implementation of this Regulation".
so See the Guidance, above n. 269, at par. 70.
506 According to the 1992 Regulations reg. 4(3)(d): 'For the purposes of these Regulations information must
be treated as confidential if, and only if, in the case of any request made to a relevant person under regulation
3 above- [...] (d) the disclosure of the information in response to that request would, in the circumstances,
increase the likelihood of damage to the environment affecting anything to which the information relates'.
This transposed art. 3, par. 2 seventh indent of the 1990 Directive.
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pursuance of the Regulations and if the interest in favour of disclosure could outweigh the interest
in favour of secrecy, then disclosure would have already taken place! Also, section 39(3) of the
2000 Act provides that the exemption found in section 39(1) on environmental information, does
not limit the generality of section 21(1) of the Act, which creates an absolute exemption in relation
to information reasonably accessible to the applicant by other means. Thus when the environmental
information regulations are applicable, there are two exemptions that prevent environmental
information becoming accessible under the FOIA: the exemption relating to environmental
information and the one relating to information accessible to the applicant by other means as are
the regulations.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
c) Taking the public interest into account: the exercise
of a harm test.
All of the aforementioned exemptions to disclosure are not to be applied in an absolute
manner, since the legal instruments under scrutiny provide that public authorities have to exercise
discretion in assessing whether disclosure should occur or not. Discretion is exercised through a
harm test, taking into consideration the competing interests favouring disclosure and secrecy?" In
all cases a balance test has to be applied, except when the balancing has already been exercised by
the legislator either in favour of disclosure, as it is in the current environmental information
regimes when emissions are concerned, or against disclosure as it was in the 1992 Regulations or is
the case in the FOIA 2000.
i) The harm test between the competing interests of secrecy and environmental
protection.
In the Aarhus Convention, the 2003 Directive and the new Regulations, in most cases
where an exemption applies, public authorities are always granted discretion to disclose though the
test to apply varies depending on the exemption considered.
507 Secrecy has to be avoided not only because extensive use of exemptions would empty the right of access
of any content, but also because secrecy can only be best protected when it is not unduly invoked: '/zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAshould
suppose that moral, political, and practical considerations would dictate that a very first principle of that
wisdom would be an insistence upon avoiding secrecy for its own sake. For when everything is classified,
then nothing is classified, and the system becomes one to be disregarded by the cynical or the careless, and
to be manipulated by those intent on self-protection or self-promotion. I should suppose, in short, that the
hallmark of a truly effective internal security system would be the maximum possible disclosure, recognizing
that secrecy can best be preserved only when credibility is truly maintained' Stewart, J., Concurring Opinion
in the U.S. Supreme Court case of New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), at p. 729.
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As we have seen, the Convention and the 2003 Directive provide for two sets of
exceptions: one concerning matters that are important for the correct operation of public bodies and
one concerning important state and private secrets.
Concerning the first set of exemptions (on information not-held by the public authority, too
general or unreasonable requests, unfinished documents and internal communications), in the
Aarhus Convention only the exemption on unfinished documents and internal communications has
to be balanced against the public interest in disclosure. This position has been made more liberal in
the 2003 Directive where a balance test has to be applied in relation to all exemptions. The new
2004 Regulations stick to the position under the Directive and provide that for the application of all
exemptions the public interest test has to be applied.
Concerning the second set of exemptions (relating to confidentiality of proceedings, state
secrets, judicial proceedings, commercial confidentiality, intellectual property, personal data
confidentiality, information voluntarily provided by third parties, and information prejudicial to the
environment) a balance test between the public interest served by disclosure and the interest served
by the refusal has also to be applied in all cases where these exemptions are applicable.
It is unclear how the balancing exercise will have to be applied and which thresholds
would have to apply. The only indication given in the 2003 Directive'" is that all of the exemptions
have to be interpreted in a restrictive way. This is not something new, since this principle of
restrictive interpretation of exemptions had been previously expressed in both the ECJ and UK case
law, even if not expressly mentioned in the 1990 Directive or 1992 Regulations.i" The Aarhus
Convention does also mention that the exemptions have to be interpreted restrictively, but only
refers to the second set of exemptions and not to all of them as in the Directive, which thus goes
further than Aarhus."? The 2004 Regulations on their part, simply do not expressly mention that
exemptions have to be interpreted in a restrictive way. However, this should not be taken as a
failure to transpose this requirement. On the contrary, this requirement has been transposed by a
provision going further than the principle of restrictive interpretation. This is possible since even if
member-states are precluded from transposing the directive in a less liberal way i.e. by adding
exemptions not present in the Directive, they are free to make its provisions more liberal in national
law by favouring disclosure. The new Regulations create a presumption in favour of openness
whenever any exemption is involved, and such a mechanism is undoubtedly going farther that thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
S08 At par. 2 of art. 4 of the 2003 Directive it is mentioned that: 'The grounds for refusal mentioned in
paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be interpreted in a restrictive way, taking into account for the particular case the
public interest served by disclosure. In every particular case, the public interest served by disclosure shall be
weighed against the interest served by the refusal. Member States may not, by virtue of paragraph 2(a), (d),
(f), (g) and (h), provide for a request to be refused where the request relates to information on emissions into
the environment.'
509 Such a statement can be found in all ECJ cases applying the 1990 Directive and it was also impliedly
accepted by Sullivan J. in the Birmingham Northern Reliefroad case, op. cit. at p. 477.
510 Par. 4 of article 4 of the Aarhus Convention containing the second set of exemption mentions that: 'The
aforementioned grounds for refusal shall be interpreted in a restrictive way, taking into account the public
interest served by disclosure and taking into account whether the information requested relates to emissions
into the environment.'
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inclusion of a basic and vague indication that exemptions are to be interpreted restrictively. More
specifically, regulation 12(2)mentions that for the application of exemptions present in the second
set of exemptionszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA'A p blic authority shall apply a presumption in favour of disclosure. ' This
presumption is not an absolute one since it could be rebutted, though the clear intention of the
drafters is that there should be irrefutable arguments justifying such a rebuttal. This provision is the
unique example where the UK system is more liberal than the 2003 Directive and Aarhus. Such a
legally binding presumption in favour of openness is something unheard in any UK legislative
instrument to date and it certainly is a giant step ahead of the FOIA 2000 which even if it contains a
presumption, as analysed before, it is a presumption against disclosure when national security
information is involved.
Another important question, is what does the public interest served by disclosure is
supposed to refer to, since it is a term left undefined in all the legislative instruments examined
herein. This is left for public authorities to decide on a case by case basis. This is sensible since
such a balancing exercise would be easier to be appreciated on a case by case basis. The existence
of a balance test, however, in a way contradicts the fact that information has to be disclosed
without any interest having to be proven, since in cases where some of the requested information
might be exempt and thus the balance test would have to be applied, the applicant would have to
prove that his interest in obtaining the information is superior to the confidentiality requirement.
A final point that is important to mention, is the scope of the judicial review that English
courts would exercise on such a balancing exercise. The case of the Birmingham Northern relief
road provides an answer to this issue concerning the discretion given to public authorities in
deciding whether an information falling into one of the exemptions should be disclosed or not.
Sullivan J. unambiguously ruled that the balance test operated by public authorities when deciding
to release or not information that could be withheld under a non-mandatory exemption 'is a
discretionary decision, reviewable only on Wednesburygrounds '.SlI This is problematic due to the
restricted scope ofWednesbury judicial review, though the scope of judicial review would today be
increase~ when human right issues are involved as analysed elsewhere in this work.'"zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIn any case,
SlI Id. at p. 467.
512 Also according to Maurice Kay J. in R. (on the application of Medway Council) v Secretary of State for
Transport, Local Government and the Regions [2003] JPL 583, 'In my judgment, the greater intensity of
review which is required by the proportionality test does not arise in domestic law where there is no
engagement of a Convention right and no fundamental right is in play. The test remains Wednesbury. There
is no room for a proportionality challenge in the present case. It is important that proportionality is confined
to its proper role and is not allowed to run amok as the "unruly horse" of the new era' at par. 47. This
approach denying proportionality challenges in reviews based solely on national law is contrary to the speech
of Lord Slynn of Hadley in R (Alconbury Developments Ltd) v. Secretary of State for the Environment,
Transport and the Regions [2001] 2 WLR 1389 (at par. 51) 'I consider that even without reference to the
Human Rights Act 1998 the time has come to recognise this principle [i.e. proportionality] is part of English
Administrative Law, not only when judges are dealing with Community acts but also when they are dealing
with acts subject to domestic law. Trying to keep the Wednesbury principle and proportionality in separate
compartments seems to me to be unnecessary and confusing.' Maurice Kay J. interpreted this phrase as only
referring to proportionality in the context of Convention rights, though this has been criticised by Purdue as
being certainly contestable. See Michael Purdue, The policy on the expansion of airports in the South East of
England and the Medway decision, Current topics (March), [2003] JPL 269, at p. 270. Also, although in the
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the review powers of the Information Commissioner and the Information Tribunal are not limited
and enjoy full jurisdiction on any matters arising under the Environmental Information
Regulations, as analysed in more details further on.
ii) The emphasis put on emissions: the balance has already been struck by the
legislator
Even if it is unclear how the balance test between the competing interests of disclosure and
secrecy should be applied, the Aarhus Convention does provide a guideline on how the public
interest test should be operated, by requiring public authorities to consider the fact whether
requested information relates to emissions. This indicates that the balance of competing interests
should in most cases lean towards disclosure, whenever emissions are involved.
Moreover, the Convention expressly adds that if commercially confidential information
relates to emissions and is relevant for the protection of the environment, it shall be disclosed. For
Stec et al.m this exception is explained by the idea that information about emissions loses its
proprietary character once the emissions enter the public environment. The term of emissions is left
undefined in the Convention but has been defined in the IPPC Directive aszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA'the direct or ind rect
release of substances, vibrations, heat or noise from individual or diffuse sources in the installation
into the air, water or land' .514 This special status for emissions is directly in conflict with the
provisions of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 on public registers of emissions'" for which
the Act provides that some types of information might be excluded from disclosure to the public
due to commercial confidentiality issues, even though they are included on the registers.
These provisions are undoubtedly very liberal in allowing people to access information on
pollution, which can be a very important human right if that pollution can affect someone's health
and family life as demonstrated in the Guerra case.!" The 2003 Directive adopts an even more
liberal approach since it provides that when information relates to emissions, not only the
exemption on commercial confidentiality cannot prevent disclosure (as in Aarhus), but neither the
exemptions on confidentiality of proceedings of public authorities, personal data confidentiality,
case of R. (on the application of Association of British Civilian Internees (Far East Region)) v Secretary of
Statefor Defence [2003] EWCA Civ 473 the Court of Appeal held that the Wednesbury test still survives and
it is the correct test to apply in cases not involving ECHR rights or EC law, it was also indicated that 'The
Wednesbury test is moving closer to proportionality and in some cases it is not possible to see any daylight
between the two tests'. More generally, see Hilson Chris, The Europeanisation of English Administrative
Law: Judicial Review and Convergence, 9 [2003] 1 European Public Law 125.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
m See above n. 97, at p. 60.
514 Council DirectivezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA96/61IEC of24 September 1996 concerning integrated pollution prevention and control
OJ of the EC, L 257, 10/10/1996 p. 2, at art. 2. Par. 5.
SIS See the relevant chapter on registers, part I, 2 , ii) The nature of information contained on registers.
516 Analysed in detail in Chapter 3 on Human Rights and Environmental Information.
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information voluntarily provided by third parties, and information prejudicial to the environment."?
So, when these exemptions are concerned it can be said that the community legislator has
undertaken in advance the balance test between competing interests and has decided that under no
circumstances, information on emissions can be withheld on the basis of these exemptions. This
demonstrates the importance given by the European legislator to the right of people to access
information on pollution, since the 2003 Directive, which in general sticks closely to the wording
of Aarhus, in this occasion went way beyond it and provided for far more liberal provisions.
The new 2004 Regulations do not stick to the position in the 2003 Directive and provide'"
that information on emissions can only override the exemptions on commercial confidentiality, on
confidentiality of proceedings of public authorities, on information voluntarily provided by third
parties, and on information prejudicial to the environment, but not the exemption on personal data
confidentiality provided by the 2003 Directive. This approach is contrary to the express wording of
the Directive and since it is a less liberal one than in the Directive as it favours secrecy, is in clear
breach of EC law. The Government in an effort to align as much as possible the 2004 Regulations
with the FOIA regime, probably omitted this essential detail: that when information on emissions is
concerned, then this information cannot be kept secret even for personal data confidentiality issues.
iii) Comparison of the new 2004 Regulations with the previous position under the
1992 Regulations and the present position under the Freedom of Information
Act2000
The aforementioned provisions are definitely more liberal than the categorisation of
exceptions to disclosure operated under the 1992 regulations and under the FOIA 2000, since they
both contain mandatory exemptions to communication, which have completely disappeared form
the Environmental Information Regulations 2004, as analysed before.
The 1992 Regulations provided two categories of exemptions: information that was
capable of being treated as confidential (discretionary exemptions) and information that must be
treated as confidential (mandatory exemptions). In Regulation 4(2) were listed cases of
discretionary exemptions (relating to state secrets, legal proceedings, confidentiality of
deliberations, unfinished documents, internal communications and commercial confidentiality) and
in regulation 4(3) cases of mandatory exemptions to disclosure (on disclosure which would
contravene any statutory provision or would be a breach of agreement, personal information,
information voluntarily supplied by third parties and information whose disclosure could harm the
environment). When mandatory exemptions were applicable, public authorities were under a duty
517 At art. 4 par. 2 of the 2003 Directive.
518 At reg. 12(8).
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not to disclose any information and no discretion whatsoever was granted to them to apply a
balance test.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIt has been suggested, that providing for mandatory exemptions went far beyond what
was allowed by the 1990 Directive, which only spoke about refusals to disclose when disclosure
would affect certain interests and did not provide for mandatory exclusions.?" However, in the case
ofzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBACommission v. France, (mentioned above) the French legislation which was considered, did
contain some mandatory exclusions, and the Commission did not raise this point, thus probably
indicating that the Directive grants discretion to member-states to establish the exclusions present
in the Directive as mandatory as long as they do not add to this list any other grounds for disclosure
not present in the Directive. In any case, we believe that the wording of the 1990 Directive clearly
granted discretion to member-states to include mandatory exemptions into national law. Art. 3(2)
of the 1990 Directive provided that: 'Member states may provide for a request for such information
to be refused where it affects ...' some of the interests protected by the exemptions. It seems over-
stretched, as Bakkenist seems to be doing, to read in the usage of the phrase 'where it affects' that
no mandatory exclusions can be provided in national legislation. This is also the position adopted
in the case of the Birmingham Northern Relief Road case, where it was argued that the 1992
Regulations had incorrectly transposed the 1990 Directive, since it was considered that it was
disproportionate with the aim of the Directive to provide for mandatory exemptions and not leave
any room for discretion. Sullivan J. ruled that the 1992 Regulations by distinguishing between
information which is capable of being treated as confidential and information which must be so
treated, incorporated a measure of flexibility and this was a proportionate response to the Directive
requirements. This justification is an elliptic one, though it seems to be in conformity with the
wording of the 1990 Directive and so is correct. 520
Similarly, the FOIA 2000 also provides that for some categories of information, public
authorities have no discretion to disclose but have to refuse the request. Section 2 of the FOIA 2000
distinguishes the exemptions to disclosure into two categories: absolute exemptions and
exemptions where the public interest in disclosure has to be weighted against the public interest in
secrecy. Absolute exemptions cover, broadly speaking information accessible to the applicant by
other means; information supplied by, or relating to, bodies dealing with security matters; court
records; parliamentary privilege; information which can prejudice to effective conduct of public
affairs by the House of Lords or the Commons; personal information; information provided in
confidence and information prohibited from disclosure by an enactment or whose disclosure would
constitute contempt of court.S2JAll other exemptions are discretionary ones and public authorities
have to apply a balance test before refusing disclosure under them.
519 See inter alia Bakkenist, above n. 311, at p. 83.
520 Also, Lee and Abbot indicate that under the 1990 Environmental Information Directive member states are
under no explicit obligation to provide for a balance test between competing interests. Maria Lee and Carolyn
Abbot, 'The Usual Suspects? Public Participation under the Aarhus convention?' [2003] M.L.R. 80, at p. 90.
521 For more details, see Birkinshaw, op. cit.
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Consequently, in the FOIA and the 2004 Regulations, a similar balance test is used.
However, the regulations make this harm test relevant to all exemptions to disclosure, whereas the
FOIA provides for some mandatory exemptions.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIn these cases in the FOIA 2000, it can be said
that the balance test has already been struck in favour of secrecy by the legislator. Also, the FOIA
does not contain a presumption in favour of disclosure, neither does it provide that disclosure
cannot be refused when emissions are concerned. On the contrary, when the balance test is applied
under the FOIA, any prejudice is sufficient to prevent disclosure, as there is no requirement for the
prejudice to be serious, significant or substantial. Thus, it can be safely concluded that the new
Regulations are far more liberal that the FOIA 2000. When the Government initiated the public
consultation on the Regulations, it announced that it would try as far as possible to align the
Regulations to the FOIA 2000. However, it seems that it is the FOIA that needs now to be modified
in view of the more liberal provisions of the Regulations. Paraphrasing the Government, 'there is
no need to treat environmental information in any respect more favourably than other
information' .522zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
4) Appeal and review procedures.
The question that arises here is what appeal or review procedures or both, are open to
people requesting access to environmental information and either receive no answer at all or
receive a dissatisfactory answer. Preliminarily, the difference between appeal and review has to be
made clear, since it is important to determine which of these two different proceedings exist when
difficulties concerning disclosure of environmental information arise. There are mainly two
fundamental differences between appeal and review proceedings.i"
The first difference concerns the power of the courts. In appeals proceedings the court has
the power tozyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAsubstitute its decision for that of the body appealed from. On the contrary, in review
proceedings, the court can normally only quash the decision and direct the body that took the
original decision to reconsider the matter either from the beginning of the decision making process
or only in accordance with the findings of the court, 524
522 The stated aim of the Government in drafting the new Environmental Information Regulations is: 'In
addition to meeting our obligations under the Aarhus Convention and draft Directive we have taken the
approach that access to environmental information must be on at least an equal footing with those aspects of
access to information available under the FOIA which are not addressed by the Convention or draft
Directive. There is no case for treating environmental information in any-respect less favourably than
other information. To make it easier and more practical for public authorities to adopt streamlined procedures
for supplying the information on request we have also aimed to minimise the number of areas where
differences may arise between FOIA and EIR. However, where a refusal is contemplated the public authority
will need to consider the exceptions under the appropriate regime'. See the New draft Environmental
InformationRegulations: Public consultation, DEFRA, July 2002, at paragraph 3.4.
523 See Peter Cane,zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAAn Introducti to Administrative Law, Clarendon Press, 3rd edition: Oxford 1996, pp. 8-zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
9.
524 However, CPR 54.19 introduces a new power for the Court to make the fresh decision itself, but only
when no purpose would be served in remitting the decision back.
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The second difference concerns the extent of the court's jurisdiction.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIn appeal proceedings,
the court will re-examine the merits of the decision, thus will exercise afresh the discretionary
powers that the body which made the original decision exercised in the first place. On the contrary,
in review proceedings the court will only examine the legality of the decision and will not re-
examine the merits of the initial decision. Judicial review proceedings are review proceedings and
usually proceedings before administrative tribunals are appeal proceedings.
It is fundamentally important to understand the difference between these two terms, since
the EC information Directive and the Aarhus Convention do not make it clear which of these two
procedures (or both) are intended when they provide for re-examination procedures by Courts or
other independent bodies.
The different procedures available in British law shall also be examined in detail. It shall
also be examined whether third-parties (these would be people whose interests would be affected if
requested information was to be disclosed) have any rights to appeal against a decision to disclose
and thus prevent the circulation of information that would affect any of their interests such as
privacy or commercial secrecy.
Finally, we shall also examine whether criminal law is of any relevance when access to
environmental information rules are at stake.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
a) Possible procedures: is there a choice between a
judicial or an administrative procedure?
The first question to ask is whether there is a choice between various re-examination
procedures for the applicant to choose from and what obligations are imposed byzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAsupranational
legal instruments in this regard.
i) The Aarhus Convention
The Aarhus Convention gives states parties a choice between adopting judicial or
administrative re-examination procedures.f" Such procedures have to be implemented whenever
the applicant considers that the response received is inadequate or when he believes that the request
was otherwise not dealt with in accordance with the relevant provisions establishing access to
environmental information. The Convention makes compulsory for parties to establish by law at
least one appeal procedure, though they can freely choose which one. However, if a judicial re-
examination procedure is provided, then parties have also the obligation to provide for an
alternative mechanism for "reconsideration" which has to be "expeditious" and "inexpensive". This
requirement aims to remedy the greatest disadvantages of using the courts system, namely delays
525 All provisions on appeal procedures concerning the right to access environmental information can be
found at paragraph 1 of article 9.
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and costS.526 As long as three requirements are met, inexpensiveness, expeditiousness and
establishment by law, any administrative procedure is acceptable under the Convention. This could
be a re-examination by an administrative tribunal, by a higher public authority, by an Ombudsman
or even possibly by the same authority.
There is a controversy, however, on whether the Convention allows for administrative
"reconsideration" to be carried out by the same public authority that made the initial decision, or if
it should be another administrative body or tribunal. SteczyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAet al. interpret this provision as allowing
the "reconsideration" to be carried out by the same body in order to ensure its accuracy.f"
However, Wilsher'" argues that since sub-paragraph 3 of paragraph 1 of article 9 provides that
final decisions (by a judicial or administrative body) should be binding on the public authority
holding the information, reconsideration by the same public authority has to be excluded, since a
body cannot be said to truly bind itself as a matter of law. Thus, he thinks that administrative
review proceedings can only be performed by another public authority than the one which made the
decision. However, this is a misinterpretation of the wording of this sub-paragraph which speaks
about "final decisions". Only such decisions have to be binding, thus a party is free to provide for a
reconsideration by the same body that made the decision as long as it provides for another re-
examination procedure at a higher level (either administrative or judicial) which would have to be
binding. The above interpretation presumes that 'reconsideration' looks at merits, while "re-
examination" seems to be a matter oflaw.
As long as the form (oral or written) of the outcome of any judicial or administrative
appeal procedure is concerned, the Convention seems to leave it to the national legislators to
decide. It only imposes that if the appeal fails, reasons for refusals shall be stated in writing.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
ii)zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAThe 2003 Environmental Information Directive.
Directive 90/313IEEC provided in its article 4 that people facing refusals or delays in
accessing environmental information could ask for a "judicial or administrative review of the
decision in accordance with the relevant national legal system". This provision clearly left the
choice to each member-state to choose between administrative or judicial or even both
reconsideration proceedings.
The 2003 directive, heavily inspired from the equivalent provisions of Aarhus, provides
that member states are to provide both for an administrative and a judicial reconsideration
procedure.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIn its article 6, paragraph 1, it is provided that members of the public have to be able to
challenge the acts or the omissions of the public authority concerned either by applying to the same
or to a different public authority for reconsideration, or by applying to an independent and impartial
body. On top of these possibilities, paragraph 2 of the same article provides that members of the
public have access to a review procedure before either a court of law or another independent and
526 See D. Wilsher, above D. 304, at p. 687.
527 See Stec et al., above D. 97, at p. 127.
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impartial body established by law. Paragraph 3 also provides that final decisions made under
paragraph 2 shall be binding on the public authority holding the information and that when any
appeals (either judicial or administrative) are refused, reasons shall be stated in writing. These
provisions even if more detailed than in the 1990 Directive, have, correctly, been criticised by
Hallo as omitting to include sanctions for improper refusals and'procedural details on relevant court
proceedings such as provisions on cost-recovery.i"zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
b) The scope of the re-examination procedures.
The most difficult question that has to be answered when re-examination procedures are
concerned, is the extent of the jurisdiction of the reviewing body: can the reviewing body or court
examine the merits of the decision and if so can it substitute its decision to the original one? Thus
have re-examination procedures to be appeals, in the sense described above, or mere reviews?zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
i) The Aarhus Convention
As far as the Aarhus Convention is concerned, when it mentions in its article 9 paragraph 1
judicial proceedings, the Convention speaks aboutzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA"a review procedure before a court of law".
Concerning administrative proceedings the Convention speaks about "reconsideration by a public
authority or review by an independent and impartial body other than a court of law". From these
wordings it is not clear whether what is meant is an appeal or a review, as we have defined these
terms at the beginning. Thus, since article 22 of the convention provides that both the English, the
French and the Russian text of the convention are equally authentic, these versions shall be
examined .. Concerning administrative proceedings, the French version of the Convention speaks
about "un recours devant une instancejudiciaire". This is in conformity with the English version,
thus it does not indicate the extent of the review powers of the court of law. Concerning
administrative proceedings the Convention speaks about "du reexamen de la demande par une
autorite publique ou de son examen par un organe independant et impartial autre qu'une instance
judiciaire", This is somehow different from the English version, since the French text speaks about
a re-examination ("reexamen")when the English texts mentions "reconsideration", and examination
("examen") instead of "review" in the English version. The use of the words review and recours
when judicial proceedings are concerned, seems to indicate that a review limited on points of law
should be enough. Also the use of words review and examen when procedures in front of
independent and impartial bodies (thus implying some sort of administrative tribunal) means that
for these proceedings too, a review limited on points of law should be enough. On the contrary, the
S28 See D. Wilsher, above n. 304, at p. 688.
S29 See above n. 201, at p. 11.
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merits have to be considered when reconsideration by a public authority is involved, since the
words reconsideration andzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAreexamen are used.
Consequently, this seems to indicate that under Aarhus, judicial review (thus a control
limited to legal grounds of challenge) carried out by an administrative tribunal or a court of law
seems to be enough. Only when reconsideration has to be undertaken by a public authority other
than a tribunal or a court of law, then this procedure has to review the merits. However this literal
interpretation implies that the drafters of Aarhus wanted to address the problem of the scope of the
reconsideration proceedings. It seems more likely that this was not intended, since otherwise it
would have been clearly stated.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIt seems hat the only aim of the drafters of article 9 was to provide
for a cheap, expeditious and binding administrative reconsideration procedure, without dealing
with the scope of this procedure.
In any case, article 9 of the Aarhus Convention is strangely drafted. This is presumably the
result of trying to fit various legal systems. This poses problem in a common-law context (such as
Britainj'" where the usual judicial remedy available against decisions of public authorities (that is
judicial review) is limited to matters of law and does not extend on issues of merits. On the
contrary, in continental legal systems, judicial review of administrative action can sometimes go on
the merits.":
ii) The 2003 Environmental Information Directive.
This controversy is maintained in article 6 of the new Environmental Information
Directive, which is equally strangely drafted, for the same reasons. The issue of the scope of review
is not directly answered. The Directive uses the term "reconsidered" when it refers to
administrative reviews.i" whereas the term "reviewed" is used when appeals to courts or tribunals
are referred to.533No safe conclusion can be drawn from these words but "reconsideration" would
suggest merits and "review" law. Again the problem is that the Directive, as with the Aarhus
Convention, is trying to cater for various legal systems and this leads to confusion and uncertainty
of terminology.
iii) Human Rights cases
As we analyse elsewhere in this work, under certain circumstances, a right to access
environmental information might arise under the European Convention on Human Rights. In this
case, where there is a fundamental right to access environmental information, the traditional limited
grounds of judicial review are insufficient and have to extend to proportionality issues and thus to
the merits of cases.
530 But this is equally true for Ireland, Malta and Cyprus, which are EC states with common law legal
systems.
531 This usually depends on the subject matter before the court. For instance, in France in cases involving
civil liberties and property issues, the merits of a decision will always be considered.
532 In art. 6 par. 1. The French term used is reexamines.
533 In art. 6 par. 1 and par. 2. The French terms used are recours administratif'easi reexaminer.
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More specifically, the ECtHR in the recent case ofzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAHatton and Others v. UK 534 which
concerns a breach of article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights due to disturbance
caused to the family life of people living near Heathrow airport due to the noise of night flights,
held that judicial review is not a sufficiently effective remedy when Convention rights are
involved, due to its limited scope of review of the proportionality balance struck by public
authorities. This case suggests that normal judicial review in not an effective remedy for assessing
Convention rights. 535 Consequently, when a right to access environmental information arises under
the European Convention, it seems that public authorities will have to strike a proportionate
balance and this in tum can now reviewed by the courts.i"zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
c) Reconsideration by the public authority to which the
initial request for information was made.
The new Environmental Information Regulations 2004 have made the choice to provide
both for an administrative appeal and a judicial one, by reference to the enforcement provisions of
the FOIA 2000 which apply for the purposes of the Regulations subject to some alterations."?
However, the regulations make compulsory for any person that has made a request to access
environmental information and thinks that the public authority has violated the Regulations, before
initiating any other appeal proceedings, to make representations to the same public authority to
which his initial request for information was made.l" This is a kind of early reconsideration by the
body that just made the initial decision.
Regulation 11 provides that public authorities to which representations are made by any
person who feels that his request to access information was not dealt in accordance with the
regulations, are in a duty to consider these representations. They have to decide whether they have
complied with the requirements of the Regulations as soon as possible and at the latest within 40
working days from the day of the representations were made. Representations are to be made in
writing and no later than 40 days after the applicant feels the public authority has failed to comply
with the Regulations. The regulations also provide that the public authority concerned, when it
finds that it has not complied with the requirements of the Regulations, has to indicate to the
applicant what was its failure to comply and what remedy the authority has decided to take in that
534 Hatton and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2110/2001, application n. 36022/97, (2003) 37 EHRR 28.
535 On this point see Christopher Hancock, Hang in the Balance, Estates Gazette, 19 January 2002, p. 122.
Also Michael Purdue, Current Topics, [2002] JPL 255.
536 About the increased review of administrative decisions in cases involving human rights, going farther than
the 'classic English public law concepts' of irrationality, illegality and procedural impropriety, see R. (on the
application of Daly) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 2 WLR 1622 and also R. (on the
application of Prolife Alliance) v BBC [2002] EWCA Civ 297 (CA). Also Ben Pontin, Human Rights and
Judicial Review (editorial), ELM 13 [2001] 5.
537 According to reg. 18(3).
538 According to reg. 18( 1).
173
respect and in which time frame this remedy will be implemented.?" It is not specified what this
remedy shall be, but it can safely be assumed that in most cases it would be the disclosure of the
requested information, which has been partially or totally withheld.
Regulation 18 makes it clear that if representations have not been made, any further
appeals to the Information Commissioner are impossible.?" The same regulation provides that any
person who believes that the public authority, to which representations have been made, either has
failed to accept within the 40 working days limit that it has not abided by the requirements of the
Regulations can further appeal to the Information Commissioner. Even if the public authority has
accepted that it has breached the regulations but has failed to remedy the breach then an appeal to
the Commissioner is also possible.
There is also a danger of a person waiting too long before appealing to the Commissioner.
The Commissioner could then dismiss his appeal on the grounds of s. 50(2)(b) of the FOIA 2000,
which provides that the Commissioner can decline to consider a complaint when there has been
"undue delay" in making the application to him. All this uncertainty would have been avoided if
the regulations had provided for a certain time limit for making applications to the Commissioner,
starting either 40 days after the public authority has answered to the representations it has received,
or in cases where no answer at all has been given starting after the 40 working days period the
public authority has in order to answer has lapsed. A reasonable time-period for making
applications to the Commissioner could have been 40 days, the same period that is granted to
people for making representations to public authorities.
A final issue that arises is whether it is very useful in practice to provide for the
reconsideration of a refusal by the same body that issued it. Wouldn't the authority stand by its
original decision in most cases? Thus, wouldn't this be just an unnecessary bureaucratic burden for
the applicant that wants his case heard by an independent and impartial body? The Lord
Chancellor's Code of Practice on the discharge of public authorities' functions under the FOIA
2000 tries to address this issue"! by providing that internal complaints procedures should be clear,
prompt and not unnecessarily bureaucratic and it should be possible to reverse or otherwise amend
decisions previously taken.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIt is also provided that a person who was not a party to the original
decision should handle the review, and if this is not possible (for example in a very small public
authority), the circumstances should be explained to the applicant. If the initial decision was taken
by someone in a position where a review cannot realistically be undertaken (for example a
Minister), the Code asks the public authority to consider whether to waive the internal review
procedure so that the applicant is free to approach the Commissioner directly.
539 At reg. 11(5).
540 However, as we shall see further on, the Commissioner is given discretion to entertain an appeal even if
the available internal review procedures have not been exhausted.
541 The Draft Code of Practice on environmental information mirrors theseprovisions.
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d) The Information CommissionerzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
i)zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAPo ers and competences of the Information Commissioner
The UK Information Commissioner is an independent authority reporting directly to the
UK Parliament, which enforces and oversees the Data Protection Act 1998 and the Freedom of
Information Act 2000.542 In order for the Commissioner to provide an integrated and coherent
approach concerning all aspects of information handling by public authorities, his supervisory role
has been extended to environmental information by virtue of regulation 18 of the Environmental
Information Regulations 2004. This extension of his jurisdiction was expressly provided by the
Freedom of Information Act 2000, which mentions in s. 74(4)(d) that regulations made in order to
implement the Aarhus Convention may in particular provide that the Information Commissioner
and the Information Tribunal (on this Tribunal seezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAinfra) may be made competent in relation to
compliance with any requirements of the regulations.
The status, capacity and tenure of the Commissioner and other miscellaneous matters on
this institution are dealt with in part I of Schedule 5 to the Data Protection Act 1998. The
Information Commissioner is appointed for 5 years by the Queen by letter patent but he is not a
servant or an agent of the Crown.l" The Information Commissioner is given several functions in
order to supervise the correct application of the Regulations, which are the exact equivalent of the
functions granted to the Commissioner under the Freedom of Information Act.
Firstly, under regulation 16(5) which refers to s. 47 of the FOIA, the Commissioner has a
duty to promote good practice concerning the operation and the application of the Regulations. He,
in particular, can make any promotional campaign with a view to disseminate to the public
information about the operation and any other matters concerning the regulations. He is also
granted the possibility to give advice to any person about any aspect of the Regulations, thus
making him also an advisory body. 544
Also, under regulation 16 the Secretary of State may issue a Code of Practice providing
guidance to public authorities on the application of the Regulations. The Commissioner has to be
542 For a broad description of the powers of the Commissioner under the Data Protection Act, see Rowan
Middleton and Christopher Rees, 'Enforcement Of, And Sanctions For Breaching, The Data Protection Act',
Privacy and Data Protection 2.2(3). The Commissioner also oversees disclosure of Information under the
Telecommunications (Data Protection and Privacy) Regulations 1999 (SI 1999/2093) as amended. He has
also some minor powers in relation to the Public Records Act 1958.
543 According to Par. 1(2) of Sched. 5 Part I to the Data Protection Act 1998 which indicates that: "The
Commissioner and his officers and staff are not to be regarded as servants or agents of the Crown."
544 Also, under section 52(1) of the Data Protection Act 1998 and section 49(1) of the Freedom of
Information Act 2000 the Commissioner each year has to make an annual report to the House of Commons
and to the House of Lords concerning the exercise of his functions under the Regulations. He is also granted
the possibility to lay other reports concerning his functions, as he thinks appropriate. The commissioner also
deals in his report about access to environmental information. See for an example the Information
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consulted before this Code is adopted or amended. This provision thus makes the Commissioner azyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
consultative body. By reference to s. 48 of the FOIA, regulation 16(5) also makes the
Commissioner an enforcing body in regard of these Codes of Practice, since it provides that the
Commissioner can make recommendations to specific public authorities ("practice
recommendations") if he finds that the Codes of Practice aren't correctly applied. Practice
recommendations ought to include the steps that have to be taken so as to conform to the Codes of
Practice. These recommendations are not mandatory for the public authorities, which is evident
since the Codes of Practice aren't binding legal instruments.i" These provisions might seem of a
technical nature, but they are very important since they demonstrate a radical change from what
was in place before. Under the old Regulations, each body was free to make its own practical
arrangements for the procedural details of access, when on the contrary now these details will be
specified by the central government for all public authorities at all levels.
However, the Regulations are mandatory, and thus if the Commissioner considers that any
public authority has failed to correctly comply with any of its obligations arising under them, he
can issue a mandatory decision (an "enforcement notice,,)546in which he specifies the steps that the
authority has to take so that the public authority conforms to its obligations. This enforcement
notice must also mention a deadline during which the authority must conform to it, and must also
mention particulars of the suspensive appeal procedure available against it in front of the
Information Tribunal.
Apart from these secondary powers, the most important functions of the Commissioner are
his decision powers in relation to applications made to him by people having previously made
requests of information to public authorities and believing their right to information has been
declined. The most important aspect of these procedures is that he can substitute his decision for
that of the public authority.
Indeed, in accordance with s. 50 of the FOIA 2000, the Commissioner may answer to such
complaint by making a decision (a "decision notice") either dismissing the complaint or specifying
the steps that the public authority has to take in order to comply with the regulations (this would
normally be a decision to disclose). The Commissioner may also refuse to make a decision if the
applicant did not exhaust the complaint procedures offered to him by the Code of Practice enacted
by the Secretary of State and also if the request is vexatious or frivolous.l" has been withdrawn or
abandoned, or if there has been undue delay'" in making the application.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
Commissioner's Annual Report ..and Accounts for the year ending 31 March 2004, London: The Stationery
Office, 2004, HC669, available at: http://www.official-documents.co.ukJreps/ic/index.html
545See Stanley, above n. 608, at p. 36-65.
546Provided for by reg. 18 and s. 52 of the FOIA 2000.
547On the definition of 'frivolous' and 'vexatious' requests, see above on the reasons justifying rejection of
refusals of requests to access information. The same definitions could be used as with frivolous or vexatious
requests to information.
548See about a criticism of the lack of a certain specific period of time for bringing complaints, supra.
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When a complaint has been made to the Commissioner and he considers that he needs
more details from the public authority, he can issue a decision asking for further information (an
"information notice") so that the Commissioner can determine the complaint. This notice must
mention a deadline for compliance, and must also mention the suspensive appeal procedures in
front of the Information Tribunal. The Commissioner is freezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAtu use this pr cedure in or er to ask
any information the public authority holds even if it is exempt, so as to test whether the exemption
that might be claimed by the public authority applies. Public authorities are obliged to comply with
this information notice, except in respect of information covered by professional legal privileges
concerning matters connected with the Regulations and proceedings arising under them.i"
In addition to these powers, the Commissioner is granted powers of entry and inspection
whenever a circuit judge can be persuaded that there are reasonable grounds for believing that a
public authority has failed to comply with any of the requirements of the Regulations or to the
requirements in a notice issued by him and also that evidence of such a failure is to be found on
certain premises. Schedule 3 to the FOIA,550provides how circuit judges are to issue such warrants
allowing the Commissioner using reasonable force to enter and search the premises and to inspect
and seize almost any evidence'" that would prove the grounds on which the warrant was issued. As
analysed below, it is a criminal offence for any person to obstruct the execution of such warrants.
Finally, as analysed below, the Regulations provide by reference to the FOIA that the
Commissioner's notices are to be treated as orders of the High Court and enforced by contempt of
Court proceedings.
To sum up, it is interesting to note that the Commissioner is the primary method used to
enforce the Regulations and in fact forms a specialised first instance tribunal. This interpretation is
consistent with the fact that the Commissioner is included in the lists of Tribunals on which the
Council on Tribunals has supervisory powers concerning their constitution and working under the
Tribunal and Inquiries ActzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA1992.SS2 As such, the Commissioner would probably have to apply the
procedural requirements of article 6 of the ECHR. In this respect, Stanley'" considers that the fact
that the Commissioner when making decisions concerning disclosure of controversial information,
can actually issue an information notice so as to get hold of the information, might pose a problem
of unfairness in human right terms since he might be unable to show L'1einformation requested to
the applicant. He contends that to overcome this unfairness the Commissioner ought to seek the
applicants consent before seeking information he might be unable to disclose and in any case to
allow the applicant to comment on it by disclosing as much as is not exempt. However, even if
549According to s. 51(5) of the FOIA 2000.
550To which reg. 18(4) of the 2004 Regulations refer.
55!Information relating to professional legal privilege concerning matters arising under the Regulations are
exempt by virtue of Schedule 3 to the FOIA 2000.
552Both the Information Tribunal and the Information Commissioner are supervised by the Council on
Tribunals concerning their constitution and working, following the Tribunal and Inquiries Act 1992, as
amended.
553See above n. 608, at p. 36-61.
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such measures would be useful in preventing any challenges based on article 6 or natural justice
principles, they would result in delays in the procedure, when the Directive speaks about an
expeditious procedure. In any case they are unnecessary, since it does not appear to be a breach of
the fair trial requirement for the Commissioner to access information which could not be further
disclosed to the applicant as being covered by an exemption. On the contrary, the Commissioner
might be better equipped to issue a fair decision if he is fully aware of the contentious information
and can thus determinezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAin concret whether the public authority was right to refuse disclosure on
grounds of one of the exemptions. This would seem to be a better illustration of the fair trial
requirement than completely preventing the Commissioner from accessing exempt information.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
inzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAThe Ministerial veto
Under the FOIA and the 2004 Regulations there is one exception to the obligation of public
authorities to comply with an enforcement or decision notice requiring them to disclose
information falling under any exemption. Section 53 of the Act creates a power of veto of the
Information Commissioner's enforcement and decision notices by an accountable person, normally
a Minister.l" justified by the fact that Ministers better understand the public interest and are
accountable to Parliament for the exercise of such political judgments.i" This power can be
exercised through the issue of a certificate if the person issuing the certificate has on reasonable
grounds formed the opinion that, in respect of the request to which the certificate relates, the
authority has not failed to comply with its obligations. The effect of the certificate is that the public
authority need not comply with the Commissioner's decision to disclose information, since once
the Certificate is issued the Commissioner's decision 'shall cease to have effect'. 556 The only
safeguard that is provided, is that a copy of the certificate has to be laid before each House of
Parliament, or the appropriate devolved Assembly, as soon as is practicable after it is issued, and if
the Commissioner's decision was made after a complaint, the complainant has to be informed of
the Certificate and be given reasons. This veto power can be exercised up to 20 working days after
the Commissioner's decision or enforcement notice has been given to the public authority.?" It can
also be exercised 20 working days after the Information Tribunal has determined an appeal against
554 These 'accountable persons' are strictly designated by s. 53(8) as the First Minister and deputy First
Minister in Northern Ireland acting jointly (for Northern Ireland authorities), the Assembly First Secretary of
the National Assembly for Wales (for Welsh authorities) and a Minister of the Crown who is a member of the
Cabinet, the Attorney General, the Advocate General for Scotland or the Attorney General for Northern
Ireland (in relation to any other public authority).zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIt has been suggested that since in this instance there is
clear parliamentary intention that the concerned Minister or senior public official has to exercise personal
judgement on the matter, under the Carltona principle (Carltona Ltd v Commissioners of Works and Others
[1943] 2 All ER 560), further delegations of this power are not permissible. See Stanley, above n. 608, at p.
36-64.
555 According to Nigel Johnson, The Freedom of Information Act 2000, [2001] 151 N.L.J. 1030.
556 According to s. 53 of the FOIA 2000.
557 According to s. 53(2) and 53(4)(a) of the FOIA 2000.
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the Commissioner's decision notice or enforcement notice, or after that appeal has been
withdrawn.l" Thus, this last provision allows the executive to first exhaust all possible remedies
and if, in the end, the Information Tribunal finds against the public authority, to bypass this judicial
decision by issuing a section 53 Ministerial Certificate!
Of course, it should be noted that there is nothing in the FOIA that would prevent the
Commissioner or the complainant concerned to bring an action for non-statutory judicial review of
the Ministerial certificate arguingzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAWedne bury unreasonableness.i" However, it is still doubtful
that this veto power of Ministers would be compatible with the fair trial requirements of article 6 of
the EClIR, if it was exercised after the Information Tribunal had rendered its decision, because in
that case the executive would be directly interfering with ajudicial decision.t'"
This veto power, according to the FOIA 2000, only applies for information held by
Government departments, the National Assembly for Wales and any other public authority
designated for this purpose by the Lord Chancellor by an order subject to affirmative approval of
Parliament. Thus, under the FOIA 2000 this power of veto is limited to mainly information held by
Central Government.
Although the draft 2002 Environmental Information Regulations did not contain any such
limitation to the mandatory nature of the Commissioner's decisions, the Environmental Information
Regulations 2004, not only contain this veto power of Ministers at reg. 18(8), but go further than
the FOIA, by providing that it applies to information held byzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAany public authority under these
Regulations. This is the only example where the Regulations are less liberal than the FOIA. It is
indeed hard to understand the rationale for the all-encompassing extent of this provision, especially
since this veto power has been criticised as undermining the authority of the Information
Commissioner and eroding public confidence in the FOIA.561 Probably because the 2004
Regulations are so liberal, the Government wanted to be able to have the final decision in all cases,
by having the power to bypass the Information Commissioner and the Information Tribunal. This
seems to be a clear breach of art. 6 of the 2003 Directive, which provides for both an administrative
558 According to s. 53(2) and 53(4)(b) of the FOIA 2000.
559 The government during the passage of the Bill through Parliament acknowledged that this power of the
executive would be subject to judicial review. See Hansard, HL (series 5) vol 612, col 828 (20 April2000).
Lord Falconer of Thoronton indicated that: "It is important to note the limitations on this provision [... ].
First, this is not a general override of the commissioner's decisions; it app/ies only to decisions taken under
Clause 13. Secondly, the Minister must explain pub/icly why he has chosen to disagree with the
commissioner. Thirdly, the decision is subject to judicial review and the commissioner will have the locus to
seek such a review. Thus, this is not an easy provision for Ministers to use".
560 The ECtHR has interpreted article 6 par. 1 of the ECHR, which guarantees inter a/ia the right of access to
a court, as also requiring the enforcement of judicial decisions. The ECtHR has stated that a right of access to
the courts would be useless if the intemallegal system of a contracting state permitted a fmal and compulsory
court decision to remain without enforcement. See the ECtHR judgements of Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy,
28/07/1999, n. 22774/93, par. 63, Hornsby v. Greece, 19/03/1997, par. 40, and Antonetto v Italy (2003) 36
EHRR 10.
561 See p. 24 of the report of the Independent Review of Government Communications, chaired by Bob
Phillips, and commissioned by the government, published on January 19zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAth, 2004, in which it is recommended
that ministers should renounce the use of the ministerial veto under the Freedom of Information Act and
strengthen its key provisions. The report is available from:
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review and a judicial one. When this veto power is used, this veto decision would be a decision
refusing access to information, which should also be subject, according to art. 6( 1) of the 2003
Directive, to both a review in front of an administrative body and a judicial one, since the Minister
acts as a public authority refusing to provide information under the Regulations. It could not be
contended that in this situation the Minister acts as a sort of review body, as the applicant has not
appealed to him and he has no right to do so under the Regulations. Consequently, in this case,
because only the limited remedy of judicial review would be available, there seems to be a breach
of the 2003 Directive. This breach is even more evident if, as analysed above, Ministers exercise
their powers after the Information Tribunal has determined an appeal against the Commissioner's
decision, in which case the decision of the judicial body that is responsible for applying the
Regulations is simply overruled by the executive.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
e) The Information Tribunal - the National Security
Appeals Panel
The Information Tribunal, formerly the Data Protection Tribunal.t" is given competence
by reg. 18(8) of the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 by reference to Part V of the
FOIA to hear appeals against decisions of the Commissioner made under the Regulations, in the
exact same way as these appeals are possible against decisions made under the Freedom of
Information Act 2000.563
Both public authorities and complainants (thus people already having made a complaint to
the Commissioner as provided above) can appeal against decision notices of the Information
Commissioner. On the contrary, only public authorities can appeal to the Tribunal against
information or enforcement notices. This is consistent with the fact that only decision notices affect
the interests of complainants to the Commissioner, since they contain the opinion of the
Commissioner on whether the applicant is entitled or not to disclosure. In order to appeal, there is
not any requirement to seek leave to appeal and this has been criticised by Macdonald, as being a
way for public authorities to delay the disclosure of information which might prove embarrassing.
He argues that the appeal procedures should be kept as simple and informal a possible.i" However,
a requirement of having to seek permission to appeal, would in practice go to the opposite
http://www.gcreview.gov.ukinews/FinalReport.pdfzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
S62 By section 18(2) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000, the Data Protection Tribunal is now known as
the Information Tribunal. Also it should be noted that the Information Tribunal and also the Information
Commissioner are supervised 'by the Council on Tribunals concerning their constitution and working,
following the Tribunal and Inquiries Act 1992, as amended. The Information Tribunal was brought into
existence by the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Commencement No. I) Order 2001 (SI200111637).
563 Interestingly, in Re Ewing [2002] All ER (D) 350 (Dec), it was decided that the Information Tribunal does
have judicial characteristics and does exercise judicial functions by means of judicial procedures (as opposed
to exercising purely administrative functions), and as such it can properly be categorised as a court within the
meaning ofs. 42 (lA) of the Supreme Court Act 1981.
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direction, as it would increase the procedural steps necessary in order to bring an appeal, as
litigants would have to seek leave first, before appealing.
The grounds on which appeals are to be allowed are very wide and extend on all issues of
law and very importantly on all issues of policy, since the Tribunal has power to review the
exercise of discretion by the Commissioner. This means that it has full jurisdiction and the Tribunal
can allow the appeal and quash the notice, dismiss the appeal or even substitute its decision to the
notice of the Commissioner since it is also given power to review any relevant facts.
The relevant rules concerning the constitution and the procedure of the Tribunal are the
ones made under Schedule 6 to the Data Protection Act 1998565and are the Data Protection
Tribunal (Enforcement Appeals) Rules 2000.566We shall not analyse in detail these rules, though
some important features of them have to be mentioned. The rules provide that appeals have to be
brought within 28 days of the date on which the notice relating to the disputed decision was served
on or given to the appellant, except when special circumstances justify, to the Tribunal's discretion,
an extension.l" They also provide that the burden of proof that the disputed decision should be
upheld rests on the Commissioner only.568Moreover, they provide that, in principle, the Tribunal
determines appeals with hearings, though in certain circumstances it can decide not to do so,
usually when the parties waive this right.s69Additionally, other miscellaneous details are dealt with
such as summoning of witness etc.570Finally, it should be noted that the Information Tribunal is
composed of a chairman and an equal number of members representing those who make requests
for information and persons representing public authorities."! This ensures that the Tribunal is
well-qualified to decide on issues dealing with access to information.
To sum up, the Tribunal deals with matters arising under the Regulations in the same
manner as with matters under the Freedom of Information Act 2000. There is also a specific
procedure for appeals against National Security certificates by which Ministers of the Crown can
totally block disclosure, discussed before.i" These appeals are heard by a separate National
Security appeals panel of the Tribunal, members of which are designated and appointed especially
thzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAI 573by the Lord Chancellor to hear ese appea s.
564SeeMacdonald, below n. 578, at p. 879.
565To which section 61 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 refers for the details of proceedings in front
of the Tribunal.
566The Data Protection Tribunal (Enforcement Appeals) Rules 2000 (SIzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA2000/189), as amended by the




570For more details, see David Bainbridge,zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAData Protection Law, CLT Professional Publishing, 2000, pp.
230-245.
571According to s. 6(6) of the Data Protection Act 1998, as amended.
572A procedure regulated by the Data Protection Tribunal (National Security Appeals) Rules 2000, SI
2000/206. On these certificates see also above, n. 450.
573According to section 6(4) of the Data Protection Act 1998, in conjunction with Schedule 6 paragraph 2(1)
of the sameAct.
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However, the drafter of the Regulations, so keen to provide for the exact same procedures
as in the 2000 Act, overlooked one difficulty when environmental information is concerned: the
issue of the award of costs.
Under its rules of procedure the Tribunal may make an order awarding costs even when the
appeal has been withdrawn.f" The award can be against the appellant and in favour of the
Commissioner where it considers that the appeal was manifestly unreasonable, or the contrary
where it considers that the Commissioner's disputed decision was manifestly unreasonable.!" Also,
in situations where a party has been responsible for frivolous, vexatious, improper or unreasonable
action, or has failed to comply with a direction or has been responsible for delays which with
diligence could have been avoided, the Tribunal can award costs against that party and in favour of
the other.i" These awards can be either a specified sum in respect of the costs incurred by that
other party or parties in connection with the proceedings or the whole or part of such costs as taxed,
except if parties reach an agreement. Rule 25(4) finally provides that costs may be taxed in the
County Court according to such of the scales prescribed by the county court rules for proceedings
in it, as shall be directed by the order."?
These rules might sound reasonable when the Tribunal hears appeals in cases under the
Data Protection Act or the Freedom of Information Act but it can be contended that this poses
problem when environmental information is concerned. As analysed above, both the Aarhus
Convention and the Directive, prescribe in the same terms that administrative appeals proceedings
have to be either "free of charge or inexpensive". Although the term "inexpensive" can have
various meanings, its inclusion right after the phrase "free of charge" seems to indicate that the
intention of the drafters of Aarhus and the Directive was to indicate that if administrative
reconsideration procedures do not have to be free, they at least should be almost free of charge, so
as to prevent costs being a barrier to ordinary people bringing appeal proceedings.?" Thus, since
the Tribunal can award costs, which can be taxed in the County Courts, this might become very
expensive for unsuccessful appellants especially if the Commissioner is represented by professional
counsel and can lead to a breach of the above-mentioned EC requirement of inexpensiveness.f"
574 See above n. 566, Rule 25.
575 Costs can also be awarded if the decision challenged in the appeal has from the time the appeal was
lodged been withdrawn. See the appeal ofzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAMohamed al Fayed v The Secretary of State for the Home
Department and the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2002] dated 28/2/2002,
unreported. This decision was made by the Information tribunal under the specific rules for national security
appeals, however its findings, exclusively concerning costs, can be applied mutatus mutandis to regular
a~peals. Available at http://www.dca.gov.ukIfoilalfayedfm.pdf '
5 6 This provision is not something new, but is similar for instance to award of costs in planning appeals to
the Secretary of State against refusals to grant planning permission. See Victor Moore, Apractical approach
to Planning Law, Oxford University Press, 8th edition 2002, pp. 400-401.
577 The Sheriff Court in Scotland. Rule 25(5).
578 Macdonald and Jones suggest that it is cost that is responsible for the small number of cases concerning
the 1990 Regulations. See John Macdonald and Clive H Jones, The Law of Freedom of Information, Oxford
University Press, 2003, at p. 505.
579 As an example, £300 per hour for legal fees have been considered as. "not excessive." Even if this case
concerned a clinical negligence case and the judge stressed these rates should not be taken as the norm in
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However, this problem might be avoided by a constructive interpretation of these rules of
procedures by the Tribunal itself. Since these rules grant a discretion to the Tribunal to award costs
against the individuals when appeals are "manifestly unreasonable", the Tribunal could rule that no
appeal is manifestly unreasonable when made under the Environmental Information Regulations or
consistently refuse to award costs. However, such a policy-based approach would not in itself be
considered a correct transposition of the inexpensive requirement of the Directive, since it's not
legally binding and certain. Also, in itself it would be illegal as being a failure to exercise the
power to exercise discretion. The prospect of not only having to pay your own costs.l" but also an
uncertain amount for the other side's fees, can be a real deterrent and would sabotage the aim of the
Directive which is to at least open up administrative reconsideration mechanisms to everyone
irrespective of their wealth.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
f) Judicial review proceedings
We shall not enter into the details of judicial review proceedings, which is the judicial
remedy that will have to be sought by applicants aiming at either accessing information which is
denied to them or at blocking disclosure.
Judicial review proceedings can either be statutory, when expressly provided for under a
statute against specific decisions provided for in the statute or non-statutory against any action or
omission of public bodies. When statutory judicial review or other remedies are available, then
applications for judicial review are in principle refused for non-exhaustion of alternative remedies,
as judicial review is intended to be a remedy of the last or only resort. 581 In judicial review
proceedings relating to decisions of whether disclosure should be allowed or not, it seems that the
judicial review remedies that could be of any relevance would be either quashing orders or
mandatory orders. It should be noted that as held in thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBABirmingham Northern Relief road case, the
Court ruled that even if the reasons given for a refusal to provide information are found to be
erroneous or inadequate, the Court is not bound to quash the refusal decision, but has discretion to
accept different reasons and to decide whether they are justified.l"
other cases, this example is significant of the high amount of costs awarded by English courts when legal fees
are finally taxed. See '£ 300 per hour for legal fees "not excessive'" [2003] N.L.J. 31 January 2003, p. 116.
580zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIt should be noted that legal aid is obtainable for appearances in tribunals or inquiries if this has either a
significant wider public interest or has overwhelming importance to the person concerned and if legal
representation is the only adequate way of establishing the facts and presenting the case. However, these
grounds for the grant of legal aid are undoubtedly restricted. See mutatus mutandis Angus Murdoch,
"Gypsies and planning appeals: the right to a fair and impartial hearing" [2002] JPL 1056.
581 See inter alia, Cane above n.523, at p. 83.
582 See below, 586, Sullivan J. stated: 'Even though the reasons given are acknowledged to have been
erroneous, and I would have regarded them as inadequate even if they had been correct, I do not consider that
I am bound to adopt the approach in Ermakov and quash the Secretary of State's decision in any event. I am
entitled to have regard to the reasons now advanced in Mrs Dixon's affidavit, and it is for me to decide
183
For Wilsher.i" the "binding" appeal decision requirement of the Aarhus Convention poses
problem to British judicial review proceedings when quashing orders are made, since for himzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
"quashing orders are binding only in a narrow sense". He contends such orders are not binding in
the Convention sense, since the public authority must only go and think again and make a new
decision. This argument is totally unconvincing, since although the result of a quashing order is
that the public authority can reconsider the matter afresh, it cannot decide differently on matters
decided in the Court's ratio decidendi. For instance, if the court quashed a decision to refuse
disclosure based on an incorrect application of a legal requirement, the public authority is bound by
the Court's interpretation and cannot persist on a different interpretation of what is res judicatai"
The Environmental Information Regulations 1992 did not expressly provide for any kind of
judicial remedy and thus the only available remedy (apart from actions in tort and claims to
Ombudsmen, which in any case could not legally compel public authorities to disclose information)
was non-statutory judicial review.l" Even though these regulations had been in place for more than
a decade, their application has only lead to five judicial review cases having been litigated in the
High Court and none in the Court of Sessions or the High Court of Northern Ireland.l" Such a
small amount of court decisions, in a period of time when there was no other enactment providing
for a general right to access information,"? can show one of two things. Either that the Regulations
have been correctly assimilated and applied by public bodies, thus resulting in small number of
disputes, or that the costs and length of bringing judicial review proceedings taken in conjunction
with their uncertain nature and the prospect of having to pay unlimited costs to the defendant if the
action fails, deter any potential claimants. There can be no certain answer to this question in the
absence of any precise empirical research on this subject, though the vast criticism of the
Regulations for only providing for judicial review proceedings seems to indicate that the second
whether they are justified, in the light of the factual material available to the court' [1999] Env. L.R. 447 at p.
469.
583 Ibid.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
584 According to s 31(5) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 "If, on an application for judicial review seeking an
order of certiorari, the High Court quashes the decision to which the application relates, the High Court may
remit the matter to the court, tribunal or authority concerned, with a direction to reconsider it and reach a
decision in accordance with the fmdings of the High Court".
585 According to the UK government there was also a possibility of civil law actions, although there has never
been any such cases. In any case the payment of damages could not result in a public authority being legally
forced to disclose information it wanted to keep secret. See infra.
586 These figures only cover reported cases but include applications to leave. These cases are:
Maile v Wigan MBC [2001] JPL 193;zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
R v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions Ex p. Alliance Against the
Birmingham Northern Relief Road (No.1) [1999] JPL 231;
R. v Tower Hamlets LBC Ex p. Tilly [1996] Env. L.R. D23, [1996] 6(6) PELB 45;
R. v British Coal Corp Ex p. Ibsiock Building Products Ltd [1995] Env. L.R. 277;
R. v. The Secretary of State for the Environment Transport and Regions Ex p. Anthony Marson, 23 March
1998, CO/911/98 (unreported application for leave).
587 Also, the regulations implicitly repeal any common law right of access to environmental information, as
held by Jowitt J. in R. v. The Secretary of State for the Environment Transport and Regions Ex p. Anthony
Marson: 'They [the Environmental Information Regulations] take over from and replace any common law
duty of disclosure which might otherwise have related to the information covered by them.' See above, n.
586.
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answer is more probable.l" Also, it shouldn't be overlooked that judicial review proceedings are
lengthy, and usually having to wait sometimes up to 18 months for a decision might discourage the
commencing of'proceedings.l" This is problematic, since when a Minister exercises his veto power
under s. 53 of the FOIA, as analysed before, then the only possible remedy is non-statutory judicial
review.
The new Environmental Information Regulations do provide for specific grievance
procedures through the Commissioner and the Tribunal. Section 59 of the FOIA provides that an
appeal on points of law lies from decisions of the Tribunal to the High Court by any party to the
appeal to the Tribunal.i" A further appeal lies from the High Court to the Court of Appeal.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
It is almost certain that when these remedies are available, then there is no non-statutory
remedy of judicial review and these procedures, namely first an appeal to the Information
Commissioner, then to the Information Tribunal and finally to the High Court, have to be followed.
However, when the Commissioner declines to examine a complaint based on one of the grounds
present in s. 50(2) (such as non-exhaustion of alternative complaints procedures, undue delay,
vexatious or frivolous or withdrawn or abandoned applications), then the only way of challenging
that decision would be by way of non-statutory judicial review, since these decisions are not
"decision notices" and thus cannot be challenged in front of the Tribunal."!
However, since the appeal procedures provided for by the Regulations are not available to
third parties aiming at blocking disclosure, the only way for them to block disclosure would be
through non-statutory judicial review proceedings (apart from civil law claims discussed
elsewhere). Third parties who could prove that their interests might be prejudiced by disclosure of
certain information, will seem to justify the sufficient interest test necessary to bring judicial
review proceedings against a decision to disclose made either by the public authority holding the
information or even the Commissioner or the Tribunal, in case disclosure is only granted after an
appeal against an initial refusal.
Also, an important issue is, since the Environmental Information Regulations provide for
an exception to disclosure of any information whose disclosure might be prejudicial to the
environment which it relates, who would justify the sufficient interest test in order to try and block
disclosure on this ground? It seems that in English law, the sufficient interest test is quite relaxed
for environmental interest groups that can show they have a genuine interest in the issues raised, as
588 Sometimes the costs of judicial review can be so high that they act as a real deterrent to even justified
claims and seem to breach the Aarhus Convention's requirement for reasonable costs in legal proceedings. A
possible solution could be that when leave is sought to bring a judicial review claim, an advance order of
costs is made for any litigants not eligible for legal aid so as to limit their potential liability to pay costs. See
Mcoracken Robert, 'Jones Gregory, The Aarhus Convention, [2003] JPL 802, at 806.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
S89 As analysed by the anonymous commentator of R. v. British Coal Corporation exparte. Ibstock Building
Products Limited, in [1995] Env. L.R. 277, ,... the major difficulty with such applications is the time spent in
between a request and the final judgment of the Court. Such a period (up tozyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAJ8 months) means th t the
information requested is very rarely going to be sufficiently important or urgent to justify commencing
~roceedings in thefirst place!'.
90 The Court of Sessions in Scotland, or the High Court of Northern Ireland in Northern Ireland.
591 See Stanley, above n. 608, at p. 36-59.
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held in the important precedent ofzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAR v Inspectorate of Pollution ex p. Greenpeace Ltd (no. 2).592 So,
it appears possible that such groups as Greenpeace could bring judicial review proceedings on this
ground so as tozyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAtry and block disclosures of information damaging to the environment. Also, the
Attorney-General himself could bring such actions since he has always standing in judicial review
proceedings as a guardian of the public interest.l"
A very important procedural issue that arises is in deciding an application for judicial
review against the refusal to disclose a confidential document, whether the judge is permitted to see
the confidential document without releasing it to the applicant. The question that arises is whether
in camera inspections of requested material in order to determine if it falls under the protection of
one of the exemptions are possible. This question is an impossible one, since on the one hand non-
disclosure of the document seen by the judge would breach the principle of procedural fairness and
equality of arms, as guaranteed in English common law principles of natural justice and in article 6
of the ECHR. On the other hand, if the applicant could get in such way the withheld document,
bringing judicial proceedings would be a way to negate third party rights protected by the
exemptions. In the Birmingham Northern relief road case, the applicant asked for the Court to
disclose the agreement under the rules of civil procedure.l" This issue was resolved by Sullivan J.
After having asked the public authority to show him the agreement (and neither parties objected to
that), he stated that 'In trying to ensure the fair disposal of an Application where the issue at stake
was the confidentiality of the document in question, I considered that the applicants would not
suffer any unfair disadvantagezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAif they were unable to see the whole of the Agreement'F" However,
he decided that both the applicants and himself should see an edited version of the document after
confidential provisions had been erased and stated that 'I am satisfied that the redacted version of
the Agreement as finally supplied to both the applicants and myself enables a fair disposal of this
application' .596 However although the judge had supervised the editing process and had seen the
entire document, he concluded that he was going to decide the substantive application on the basis
of the edited version of the document as supplied to him and the applicants and he refused to recuse
himself for this reason. This approach is a pragmatic one and solves the issue fairly since, although
the applicant does not get all of the information disclosed to the judge, he does get an edited
version of it and also the judge has a chance to see the contentious information which undoubtedly
will help him to reach a correct decision even if he subsequently does not take into consideration
the parts not disclosed to the applicant."?
592 [1994] 4 AllER 329.
593 On all of these points see S. Bell and D. McGillivray, Environmental Law, 5th ed, Blackstone 2000, pp.
76-77.
594 Under the Rules of Supreme Court, Order 24, r. 13. Currently Rule 31 on Disclosure and Inspection of
Documents.
595 See above n. 197, at p. 473.
596 Ibid, at p. 474.
597 This solution is also the one expressly adopted by article 67 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First
Instance of the European Communities of2 May 1991 as amended, which provides inter alia that 'Where a
document to which access has been denied by a Community institution has been produced before the Court of
g) The issue of standing - Appeals by third parties?zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
A very important question is who can ask for review ef any decision that he alleges to be
unsatisfactory? This raises the question of the rights of third parties'" to disclosure proceedings.
Concerning people who have requested information, the Aarhus Convention provides'"
that any person who has made a request to information and who considers that it "has been ignored,
wrongfully refused, whether in part or in full, inadequately answered, or otherwise not dealt with in
accordance with the provisions of that article" may bring appeal proceedings. This is consistent
with the information provisions of the Convention, which allow any member of the public to
request information.
However, the Convention does not mention any rights of third parties to block disclosure
of information that would be prejudicial to their interests. Such a solution is compatible with the
purpose of environmental information regimes, which is environmental protection. Indeed, any
such third-party rights would prevent disclosure when what is aimed at, is increased accessibility of
environmental data. However, such actions by third parties could be based on other legislative
instruments and principles; for example the right to privacy and similar human rights.
Interestingly, although Directive 90/313IEEC (and the implementing regulations) were
completely silent on the matter, the new environmental information Directive states that member
states "may" provide that third parties affected by the disclosure of information may have access to
"legal recourse'Y" This means that member states are granted discretion by the European legislator
as to whether to recognise or not third parties rights in regard to disclosure of environmental
information. On the other hand, the Directive does not specify what sort of rights could be
recognised to third parties by the national implementing measures.
The usage of the very general term of "legal recourse" does not indicate clearly what this
recourse could be. Possible solutions could include a right to sue for damages when confidential
information has wrongfully been disclosed; a right to bring judicial review procedures with an aim
to block disclosure; or even a right to be informed by public authorities before any information
involving third parties is disclosed. In this last case, this could be assorted with a right to be given a
certain period of time before disclosure is performed, so as to make any representations to thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
First Instance in proceedings relating to the legality of that denial, that document shall not be communicated
to the other parties'. This provision was inserted by the 2000 Amendments to the Rules of Procedure of the
Court of First Instance of the European Communities which also mention in par. 5 of their preamble that' in
order to resolve certain problems which may arise under the new procedure concerning disputes regarding
public access to administrative documents, it is necessary to provide for the Court of First Instance to be
able to exclude the communication to the parties of documents the production of which must be ordered' OJ
L 322, 19/12/2000, p. 4.
598 As defmed above.
599 At art. 9, par. 1.
600 At art. 6, par. 2.
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public authorities or to ask for interim relief in the High Court with a view of initiating judicial
review proceedings so as to block disclosure.
The new 20M environm.enta\ information regulations do not ext'reggly provide for azyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBArightzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
~{C~~'&\l.\.tat\c\\.\.Q{third Qarties. However, under section 45(2)(c) ofthe Freedom of Information Act
2000, persons to whom requested information relates or persons whose interests arezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAlikely to be
affected by the disclosure, have to be consulted beforehand under the Codes of Practice made by
the Lord Chancellor. However, there is no legally binding right of a third party to intervene before
the information is disclosed and this has been criticised as a defect in the ACt.601 These
aforementioned Codes of Practice are made under s. 45 of the Act and provide guidance to public
authorities on the implementation in practice of freedom of information. Its should be noted, that if
a public authority disregards these provisions and nevertheless discloses information the person
concerned has no redress under the FOIA 2000.602 Interestingly, although s. 45 of the Freedom of
Information Act 2000 is textually repeated by reg. 16 of the new Regulations, subsection 2, which
provides about this right of consultation, iszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAomitted alt gether in the regulations. The reason for
this omission is unclear, though nothing prohibits the Secretary of State to include such a right as
he has already done in the Draft Code of Practice, especially if this right is includes in the Codes of
Practice concerning general Freedom of Information, In any case, the Directive allows for such a
possibility.
However, apart from this limited non-legally binding right of consultation, there is no other
right for third parties that would allow them to appeal against a decision favouring disclosure made
by a public authority. Third parties cannot appeal to the Information Commissioner since this way
of appeal is reserved to people having made requests for information.t" No such right is provided
to third-parties wanting on the contrary to block disclosure.
Consequently, one possible remedy for third parties seems to be to initiate judicial review
against a decision made by a public authority that concerns information relating to them if its
.disclosure can be prejudicial to their interests. For instance, we could imagine of a private
corporation wanting to prevent disclosure of information being in her opinion commercially
confidential, when the public authority holding the information has a different view. In such cases,
it makes no doubt that third parties do have sufficient interest to bring judicial review proceedings
against a decision to disclose and ask for an injunction to restrain disclosure. However, it should be
noted that in practice this might not be a very effective remedy, first because the third party
obviously would need to know that information concerning him has been requested for disclosure,
if he is to bring judicial review proceedings. Second, initiating judicial review proceedings cannot
by itself halt the administrative decision-making process and thus prevent disclosure, following the
601 According to John Macdonald QC, see above n. 578, at p. 880. He ads that third parties should have the
right to be informed when a request of information affecting their interests is made; to intervene to protect
their interests; to appeal to the Information Commissioner, to the Information Tribunal and to the Courts so
as to be able to block disclosure.
602 See Macdonald, above n. 578, at p. 152.
established principle of public law that any administrative act is presumed lawful until pronounced
unlawful. Interim relief has to be soughtzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAin order to get an interim injunction ordering the public
authority to refrain from anyzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAdisclos re pendi g the hearing of the tnain judicial revievv
Apart n-mn fuese \;m\.\.etl anl\ fueoTe\.\.ca\ ~o~o;>\.'o\.\\\\eo;>{OT \\\\-cc:\ ~art.\.eo;>\~ 'o\~Cv..c:\\,<;l,c\~<;l,\Xte>
there are also other procedures that may allow them to be indemnified when they have suffered
damages by unlawful disclosures. These private law procedures will be examined below.
h) Criminal and quasi-criminal law remedies
The question that has to be examined is whether there are any criminal offences enacted
specifically for cases involving requests to access environmental information wrongfully refused or
ignored.
None of the relevant international and EC legal instruments provide for any related offence
in the field of access to environmental information. However, the inclusion in international treaties
and in EC law of specific criminal offences is possible, as demonstrated by the recent adoption of
the European Convention on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal law60s and by the
adoption of the Council Framework Decision on the protection of the environment through
criminal law. 606
However, the new environmental information regulations do provide for some specific
offences concerning access to environmental information. These offences have been initially
created by the Freedom of Information Act 2000, and the regulations extend them to environmental
information.
j) Offence of obstructing the execution of a warrant or failing to give reasonable
assistance for its execution.
It is regulation 18(10) that makes it an offence for any person to intentionally obstruct the
execution of a warrant issued by a Court in favour of the Information Commissioner when
exercising his investigatory powers of entry and inspection. Also, it is an offence to fail without
reasonable excuse to assist any person executing such a warrant with any assistance the executor of
the warrant may require for its execution. This latter offence is conditional on the reasonableness of
the assistance asked for by the executor of the warrant and may vary from case to case, though it
seems that if a person is asked to indicate where some relevant documents are held and he fails to
603 According to s. 50 of the FOIA 2000.
604 On interim relief in judicial review proceedings in general, see Peter Cane, above n. 523, at pp.66-68.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
60S Adopted at Strasbourg on the 4/1111998, ETS no. 172, available online from the Treaty Office of the
Council of Europe at http://conventions.coe.int
606 Council Framework Decision 2003/80 of January 27, 2003 on the protection of the environment through
criminal law, OJ L 2003, 29 p. 55
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indicate that knowing their location, then this offence is committed. These offences are subject to a
summary conviction and the only penalty is a fine not exceeding levelS on the standard scale (thus
a maximum of £5,000).607These offences can be prosecuted exclusively by either the Information
Commissioner or by the Director of Public Prosecutions or with his consent. Thus there is no right
to privately prosecute these offences. These offences can be found in paragraph 12 of Schedule 3 to
the Freedom of Information Act 2000, to which reg. 18(10) refers.
It is doubtful if this offence will ever be committed, since apart from the fact that it is
extremely narrowly drawn (the obstruction has to be intentional and the failure to assist can be
avoided if there is a reasonable excuse or the assistance asked for is not reasonable), the power of
issue of warrants by circuit judges will be seldom exercised since it would require cogent evidence
to satisfy the judge that it should be issued.?" Thus these provisions seem of little, if any, practical
significance.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
inzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAOffence of altering records etc with intention to prevent entitled disclosure.
Regulation 19 of the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 extends the offence of
altering records etc. found in section 77 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 to information
requested under the Regulations. It is an offence for people employed by a public authority or are
officers of it, or are under its supervision to alter, deface, block, conceal, erase or destroy any
record held by the public authority with the intent of preventing disclosure of all or part of the
information. The offence is only committed if a request for information has been made to the
public authority and only if the applicant would have been "entitled" under the regulations to
disclosure of information in accordance with that section. The offence is subject to a summary
conviction and the only penalty is a fine not exceeding levelS on the standard scale (thus a
maximum of £5,000). The same restrictions on who can initiate prosecution proceedings apply as
for the above-mentioned offences.
As Paul Stanley indicates, this offence poses no problem when information is absolutely
exempt or when no exemption to communication applies to the requested information. However, he
adds that in cases where information covered by an exemption is concerned and thus the public
interest test would have to be applied, it would be unsatisfactory for criminal liability to turn on an
assessment of something so nebulous as the public interest. So, he argues that the ambiguity in
meaning of the word "entitled" would have to be resolved in favour of the defendant, so that an
offence is only committed where no exemption to communication applies.f" We disagree with such
a restrictive interpretation. ~ven though, the principlezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAin d bio ro reo is applicable in criminal
607 By reference to Section 37(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 1982 which provides for a standard scale of
maximum fmes for an adult on conviction for summary offences.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
608 According to Paul Stanley, Current Law Statutes, Vol. 2, 2000, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2000, p. 36-
65.
609 See above n. 608, p. 36-79.
cases, adopting the above-mentioned interpretation would result in being possible for officers of
public authorities to alter records with the intent to prevent disclosure in all cases where a non-
absolute exemption is applicable without an offence being committed! This is also definitely
contrary to the intent of parliament, which is to prevent such actions through criminal punishment.
In any case, such a restrictive interpretation would render almost totally ineffective the enactment
of this offence.
Moreover, according to Macdonald, a prosecution under the equivalent offence of section
77 of the FOIA 2000 would fail if the defendant shows that the destruction or alteration of the
record would have taken place at the same time in the course of departmental practice, regardless
of whether a request had been submitted or not.610 This interpretation is based on section 1(4) of the
Act which provides that although authorities are under a duty to provide information held at the
time when a request is received, they are under no duty to safeguard this information from
amendment or deletion that would have been made regardless of the receipt of the request. This
section seems to legitimise alterations or destructions made by public authorities in the ordinary
course of business, even if they are made in the full knowledge of a request. However, even if we
accept such an interpretation, this cannot be applicable as far as environmental information is
concerned, since the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 do not contain an exception
similar to section 1(4)of the FOIA 2000. Thus, the scope of the offence seems to be different under
the regulations: an offence is committed whenever requested environmental information is altered
or destroyed in knowledge of a request having been made, regardless of whether this information
would have been altered or destroyed in the ordinary course of business of the authority.
iii) Contempt of court.
Lastly, the Information Commissioner's and the Information Tribunal's decisions are
enforced through the mechanism of contempt of court, which is not strictly speaking a criminal law
remedy, though it will be examined in this part, since contempt proceedings may lead to the
punishments with quasi-criminal penalties, such as imprisonment and fines.
1)Non-compliance with the Information Commissioner's notices.
Section 54 of the FOIA, to which reg. 18(4) of the 2004 Regulations refers, provides that
decisions of the Information Commissioner (thus decision notices, information notices and
enforcement notices) are to be treated as orders of a court of law so as to be enforced by contempt
proceedings. If a public authority fails to comply with any of the notices issued by the
610 See Macdonald, above n. 578, at p. 144.
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Commissioner, then the Commissioner can certify that in writing to the relevant Court,"! which in
turn is given the power to enquire into the matter and to hear any defence or witness statements.
This indicates that the court is not bound by the Commissioner's certificate of non-compliance'"
and therefore must establish itself if there has been in fact been non-compliance or not. However,
the regulations expressly indicate that failure to comply with an information notice includes
knowingly or recklessly making false statements.
On a theoretical basis, the usage of the contempt of court mechanism seems odd, since
contempt intends to protect the dignity of the Court, and thus it seems that in this case the judge
would be the Information Commissioner but he has no power to punish contempt by himself and
has to remit the matter to the High Court. This extension of the law of contempt by statutory
provisions to cover disobedience of orders made by various public bodies is not something new and
has been widely adopted in various statutes.?" although it has not been very coherent to apply the
law of contempt to various situations to which contempt is not always necessarily the most
effective remedy.?"
A further issue, is what punishments and fines can be applied when dealing with contempt
under these provisions. The FOIA provides that the Court mayzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA"deal with the aut ority s if it had
committed a contempt of courf', without giving any more details on the procedure (criminal or civil
contempt)?" that has to be followed. In general, criminal contempts are offences of a public nature
punishing interferences with the ability of justice to function properly, such as threatening
witnesses or improper conduct in hearings. Civil contempt occurs when the contemnor
intentionally disobeys court orders or judgements and in general abstains from doing certain acts,
in which case fines or prison sentences intend to coerce the contemnor into obeying rather than
punishing him. Thus, it seems that disobedience of the Commissioner's decisions can result in civil
contempt proceedings.?" However, not under all of his decisions will contempt proceedings be
possible. Only disobedience of enforceable decisions will amount to contempt, thus notices which
611 In England and Wales it is the High Court and in Scotland the Court of Sessions. See par. 4(4). Also,
according to the Rules of the Supreme Court, it is a single judge of the Queen's bench division that has
jurisdiction in such cases: "Where by virtue of any enactment the High court has power to punish or take
steps for the punishment of any person charged with having done any thing in relation to a court, tribunal or
person which would,zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAif it had been done in relation to the High Court, have been a contempt of that Court, an
order of committal may be made by a single judge of the Queen's Bench Division" (SI 196511776 Sch 1 (5)
(52) Para 1(4». Appeals are also possible to the Civil Division of the Court of Appeal under s. 13(2)(b) of
the Administration of Justice Act 1960.
612 See Paul Stanley, above n. 608, p. 36-65.
613 See amongst others, the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967, s. 9(1) (concerning the Parliamentary
Commissioner); the Local Government Act 1974, s. 29(8) (concerning the Local Commissioner); the Courts
and Legal Services Act 1990, s. 25 (concerning the Legal Services Ombudsman); the Pensions Schemes Act
1993 (concerning the Pensions Ombudsman); the Mental Health Service Commissioners Act 1993, s. 13
(concerning the Mental Health Commissioner); the Freedom of Information Act 2000, s. 54 (concerning the
Information Commissioner).
614 According to Miller, "These specific extension of the law of contempt have apparently been adopted on a
random basis rather than as part of a coherent pattern ...", Christopher J. Miller, Contempt of Court, Oxford
University Press, 2nd ed, Oxford: 1989, at p. 74.
615 On the theoretical distinction between civil and criminal contempt and its limits, see Nigel Lowe, Brenda
Sufrin, The Law Of Contempt, Butterworths, 3rd edition, London: 1996, pp. 655 et seq.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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merely ascertain that someone's right information has been ignored or that procedures have not
correctly been followed, without prescribing any sort of specific action on the part of the public
authority concerned will not be enforceable decisions. Thus, contempt proceedings are only
possible when information notices, enforcement notices and decision notices requiring specific
steps to be taken, have not been complied with. This is consistent with the principle established inzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
Webster v Southwark LB~J7 where it was held that since declarations are not coercive orders,
refusals to comply with them do not amount to contempt.
As a result, whenever the High Court is satisfied the contemnor has breached a
Commissioner's decision, it may either issue a writ of sequestration (temporarily seizing the
defendant's property till he obeys), a writ of committal (imprisoning him till he obeys) or order the
payment of a fine or order the payment of costs or even grant an injunction.?" The Contempt of
Court Act 1981, s. 14(1), imposes a two-year maximum jail sentence for civil and criminal
contempt. This means that even if a person persists in his disobedience, he cannot be held locked-
up eternally.?"
A question that arises is what would happen if the initial decision of the Information
Commissioner was unlawful. Could that be challenged in contempt proceedings as defence?
Stanley, says no.620 He recalls the House of Lords landmark decision of Boddington v British
Transport Police'" according to which defendants in criminal proceedings are entitled to contend
that subordinate legislation or an administrative act made under it was ultra vires except when
Parliament has expressly prohibited the bringing of such public law challenges by statute. Also, it
was held that in construing legislation, there is a strong presumption that Parliament did not intend
to inhibit such challenges. First, he accepts that this precedent concerning criminal matters is also
applicable in contempt proceedings that have quasi-criminal sanctions. Second, he concludes that
since the Freedom of Information Act provides for carefully structured and with suspensive effect
appeal mechanisms, this implies that Parliament intended these appeal proceedings to be exclusive,
thus not permitting ultra vires claims in other court proceedings such as in contempt ones. We do
accept that the Boddington case is of relevance to contempt proceedings, however we feel that in
the absence of a clear and express statutory provision prohibiting such ultra vires claims, the
provision in the Act of appeal mechanisms against the Commissioner's decisions is insufficient to
616 This is also the view adopted by Macdonald. See above, n. 578, at p. 235 and footnote 168.
617 [1983] 2 WLR217.
618 However, as held in Elliot v Klinger [1967] 3 All E.R. 141 although the court might in its discretion
substitute an injunction in lieu of sequestration or committal, a plaintiff cannot claim an injunction without
asking for committal or sequestration.
619zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAOn furthe pr cedural details on how contempt procedures are brought see Lowe and Sufrin, above n.615,
Ch. 14 Civil Contempt, Part III Power of the courts to enforce judgements or orders other than for the
Eayment ofa sum of money, pp. 603-641.
20 See above n. 608, at p 36-65.
621 [1998] 2 All E.R. 203. This case concerns a criminal prosecution for smoking in a train brought under
British Railway bylaws. The defendant argued they were ultra vires.
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rebut the strong presumption that Parliament did not intend to inhibit such challenges.?" So, such
incidental arguments should be allowed in contempt proceedings.
Also, Birkinshaw''" criticises the choice of using contempt proceedings for enforcing the
Commissioner's decisions, since contempt proceedings are unlikely to have any significant role in
enforcement unless there is no appeal and the authority does not comply with a decision of the
Commissioner. Thus, he recommends that it would have been better if the Commissioner had been
given a power to seek injunctions, similar to the one given to the Northern Ireland Commissioner to
force the recalcitrant authorities to comply with its decisions. We disagree with this view, because
if court injunctions are not complied with, then it becomes a matter of contempt. Thus, the current
position leads to the same result, contempt proceedings, and in a faster way since there is no need
to seek an injunction first.
However, we do agree with Birkinshaw that the choice of contempt proceedings can be
criticised. This is even truer when environmental information is concerned where it should be kept
in mind that by allowing greater openness, it is the environment that is protected. Thus, any attempt
by public officials to prevent disclosure indirectly harms the environment and as a consequence the
public interest too. So, this could justify harsher punishments and more wide-ranging offences than
the ones created by the Freedom of Information Act 2000, which have only been extended by the
Regulations as to cover environmental information. A possible solution would have been instead of
providing for contempt proceedings whenever the Commissioner's decisions are not complied
with, to create azyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAcriminal offence of non- ompliance to the Commissioner's decisions made under
the Environmental Information Regulations. This offence could carry harsh punishments, and could
be a strict liability offence so as to avoid any questions of intent, which might be difficult to prove
and thus would prevent successful prosecutions.
2) Obstruction etc of the InfQrmation Tribunal's proceedings.
Concerning the details of proceedings in front of the Information Tribunal, section 61 of
the FOIA provides that they have to be found in Schedule 6 to the Data Protection Act 1998, so far
as applicable. According to paragraph 8(1) of this Schedule the Information Tribunal can commit a
person to the High COurt624 when a person is guilty of "any act or omission in respect of
proceedings before the Tribunal" if it would be such as to amount to contempt of court if the
622 Indeed, as held in thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBABoddington case: "In my judgment only the clear language of a statute could take
away the right of a defendant in criminal proceedings to challenge the lawfulness of a byelaw or
administrative decision where his prosecution is premised on its validity" (our emphasis). For such a case in
which a statute explicitly provides for an exclusion clause, see R. v Wicks (Peter Edward) [1997] 2 All E.R.
801 (HL).
623 See Patrick Birkinshaw, Government and information: the law relating to access, disclosure and
regulation, 2nd ed 2001, London: Butterworths, p. 41.
624 In Scotland, the Court of Sessions.
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proceedings were before a court of law. In such a case, the Tribunal can certify this matter to the
High Court, which can deal of the matter under contempt proceedings.
This covers mainly contempts committed in the face of the Tribunal, such as verbal abuse,
throwing objects at members during hearings or violent interruption of proceedings. These,
contrary to the previously described contempts about the Commissioner's decisions, are criminal
contempts and are punishable by imprisonment, fines, order to pay costs, taking security for good
behaviour, and even by granting injunctions either to prevent repetition of the act or to prevent the
act of being committed. The same limitations on the length of the jail sentences that can be given
apply as analysed above.f"zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
i) Civil proceedings - Actions in tort.
A further question that arises, is what actions are possible under civil liability rules when
citizens, either applicants to disclosure or third parties aiming at blocking disclosure, have been
damaged in their interests by a wrongful disclosure or a wrongful refusal. It should be noted first of
all that in English public law, anzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAultra vi es action by a public official or authority (and thus
referred in this part as illegal) does not, simply of itself, give rise to an action for damages.
Expressly and unambiguously, reg. 18(6)(e) of the Environmental Information Regulations
2004 ensures that the Regulations do not create any right to sue for damages for breach of a
statutory duty present in the Regulations. This regulation refers to section 56 of the Freedom of
Information Act 2000, which makes clear that there was no intent to imply that breaches of
statutory duty under these pieces of legislation created a right to sue for damages. Interestingly, this
is a radical change from the position under the previous 1992 regulations, under which a
dissatisfied applicant could pursue an action for breach of statutory duty in the civil courts.?"
According to Birkinshaw,627 this preclusion clause cannot prevent actions based on
negligencef" or for breaches of confidentiality, since these duties are not imposed under the Act.
However, this provision does not completely oust the Courts' powers to grant damages based on
other rules too.
First, as Stanley indicates, this provision does not prevent tort claims in very serious cases
based on the tort of misfeasance in public office.629 This tort exists when an official person has
625 On further details on these procedures and for other types of criminal contempt, see Lowe and Sufrin,
above n.615, pp. 507 et seq.
626 According to the UK government's report to the Commission in 1997 about the application of the
Directive. See the Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the
Experience gained in the application of Directive 90/313IEEC on Freedom of Access to Environmental
information. (COMl200/0400 FINAL).
627 See above n. 623, at p. 44.
628 However, according to Macdonald, actions based on the tort of negligence are precluded. See Macdonald,
above n. 578, at p. 236.
629 See Stanley, above n. 608, at p. 36-66.
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deliberately acted in the knowledge that what has been done is unlawful and likely to cause damage
or when he deliberately acts in a way to injure.630This tort is thus of very limited help, since it
involves proving the state of mind of the targeted official, which resembles tozyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAaprobatio diabolica.
In any case, this tort does not cover most illegal actions.
Second, as we analysed elsewhere, environmental information has Human Right
implications, and the Human Rights Act 1998, has created what is virtually an administrative tort
in cases where damages are caused by unlawful action by breach of a Convention human right.?"
Until now, there has been no precedent on this ground concerning human rights and environmental
information.
Third, it should be noted that both the Environmental Information Regulations, contrary to
the Freedom of Information Act 2000, transpose a EC Directive which also appears to have direct
effect to citizens,632since it clearly creates a right to access information in favour of any individual.
Thus, damages can also be sought under the Factortame line of precedents?" whenever there has
been clear breaches of a right to access environmental information and the damage is of sufficient
seriousness. However, there is one serious limit in these claims: the applicant has to prove that the
damage has resulted from an incorrect transposition of the EC environmental Information
Directive. Thus, he would have to prove that the implementing regulations prevented his right to
access information he would have been entitled to get if the UK had correctly transposed the
Environmental Information Directive. This is of limited practical significance to people being
wrongfully refused disclosure since, first, wrongful implementation would be hard to ascertain, and
second, the breach ofEC law has to be sufficiently serious.
Also, the common law tort of negligence could also found grounds for actions for damages.
However, negligence in a public law context is very restricted and limited in cases where public
authorities have acted unreasonably in the Wednesbury sense, thus when it can be proved that no
reasonable authority could have so acted.f"
630See on this tort McBride Nicholas, Bagshaw Roderick, Tort Law, Pearson 2001, chapter 23, and also
Three Rivers District Council v. Bank of England (No. 3) [2001] 2 All E.R. 513 (HL).
631See inter alia, Michael Purdue, "Liability for Faulty Planning Decisions" [2001] J.PL 1141. See also the
landmark case of Marcie v Thames Water Utilities Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 64, in which a breach of article 8
lead to the award of damages.
632As stated by Kurt Riechenberg concerning Directive 90/313, 'Article 3 establishes a right for individuals
to receive environmental information that is in possession of public entities. There can be very little doubt
that this provision can be relied upon by individuals directly even if Article 3 has not been translated into
domestic law provided that no other rights are affected by disclosure', in Local administration and the
binding nature of community directives: a lesser known side of European legal integration, [1996] 22
Fordham International Law Journal 696, at p. 740-741.
633See above, n. 118.
634On negligence in a public law context, see Cane, above n. 523, at pp. 246-247. Also, according to
Birkinshaw, (see above n. 623 at pp. 47-48) because individuals affected by disclosure have to be consulted
beforehand under the Codes of Practice made by the Secretary of State, if a public authority fails to notify a
third party and then wrongfully discloses information and this disclosure causes damages to the provider of
the information, then, under the precedent of Swiney v. CC of North umbria Police [1996] 3 AllER 449 (CA),
the public authority concerned is liable in negligence. However, he adds that 'lf the public authority had
considered whether the third party ought to have been consulted and had wrongfully found that it should havezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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Lastly, another tort that might find grounds of application iszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAbreach of c fidentiality. For
the common law of confidentiality to be successfully invoked, it has to be shown that 1) the
information can be characterised as confidential; 2) the information was communicated in
circumstances importing an obligation of confidence; and 3) the information was used without
proper authorisation.?" However, this tort can only be invoked by third parties having suffered
damages by unauthorised disclosures, so it would have to be shown that the public authority was
completely barred by a specific statutory provision to disclose such information (andzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAwas not
merely given discretion as to refuse disclosure). This remedy apart from being restricted to cases
when disclosure is expressly prohibited (i.e. under a specific act), can be of little help if disclosure
has already taken place where as Birkinshaw points out, H...zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAthe real damage brought about by
disclosure may already have been perpetrated and the money remedy will offer little solace".636zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
j) Complaints to Ombudsmen.
Apart from reconsideration procedures that are binding as analysed above, there are also
possible recourses to Ombudsmen whose recommendations are not binding even though they are
almost always accepted in full.637 Ombudsmen are bodies investigating informally the working of
the state, independent from the sector they are investigating and are cost-free to complainants. In
England there are three types of public Ombudsman each responsible for a particular sector of
administrative activities and specific bodies. They are the Parliamentary Commissioner for
Administration (hereinafter PCA) created by the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967 and
responsible for mainly governmental bodies; the Health Service Commissioner created by the
National Health Service Reorganisation Act 1973 and responsible for the NHS bodies, and finally
the Local Government Ombudsman created by the Local Government Act 1974 and responsible for
mainly local authorities.638 Each of these bodies can investigate complaints concerning
maladministration that has caused injustice in their areas of competence.
The main advantage of using these bodies as opposed to judicial review proceedings, is
that they are free for applicants and that their jurisdiction extends to 'maladministration' which is a
wider concept than the Wednesbury unreasonableness. Maldministration is inefficient or improper
not, then negligence could arise only if this decision not to consult could be held to be unreasonable or
irrational in the Wednesbury sense, in application of Anns v LE of Merton [1978] AC 728.
635 See for more details, Halsbury's Laws of England, Confidence and Data Protection, Butterworths, at
Earas.401-472.
36 See Birkinshaw, above n. 623, at p. 48.
637 Though not always. See the PCA's Fourth Report (Session 2001-2002) to Parliament (13 November
2001, HC 353) which is the first occasion on which a Government department has refused to accept the
conclusions of the Ombudsman on a question of disclosure of information under the Code of Practice.
638 There are also equivalent Ombudsmen for similar maters in Wales and in Northern Ireland but their
method of operation is mainly similar with their English counterparts. On these see chapter 21 by Purdue,
Investigations by the public sector Ombudsmen, in David Feldham (ed.), English public law, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2004.
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administration and does not cover the merits of a decision but only the manner in which it was
reached. However, the public sector Ombudsmen in deciding whether there has been
maladministration seem to be willing to extend their assessment on the merits of a decision and to
find that when a decision is bad, there has been maladminlstration.f"
As mentioned in the introduction, the first legal instrument (though not of a binding nature)
on a general right of citizens to access information held by public bodies was the 1994 British
Government's Code of Practice on Access to Government Information.?" This Code was of
limited application to only those bodies that came within the jurisdiction of the PCA,641as it is the
PCA who was responsible to enforce the Code. These bodies are the Central Government or
persons or bodies acting on its behalf performing administrative duties, or certain specific non-
departmental public bodies, commonly referred to as quangos. The code provides that all
information held by these bodies is to be released to any applicant without the need to prove any
interest in disclosure, except when requested information is covered by an exemption provided for
by Part II of the Code. These exemptions, generally speaking, cover the usual areas of secrecy as
under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and the Regulations. The Code of Practice lays down
the principle that applicants who have been refused information, or who consider they have been
charged unreasonable fees, should first seek an internal review of the decision from the relevant
body. Only if applicants are not satisfied with the outcome of the review, it is open to them to
complain, through a Member of Parliament to the PCA.642It should be noted that MPs are not
obliged to forward such complaints to the Ombudsman for investigation and, when the PCA
receives a complaint, he has discretion as to whether or not to investigate the matter.
As far as environmental information is concerned, the Code expressly excludes the
competence of the PCA, as it considers that it cannot override statutory provisions on access to
information. Section 8 of the Code about relationships with other statutory rights provides thatzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
" ...Where the information could be sought under an existing statutory right, the terms of the right of
access takes precedence over the Code. [...] There is also a right of access to environmental
information. It is not envisaged that the Ombudsman will become involved in supervising these
statutory rights." However, in some cases the PCA has examined complaints which involve
information relating to the environment, as a complaint involving refusal of disclosure of
639 See on this point the chapter 21 by Michael Purdue, Investigations by the public sector Ombudsmen, in
David Feldham (ed.), English public law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
640Available online from the Department for Constitutional Affairs website at
http://www.dca.gov.uk/foilogcode981.htm
641According to s. 6 of the Code: "The Code applies to those Government departments and other bodies
within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman (as listed in SchedulezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA2 to the Parliamentary Commissioner Act
1967)[3]. The Code applies to agencies within departments and to functions carried out on behalf of a
department or public body by contractors. The Security and Intelligence Services are not within the scope of
the Code, nor is information obtained from or relating to them".
642According to section 11 of the Code.
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governmental correspondence about the Ilisu Dam project in Turkey.t" Also in another
investigation concerning some farm inspection reports held by the Scottish Office Agriculture,
Environment and Fisheries Department (SOAEFD), where the Environmental Information
Regulations 1992 were partially applicable, the PCA declined to entertain the complaint raised
about the incorrect application of one of the exemptions of the Regulations, since he considered it
was a matter for the courts to decide. However, he considered himself competent for environmental
information produced before the entering in force of the Regulations, since he considered the Code
applicable to them and recommended their disclosure.t" This shows that the Code and the
protection provided by the PCA have still a residual role for environmental information.?"
Since the coming into force of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and until its complete
implementation across all bodies of the public sector in January 2005, the Code is still relevant for
bodies not yet subject to the requirements of the Act and for whose activities one of the
Ombudsmen is competent.646 This is important since sometimes some complaints to the PCA have
involved environmental information. In any case, it is important to note that from the time the
Freedom of Information Act 2000 is fully implemented and the Environmental Information
Regulations provide for a specific appeal procedure to the Information Commissioner, then the
PCA (nor any other Ombudsman) won't be any more competent to deal with such complaints about
access to information. This is due to the fact that all statutory provisions on the public sector
Ombudsmen expressly provide that the Ombudsmen should not investigate when there is an
alternative right of appeal to a Tribunal or a remedy by proceeding before a court of law. Indeed, as
643 Case No. A.26/0l, detailed in the PCA'szyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAThird Report for Session 2001-2002-Access to Official
In/ormation-Investigations Completed January-June 2001, HC 160.All PCA's reports and cases mentioned
herein are available online from http://www.o",budsman.org.uklpublications.html
644 Case No A.38/99, Second Reportfor Session 1999-2000-Access to Official Information: Investigations
Completed-April-October 1999.
64S The PCA has dealt with other complaints involving environmental information, though the Code was
applied without reference to the Regulations: Case No. A.43/96 Refusal to disclose information about a
planning application from the Commission for the New Towns; Case No. A.ll/97 Delay in replying to a
request for environmental information from the Department of the Environment about the effect of
discharges from offshore oil and gas installations on marine wildlife and habitats (the initial application to
disclosure was made both under the Code and the Regulations and the PCA did not struck out the Complaint
as inadmissible, thus possibly indicating a sort of concurrent applicability of both provisions); Case No.
A.37/96 Refusal to disclose information about defects at a nuclear power station sought from the Health and
Safety Executive. All these cases are reported in the PCA's Fourth Report (l997-98). See also Case No.
A.37/03 Refusal to release information about the construction of the Silverstone Bypass, and Case No.
A.12/03 Refusal to release information about accidents involving nuclear weapons, reported in th
Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration (Investigations Completed July 2003 - June 2004) Access
To Official Information 1st Report - Session 2003-2004, HC 701 (Session 2003-2004), available online
from: http://www.ombudsman.org.uklpcaidocumentiaoi0304/index.htm
646 The PCA's jurisdiction is very limited compared to the scope of the Environmental Information
Regulations, since it does not extend to private bodies exercising public functions or under the control of
public bodies. This has lead to some cases being dismissed by the PCA for lack of jurisdiction. In case no.
A17/03, the applicant complained of a refusal by NIREX (a private company managing UK's intermediate
level radioactive waste and owned by BNFL, UKAEA and British Energy) and the Department of Trade and
Industry to release information about a shortlist of 12 preferred sites for the disposal of radioactive waste.
The PCA considered that NIREX was not a body within its jurisdiction. See the Parliamentary Ombudsman's
report for 2003, Access to Official Information investigations completed between November 2002 and June
2003 (HC 951).
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expressed by WoolfzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBALJ. inzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedc ZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAR v Commissioner o Local Administration ex p. Croydon LB ,647" ...zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAif
there is a tribunal (whether it be an appeal tribunal, a Minister of the Crown or a court of law)
which is specifically designed to deal with the issue, that is the body to whom the complainant
should normally resort",
From all of the above, it can be concluded that the role of the Ombudsmen in providing
access to environmental information is residual under the Environmental Information Regulations
1992 and non-existent since the coming into force of the Environmental Information Regulations
2004, on the 1st January 2005.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
k) Conclusion on the available remedies concerning
access to environmental information
It is obvious from what has been described on the available remedies concerning access to
environmental information, that there is a great number of various and overlapping remedies which
are almost exclusively equivalent to the ones available to general requests to access information
made under the Freedom of Information Act 2000. Undoubtedly, the whole environmental
information regime was aligned concerning review procedures with the one present in the Act,648so
as to avoid complexities that two different sets of remedies would have created. However, is this
the best possible approach?
The result is a "patchwork" of remedies, which might or might not protect effectively the
citizens (we shall not embark on this issue)?" but none of these remedies is taking into account the
protection of the environment. This can firstly be demonstrated by possible inconsistencies of the
adopted review mechanism with the Directive's requirements. A good example is the issue of costs
in front of the Tribunal, whereas the Directive imposes an inexpensive procedure. Secondly, even
though criminal remedies are used, as demonstrated, these are available in such extreme cases that
they will most probably be only of theoretical and academic interest than of any practical
relevance. The causes for these inconsistencies are the links the environmental information regime
has with the general freedom of information one. The latter aims at providing mechanisms in order
to protect the citizen's right to access information. On the contrary, environmental information is
only an instrument aiming at protecting the environment, thus the public interest. Specific remedies
would be welcome taking this factor into account. These could be, as analysed before, harsh
criminal sanctions for attempts of public officials to block disclosure when environmental
information is concerned, similarly to the new trend in European law of the usage of criminal law
as a means to protecting the "environment and also measures aiming at lowering the costs of court
proceedings in environmental matters.
647 [1989] 1 AllE.R. 1033, at p. 1044.
648 See above n. 522.
649 Though on a criticism of the enforcement proceedings found in the EOIA concerning the right of third
parties, see Macdonald, above n. 578, at p. 240.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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CHAPTER 2) Other specific legal instruments of access to
environmental information upon request: the example of public
registers containing environmental informationzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
Public registers can be defined as an official compilation of certain specific sort of
information required by legislation, maintained by public authorities and open to public inspection
although certain restrictions may apply on this account. They can be maintained on a computerised
or a more traditional manual form. British law has been for a long time using public registers as a
means of making information accessible to interested parties and also the general public. Public
registers are widely used in a multitude of different areas ranging from the traditional registers that
contain all births, marriages and deaths maintained by the General Register Office for England and
Wales to the more modem Data Protection Register, a public register maintained by the
Information Commissioner containing all controllers of personal data.
As far as registers containing environmental information are concerned, their
characteristics vary depending on the statutory provisions that created them. Public registers
containing environmental information are definitely one of the means that allow the public to have
access to data on the environment. However, public registers are not just a means of providing
environmental information to the public; they perform a dual function. They have also (and it is
equally important in our view) a function of being a readily accessible compilation of documents
on the same subject present in a single archive. This role facilitates the task of record keeping by
public administration bodies; though of course it would always be open to public bodies to do this
on their own initiative.
A) Public Registers as a route to access to information.
Public registers are seen by the government as the most practical way for collating and
providing information to the public regarding specific and continuing sources of information.Y"
We shall first examine the advantages and disadvantages of establishing public registers and their
suitability as a means of access to environmental information.
650 See the Draft regulations and guidance on implementation of the EC Directive 90/313 on the freedom of
access to information on the environment, Department of the Environment, 1992.
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1) Advantages and disadvantages of public registers.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
There is a great deal of controversy between scholars whether registers are an effective
means of allowing access to and dissemination of environmental information. According to
John651,zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA'registrati of data in publicly accessible registers presents perhaps the best possible
means of making information public ... ' He also believes that despite their defects (lack of
comprehensiveness, unwieldy format and the delays in updates) their more extensive use should be
promoted. On the other hand, according to Rowan-Robinson et al.652, 'registers offer an easy option
for seeming to meet the pressure for greater public access to environmental information without
actually achieving very much'. The truth probably lies somewhere between these two extremes and
we should concentrate on analysing the main issues.
First of all, it has been argued by the British Government653 that registers are clear and
transparent in their use. It is mentioned that they are also clear and simple in operation, free of
charge when being inspected, relatively cheap to maintain and it is easy to inform the public on
their contents.
Even though all these arguments seem correct on a theoretical basis, in practice studies
have shown that the implementation of public registers can be problematic, According to Burton654
there has been little awareness of the existence of registers by members of the general public and
little use has been made of registers by them. He suggests that this might be attributed to the
complexity of information and insufficiency of data included on registers.
Moreover, according to Sanders and Rothnie655, planning registers are an 'under used
facility' and this is 'cause of concern given the resources involved in setting up and maintaining a
register'. The authors try to find solutions to alleviate this concern. We shall not discuss these
solutions, but we think that the author's approach omits to take into consideration an extremely
important factor that could in itself justify the costs involved for maintaining a register. As
discussed above, public registers have a dual function of providing information to the public and
also being a useful administrative archive of relevant documents. Consequently, it can be argued
that due to this dual function, their costs are justified since they also help to create an important
archive of use to pubic bodies themselves.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIt is also suggested that public registers are cheap
compared to other means of providing environmental information that do not serve any other
functions.
651 Edward John, Access to Environmental Information: Limitations of the UK Radioactive Substances
Registers [1995] JEL 11.
652 Jeremy Rowan-Robinson, Andrea Ross, William Walton, Julie Rothnie, Public access to Information: a
means to what end? [1996] JEL 19.
653 Cited by Gisele Bakkenist, Environmental Information: Law, Policy and Experience, Cameron May 1994,
page 67.
654 T. P. Burton, Access to Environmental Information: the UK experience of water Registers [1989] JEL
192.
655 Anne-Michelle Sanders and Julie Rothnie, Planning registers - their role in promoting public participation
[1996] JPL 539.
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Secondly, the fact that only certain categories of information are included in the registers is
definitely a disadvantage of this system, compared to a general right of access to environmental
information. The amount of information accessible under registers is finite, compared to a general
right provision where all information is accessible except if it is excluded. Consequently, there can
be no 'fishing' in files of public bodies, trying to find some 'neglected' piece of information.
Another disadvantage of the system of public registers is that if information is omitted
(deliberately or accidentally) from inclusion in the registers it can be precluded from disclosure. If
it could be proved that a register was incomplete, the public authority could be forced to remedy
this but in most cases the omission might go unnoticed. However, this problem does not apply with
a system of general access to information, in which disclosure of information is independent of the
fact that it is included or not on registers; though again public bodies might conceal information
that they should disclose.
Finally, it must be said that legal provisions that create and organise some registers do not
always contain time limits for them being updated. Consequently, information held on public
registers could sometimes become out of date. For instance, registers set under the EPA do not
contain any time limit for them being updated, except for registers of genetically modified
organismsf".zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
2) Common features of Public Registers containing environmental information.
Public registers which contain environmental information were initially set up with the aim
of providing a way so that the public can be informed about systems of regulation of polluting
activities by public authorities. The registers therefore contain applications to carry out polluting
activities and the responses that were taken in accordance with that (through authorisations to
pollute or enforcement actions) by pollution regulatory authorities. Since all, or at least almost all,
of public registers concerning environmental information are pollution-oriented, they have a lot of
features in common, though caution should be taken when generalising about public registers,
because, on some minor points, great differences can arise, as we shall see further on. These
common features can be analysed in two categories: firstly, features that concern the practical
implementation of registers, and secondly, features that concern the information included on them.
a) Practical implementation of registers.
i) How information on registers can be accessed
656 See the Genetically Modified Organisms (deliberate release) Regulations 1992 (SI 3280), Part V on the
register of information, and particularly regulation 1, which provides for a fourteen days limit for
information to be placed on the register.
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As a general rule, the statutory provisions on registers provide that they must be open for
inspection by any member of the public at all reasonable times. Although this should not be a
source of problems, there is some case law on what are 'reasonable times' and on who are the
'public' .
The determination of what is considered to be reasonable times has been left by the
legislature to the discretion of the authorities holding the registers for inspection. However, inzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
Small v. Bicklel57 the meaning of the term reasonable was interpreted and it was decided that it is
a matter of fact to be determined on a case by case basis. The case involved a Victorian statute
which gave authority to the inspector of nuisances to enter places where meat etc. was held only at
'reasonable times,658. Justice Blackburn held that: 'J do not think the inspector's judgement on
what is reasonable time should be final; but the justices must have a discretion in determining what
time, under the circumstances of each case is reasonable '. This would suggest that whether there is
access at reasonable times would be a matter of law for the courts to decide. According to Sanders
and Rothnie659 'all reasonable times' is ambiguous and in practice refers to the working hours of
the authority. They suggest660 that the issue of restricted opening times should be addressed by
lunch-time, evenings or Saturday openings but also accept that this would have resource
implications. We do believe that such extended opening hours can only be beneficial in increasing
the importance of public registers as a means towards circulating information. However, we do not
think that the phrase 'all reasonable times' could be reasonably interpreted in a way as creating azyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
statutory duty for authorities maintaining registers to extend the times at which registers can be
inspected outside their normal opening hours. This provision was intended to prevent authorities
from reducing unreasonably the times at which registers can be inspected, thus creating a barrier to
the public who wants to consult registers, but not to allow members of the public to consult
registers whenever that suits them most. Thus, it would presumably be unreasonable for an
authority to restrict access one hour every week, or at times that would reasonably prevent people
from accessing the registers.
The case of Stirrat Park Hogg v. Dumbarton District Councit'" provides an important
precedent as to who is to be considered as members of the 'public' for having the right to inspect
registers. The case involved the right to inspect planning registers free of charge. It was held that
artificial legal persons, such as partnerships and limited companies, are not to be considered as
members of the public and consequently they cannot assert such a right for themselves. However,
657 Small v. Bickley [1875] 32 LT 726.
658 Section 2 of 26 and 27 Viet, c. 117. This statute and the facts of the case are irrelevant for registers,
however the way in which the term- 'reasonable times' was interpreted seems that it could be considered as a
Erecedent when interpreting the same terms concerning legislation on registers.
59 Above n. 655, at page 543.
660 Ibid at page 546.
661 Stirrat Park Hogg v. Dumbarton District Council (1996) SLT 1113. (Outer House, 1994). The case
involved the Scottish Planning register of planning applications set up by section 31 of the Town and
Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1972, but the provisions concerning planning registers are almost the same
in Scotland and England. -
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this has little practical implications since Lord Cameron of Lochbroom admitted thatzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA'this right as
it were benefits them only by reason that they are a legal person formed of a partnership of natural
persons to whom that right pertains' and consequently the applicant (a firm) had title and interest
to sue. He also accepted that the employee of the partnership was no more nor less than a member
of the public when they subsequently sought sight of the register. So, the exclusion of artificial
legal persons has little practical effect. Moreover, this appears to be inconsistent with the Directive
on the freedom of access to information on the environment, which states that environmental
information should be available 'to any natural or legal person,662. The Directive expressly creates
a right of access for an artificial legal person, consequently the term 'public' should have been
interpreted in a way consistent with EC law as to include an artificial legal person as well as a
natural person. In Stirrat Park Hogg v. Dumbarton District Council it was held that this was not the
case and we believe that the court's interpretation was erroneous as contrary to the EC Directive on
the freedom of access to environmental information.
Moreover, in the vast majority of cases the simple inspection of registers concerning the
environment is free. When this is the case it is usually mentioned to be so in the legislative text that
creates the register. However, when nothing is mentioned concerning charges for inspecting the
registers some authorities maintaining them have been tempted to levy such charges. In Stirrat
Park Hogg v, Dumbarton District Council it was argued inter alia by local authorities that since the
Scottish TCPA did not make any provision for the inspection of registers containing planning
applications to be free of charge, as it expressly provided for other planning registers (such as the
tree preservation orders register and registers of structure plans and local maps), it should be
deduced from a comparison of these expressions that the TCPA allowed charges to be levied by
way of necessary implication. This argument was rejected by Lord Cameron of Lochbroom who
held that silence on the matter of charge in the 1972 Act did not satisfy the rigorous test which had
to be passed before a statutory power to charge could be held to exist by necessary implication and
consequently, the decision to charge by the local authority was ultra vires.
So, in fact, there are three classes of registers in this regard. First, registers where it is
expressly stated that inspection is free of charge. Second, registers where there is an express power
to charge (either for inspection or for obtaining copies or both). Third, registers where the Act is
silent as to charges. In the last category, the presumption would be that no charges could be made
for an inspection of the register. In Stirrat Park Hogg v. Dumbarton District Council it was decided
that it cannot be concluded from the silence of the TCPA on whether local authorities could charge
for the inspection of the register of planning applications that they may levy such charges.
As regards the right to obtain photocopies of information present on registers is concerned,
even though copies are available most of the times (with the notable exception of planning
registers, see below), they are not free, and are subject to a reasonable charge. The fee schemes are
designed by each authority and as studies have shown, there can be important differences between
662 Article 3, paragraph 1, Directive 90/313IEEC and article 2, par. 5 of Directive 2003/41EC.
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charges, some authorities charging far higher prices than others.663 However, it is interesting to
mention that in the case of water registers set up under the Water Supply (Water Quality)
Regulations 1989 and maintained by water supply undertakers, people with a direct interest in the
water supply can obtain copies from the register free of charge.664 This can be probably explained
by the will of the government to increase public participation of people directly concerned with the
quality of water supplied by private companies: people receiving water through their own taps.
At this point, special mention must be made of regulation 5 of the Environmental
Information Regulations 1992. This regulation provided that where any piece of environmental
information was not covered by the Environmental Information Regulations 1992 but was required
to be made publicly available by other statutory provisions, arrangements for doing so must have
provided a similar procedure for that required for information covered by these Regulations. This
was very important since it aimed to unify the procedures that provided for access to environmental
information. Provisions concerning registers did fall under these provisions since they werezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
'information contained in records which are required [... ] to be made available for inspection by
every person who wishes to inspect them,665 and consequently they were not information covered
by the Environmental Information Regulations 1992.
More precisely, regulation 5 provided that every request for information relating to the
environment (made for the purposes of that provision, thus in the case of registers) had to be
responded to as soon as possible and in any case not later than two months. Moreover, in the case
of a refusal to make information available, the refusal ought to have been in writing and to specify
the reasons for the refusal. This was important as it provided the information to ascertain whether
the refusal was justified. Finally, the regulation provided that no charge that exceeded a reasonable
amount was to be made for making information relating to the environment available.
Thus, the 1992 Regulations distinguished between environmental information subject to
existing statutory regimes and other environmental information and required existing rights to
environmental information to come up to the standard specified in the regulations. On the contrary,
the 2004 Environmental Information Regulations make no special provisions for existing rights to
environmental information but just mention that they supersede any other statutory scheme of
access to information .. More precisely, paragraph 6 of regulation 5 of the 2004 Regulations
mentions that "Any enactment or rule of law that would prevent the disclosure of information in
accordance with these Regulations shall not apply". So, it is the provisions of the new regulations
that are applicable, as examined in the previous chapter.
663 See Burton above n. 5, at page 199.
664 According to section 30(2)(a) of The Water Supply (Water Quality) Regulations 1989 (SI 1147) as
amended, free copies from the register must be provided 'in the case of a person who receives a supply of
water in the zone and whose request is confined to information relating to that zone '.
665 Regulation 2(c)(ii). -
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ii) The duty of public authorities to maintain registerszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
Equally important to the duty of public authorities to provide upon request information
present on registers to any person that requests it, is the duty of public authorities to maintain the
registers by collecting, compiling and updating the informati0l! that has to be included on them. A
right to access environmental information present on a register is, of course, meaningless if there is
no information available. Also, as we have seen in the previous chapter, the relevant provisions on
active access to information of the 2003 Directive have no direct effect and the 2004 Regulations
do not go as far as creating a right for any person to receive environmental information without
making a prior request. Thus, the existence of public registers containing environmental
information is important, because public authorities are obliged to collect and maintain
compilations of environmental data that can be accessed at reasonable times by any member of the
public and this can be said to be a way of actively disseminating environmental information,
especially when registers are accessible online over the internet.
Registers, at the discretion of the authorities maintaining them, can generally be held either
in a computerised version or in a manual form. For instance, section 22(8) of the EPA 1990
concerning registers of Integrated Pollution Control provides that these registers may be kept in any
form. There is a problem (although of only theoretical importance) with older Acts that provide for
the existence of registers and which do not mention anything about the form in which registers can
be maintained. Concerning some of the oldest registers such as the planning registers, Parliament
could definitely have not implied that registers could be held in electronic form since computers
were a matter of science-fiction in the 40s. However, we can reasonably say that Parliament
intended to create a publicly available compilation of information and the form in which this could
be held was irrelevant to Parliament as long as the register fulfilled its aim of making information
publicly available.
Weight seems to been given to such an interpretation by the Aarhus Convention, which
promotes (although not creating a strict obligation) the creation of computerised registers.
Paragraph 9 of article 5 provides that'zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAeach party shall tak steps to establish progressively [... ] a
coherent nationwide system ofpollution inventories or registers on a structured, computerized and
publicly accessible database compiled through standardized reporting '. According to
Gavouneli'f", these provisions are not of great significance since most European states have
already established such mechanisms and these only aim to harmonise divergent national practices
and also serve an educational purpose especially for Eastern-Europe democracies. We do not
completely agree with this view. Of course, registers in electronic format already exist and some of
them ~e already available through the internetzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA667• But what this article provides for is for a single
electronic public database that will unify all sectoral registers into a single mechanism providing
666 Maria Gavouneli, Access to Information: Delimitation of a Right [2000] Tulane Environmental Law
Journal13, at page 319.
667 See for instance the electronic planning registers accessible over the internet, below at n. 699.
207
information. Its wording does not expressly create an obligation to set up such a mechanism into a
set period of time. However states parties to the convention will have to take at least some steps to
achieve this objective since the Aarhus Convention provides for a mechanism to review
compliance of the contracting parties with their obligations'f".
Also, registers are usually held at the principal or regional offices of the regulating
authority or the local authority in relation to the location where the environmental-related activity
takes place. For some sorts of registers multiple copies of the same registers (for instance the
nuclear Registers) are maintained at different levels (such as at local, regional and central level).zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
b) The nature of information contained on registers.
Information on registers includes data collected by the relevant regulating authorities
concerning pollution measurements as well as data handed in by operators of regulated activities in
compliance with a statutory duty to do so. Most of the times these include the amount of pollutants
emitted and measurements about the state of soil, water or air quality. Registers also include
copies of applications for authorisations to pollute or discharge into the environment and also
appeals against these acts and their outcome. They can also include details of criminal convictions
concerning regulated activities.
However, some type of information might be excluded from disclosure to the public, even
though it is included on the registers. There are two exemptions that apply to information
contained on registers: commercial confidentiality and national security.
When national security is concerned, it is normally the Secretary of State that defines what
information is to be treated as such669 and there is no possibility under the EPA 1990 for a member
of the public to challenge this decision. In contrast, as we have seen, there is a National Security
Appeals Panel as part of the Information Tribunal, which has competence for hearing appeals
against a certificate issued by a Minister of the Crown providing conclusive evidence that the
information requested by applicants under the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998, the
FOIA 2000 or the 2004 Regulations are matters of national security and thus it should not be
communicated. Anyone directly affected by the issue of such a certificate may appeal against it to
this panel.
668 At articles 15 and 16 of the Aarhus Convention.
669 See for an example section 65(1) of the EPA 1990: 'No information shall be included in a register
[concerning waste under s. 64] if and so long as, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, the inclusion in the
register of that information, or information of that description, would be contrary to the interests of national
security'. -
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Commercial confidentiality is usually defmed by reference to commercial interests of the
person concerned: if disclosure canzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA'prejudice to an unreasonable degree,670 commercial interests,
then it must not be permitted.
It is interesting to mention that this definition of commercial confidentiality is more
restrictive than the definition included in the Environmental Information Regulations 1992 as
amended by the Environmental Information (Amendment) Regulations 1998, which exempts from
disclosure any information that would affect the confidentiality of matters to which any
commercial or industrial confidentiality attaches. The new 2004 regulations adopt a similar
definition, the main difference being that additionally a legitimate economic interest has to be
protected by commercial confidentiality and that this confidentiality has to be provided by law.
This definition is the most recent of all. One would expect the Regulations to be more liberal than
the EPA 1990, since they are more recent and there has been a vast movement in the late 90's
toward a greater availability of information maintained by public bodies as demonstrated by the
Freedom of Information Act 2000. In the case of the Freedom of Information Act 2000, the test is
different again, since according to section 43(2) information is exempt from disclosure if its
disclosure would or would be likely to prejudice the commercial interests of any person. This test is
situated in between the commercial confidentiality as defined by the Environmental Information
Regulations 2004 which is the most liberal, and the test contained in the EPA 1990 which only
exempts from disclosure information when there is a prejudice to commercial interests and the
prejudice is 'to an unreasonable degree' .
Operators usually can ask that information they provide remains confidential under the
commercial confidentiality exemption. In that case it is for the authority that maintains the registers
to decide, though appeals are possible against refusals to the Secretary of State. Since until the
appeal is finally decided, information is kept out of the register, this could be a way to delay the
disclosure of information by operators who act in bad faith by lodging appeals just to delay
disclosure. Not surprisingly, there is no appeal procedure open for third parties to challenge an
exemption of information. After a period of time information is treated as not being commercially
confidential and is declassified671 unless its owner applies for a renewal of the exemption. In the
case of information being excluded from disclosure due to commercial confidentiality, but not in
the case of national security, there is a mention in the register that indicates the existence of the
information. Moreover, when it's in the public interest that commercially confidential information
be disclosed, the Secretary of State can direct that such information be placed on the registers672•
This provision is similar to the balance test that is provided in the Environmental Information
670 Section 22(11) EPA 1990.
671 See for an example section 66(8) of the EPA 1990: 'Information excluded from a register shall be treated
as ceasing to be commercially confidential for the purposes of this section at the expiry of the period of four
years beginning with the date of the determination by virtue of which it was excluded; but the person who
furnished it may apply to the authority for the information to remain excluded from the register on the ground
that it is still commercially confidential and the authority shall determine whether or not that is the case'.
672 See Section 22(7) of the EPA 1990.
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Regulations 2004: disclosure must be performed in all cases when the public interest in maintaining
the exception outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
B) Categories of registers containing environmental information.
We are not going to describe every single public register in detail, because on the one hand,
this has already been done to some extentzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA673 and on the other hand the law in this area is evolving
so rapidly that any attempt to describe all statutory provisions involved would almost immediately
become out of date. Instead, we shall be describing very briefly the public registers incorporating
environmental information that seem to raise particularly interesting points, depending on whether
information is placed on registers held at local level by local authorities or private undertakers, the
Environment Agency or directly by the government. It must be said that copies of some registers
are held at other places (usually at local level), but our classification will take into consideration the
authority responsible for maintaining the register and updating it.
Also, we shall not describe in every detail statutory provisions that create environmental
registers since this would be tedious and as explained above, not very useful. We shall instead very
briefly mention and describe some of the registers which adopt, on some points, different solutions
from the main general Acts in the area of access to environmental informationt". Concerning the
rest of statutory registers, for the sake of completeness, we shall refer the reader to the Annex to
this work which contains an extensive list of all the different environmental-related registers.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
1) Public Registers maintained at local level.
As mentioned above, at local level registers are either maintained by local authorities or by
some private undertakers, such as water and sewerage companies.
Local authorities have a statutory duty to maintain a multitude of different public registers.
We shall not be examining them all in this part otherwise than in a very general overview of them,
with the exception of planning registers. We shall make an in-depth examination of planning
registers in order to demonstrate the incoherence of creating a general right to information (first
with the environmental information regulations and then with the Freedom of Information Act)
whilst maintaining in force particular statutory provisions that provide for public registers.
673 See Environment facts: a guide to using public registers of environmental information, Department of
Environment 1995. Also see Gisele Bakkenist, Environmental Information: Law, Policy and Experience,
Cameron May 1994. However, caution must be taken with this work because much of it is out of date.
674 Namely the Freedom of Information Act 2000, the Local Government Act 1972, the Environmental
Information Regulations 1992 as amended in 1998 and the Environmental Information Regulations 2004.
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Planning registers are the best example to test this argument, since they are one of the oldest public
registers dating back to 1947 and they are also one of the most used public registers675•zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
a) The Planning registers.
Planning Registers are the 0ldest676 registers containing environmental information since
they date back (for the register of planning applications) to the Town and Country Planning Act
1947. It is also one of the most consulted registers and local associations and conservation groups
often have a practice of regularly inspecting the registers.677
There are five different types of registers that contain planning-related information: the
register of planning applications, the register of enforcement and stop notices, the register of tree
preservation orders, the register of structure and local plans and finally the register of listed
buildings and places .of historical interest. We will talk only about the first three of them, since they
are the ones that are most interesting, in our view.
i) The register of planning applications and consents.
This register is set up under section 69 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 and
article 25 of the Town and Country Planning (General Development Procedure) Order 1995678• The
Register of applications is in two parts and is held by every planning authority.
The first part of the register contains a copy of every planning application together with
any accompanying plans and drawings. The second part of the register contains a permanent record
of the application along with plans and drawings and the particulars of subsequent decisions or
directions. The register also contains details on certificates of lawfulness of existing or proposed
use or development issued by the local authority. To enable any person to trace any entry in the
register the register must include an index that takes the form of a map.
The Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 1999679
also provide in regulations 20 and 21 for the inclusion in this register of details concerning the
process of Environmental Impact assessment. This includes details of the environmental impact
statement submitted, reasons, directions and opinions of local authorities relating to this statement.
675 This can easily be deducted from research undertaken by Rowan-RobinsonzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAet al., ee above n.652, at page
24, table I.
676 According to A-M. Sanders and J. Rothnie, Planning Registers - Their Role in Promoting Public
Participation, [1996] JPL 539, 'Registers of planning applications were first introduced in 1948 and are the
oldest form of register containing environmental information'.
677 See Michael Purdue, Cases and Materials on Planning Law, Sweet & Maxwell, London 1977, page 150.
Since this was the case 27 years ago, it should also be the same today, in a society where environmental-
awareness and public participation have become very important
678 Town andzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBACountry Planni g (General Development Procedure) Order 1995, SI 1995/419.
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According to section 69(5) of the TCPA 1990 every register shall be available for
inspection by the public at all reasonable hours.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
ii) The Register of enforcement and stop notices.
This register is set up under section 188 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 and
under article 25 of the Town and Country Planning (General Development Procedure) Order 1995.
It includes details relating to an enforcement notice, stop notice or breach of condition notice
served by local planning authorities.
According to section 188(5) of the TCPA 1990 every register shall be available for
inspection by the public at all reasonable hours.
iii) Registers of Tree Preservation Orders.
This register is set up by sections 199 and 212 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990
and under regulation 3 of the Town and Country Planning (Trees) Regulations 1999680•
Tree preservation orders are orders with respect to trees, groups of trees or woodlands
issued by local planning authorities when it is expedient to make provision for the preservation of
trees or woodlands in their area. These orders specify the land, the trees and the permission that is
required before trees can be cut and also provide for replanting requirements. Copies of the orders
are to be made available for inspection, free of charge, at all reasonable hours, at the offices of the
authority by whom the order was made. The register also contains notices made according to
section 211 of the TCPA 1990 concerning trees in conservation areas. These notices are made by
owners of land before starting any operation concerning their trees.
b) Is there a right to obtain copies of the documents
in the planning register?
Although today, as analysed in the previous chapter, there is a right to obtain copies of
documents under the new Environmental Information Regulations 2004, which mention that any
environmental information should be, in principle, disclosed in the format requested, the position
was not straightforward before. We believe it is interesting to examine what was the position before
the new regulations, as it helps highlighting the importance of these new regulations, which
679 The Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) (England and Wales) Regulations
1999, SI 1999/293.
680 The Town and Country Planning (Trees) Regulations 1999, SI 1999/1892 ..
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explicitly apply to any environmental information, even if covered by other statutory provisions on
disclosure.
The question of the right to obtain copies of information present on the planning registers
was a complex one, probably due to the fact that they date back to 1947, when the technique of
making photocopies was not available. Also, although the TCPA has been amended a lot, the
provisions concerning registers have not varied much over the time in order to reflect the trend of
public administration towards greater openness. Sanders and Rothnie681 state thatzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA'the legislation
does allow charges to be levied for copies of entries in the planning register' and that in the
research they conducted concerning planning registers some local planning authorities 'did not
permit copies to be taken, notwithstanding the legal position'. However, the authors do not
expressly cite which statutory provisions create this right, but the clear implication is that there is a
right provided by a piece of legislation to obtain copies of information present on planning
registers. We shall try to locate this 'phantom' piece of legislation.
There is not any provision in the TCPA 1990 or in any delegate legislation made under it
concerning a right to obtain photocopies of information present on any planning register,
consequently if such a right exists, it does not arise under planning legislation.
Could such a right have been created by the Environmental Information Regulations 1992
? This is doubtful for two reasons. Firstly, the Regulations do not create a duty on public authorities
to allow copies of environmental information to be made. They merely create a duty for public
bodies to make environmental information available, and it is for each particular authority to
implement the practical arrangements. This seems to be consistent with the 1990 Directive which
provides that practical arrangements concerning the availability of information are to be defined by
member states. Secondly, as described above, the Environmental Information Regulations 1992 do
not apply to information contained on registers required to be made available for inspection by
everyone. This seems to be the view of David Woolley who cites as an example of information
exempt from communication under the 1992 Regulations the 'register of actions and decisions
under the Town and Country Planning Acts,682 (however see the discussion on this point in the
chapter concerning the Directive).
The only statutory provision that could create such a right to obtain copies is the Local
Government Act (Access to Information) 1985 insofar as it amends the Local Government Act
1972. The Local Government Act (Access to Information) 1985 provides for greater access of the
public to meetings of local authorities, allows public access to the agenda and connected officers'
reports of meetings in advance of meetings, inspection of background papers before and after
meetings and places a duty on local authorities to publish some other documents. Copies of all
these documents can be obtained on payment of a reasonable fee. The only logical possibility to
681 See above n. 655, at page 545.
682 David Woolley et al., Environmental Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2000. See Chapter 5 on
Environmental Information, written by Woolley, page 152.
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make this Act apply to planning registers would be to consider the registers as background
papers683 for the reports submitted to meetings of local authorities. Although we believe such an
interpretation of the Act would be logical, it has been rejected by Lord Cameron of Lochbroom inzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
Stirrat Park Hogg v. Dumbarton District Councif84 as 'wholly incongruous'. According to his
Lordship the fact that a local authority's official consulted and relied to information present on a
register, does not constitute the register as a background paper.
Surely, there are two different arguments in this case. First, the Local Planning authority
was purporting to charge for inspection of the planning register. It would be incongruous for such a
right to apply just because a planning permission was part of background papers or referred in such
papers. Second, it is unclear whether the 1972 Act authorises charges for copies of background
papers. This Act does authorises charges to be made, but only for documents that can be considered
as background papers and does not extend to the planning registers.
Moreover, according to section 100G(3)(b) of the Local Government Act 1972 at the
offices of each principal council there shall be kept a written summary of rights to inspect and copy
documents and to be furnished with documents which are conferred by the Local Government Act
and by 'such other enactment as the Secretary of State by order specifies'. Under this provision was
enacted the Local Government (Inspection of Documents) (Summary of Rights) Order 1986685,
which does not appear to have ever been expressly repealed and is so still in force. This order
mentions the planning registers by reference to the TCPA of 1971686• It could therefore be argued
that the right to be furnished with copies of documents from registers was created by this order. We
think that such an interpretation would not conform to the wording of the order. The Local
Government (Inspection of Documents) (Summary of Rights) Order 1986 does not intend to alter
previous statutory rights in any manner. Its aim is just to make an official summary of statutory
provisions that give a right' to inspect and copy documents and to be furnished with documents ,687.
Moreover, even if we accept that this Order had as necessary implication that the right to be
furnished with copies has been extended to the registers mentioned in it, this would be a matter for
the courts to decide. However, we do not believe that the inclusion of planning registers under the
TCPA 1971 in this instrument was more than an unintentional error. Of course the fact that the
Order has not been amended to reflect changes in planning legislation and still refers to the TCPA
1971, which has been repealed by the TCPA 1990 does not alter any of these conclusions since
683 Under section 100D of the Local Government Act 1972. See on this point Patrick Birkinshaw,
Government and In/ormation, The Law Relating to Access, Disclosure and Regulation, Butterworths, London
1990, page 167. .
684 See above n. 661, at page 1117.
685 Local Government (Inspectionof'Documents) (Summary of Rights) Order 1986, SI 1986/854.
686 'Town and Country Planning Act 1971: section 34(3) including that subsection insofar as it has been
applied by section 60(2)(a) to tree preservation orders under section 60(1)
section 54(8)
section 61A(7)
section 92A(4)' Ibid, tabulation mentioned in the Schedule to the Order.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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according to section 17(2)(a) of the Interpretation Act 1978 when anAct is consolidated, references
in any enactment to the previous Act that has been consolidated is supposed to refer to the
equivalent provisions of the new consolidated Act of 1990688•
Consequently, it has been demonstrated that as long ~s planning registers are concerned,
there was no duty arising under any express legal provision (before the coming into force of the
new 2004 environmental information regulations) to provide copies of documents present on these
registers. However, some local authorities operate a policy of allowing copies to be made if a
charge is paid689, but they were not under any statutory duty to do so and consequently it was not
available as a matter of right but of indulgence.
Finally, to make matters even more complicated, section 21 of the Freedom of Information
Act 2000 totally exempts from the applicability of the Act matters reasonably accessible to the
public by other means than under this Act. Information is deemed to be reasonably accessible when
the public authority is obliged under any other enactment to communicate it to members of the
public on request,zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA'otherwise than by making the information available for tnspection'[", Since, as
demonstrated above, there was no statutory duty to make information available on planning
registers otherwise than by allowing the registers to be inspected at all reasonable hours, it seems
that this exemption did not apply to planning registers. Thus information present on them would
have to be available under the Freedom of Information Act which provides a right to obtain copies!
Whether this consequence was intended by the Act is doubtful.
Subsequently, the question arises whether local planning authorities have also a power to
charge for such copies. In R v Richmond upon Thames LEC Ex p. McCarthyzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA& Stone691 it was held
that they could not charge for their services without express or implied statutory authority. Where
planning registers are concerned, it ~ppears that charges could be made on the basis of the 1992
regulations. These regulations even though, as explained above, did not create a right to obtain
copies (since it was for each public body holding environmental information to choose by which
means it would make such information available) provided that no charge exceeding a reasonable
amount should be made for making information relating to the environment available. The new
2004 Regulations also provide that only reasonable charges can be made. Concerning these copies
687 Section 100G(3)(b), Local Government Act 1972 as amended by the Local Government (Access to
Information) Act 1985.
688 Interpretation Act 1978 (c. 30) section 17 (2)(a): 'Where an Act repeals and re-enacts, with or without
modification, a previous enactment then, unless the contrary intention appears,--
(a) any reference in any other enactment to the enactment so repealed shall be construed as a reference to
the provision re-enacted; '. See also on this point Francis Bennion, Statutory Interpretation: A code, 3rd
edition 1997, Butterworths, page 230 on adaptation of references.
689 For an example see the London Borough of Merton policy on charging for copies from planning registers
at its website: http://www.merton.gov.ukllandcharges/fees.asp
690 Section 21(2)(b) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (c. 36).zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
691 R v Richmond upon Thames LBC Ex p. McCarthy & Stone [1992] JPL 467 (HL).
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the recent planning green paper states that:zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA"we acce t that local authorities should charge for any
hard copies they produce but these charges must be reasonable ,,692.
Consequently, it seems (as we shall explain in the following paragraph) that local planning
authorities are bound not to charge the full cost of copies, but to subsidise a part of the copying
costs.
However, it should be noted that some information present on planning registers might also
be present on the Local Land Charges Register693, which are registers that contain all charges that
affect property and are maintained by local authorities. Part 3 of the Local Land Charges Register
which contains all information concerning planning charges, contains also some information
concerning planning charges also present in the planning registers. To avoid duplication of
registers, Rule 7 of the Local Land Charges Rules 1977694 provides that when a planning charge or
other charge which are required to be entered in the register have been entered in other registers
maintained and kept open for public inspection in pursuance of a statutory obligation, it shall be
sufficient to enter in the Land Charges register a reference to the other register. The Local Land
Charges Register can be searched by anyone and copies of information present on it can be
obtained on payment of a fee. These fees for inspection and copies can be found in the Schedule 3
to the Local Land Charges Rules 1977. This charging scheme is quite expensive, probably due to
the fact that Land Charges Registers are mostly and almost exclusively used for conveyancing
purposes and thus provide a value-added service to professionals in this area for which it is normal
to pay. These fees cannot objectively be considered as 'reasonable fees' as the environmental
information Directives provide since they seem to cover at least the full cost of providing the
information. The European Court of Justice has ruled in Commission v. Federal Republic of
Germanl95 that the term 'reasonable fees' for the purposes of Article 5 of the Information
Directive must be understood as meaning that Member States are not authorised to pass on to those
seeking information the entire amount of the costs actually incurred in conducting an information
search.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIn Land Charges Registers, fees for performing searches (even when performed by the
applicant himself) are charged at very high rates, which seem to reflect at least the entire cost of the
service. For example, for a personal search in the whole or in part of the register the charge is 10
pounds696 and if the search extends to more than one parcel of land 1 pound697 per supplementary
parcel is charged subject to a maximum of 13 pounds.
692 See the Government's Green Paper on Planning, Planning: Delivering a Fundamental Change, published
12 December 2001, paragraph 5.62 . Needless to say, the green paper is not a legally binding instrument.
Available from the DTLR website at http://www.planning.dtlr.gov.uk/consultlgreenpap/index.htm
693 Local Land charges Registers and are set up under the Local Land Charges Act 1975 (c. 76).
694 Local Land Charges Rules 1977, SI 1977/985.
695 Judgement of the European Court of Justice (Sixth Chamber) of 9 September 1999 in Case C-217/97:
Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany, Official Journal of the E.C., C
352,04/12/1999 p. 3
696 Fees substituted by SI 1998/1190 (Local Land Charges (Amendment) Ru!es 1998, Sch. 1, Para. 1.
697 Ibid.
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This is clearly a way to obtain copies of information present on planning registers, thus
bypassing the legal imbroglio described above. However, not all information present on planning
registers is also present on the Local Land Charges Register.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAAn example of th s is etails of
conditional planning permissions issued before the 1st August 1977698 which are not held on the
Local Land Charges Register, but may be inspected at the Planning register.
It has to be conceded, that the issue raised above may have limited practical significance
since now some planning registers can be accessed online via the internet, thus permitting for the
cyber-users of the registers to make copies of planning documents that appear on their computer
screens699• However, these registers (open to everyone even geographically situated at the other end
of the globe), pose problems of confidentiality of data present on them. For instance, drawings of
houses can depict with great details the interior organisation of buildings thus permitting intruders
to enter more easily the premises. Also, planning applicants may not wish their personal data that
appears on planning documents (name, telephone, home address, etc) to be readily available online
to anyone. These definitely are problems that should be addressed before opening registers held
electronically to the internet. In any case, due to the high costs incurred for setting up and
maintaining such electronic registers, some small planning authorities may take a lot of time to
implement such registers, at least until they are under a statutory duty to do it. The Aarhus
Convention seems to create such a duty in paragraph 3 of article 5, but it only applies to
information already available in electronic form. This means that authorities do not have a duty to
transform manually held registers in electronic ones, but if they do have electronic registers, they
should open them to public scrutiny through the interneeoo. This obligation, however, is drafted in
a fairly innocuous language that might not prove very effective. For instance, the words 'shall
ensure ... progressively' that are used do not seem to create anything more than a weak obligation
to consider making information publicly available through the internet. There is no specified time
limit for the implementation, so states may take ages to fully implement this obligation.
Thus, before the entry into force of the new regulations, the confused position of planning
registers was definitely a matter of concern. It seems that in the case of planning registers there
were four different legal instruments that seemed to overlap on the same subject: the TCPA 1990,
the Environmental Information Regulations 1992, the Local Government Act 1972 and the
698 Pursuant to section 2(e) of the Local Land Charges Act 1977, which states that: 'The following matters are
not local land charges [... ] (e) a condition or limitation subject to which planning permission was granted at
any time before the commencement of this Act ... '.
699 See for an example the electronic planning register of the London Borough of Wandsworth, which holds
in electronic form all applications and all related documents and drawings online and accessible from
virtually anywhere at anytime. That are definitely 'reasonable times' for the public to access the registers!
Their website address is
http://www.wandsworth.gov.uklHomelEnvironmentandTransportlPlanningService/default.htm
700 Paragraph 3 of Article 5 of the Aarhus Convention read as follows: 'Each party shall ensure that
environmental information progressively becomes available in electronic databases which are accessible to
the public through public telecommunications networks. Information accessible in this form should include
[... ] (d) Other information, to the extent that the availability of such information would facilitate the
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Freedom of Information At 2000. This is definitely a problem that might have led to some
incongruous situations where although a person had a right to obtain copies under one of these
Acts, he could have seen his claim refused because he had based his request of information on the
wrong legal instrument.
The position is very different today, as the new Environmental Information Regulations
2004 set out minimum standards applicable in respect to access to all environmental information,
regardless of whether they are also covered under other enactments.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
2) Other registers maintained at local level.
a) Trade effluent registers.
Under section 196 of the Water Industry Act 1991, local sewerage undertakers have a
statutory duty to maintain registers containing copies of consents, directions, agreements and
notices relating to the discharge of trade effluent into public sewers. Details included are the name
and address of the premises from where the effluents are discharged, a description of the process
. producing the waste and limits concerning the maximum quantity allowed to discharge.
According to BakkeniseOzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAI this register suffers fr m lack of detailed information. Since
there is no record of which sewage treatment works receives the trade effluent and no monitoring
data is placed on the registers, it is difficult to identify which business produces which waste and to
evaluate whether consents to discharge and conditions attached to them are complied with.
This problem with the trade effluent register not being detailed enough, contrasts with the
fact that other registers are criticised as being too detailed and thus too complex, such as the waste
management registers (see below). Obviously, it seems to be difficult to find a balance between
extreme complexity and lack of essential information. This demonstrates one of the major
disadvantages of public registers: that they may leave important parts of information outside their
scope. It also demonstrates an important advantage of public registers: that they can make it easier
for the lay public to understand environmental information by omitting too technical arguments and
complicated amounts of data.
It is interesting to mention that these trade effluent registers were set up under the Water
Resource Act 1991 in order to make some information about trade effluent accessible to the public.
Just before this Act required more publicity regarding trade effluents to be made through these
registers, the situation was totally different since according to section 68 of the Public Health Act
1961 it was a criminal offence for a water pollution inspector to disclose details of effluent passing
application of national law implementing the convention, provided that such information is already available
in electronic form'.
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to sewers. This Act has been repealed702but it is interesting to see this shift from total secrecy,
which is even protected through criminal sanctions, to the opening up to the public of all this
information. It raises the question of whether these criminal penalties were really protecting
information that was in need to be protected by criminal law from disclosure. We can doubt it
because if it would have been the case, there should not have been such a radical change in attitude:
passing immediately703from a state of complete secrecy of trade effluent information to a state of
openness through trade effluent registers.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
b) Other miscellaneous registers.
There are of course multitudes of other registers that contain environmental-related
information and are maintained by local authorities. The reader can find a list of these registers in
the Annex. They cover a wide variety of subjects ranging from registers of stray dogs seized by
local authorities?", to the noise abatement zones register which contains details of zones
designated by local authorities as noise abatement zones where noise levels of particular activities
should be kept under certain levels. A very interesting enactment to note is the Environment and
Safety Information Act 1988, which requires the authorities who enforce four major safety, fire and
environmental laws to set up public registers containing details of enforcement notices they have
served_705
3) Public Registers maintained by the Environment Agency.
In 1995, the functions of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Pollution, the National Rivers
Authority and local waste regulation authorities were brought together into the Environment
Agency. As a consequence, registers concerning matters dealt by these authorities and formerly
701 See above n.653, at page 180.
702 This particular provision has been repealed by Paragraph 1 of Schedule 3(1) to the Water Consolidation
(Consequential Provisions) Act 1991 (c. 60). Surprisingly, the fact that this repeal has taken place has been
missed by Bakkenist (1994) who states that s. 68 of the Public Health Act 1961 is still anzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA'anomaly of the
trade effluent information'. See above n. 653, at page 180.
703 The Water Resources Act 1991 that created the trade effluent register and the Water Consolidation
(Consequential Provisions) Act 1991 that repealed the offence of disclosure received Royal assent on the
same day: the 25th July 1991.
704 Maintained under section 149(8) of the EPA 1990.
70S Listed in Schedule 3 to the 1988 Act. These are notices made under various powers: the Fire Precautions
Act 1971, the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974, the Safety of Sports Grounds Act 1975, and the Food
and Environment Protection Act 1985.
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maintained by them, namely activities concerning water quality and pollution, waste activities, and
Integrated Pollution Control, are now handled by the Environment Agency.706zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
a) The Water Quality And Pollution Control Public
Register.
The main register concerning the condition of inland waters and watercourses is the Water
Quality And Pollution Control Public Register, maintained under section 190 of the Water
Resources Act 1991 and prescribed by the Control of Pollution (Applications, Appeals and
Registers) Regulations 1996707.This register contains details on notices of water quality objectives
served by the Environment Agency under section 83 of the Water Resources Act 1991, applications
for consents to discharge or for variation of an existing consent, discharge consents, consent
conditions and any variations.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIt also contains details from samples of water or effluent taken by
the Environment Agency or other persons, the result of their analysis and any steps taken by the
Agency as a consequence. The register also contains details of enforcement taken by the
Environment Agency in relation to water protection as well as details of prosecutions and criminal
convictions of consent holders.
It must be noted, that under section 202(2) of the Water Resources Act 1991, the Agency
or the Minister of agriculture or the Secretary of State have the power to serve on any person a
notice requiring him to furnish within a specified period of time such information as is reasonably
required for the purpose of carrying out any of their functions under the water pollution provisions
of the Act. Refusal or omission to comply with the notice is a criminal offence. Section 202(3)
grants the power to the aforementioned ministers to limit the scope of these powers by making
regulations for restricting the information which may be required and for determining the form in
which the information is to be so required. However, such regulations have not (yet) been made
and consequently these far-reaching statutory provisions stand as they are.
InzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAR v Hertfordshire CC ExzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAp. Green Environmental Industries Ltd708 it was held that the
powers granted by these provisions extended to (as it is indicated in the Act) 'any person' and
consequently they cannot be read as extending only to holders of licenses under the Act, as claimed
by the defendant. The case did not involve section 202 of the Water Resources Act but the powers
conferred to the Environment Agency by Part II of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 on the
disposal and treatment of Waste. Since they are drafted in a similar way, we can reasonably apply
this finding to all similar powers to requisition information. These similar powers to requisite
information from 'any person' are contained in: section 71 of the Environmental Protection Act
706 On the registers maintained by the Environment Agency, see Public Registers of Environmental
In.(~rination,Environment Agency, 1999.
70 Control of Pollution (Applications, Appeals and Registers) Regulations 1996, (SI 2971)
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1990 (on Waste on Land); section 19 of the EPA 1990 (on Integrated Pollution Control and Air
Pollution Control); section 135A of the Water Industry Act 1991 (on special category effluents)
and section 202 of the Water Resources Act 1991 (on the pollution of controlled waters, see
above).
According to Woolley709, 'the existence of the power to require the provision of
information is a reminder that the dissemination of information about the environment is a bilateral
process, involving obligations upon the subject as much as on regulatory bodies which have a duty
to keep registers and to make their contents available to the public'. We totally disagree with such
an approach.
Firstly, these provisions to demand information have not been enacted to allow or even
facilitate dissemination of information. As indicated in the relevant statutory provisions,
information is to be asked for in cases where it is reasonably required for the exercise of regulatory
functions concerning environmental protection (such as the protection of inland waters etc).
Consequently, these provisions are not directly connected with the duty on public authorities to
disseminate environmental information, because their purpose is not to achieve this goal either
directly or indirectly, but to allow regulatory authorities to perform their functions. Of course, some
of the data collected through this method can subsequently be placed on public registers or
communicated to the public under the Environmental Information Regulations, but this cannot
alter, in any way, the consequence that provisions to demand environmental information are not
connected with and do not serve dissemination of information. Otherwise all investigating activities
and enforcement procedures undertaken by environmental protection authorities, would be taken to
serve the purpose of disseminating information, which is of course absurd.
Secondly, we cannot agree with the fact that dissemination of information is a bilateral
process involving obligations between the subject (people that provide information) and the
regulatory bodies which have a duty to inform the public. Similarly as before, the bilateral
relationship between the regulator and the regulated is not one involving dissemination of
information to the public but rather one of a 'cat and mouse' situation where the regulator tries,
using information as a means to find how the regulated is performing his statutory obligations, to
keep him in the legal boundaries of his activities and to take enforcement if necessary. However,
dissemination of information is a process not between the regulator and the regulated, but between
the regulator and the public. And it does not involve bilateral obligations, but a unilateral obligation
of the regulator to provide environmental information to the public. This information concerns the
regulator's activities and fields of action and can be gathered by all possible means, which include
provisions allowing requisition of information.
Moreover it must be added, that the Environment Agency and water undertakers are under
a reciprocal duty pursuant to section 203 of the Water Resource Act 1991 to circulate informationzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
708 R. v Hertfordshire CC Ex p. Green Environmental Industries Ltd [1998] JPL 481 (CA).
709 See above n. 682, at page 173, paragraph 5.51.
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between them concerning water quality and water pollution incidents. Information is to be
circulated free of charge. It is interesting to note that although the Secretary of State has the power
to enforce performance of these duties by water undertakers, the Environment Agency has no such
power'", It is very interesting to note that although under the Water Resources Act there is the
standard exclusion from the duty to disclose information which is commercially confidential to the
public unless consent is given by the provider of information, information obtained through this
provision is exempt from this exemption. According to section 204(2)(c) of the Act, restrictions on
subsequent disclosure do not apply, making such information available to the public. The means of
accessing it may vary, depending on whether or not it has been placed on a register. If it is on the
register, it should be accessed by the public through provisions regulating the register, and if not,
nothing seems to prevent the Environmental Information Regulations from applying. As analysed
before, if the provisions on registers do not conform to the environmental information directive and
Aarhus, then they should be interpreted in light of it.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
b)zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAOther egisters maintained by the Environment
Agency.
Important public registers are also these concerning Integrated Pollution Control and have
been set out in Part I of the EPA 1990711• The interesting part of these registers is the 'commercial
confidentiality' exemption (section 22(1», which as discussed above is a more liberal exemption
than the one present in the Freedom of Information Act 2000 on commercial confidentiality, but
less liberal than the one in the Environmental Information Regulations 2004.
It is also interesting to note that some of the information contained in this register has to be
sent to the European Commission in the form of a triennial report which lists emissions of
industrial facilities into the air and water of 50 pollutants. This information is then placed on the
European Pollutant Emission Register (EPER), which is freely accessible online.?"
Concerning the other registers that are maintained by the Environment Agency, we shall
refer the reader to the Annex.
4) Environmental Registers maintained by the Government or central agencies.
710 Water Resources Act 1991, section 203(5).zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
7II In sections 20 t022 of the Environmental Protection Act 1990.
712 See the Commission Decision of 17 July 2000 on the implementation of a European pollutant emission
register (EPER) according to Article 15 of Council DirectivezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA96/61lEC concern n integrated pollution
prevention and control (IPPC), OJ L 192/36,281712000.
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a) The Genetically Modified Organisms Public
Register of Deliberate Releases and Consents to
MarketzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
The control of use and dissemination in the environment of genetically modified organisms
(hereinafter GMO's) are matters regulated by EC law. On the one hand there is Council DirectivezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
90/219IEEC713 on the contained use of genetically modified micro-organisms as amended, and on
the other hand there is the recent Directive 2001l18IEC714 of the European Parliament and the
Council on the deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms (which
replaced Directive 90/212IEEC). These Directives have been incorporated into British law in part
VI of the EPA.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA715 We are not going to discuss the mechanism set up by these provisions in order to
regulate the use and dissemination in the environment ofGMO's. However, in these instruments as
we shall examine further on, public information is viewed as an indispensable instrument in order
to protect the environment and inform the public.
Under sections 122 and 123 of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 was created a public
register on GMO's that is held by the Environment Agency on behalf of the Secretary of State for
the Environment. Details of the register are included in the Genetically Modified Organisms
(Deliberate Releases) Regulations 2002716 and the Genetically Modified Organisms (Contained
Use) Regulations 2000717• Each of these two sets of regulations provides for a different register, but
we shall examine them together.
The system of regulation of the use and dissemination ofGMO's is substantially based on
information mechanisms. Persons who acquire, release or market GMO's are bound to undertake a
risk assessment and in some cases to notify to the Secretary of State the assessment and other sorts
of information prescribed by the regulations. In some cases, these activities may require the express
consent of the Secretary of State, which can also impose conditions or even prohibition notices. In
any case, the Directives concerning GMO's place great importance in circulation of information
between the companies that handle GMO's, state authorities responsible for monitoring and the
general public. Registers include details of prohibition notices issued under section 110 of the EPA
1990. They also include details of applications for consents and consents granted or refused, the
713 Council Directive 90/219IEEC of 23 April 1990 on the contained use of genetically modified micro-
organisms (O.J.E.C. No. LI17, 8.5.90, p. 1), as amended by Commission Directive 94/51IEC of7 November
1994 (O.J.E.C. L297, 18.11.94, p. 29) and Council Directive 98/81IEC of26 October 1998 (O.J.E.C .. No.
L330, 5.12.98, p. 13).
714 Directive 2001l18IEC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 March 2001 on the deliberate
release' into the environment of genetically modified organisms and repealing Council Directive 90/2201EEC,
OJEC L 106 17.04.2001 p.1.
715 Directive 2001l181EC, has been transposed in England by the Genetically Modified Organisms
(Deliberate Release) Regulations 2002 (SI 2002/2443).
716 Originally the Genetically Modified Organisms (Deliberate Releases) Regulations 1992, SI 1992/3280,
replaced by the Genetically Modified Organisms (Deliberate Release) Regulations 2002 (SI 2002/2443).
71 The Genetically Modified Organisms (Contained Use) Regulations 2000, (SI 2000/2831), amended by the
Genetically Modified Organisms (Contained Use) (Amendment) Regulations 2002, (SI 2002/63).
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general description of the GMO's, the location at which the GMO's are to be released, the general
purpose for which the GMO's will be released, the dates of the release, the methods and plans for
monitoring the GMO's and for emergency response. Very importantly, the registers include the
evaluation of the environmental impact of the genetically modified organisms and either the
conditions or limitations in accordance with which the consent has been granted, or a summary of
the reasons why the consent was not granted. The registers also include any new information,
which becomes available with regard to any risks there exist of damage to the environment, and the
effects of any release to the environment. Finally the registers also contain details of any
convictions for any offence, the name and address of the person convicted, the description of any
GMO's in relation to which the conviction was obtained, the offence which was committed, the
penalty imposed and any order made by the Court for remedial action. Also are included details of
accidents involving GMO's (accidental releases into the environment etc).
Placing environmental information on registers is one of the means to achieve the public
information objectives that are present in the Directives on GMO's.
Consistently with provisions concerning all other registers, the EPA in section 123
provides an exemption from inclusion on the registers of any information that the Secretary of State
considers is commercially confidential or affecting national security. Concerning commercially
confidential information, such information can be excluded only if the person concerned applies to
the Secretary of State for it to be excluded. Even if such an application is granted, this 'privilege'
lapses after a period of four years and the process has to be repeated.
We must make special mention of two characteristics of the information to be included on
GMO's registers.
Firstly, some information must be included on the registers notwithstanding being
commercially confidential. This exception from the commercial confidentiality exemption covers
information viewed as particularly important by the European-Union and it consists of a
description of the GMO's, the name of the notifier, the place where these organisms will be
released or used, details of the methods and means of controlling their use, details on dissemination
and accidental response as well as evaluation of foreseeable effects on the environment on human
health. This duty stems from the Directives regulating the use ofGMO's718 and section 123 of the
EPA 1990. The EPA also grants powers719 to the Secretary of State to add by regulations other
descriptions of information that are to be included on the registers despite being commercially
confidential, when it is in the public interest. However, these powers not only have not been used,
but also all regulations made by the Secretary of State concerning GMO's registers have been more
restrictive than the spirit of the EPA, which as this provision demonstrates, is to promote openness.
The regulations that concern the register of deliberate releases do not depart from the
aforementioned provisions of the EPA but rather contain more detailed provisions on thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
718 Article 19 of DirectivezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA90/219/EC; article 19 of Directive 90/220/EC; article 25 of Directive 2001l18/EC.
719 Section 123 (7). -
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information that is to be included. On the contrary, the regulation that concerns the register of
contained uses of GMO's contains a loophole that permits for information that normally would be
included on the register even though it is commercially confidential, not to be, in order to protect
intellectual property rights of the notifier of such information. ~s Bakkenist correctly points out,720
this exception is not mentioned in the Directives and thus is totally in breach ofEC law. It can also
be added that it is contrary to section 123 of the EPA which, as mentioned before, only provides for
the Secretary of State to add classes of information to the list of information subject to appear on
registers despite it being commercially confidential. He is not granted any powers to reduce such
information, thus making less information available to the public than provided in the Act itself. On
these grounds, it appears that regulation 22(8) of the Genetically Modified Organisms (Contained
Use) Regulations 2000 could be challenged as beingzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAultra vires.
On top of that, the Genetically Modified Organisms (Contained Use) Regulations 2000
were amended in 2002 exclusively in order to include provisions restricting access to information
placed on this register in the interests of national security.?" A new regulation, regulation 23A was
inserted , which makes provision for keeping information confidential so long as the Secretary of
State is of the opinion that such information should be kept confidential in the interests of national
security. Also, regulation 24A was inserted in and makes provision for the exclusion from the
register of any information where, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, the inclusion of such
information on the register would be contrary to the interests of national security. These provisions
are hard to understand as it is difficult to conceive how information on GMO's can affect national
security. It should also be noted that these provisions do not contain any public interest test, that
would allow disclosure in cases of a prevailing public interest in favour of disclosure.
Moreover, the Regulation on the contained use of GMO's missed an opportunity to allow
greater public scrutiny on the use of GMO's other than micro-organisms. Concerning these, since
they are not covered by the EC Directives, the government has decided there should be no
exception from the commercial confidentiality exemptions. Thus, regulation 22(3)(b) that prevents
some classes of information (despite being commercially confidential) from being placed on the
registers, does not apply to GMO's other than micro-organisms. This definitely demonstrates the
will ofthe Government not to allow more openness than what is dictated by EC law.
The second important exemption relating to information that is normally placed on
registers concerning GMO's, is the one included in section 123(2) of the EPA 1990. According to
this provision, the Secretary of State may refrain from including on the registers any information
whose inclusion could lead to damage in the environment. This exemption is identical to the
equivalent one found in the 1992 and 2004 Environmental Information Regulations and
demonstrates the fact when environmental information is considered, the protection of the
environment is given preference to public information. It proves that when environmental
720 See above n. 653, at page 216.
721 The Genetically Modified Organisms (Contained Use) (Amendment) Regulations 2002, (SI 2002/63).
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information is involved, the aim of such legislation is to use public information as a lever to protect
the environment, rather than to grant a rightzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAper se to the individuals.
Finally, it is interesting to mention that GMO's is a domain of environmental protection
that uses two different mechanisms of environmental information. As describe above, registers are
used but also environmental-information labelling is another means of information on GMO's.
More precisely, article 26 of Directive 2001118IEC on the deliberate release into the environment
of genetically modified organisms, provides that products must be subject to adequate labelling in
order to provide for clear information on the presence of GMO' s. The Directive imposes the phrase
'This product contains genetically modified organisms' to appear either on a label affixed on the
product or in an accompanying document.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
b) Register of industrial sites and local authorities
participating in the Eco-Management and Audit
Scheme.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
In this register are listed the location of industrial sites which have been registered under
the Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (hereinafter EMAS) and the companies which have
registered them. This register also contains details of the local authorities that have registered all or
part of their authority under the EMAS scheme.
EMAS is a voluntary scheme set up under EC law discussed summarily before. 722
c) Register concerning eco-Iabels.
A list of products, which have been awarded the European Community eco-Iabel by the
UK government is maintained by the Department of Environment. This list was previously
maintained by the United Kingdom Ecolabelling Board. The European Commission also maintains
a register of all eco-Iabelling applications approved by each national authority. A list of all these
products is published regularly in the Official Journal of the European Communities'P.
The European eco-Iabelling scheme is another voluntary scheme to provide environmental
information set up under EC law. It has already been examined previously.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
Cl Registers containing environmental information: a need to reder-metheir role.
722 See the Introduction.
723 Article 6 par. 5 of Regulation (EC) No 1980/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17
July 2000 on a revised Community eco-label award scheme, Official Journal of the EC L 237, 21109/2000 p.
1-12.
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1)zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAA unique right of access to environmental information or rights varying in
scope extending only to each particular statutory register?zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
Initially, when state secrecy was the rule (see the introductory chapter on history of
environmental information) provisions permitting disclosure of information present on public
registers were the only legislative provisions that entitled citizens to have access to a certain
amount of environmental information. It was a limited right of access since it only extended to
information that not only was included on the registers, but also was not confidential (see above on
the forms of information included on environmental registers). Consequently, registers were
statutory creations that allowed the disclosure of some specific bits of environmental information,
leaving all the rest unobtainable.
Moreover, not all information present on registers can be communicated, since as
demonstrated above, a huge variety of exemptions still applies, depending on the particular
statutory provisions creating each public register. There can be identified three classes of
information, depending on their degree of availability to the public. Firstly, there is information
present on statutory registers. Secondly, there is information that is not present on any register,
either because it is not covered by any statutory provisions under any public register scheme, thus
not being part of a register, or either because, although it is information deemed to be available on a
register, it was omitted from inclusion for any reason. Thirdly, there is information that although
present on a register is exempt from communication because it is exempt information under the
provisions establishing the register.
The third class of information is available through the Environmental Information
Regulations (both the 1992and the 2004 ones), but it is subject to the exemptions provided therein.
As to the second class of information, it is also available through the Regulations. There is a
problem concerning the first class of information that is present on statutory public registers. In
order to avoid any overlap with the Environmental Information regulations, the 2004 regulations
provide that the exceptions they contain apply to any environmental information, even if obtainable
under a different regime.?" Thus, when the Regulations overlap with other statutory requirements
to provide environmental information (such as registers) the more liberal regime prevails. This is
the only interpretation that is fully compatible with EC law, by giving to the Information Directive
full effect in British Law and not allowing other statutory provisions to override it.
If we accept that the most liberal provisions apply, it means that what was available under
the statutory provisions on registers would remain available under these provisions even after the
Information Regulations were enacted. In contrast, information that was expressly unavailable to
public scrutiny under statutory provisions on registers should be available under the Regulations
724 Reg. 5(6): "Any enactment or rule of law that would prevent the disclosure of information in
accordance with these Regulations shall not apply".
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upon request.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA725 As a consequence, statutory provisions creating public registers containing
environmental information do not appear to create autonomous rights to environmental
information. In effect they are subsumed under the general right.
Since the coming into force of the first Environmental Information Regulations
(incorporating the Environmental Information Directive into British Law), it is arguable that
statutory provisions on environmental registers are just a particular mechanism that permits access
to environmental information and do not create rights of access. As mentioned in the environmental
information Directive, member states enjoy discretion to choose the particular mechanisms they
can use in order to implement the aim of the Directive. As a result, all public registers could be
seen as another mechanism implementing the Directive alongside the Regulations themselves.
From all this, it appears logical to deduce that there is today, after the incorporation into
British Law of the environmental information Directives, a single right of access to environmental
information that stems from these Directives (as opposed to the situation before the 1990Directive
when each individual provision concerning a specific register was creating a limited right of access
but distinct from each other). Since the 1990 Directive, all these particular and segmented rights
have merged into a single right to access to environmental information. This is, of course, still the
case under the 2003 Directive and the Environmental Information Regulations 2004.
As a consequence, all statutory provisions regulating access to information stored on
registers should now be considered simply as mechanisms that implement the Environmental
Information Directive and not as self-standing legal provisions. For this reason, they should be
construed in accordance with the Directive and read in conformity with it. Statutory provisions
regulating access to environmental information registers (as opposed to statutory provisions that
regulate what types of information should be collected and compiled on registers examined below)
are just another one of the practical arrangements under which such information is effectively made
available.
This view can also be sustained when examining more in-depth some of the statutory
provisions creating registers. Some of the most recent registers such as the waste management
registers726 are the kind of registers on whichzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA'all mu t be included'T': They are very detailed and
complex. Consequently, if we accept the view that the Environmental Information Regulations
should not apply when there are specific statutory provisions on registers, this could lead to huge
domains being subject to various statutory requirements, each accompanied by specific
complicated exemptions and procedures for access. EC law and the environmental information
725 This interpretation is supported by Bakkenist: ' ... It is arguable that the Regulations could be applied
where other legislation was more restricted, because the information is not then" ... required in accordance
with any statutory provision, to be provided". If the other provision were applied the information would be
withheld.', see above n. 653, at page 49. This interpretation concerns the 1992 regulations but can be applied
to the 2004 ones.
726 Set up under section 64 of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 (Part II) and prescribed by Regulation
10 of the Waste Management Licensing Regulations 1994 (SI No.1056).
727 According to Woolley, see above n.682, at page 163.
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Directive override the statutory provisions on environmental registers since they have a higher
status in the legal hierarchy. In any case, the great majority of statutory provisions on registers are
older that even the Environmental Information Regulations 1992.
All in all, as explained above, it is arguable that even though statutory provisions on
environmental registers have not been enacted under the European Communities Act 1972, they
should form a unique body of principles with the Environmental Information Regulations creating
a single right to environmental information. We do not believe as written by Rowan-Robinson et
al.728 thatzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA'specific rights remain' to access environmental information under the registers.
The consequences of the answer given to this question are very important.
On the one hand, if we accept that there is only a single right of each member of the public
to environmental information, then only one set of exemptions can be allowed to limit such right. If
due to the higher nature of EC law we accept that the EC Directive on environmental information
supersedes national law provisions that allow less transparency, then provisions concerning
registers that allow more information to be withheld than the Directive, should be disapplied, thus
allowing the more liberal provisions to prevail.
On the other hand, if we accept that there exist multiple rights each created and regulated
by the different statutory provisions concerning each individual register, then the scope of all these
rights varies depending on the applicable provisions in each case. Each of these rights is subject to
the limitations that are set up by the specific legal instrument that created it, and since when
examined in detail provisions on registers can have significant different scope and limitations, all
these rights vary depending on the provisions under which they arise.
In applying any of these two cases, there would be a need to identify and compare the legal
provisions that apply in each case. c<~msequently, in any case whether there is a single or multiple
rights of access to environmental information, there would be a problem of legal complexity.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
2) The problem of legal complexity.
The registers analysed above, demonstrate with enough force and clarity the fact that even
though registers can be a convenient way to present information to the public, maintaining in force
a multitude of different statutory provisions some of them having great differences with the
environmental information Directive, leads to a chaotic situation where different legal instruments
overlap with each other. We believe that we have demonstrated that the complexity caused by such
overlal_>pingstatutory provisions, might even almost nullify for the public, at least in the most
extreme cases which were used as examples, the simplicity and convenience of using public
registers as a means of providing environmental information.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
728 See above n. 652, page 23.
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As a consequence, there is a need of simplifying the different regimes of accessing
environmental information and unifying them under a single general legislative instrument that will
permit the achievement oflegal simplicity. We do not believe that registers, when used as a means
to provide environmental information to the public, should cease to coexist alongside more general
statutory mechanisms. In any case, the choice between registers or general mechanisms of
providing information is a matter for information scientists to debate. Public registers providing
environmental information can stay, but we think there is a need of a general legislative instrument
that will explicitly set forth exemptions applying to all environmental information irrespective of
whether it is held or not on public registers and that will also expressly repeal other enactments.
Although the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 mention at reg. 5(6) thatzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA'Any
enactment or rule of law that would prevent the disclosure of information in accordance with these
Regulations shall not apply', this is not enough, as the provisions on registers have not been
repealed. Thus, there is still a risk of overlap and confusion in practice, especially with the
provisions on registers also containing non-environmental information. This is because section 39
of the FOIA 2000 provides that the Act does not apply to environmental information covered by
the 2004 regulations, even when the information is unobtainable because of an exemption
contained in the regulations. In contrast, section 21 of the same Act which is not limited to
environmental information or any other subject-specific type of information, provides that any
information which is obtainable under any other statutory regime cannot be obtained under the
FOIA regime, except if an exception under this other statutory regime applies in which case the
FOIA becomes applicable.
Registers as a legal instrument allowing the public to access specific domains of
environmental information is a result of the culture of secrecy that was predominant in this country
till the early 90s. 'Secrecywas the rule but as environmental legislation developed, information was
seen as an effective tool that could assist command and control regulation in achieving its role of
environmental protection. As a consequence, as different legislative provisions were gradually
enacted protecting amenities, a lot of them contained parts promoting environmental information of
the public. And since general provisions on access to information or even only environmental
information did not exist at that time, the creation of registers was seen as a practical mechanism
that could substitute this lack. This led to the creation of a multitude of registers as environmental
law kept expanding to regulate more and more domains.
Consequently, today, when the right to access environmental information is established,
legal provisions establishing registers remain as a legacy ~f the past and seem to be a burden in
preventing the existence of a single comprehensive general legal instrument to cover all situations
of environmental information of the public.
To sum up, the problem is that although the environmental information regulations (both
the 1992 and the 2004 ones) mention that they supersede any less liberal enactments, they do not
expressly repeal them. As a consequence, public officials might. still use them in practice,
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especially when it is not clear whether the specific register concerned, contains environmental
information and thus whether the regulations are applicable.
However, the solution of expressly repealing the provisions on registers in order to allow
for greater legal simplicity has one major disadvantage.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
3) The obligation to collect and compile information for inclusion on registers
In the present chapter, we have mainly seen how the statutory provisions on registers
provide under which circumstances information held on a register can be accessed by members of
the public upon request. These specific provisions create a right for any person to access
information held on the registers and also a duty on public authorities maintaining the registers to
provide the information requested. This is similar to the right to access information created by the
Environmental Information Regulations, which supersede the provisions on registers concerning
this point.
However, and this is also important, the statutory provisions on registers also impose
another duty on public authorities: the duty to collect and compile the information that has to be
included on the registers. Thus, statutory provisions on registers also serve a different function than
the Environmental Information Regulations: they also impose the collection and compilation of
certain types of environmental information. This is extremely important for ensuring the
effectiveness of a right to access environmental information upon request, as if there is no
environmental information in the possession of public authorities, such a right would be of little
practical significance.
Although, as we have seen, the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 do contain
some very limited provisions imposing on public authorities a positive duty to collect some limited
amounts of information, they do not go as far as the very detailed statutory provisions on registers
containing environmental information. This is the reason why these provisions on registers still
perform a very useful role. Thus, if they were repealed, new legal instruments would be needed in
order to replace the function of obliging public authorities to collect and compile certain types of
environmental information.
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CHAPTER 3) Access to Environmental Information and the
1950 European Convention on Human RightszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
In this chapter, we shall be examining the relationship between environmental information
and human rights. This is even more important since the coming into force of the Human Rights
Act 1998, because section 6 of the Act makes it unlawful for any public authority to act in a way
that is incompatible with Convention rights except where provisions of primary legislation prevent
the authority from acting differently. The main question we shall try to answer is whether access to
environmental information can be qualified as a fundamental right and if so, to what extent. But we
shall also examine the opposite situation: can access to environmental information be limited by
human rights considerations, even if it is viewed as a fundamental human right, and if so, to what
extent?
First of all, we shall start by defining 'human rights'. This will allow us to set the limits of
our analysis. In this chapter, we shall not take the reader through theoretical developments about
environmental law and human rights in general. We shall restrict ourselves to the law of the
European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter ECHR). The
Convention was opened for signature by member states of the Council of Europe at Rome on 4
November 1950. It entered into force on 3 September 1953 and was ratified by the United
Kingdom in March 1951. But it was only formally incorporated in national British law by the
Human Rights Act 1998. Today arguments based on the ECHR are commonly invoked in a
multitude of national cases thus demonstrating its great importance in British law. Consequently,
our analysis on environmental information would be incomplete if it did not include a human rights
perspective. Our approach shall also encompass the law of the European Union insofar as it deals
with human right aspects. This will only include 'constitutional-level' EC law whereas 'lower-
level' EC law on environmental informetion is dealt of elsewhere in this work.
When dealing with the impact of the ECHR on access to Environmental Information our
analysis shall almost exclusively focus on the case law of the European court of human rights
(hereinafter ECtHR) rather than on general thoughts on human rights in general, law and justice.
Because the ECHR is drafted in a vague and imprecise manner, there is little or no point at all in
trying to apply Convention articles to various situations without carefully examining the Strasbourg
case law. The convention is so general that someone could easily apply it to almost any kind of
legal situations but of course, that would have hardly any practical meaning.
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According to Philippe SandszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA729 international treaties can be categorised into three
categories according to the extent they refer to the environment. The first category contains treaties
which are silent as to the environment. This is the biggest category. The second category contains
treaties which make mention of matters closely related to the environment such as health. And the
third category contains treaties which expressly refer to the environment. The European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,"? which was signed in
Rome in 1950, is part of the first category of international treaties that do not refer to the
environment neither directly nor indirectly. This can be attributed to state of world affairs at this
period of history.
The originality of the ECHR laid in the fact that it was the first international treaty to
establish an international Court, the ECtHR which was competent to judge individual complaints of
breaches of human rights attributed to public authorities of the signatory States. The ECtHR has
adopted a constructive approach of the rights contained in Convention articles, which are all civil-
political rights, and has interpreted them in a way as to derive from them other rights, some of
which are linked to the environment. According to Margaret DeMerieux, the Court would not be
entitled under the convention to declare an independent human right or rights to 'environmental
quality'."! We can only agree with such a conclusion since any other interpretation would
definitely be stretching too far the wording of the Convention, which does not even mention once
the word 'environment'.
However, the ECtHR has interpreted Convention articles in a way that can lead to
recognition of a limited but still fundamental right to access to environmental information, even if
an examination of ECtHR case law demonstrates that the Court is not actively using the
Convention to promote the environm~nt.732We shall first start by examining the relevant case law.
A. The recognition of a jurisprudential right to environmental information based on
Convention articles.
Environmental information is a subject that is relevant to two general areas of law.
Environmental law and general freedom of information law. The ECtHR has not had a large
number of environmental-related complaints or cases related to general freedom of information.
However, as we shall be examining in this part, a small number of such cases does exist. These
729 Philippe Sands, Human rights, environment and the Lopez-Ostra case: context and consequences, [1996]zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
6 European Human Rights Law Review, p. 601.
730 For the full consolidated text of the Convention see the Council of Europe's website at
http://conventions.coe.int Also, all ECtHR case-law is available freely from the Court's website at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.intl
731 Margaret DeMerieux, Deriving Environmental Rights from the European convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 21, no. 3 (2001), p. 525.
732 Ibid. at page 550: 'The foregoing examination of cases does not reveal a Human Rights Court (or
Commission) active to promote protection of the environment through its fundamental rights jurisprudence
,
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cases either suggest that the Convention guarantees a limited right to access to environmental
information or that there is a duty on States to supply environmental information to individuals.
These findings are based on an extensive interpretation by the Court of the ECHR. The relevant
articles are article 10 (on freedom of expression), article 6 (on the right to a fair trial), article 2 (on
the right to life), article 3 (which prohibits inhumane or degrading treatments), article 8 (on the
right to respect for private and family life) and finally on article 1 of the first additional protocol
(right to property). We shall examine how these articles have been interpreted in relation to
environmental information.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIn some instances, th Case law does not refer directly to
environmental information but rather to a general right of information. We shall examine these
cases, since their conclusions are also valid when environmental information is concerned.
However, we shall not deal with cases protecting private data as being too far from our main
arguments.?" Finally, it must be noted that the Court is not bound by any rule of precedent'" and
consequently it may in the future freely depart from its past interpretations on the subject and either
find that these articles are not any more applicable for environmental information or that others can
be used.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
1) The right to information (Article 10)
Paragraph 1 of Article 10 of the ECHR guarantees freedom of expression and includes the
right to receive and impart information. As with most rights and freedoms expressed in the
Convention it is not an absolute right, since paragraph 2 subjects this freedom to restrictions that
are deemed necessary in a democratic society.
The relevance of article 10 to environmental information applies as far as this article
guarantees a general right to information. Article 10 does not, at least expressly, provide for a right
to access information held by public authorities or impose a duty on states to give information.?"
733 An example of such a case is the Case ofzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBARotaru v. Romania, Appli ation no. 28341195,4 May 2000. The
case concerns the right to access private data held by public authorities and the obligation to modify such
data if it is incorrect.
734 The rules of procedure on the functioning of the ECtHR are to be found in Section II of the ECHR at
articles 19to 51. They do not expressly contain any rule of precedent.
735 The ECHR has used article 10 so as to protect the freedom of the press. But this indirectly has lead to the
press being protected when divulging environmental information as seen in the case of Bladet Tromse and
Stensaas v. Norway (2000) 29 EHRR 125, which is especially interesting since it directly concerns
environmental information. This case concerned the publication of an article. alleging breaches of seal
hunting regulations and based on an official report of the Norwegian Ministry of Fisheries, which has been
considered as exempt from disclosure to the public under Norway's freedom of information Act as being
confidential. The fishermen blamed in the report for illegal seal hunting practices brought defamation
proceedings against the newspaper and its editor for divulging details of the report. Certain statements
published in the newspaper were found to be defamatory and compensation was awarded to the seal hunters.
Relying on Article 10 of the Convention, the applicants complained that the Norwegian judgment constituted
an unjustified interference with their right to freedom of expression. The ECtHR restated the principle
established in Sunday Times v United Kingdom that freedom of expression was essential in a democratic
society, subject to the restrictions in Art. 10(2), which were to be strictly construed. That freedom applied to
both information that was favourably received and to ideas that could offend or disturb. The Court also
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When article 10 was being drafted, the word 'seek' was on purpose not included in order to stop
discussions as to whether States were under a duty to provide information.?" However, some initial
Commission and Court decisions seemed to indicate that under certain circumstances, article 10
could imply a right to seek information. However, the ECtHR.has not used this interpretation in
subsequent cases in order to expand the scope of article 10 into a general right to receive official
information from public authorities. And the jurisprudence of UK courts has been reluctant to go
further that the interpretation given to article 10by the ECtHR.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
a) A limited right to information based on article 10.
The Commission ruled inzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAX v. Ge ma y'" t at 'the right to receive information may under
certain circumstances include a right of access by the interested person to documents which
although not generally accessible are of particular importance for his own position'. The Court in
the case of Sunday Times v. the United-Kingdom'" reached a similar conclusion and also indicated
in which circumstances a right to seek information could arise under article 10. This case involved
the drug Thalidomide which after being widely prescribed in the 70s was proved to have
unexpected side-effects for unborn children who were being born with deformities as a
consequence of the drug being prescribed to their mothers. The Court held that '... Article 10
guarantees not only the freedom of the press to inform the public but also the right of the public to
be properly informed' and also that ' ... the families of numerous victims of the tragedy, who were
unaware of the legal difficulties involved, had a vital interest in knowing all the underlying facts
and the various possible solutions"?" According to Giorgio Malinverni?" although these two
accepted hat the national authorities had a margin of appreciation when assessing the need for a restriction
under article 10(2), but this was subject to a final ruling by the court on whether the restriction was
proportionate. It also acknowledged that the press had an essential role in a democratic society, and had a
duty to impart information that was in the public interest, even if it had to remain within certain bounds
regarding the rights and reputation of others and to prevent disclosure of confidential information. Also the
Court stated that the margin of appreciation of the State has to be restricted in the interests of a democratic
society so that the press is free to impart information of general public concern. The Court mentioned that 'In
cases such as the present one the national margin of appreciation is circumscribed by the interest of
democratic society in enabling the press to exercise its vital role of "public watchdog" in imparting
information of serious public concern' (at par. 59) and also that 'the press should normally be entitled, when
contributing to public debate on matters of legitimate concern, to rely on the contents of official reports
without having to undertake independent research. Otherwise, the vital public-watchdog role of the press
may be undermined' (at par. 68). Thus, the Court found that the fishermen's interest in protecting their
reputation was not sufficient to outweigh the vital public interest in ensuring an informed public debate over
a matter of local and national as well as international interest and that that the interference complained of was
not 'necessary in a democratic society'.
736 See Giorgio Malinverni, Freedom of Information in the European Convention on Human Rights and in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political rights, 4 [1983] 4 Human Rights Law Journal 449. Also Stefan
Weber, Environmental Information and the European Convention on Human Rights, 12 [1991] 5 Human
Rights Law Journal 179.
737 X v. Germany,App. No. 8383/78; 17 DecisionszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA& Reports 227.
738 Sunday Times v. the United-Kingdom, ECtHR, 26/0411979, App. No. 6538174, available freely from the
Court's website at http://hudoc.echr.coe.intl
739 Ibid. at paragraph 66.
740 See above Malinverni n. 736, at page 450.
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decisions do not recognise a general right to obtain information, they establish under certain
circumstances a right of access to documents which without being generally accessible, are of
particular importance for the position of the person seeking access. Also, they establish that States
cannot deny access to information that is of general interest. This analysis was certainly true when
it was written in the early 1980s, but may not longer be the current position.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
b) The refusal of the Court of Strasbourg to further
extend the meaning of article 10.
Subsequent and more recent case law of the ECtHR seems to have departed from the above
findings, thus making the above analysis doubtful. As indicated before, there is no formal rule of
precedent binding on the Court.
The case ofzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBALeander v. Swedenl" involved a personnel control procedure set up under
Swedish law for posts of importance for national security. Under these procedures, checks were
made to secret police registers which contained personal information, The law did not provide any
right to access information released to recruiting authorities, on the basis of which the applicant to
the ECtHR was denied employment in the Swedish Navy. As long as article 10 was at issue, the
Court held that article 10 basically prevented States from restricting a person from receiving
information that others wish or may be willing to impart to him. However, the Court found that
'Article 10 does not, in circumstances such as those of the present case, confer on the individual a
right of access to a register containing information on his personal position, nor does it embody an
obligation on the Government to impart such information to the individual' (our emphasis). The
Court did not indicate in which circumstances article 10 could confer a right to access information,
But it could be argued that these circumstances are the ones mentioned in the Sunday Times case,
namely when information is of general interest for a great number of people or when some piece of
information is of particular significance for the person?" seeking access.
The conclusion reached in the Leander case concerning article 10, was confirmed by the
Commission in its decision on the admissibility of the application of Clavel v. Swttzerlandl" This
case concerned a refusal to allow a journalist, in the course of one of his investigations on
someone's properties, to access the local land registers held by a Swiss Local authority. According
to Swiss law, this register was public but only people showing an interest could consult it. The
Commission restated the finding of the Court in Leander where it was found that the right to
receive information concerned essentially the access to sources of information and that it aimed to
prohibit States from blocking someone from receiving information others aspire to provide him.
741 Leander v. Sweden, ECtHR, 26/03/1987, App. No. 9248181, available freely from the Court's website at
http://hudoc.echr .coe.intl
742 Such seems to have been the case in Leander, but the ECtHR found article 10 was inapplicable.
743 Clavel v. Switzerland, 15 October 1987, (decision of admissibility) App, No. 11854185, unreported in
English, available in French only from the Court's website at http://hudoc.echr.coe.inti
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The Commission also concluded that in this particular case article 10 does not grant a right to
access a register on which appear information on the financial situation of third parties nor does it
oblige the authorities to communicate such information.
The ECtHR in the case ofzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAGaskin v. the United-Kingdoml" restated the above findings as
far as article lOis concerned. The applicant to the ECtHR was during his minority under the care of
Local Authority's social services. Under the Boarding-Out of Children Regulations 1955 the local
authority was under a duty to keep certain confidential records concerning the applicant and his
care. He was not entitled to access these confidential records but he tried to learn about his past and
have access to them. According to the applicable law when this case arose, access was only
possible if the contributors of information agreed to the disclosure and there was no possibility for
an appeal against a refusal decision. Gaskin brought an application for discovery of documents
with a view to bring legal proceedings against the Local Authority under which he was in care
during his minority. The application was refused by UK courts?" on the grounds that public interest
requires that the confidentiality of child care documents in a local authority's possession be
preserved, and they should not be disclosed or inspected. Concerning the alleged breach of article
10, the ECtHR held exactly as it had in the aforementioned decisions, that the right to receive
information basically prohibits a Government from restricting a person from receiving information
that others wish or may be willing to impart to him and that in the circumstances of the present
case, article 10 does not embody an obligation on the State concerned to impart the information in
question to the individual.I"
The ECtHR has not departed from this restrictive interpretation of article 10 concerning the
right to access information and it restated the above interpretation in the famous case of Guerra
and others v. Italy.147In this case, the population of an Italian town successfully complained about
the local government's lack of information in respect of a nearby chemical plant, which was
presenting a hazard to those living nearby. There had been a history of incidents at the plant,
including one explosion where in 1976 local people had to be hospitalised. Still, the applicants
themselves could not show that they had directly and physically suffered by the specific regulatory
acts or omissions by local government of which they complained. The ECtHR held that the local
government's failure to give local residents information that would allow them to assess the risks of
living in the factory's vicinity, amounted to a violation of article 8 which protects family life. The
Court also restated that as long as article lOis concerned, it basically prohibits public authorities
from preventing circulation of information.
All these decisions undoubtedly show that the ECtHR has refused to interpret article lOin
an extensive manner that would be a recognition of the right to receive information held by public
744 Gaskin v. the United-Kingdom, 07/07/1989, App. No. 10454/83, accessed at the Court's website at
http://hudoc.echr .coe.intl
745 See Gaskin v. Liverpool City Council [1980] 1 WLR 1549.
746 See above n. 744, at paragraph 52.
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bodies and in consequence would also include the right to receive environmental information. The
refusal of the Court to recognise a general right of access to information based on article 10 has
been criticised by Dimitri Yernault?" as being inconsistent with its findings in thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBASunday Times
case, where the court found there was a right of the public to receive information of general
importance. We believe this statement should be qualified. The court has not departed from the
Sunday Times case in its subsequent decisions on article 10 and access to information,zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIn all of
these decisions, the Court mentioned that in the specific circumstances of each case article 10 could
not imply a right of the applicant to access information. The Court did not totally exclude the
possibility of the applicability of article 10 but rather found that in the specific circumstances
article 10 was inapplicable. The logical consequence of this is that there could be some other
circumstances in which article 10 could create a right of access. The Court however has been silent
on which sort of circumstances these could be. As suggested earlier, it could be argued that such
circumstances could be similar to those of the Sunday Times case, namely when the information
concerned is of general importance or is particularly important to numerous people. Consequently,
we do not believe the Court acted inconsistently by not basing a right to access information on
article 10. However it could reasonably have been expected for the Court to base any subsequent
developments of the right to information on article 10 and not to abandon the move initiated by the
Sunday Times case. As demonstrated by the dissenting opinions expressed in the Guerra case,
article 10 could have been further developed and be used in order to imply a right to information
generally.
Some of the dissenting opinions in the Guerra case give valuable indications as to the
circumstances that could justify the existence of a right to access information under article 10. In
the concurring opinion of judge Palm, joined by judges Bernnhardt, Russo, Macdonald, Makarczyk
and Van Dijk, although they agreed that article 10 was not applicable in the particular
circumstances of the Guerra case, they accepted that ' ...under different circumstances the State
may have a positive obligation to make available information to the public and to disseminate such
information which by its nature could not otherwise come to the knowledge of the public' .749
Moreover, judge Jambrek indicated in a very precise manner in which circumstances article 10
would be applicable: if those who are potential victims of an industrial hazard have requested that
specific information, evidence, tests, etc., be made public and be communicated to them by a
specific government agency and it did not comply with such a request, and gave no good reasons
for not complying, then such a failure should be considered equivalent to an act of interference by
the government, proscribed by article 10 of the Convention. This idea could be interpreted as
747 Guerra and Others v. Italy, 19/02/1998, App. No. 14967/89, available freely from the Court's website at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.inti
748 Dimitri Yemault, Libertes classiques et droits derives: le cas de l'acces aux documents administratifs,
Revue Trimestrielle des droits de l'homme, 1996, p. 216 (in French).
749 See above n. 747.
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including any circumstances that could cause hazards to humans, but it is just a concurring opinion
of a single judge.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
c) The approach of UK courts on the matter.
Article 53 of the ECHR750 provides that the protection it grants over human rights issues is
azyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAde minimis one and that the Convention does not prevent the implementation of higher degrees of
protection in member states than it itself establishes. Article 53 therefore makes it possible for
national courts to expand human rights protection beyond the principles laid down by the ECtHR.
However it seems that the British House of Lords regards ECtHR decisions as a sort of binding
precedents, refusing to adopt any interpretation of the Convention that would differ from the Court
of Strasbourg's views. According to Lord Scarman,?" '[And.]zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAif it be a ssible interpretation of
the European Convention, I shall not adopt it unless and until the European Court of Human
Rights declares that it is correct.' This statement might need to be qualified in the light of article
53, which seems to allow a more protective approach for Human Rights than the ECtHR's one.
Moreover, it seems that section 2 of the Human Rights Act by providing that courts 'must take into
account' the ECtHR's jurisprudence, implies that they are not bound by it and consequently it
allows for UK courts to go even further than the ECtHR's findings.P?zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIn the recent case of
Alconbury, Lord Slynn reiterates that in the absence of any special circumstances the Courts are
bound to follow the ECtHRjurisprudence.753 However, Lord Hoffmann seems to indicate that when
this 'deference' to ECtHR law would lead to a finding contrary to the British Constitution, then the
ECtHR jurisprudence should not be applied.?" This seems to indicate that ECtHR case-law could
be considered as hierarchically lower than the British constitution.
750 'Article 53 - Safeguard for existing human rights - Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as
limiting or derogating from any of the human rights and fundamental freedoms which may be ensured under
the laws of any High Contracting Party or under any other agreement to which it is a Party'.
751 In the case United Kingdom Association of Professional Engineers v. Advisory, Conciliation and
Arbitration Service, (HL) (1981) AC 424. (at page 444) The issue concerning the ECHR was about the right
of association (article 11).
752 See on this point Kate Cook, Environmental Rights as Human Rights, 2002 EHRLR 2, 196, at page 210:
'[Moreover,] the fact that the effect of section 2 of the HRA is to oblige the U.K. courts to take this
jurisprudence into account but not necessarily to follow it, opens the way for U.K. courts to go even further
than Strasbourg has done in environmental cases, particularly in the light of some of the strong dissenting
judgements [referred to above] and bearing in mind the ongoing development of international rules and
standards in the field of the environment.'
753 R. (on the application of Alconbury Developments Ltd) v. Secretary of State for the Environment,
Transport and the Regions, [2001] JPL 920 (HL). Per Lord Slynn at par 26: 'In the absence of some special
circumstances it seems to me that the court should follow any clear and constant jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights'
754 Ibid. per Lord Hoffmann, at par. 76: '[However,] section 2(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 requires an
English court, in determining a question which has arisen in connection with a Convention right, to take into
account the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (tithe European court") and the opinions of
the Commission. The House is not bound by the decisions of the European court and, if I thought that the
Divisional Court was right to hold that they compelled a conclusion fundamentally at odds with the
distribution of powers under the British constitution, I would have considerable doubt as to whether they
should be followed'.
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In this context three English cases show two different approaches of the use of article 10
when invoked as granting a right of access to information: a restrictive approach and a more liberal
one.
All these cases concerned an application for judicial review of a decision by a Secretary of
State to hold an inquiry in private and to make public only its report, rather than to hold a public
inquiry open to everyone including the press. In all of the cases the reason for setting up the inquiry
was to enquire into a matter that had created great public concern (the outbreak of foot and mouth
disease in thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAPersey case?", the inde ent assault by a doctor of some of his patients in the Wagstaff
case'" and the murder by a doctor of some of his patients in the Howard case?").
In all of these cases it was argued inter alia that setting up a private inquiry in which
neither the general public nor the media could be present was an unlawful restriction ofthe right to
information as guaranteed by article 10 of the ECHR. This complaint has been correctly qualified
by Lord Justice Brown in Persey't", as being a claim by the applicant to sustain a right to access to
information (a right to access the information being imparted at the closed inquiry sessions) rather
than a right to receive or impart information. The decisions reached in Persey and Howard, both
relied on the ECtHR's jurisprudence and particularly in the Leander'" case and reached the
conclusion that 'The European Court of Human Rights has consistently rejected attempts by
applicants to assert a right of access to information under Article 10, holding that Article 10(1)
.does not confer a right on individuals to receive information that others are not willing to
impart.,760 Consequently, article 10 was held not to have been engaged in these two cases, since
they concerned the right to access to information and not freedom of expression.?"
The interpretation of article 10 adopted in these two cases seems to correctly reflect the
approach of the ECtHR's jurisprudence on the subject, which refuses to interpret article 10 as
according a right to access to information. In doing this, the High Court missed an opportunity to
go beyond the ECtHR's case-law by interpreting the Convention in a more liberal way than the
Court of Strasbourg has done. This would have been possible since, as analysed above, it would
increase the protection of human rights and, as discussed earlier, the Convention allows more
liberal interpretations.
755 Persey v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2002] EWHC 371.
756 R. v Secretary of State for HealthzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAEx p. Wagstaff, R. v Secretary of State for Health Ex p. Associated
Newspapers Ltd [2000] HRLR 646.
757 Howard v Secretary of State for Health [2002] EWHC 396.
758 See above n. 755, at par. 52.
759 See above n. 741.
760 Per Justice Baker in Howard at paragraph 103. The same conclusion was reached by Brown L.J. in Persey
at paragraph 52: ' ... freedom of expfession-- whether the right to receive, or the right to impart, information--
is one thing, access to information quite another, and [that] Article 10, whilst naturally conferring the former,
does not accord the latter'.
761 See also the case Petition No.2 of the British Broadcasting Corporation [2000] HRLR 423, a Scottish
case in the Appeal Court of the High Court of Justiciary, in which it was held that article 10 is not engaged
where a television network is excluded from publicly broadcasting the Lockerbie trial, even if the trial would
be broadcasted to four remote sites where only relatives of the victims of the tragedy will be allowed to view
the transmission.
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Such was the approach adopted in an earlier decision, thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAWagstaff case.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIn this ase the
court relied on article 10 even before its incorporation into English law, by considering it was of
the same effect as the common law which recognises freedom of expression as a fundamental right.
The court considered that article 10 applied not only to the content of information but also to the
means of transmission or reception, since any restriction imposed on the means necessarily
interfered with the right to receive and impart information. Consequently, the court found that the
decision of the Secretary of State to hold a private inquiry thus prohibiting the general public from
having access to what was being said, was an unjustifiable breach of article 10. This judgement
undoubtedly goes beyond the interpretation of article 10 adopted by the ECtHR, since it implies
that article 10 also grants a right of access to information, which as shown above in practice it does
not. This view was heavily criticised and rejected in the aforementioned cases of Howard and
Perseyl'" We believe it would have been possible for the High Court in these two cases to rely on
the Wagstaff decision and to interpret, if not article 10, then the English common law on freedom
of expression as recognising a right to access to information. This could have been consistent with
section 11 of the Human Rights Act 1998 that provides a safeguard for existing human rights.?"
However, as analysed above, the Court subsequently preferred not to depart from the ECtHR's
interpretation of article 10. Therefore, it has been correctly suggested that the Wagstaff case is
unlikely to be followed in the future.P'
But even if a right to information may not be recognised under article 10, it might be
recognised under other articles, a possibility which we shall examine further on.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
2) The right to respect for private and family life (Article 8)
While, the ECtHR has not used article lOin order to proclaim a right of access to
environmental information, it has used article 8 of the European Convention which protects the
right to family life. Under this article the ECtHR has ruled that States are under a positive
obligation to provide information in some circumstances. It has also ruled that States have to
provide a sufficient and accessible procedure enabling people to seek information. Surprisingly, all
these findings have been exclusively based upon article 8 and not article 10, which could seem a
762 Interestingly, although the interpretation of article 10 that the Court adopted in these subsequent two cases
was totally different that the one in Wagstaff, the Court merely mentioned that Wagstaff should be
'distinguished', when it was clear that they were completely departing from the fmdings of Wagstaff.
763 s. 11: 'A person's reliance on a Convention right does not restrict - (a) any other right or freedom
conferred on him by or under any law having effect in any part of the United Kingdom ... '
764 See Timothy Pitt-Payne, below n. 817, at p. 113.
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priorizyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAmore closely l nked to a right to receive information. Finally, we shall examine the
restrictions that may arise by the usage of article 8 when artificial legal persons are involved.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
a) A positive obligation to provide information: thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
G uerra case.
Paragraph I of article 8 establishes the right to respect for private and family life, home
and correspondence. This article protects individuals from arbitrary interference with these
protected rights by public authorities. According to paragraph 2 of article 8 public authorities are
permitted to interfere with these rights only when it is in accordance with the law and necessary in
a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety, the economic well-being of
a country, the prevention of disorder or crime, the protection of health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Apart from such a negative obligation not to
interfere with the amenities protected by article 8, this provision has also been interpreted as
containing positive obligations inherentzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAin the effective respect of private and family life.?"
Article 8 provisions might seem unlikely to sustain any environmental right. However, the
ECtHR has used it in order to guarantee environmental rights. This was first done in the case of
Lopez Ostra v. Spain.766 In this particular case, the Court held that there had been a violation of the
applicant's right to respect of private and family life because she had to live in very difficult
conditions next to a waste treatment plant that was allowed to operate without a licence and emitted
gas fumes, pestilential smells and contamination. The court considered that the Spanish State did
not succeed in striking a fair balance between the interest of economic well-being (that of having a
waste-treatment plant) and the applicant's effective enjoyment of her right to respect for her home
and her private and family life and that consequently it had violated article 8 by failing to protect
these amenities.
The Lopez Ostra case was greeted by scholars as a movement of the ECtHR towards
protecting environmental values."? The Court in the Guerra case768 reiterated the findings in Lopez
Ostra that severe environmental pollution can affect the individuals' well-being preventing them
from enjoying their homes in such a way that it leads to an interference with their private and
family life. The Court concluded that failure of public authorities to provide applicants with
'essential information that would have entitled them to assess the risks they and their families
might run if they continued to live at Manfredonia, a town particularly exposed in the event of an
accident at the factory'T" amounted to a breach of article 8. According to David Hart,no this
765 See inter alia, Sue Farran, The UK before the European Court of Human Rights - Case law and
Commentary, Blackstone 1996, see the relevant chapter on article 8.
766 ECtHR, Lopez Ostra v. Spain, 09/12/1994, App. No. 16798/90, available from the ECtHR website see
above note n. 730.
767 See inter alia supra note n. 729.
768 For the facts of Guerra, see supra.
769 See above n. 747, at paragraph 60.
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finding amounts to a positive obligation for States to inform local people about health matters and
it might extend beyond the duty to provide existing environmental documents provided for by the
Environmental Information Regulations 1992. This would seem to be correct. It is obvious that the
Court inzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAGuerra, laid down a positive obligation of States to mfonn citizens when environmental
hazards are so severe as to be able to affect people's well-being and private and family life. In
Guerra the Court considered this duty to provide information, as being a necessary step (meaning a
positive obligation) to ensure effective protection of private and family life. But as with article 10,
a severe threat that would trigger the application of article 8 could only happen in special
circumstances.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
b) The application of thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAG uerra case by UK courts.
There seems to be only one English High Court case, in which the Guerra precedent was
relied upon so as to claim access to information, though unsuccessfully. This is the case of R (On
the Application of Furness) v. Environment Agency'" which concerned a challenge by way of
judicial review of a decision of the Environment Agency to grant authorisation for the incineration
of municipal waste under the pollution control regime provided by the Environmental Protection
Act 1990. The argument that is relevant here, is the challenge that the conditions of the
authorisation were insufficient to protect the claimant's procedural right to information arising
under article 8 of the ECHR as construed in the Guerra case. The claimants argued that even if the
pollutants emitted by the activities in question had to be placed on a public register,"? this method
of monitoring provided insufficient information to enable people living in the locality to assess
risks with regard to pollutants to whic,h they may be exposed.
Turner J. started by stating that the facts in Guerra were extreme and involved emissions
of chemical far more dangerous than the one in question in the present case and that even in the
worst case scenario, the proposed plant could not present any substantial risk of injury to health or
property if it was operated. As a consequence, he ruled that there was no obligation on the basis of
the Guerra precedent, to make the relevant information available prior to it being placed on the
public register in accordance with the legislative provisions regulating the maintenance of the
register.
This English case is undoubtedly important, because it accepts that when there might be
severe risks from pollution to human health and life, then information will have to be provided
even before it could be made available through the relevant statutory registers that might exist or
through the Environmental Information Regulations.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
??O David Hart, The impact of the European Convention on Human Rights on Planning and Environmental
Law, [2000] JPL 125-6.
771 [2002] Env. L.R. 26.
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c) The duty to provide an effective and accessible
procedure for providing information: thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAMcGinley a d
EganzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAcase.
Contrary to what happened with thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBASunday Times case whose conclusions on article 10
have not been developed, the conclusions of Guerra have not only been restated in subsequent
cases, but also have been distinguished in order to widen the duty incumbent on States to provide
information.
Such a case is that of McGinley and Egan v. the United KingdomI" The two applicants in
this case had participated as British military personnel in the Christmas Islands nuclear tests. They
subsequently applied for pensions due to the alleged fact that they had been exposed to iodising
radiation thus resulting in various illness and disabilities they had been suffering. In order to sustain
their claims for disability pensions, they requested from the British government documents
concerning their exposure to radiation from the nuclear tests. The UK government provided some
of the requested documents but for some other ones it claimed that they were inexistent.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIt is of
importance that rule 6 of the Pension Appeals Tribunals (Scotland) Rules 1981,774 provides for a
mechanism to ask in a limited time period for the discovery of related documents while an appeal is
pending to the Pension Appeals Tribunal (hereinafter PAT). However, the applicants although they
had applied to the PAT, did not use this procedure. The applicants complained of a violation of
. article 6 and article 8 of the Convention due to failure of the State to provide information. The issue
raised under article 6 will be considered infra when we shall discuss this particular article.
It should be noted that this case is different from Guerra, since the applicants had expressly
asked for information from the State authorities. As mentioned before, the court ruled in Guerra
that the duty that imparts on States to provide information existszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAwhether or not people have
requested such information.
In McGinley and Egan, the Court considered article 8 applicable, since the issue of access
to information concerning their radiation exposure was linked to their private and family lives due
to the fact that applicants were in doubt as to whether they had been exposed to dangerous levels of
radiation (thus leaving them in a permanent state of distress and anxiety).
First the Court started by distinguishing this case from the Guerra case. In Guerra, it was
an undisputed fact that the Government (even though the hazardous activities involved a private
772 Maintained following the requirements of the Environmental Protection (Applications Appeals and
Registers) Regulations 1991 as amended by the Environmental Protection (Applications, Appeals and
Registers) (Amendment) Regulations 1996.
773 McGinley and Egan v. the United Kingdom, 09/06/1998, App Nos. 21825193 and 23414/94, available
from the ECtHR website see above note n. 730.
774 Rule 6(1) 'Where for the purposes of his appeal an appellant desires to have disclosed any document, or
part of any document, which he has reason to believe is in the possession of a government department, he
may, at any time not later than six weeks after the Statement of Case was sent to him, apply to the President
for the disclosure of the document or part and, if the President considers that the document or part is likely to
be relevant to any issue to be determined on the appeal, he may give a direction to the department concerned
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plant) held information on hazards involved by the plant's operation. On the contrary, inzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAMcGinley
and Egan, there was not any clear evidence that the information requested existed. Consequently,
the Court refused to rule that there was a positive obligation of the State to provide information on
the possible consequences of radioactivity of nuclear tests to the lives of the applicants. However,
concerning this point, judges DeMeyer, Valticos and Morenilla dissented and found that in such
serious issues involving nuclear tests, information on possible adverse health consequences should
have existed and ought to have been communicated to the people concerned. But the majority
refused to adopt this view which implies that States not only are under a positive duty to provide
information on hazardous activities in which they are engaged, but also have a duty to collect such
information even if they do not have it. This would mean that article 8 not only imposes a duty to
disseminate information, but also to collect it. The Court refused to adopt this very liberal
approach.
However, the Court went on and ruled that 'where a Government engages in hazardous
activities, such as those in issue in the present case, which might have hidden adverse
consequences on the health of those involved in such activities, respect for private and family life
under Article 8 requires that an effective and accessible procedure be established which enables
such persons to seek all relevant and appropriate information'i?" The Court considered that the
provision for the applicants to the PAT to ask for a discovery of documents was such a procedure
since there was no evidence that it was ineffective?" since the applicants had not used it. As a result
the Court dismissed the application. This ruling raises three issues.
First, the Court recognises that there is a duty for States to provide for a procedure that will
allow people to seek relevant and appropriate information to possible dangers to their health due to
environmental hazards. This is different from recognising a positive obligation for State authorities
to provide information or even providing a right to citizens to access official information. It merely
means that states are under a duty to provide for procedures that will allow affected people (and
only them) to seek information. So, this is not about a general right to information open to
everyone, but only open to people who can justify being potential victims of a hazardous activity
and even then, only if they ask for it. The need for interested parties to ask for information is only
waived where it is undisputed that State authorities have relevant information in their possession
(like in Guerra). It should be however noted that judges DeMeyer, Valticos and Morenilla
requiring its disclosure (if in the possession of the department) in such manner and upon such terms and
conditions as the President thinks fit [... ]'. (These regulations have been repealed)
7751bid. at par. 101.
776zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIt should be noted that the applicants h ving discovered new evidence suggesting this procedure was
ineffective since it required the identification of specific documents to be asked for and not merely a request
in general terms for any documentary evidence as suggested by the U.K. government (on which suggestion
the Court relied to prove the effectiveness of the procedure), returned to the ECtHR and asked for a revision
of the case under article 80 par. 1 of the Rules of Court. However the application for revision failed since the
ECtHR considered it was facts that could have been reasonably been known to the applicants prior to the
delivery of the original judgement. See McGinley and Egan v. the United Kingdom (Revision request),zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
28/0112000, App. Nos. 21825193 and 23414/94, available from the ECtHR website see above note n. 730.
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dissented and found that the applicantszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA'they had the rig t to know what might happen to them,
without having to ask' .777
Second, these procedures must not only be accessible, but also effective. In McGinley and
Egan, the court ruled it was the case. However, judge Pekkanen dissented on this particular point
and estimated that this procedure was not effective and accessible, since the applicants could only
seek it for in a limited time and outside this period there was not any other procedure that could
have enabled disclosure of documents not already in the public domain. It should be stressed that
two different procedures of seeking information should be distinguished: the procedure which
allows a person to ask for information and the procedure which allows a person to contest a refusal
or partial acceptance of such a request.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIn the context of the McGinley and Egan case the term
'accessible' refers to the procedure which allows a person to request information and not the
procedure which allows an appeal against a decision to communicate information or not.
Third, the hazards in question must arise by State activities, which are dangerous in nature,
such as nuclear activities. As mentioned before, this is different from the Guerra case where the
polluting activities were a result of a privately owned plant. This restriction to public activities is
comprehensible since the European Convention on Human Rights does not apply to actions caused
by private individuals. However even though some interferences may not be directly caused by an
action of a public authority, public bodies can still be held responsible if they fail to prevent or stop
(as in the Lopez Ostra case) the infringement of a citizen's human right protected by the
Convention. Consequently, we feel that the Court could easily expand these findings even to
private activities if they reach the same level of danger as nuclear tests. This will be hard to
achieve, but it is contended that civil applications of nuclear power (nuclear power plants,
radiological equipment, etc) could be considered as such, in certain circumstances.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
d) The reliance of the Court on article 8 rather than
article 10.
A major issue that arises is why the ECtHR chose to base a right to environmental
information on article 8 rather than choosing to further use article 10 as interpreted in the Sunday
Times case. According to Margaret DeMerieux, in using article 8 rather than article 10, the Court in
the Guerra case 'can be seen to resile substantially from its view in The Sunday Times v UK or at
least not to have taken those views to their logical concluston'J"
On the contrary, it has been argued by Sandrine Maljean-Dubols?" that the fact that article
10 was not used to achieve such a result should be welcomed, since it would have not led to such
an increased right of environmental protection as the one recognised on the basis of article 8. She
777 See above n. 773, dissenting opinion of judges DeMeyer, Valticos and Morenilla.
778 See above n. 731, at page 538.
779 Sandrine Ma1jean-Dubois, La Convention Europeenne des droits de l'homme et le droit a l'information en
matiere d'environnement - A propos de l'arret rendu par la CEDH le 19 fevrier 1998 en l'affaire Anna Maria
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thinks that the Court could not have interpreted article lOin such a way as to create such a positive
obligation to provide information as it did inzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAGuerra. In her opinion, article 10just prohibits State
interference in the circulation of information and deriving a positive obligation from it would have
been too difficult for the Court because it would signify a radical change in the court's
interpretation of article 10. We would agree to the extent that the ECtHR would enjoy more
flexibility when creating a new positive obligation to provide environmental information from
scratch, rather than deriving it from the well-established jurisprudence on article 10.780 This is why
article 8 was used in the Guerra case (whose findings were subsequently confirmed in McGinley
and Egan).
To put itzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAin other words, the reason why it could be said that there is an inconsistency
between Guerra and the Sunday Times case, is because the development of article 10 was
abandoned and then article 8 was brought into playas being seen as more effective in order to
establish a right to environmental information. In Guerra the Court adopted a very liberal
approach: it did not just create a right for any citizen to access environmental information. It also
imposed a duty on public authorities to actively provide environmental information that was in
their possession to citizens, whenever their family lives were affected by environmental hazards.
There was no condition for citizens to ask for such information in order for the creation of a duty
on public authorities to disclose it. This should be contrasted with the Environmental Information
Directive, where any duty to provide information arises only when someone asks for it. In
McGinley and Egan the Court went even further than that, by imposing under some circumstances
the duty on states not only to provide on their own initiative environmental information, but also to
provide effective mechanisms that would allow citizens to ask for such information whenever the
State is engaged in dangerous activities for human health.
However, this explanation on why article 8 was used instead of article 10 does not have
unanimity amongst scholars. According to Maria Gavouneli, 'in the circumstances of the Guerra
case, the Court considered it politic to avoid any repercussions on the right of the media to seek
information that might ensue from a less restrictive reading of Article 10, and preferred to grant
relief on the basis of the right to afamily life under Article 8' .781 We do not find this argument very
clear. It seems to indicate that if the Court had interpreted article 10 as containing a positive
obligation for States to provide information, this could have resulted in unwanted repercussions for
the right of the media to seek information. The author seems to suggest that this would lead in an
increased right of the media to ask for official information from State authorities and in a duty of
States to provide it. Thus, this would have been an unwanted consequence for member States and
the Court considered it 'politic' to avoid using article 10. We do not think that if the Guerra case
Guerra et 39 autres c. ltalie, Revue Generate de Droit International Public, 1998, Vol. 4, page 1016 (in
French).
780 However, the contrary could also be argued on the ground that to have complete freedom of expression
you need access to information, otherwise knowledge would be incomplete.
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had been decided under article 10 and not article 8 it would have changed anything for the right of
the media to seek information as it is suggested. These two rights (the right of the media to seek
information and the right of the public to receive information) would have been independent and
would have had a distinct parallel evolution, even though they were both stemming from article 10.
They do not necessarily have to be linked together and the Court could have granted different rights
to receive information to the public as being a 'victim' in the ECHR's sense and more restricted
rights to the press.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
e) The problem of artificial legal persons and the right
to environmental information.
As examined above, article 8, which has been used inzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAGuerra and subsequent case law to
establish a right to environmental information, protects private life, home, family life, privacy and
correspondence. According to article 1 of the ECHR, the rights contained in the Convention are to
be secured for 'everyone'. This term undoubtedly includes not only natural but also artificial legal
persons. Also, following established case law of the ECtHR, if artificial legal persons are affected
by the Convention, the rights and liberties contained in it are also applicable to them.782However,
when protecting private life, home and family life, article 8 seems to apply only to natural legal
persons. Of course, artificial legal persons have a right to protection of correspondence under this
article, but this right is irrelevant when environmental information is concerned.
The question that arises then is whether artificial legal persons can have a 'home' and
'private life' in the meaning of article 8 of the Convention, thus resulting in them also having a
fundamental right to receive environmental information in the circumstances described above.
Although a priori it could seem that artificial legal persons could not have a private life and a
home.?" in the case of Stes Colas Est and others v. France.T" the ECtHR held that it can be
possible under certain circumstances to recognize the right to a home to artificial legal persons. In
this case, the ECtHR held that the term 'home' is broad and can include the right of an artificial
legal person to receive protection of his offices or headquarters. The Court reached this decision by
reference to the fact that the ECHR should be interpreted by reference to the conditions of modem
life. Although the case concerned only the right to a home, it is not impossible to presume that the
Court, using the same method of 'dynamic' interpretation, might reach the conclusion that
artificial legal persons are also entitled to the protection of their 'private life'. Interestingly, the
European Court of Justice has reached the opposite conclusion: that the fundamental right of
781 Maria Gavouneli, Access to Environmental information: Delimitation of a Right, [2000] 13 Tulane
Environmental Law Journal 326.
782 See Weber, above n. 736, at page 183.
783 However, the ECtHR had left the matter open accepting that the fact that premises were used for business
purposes did not necessarily render article 8 inapplicable (the case concerned the search by police of a
lawyer's office). Niemietz v. Germany (1993) 16 EHRR 97 (a 1992 case).
784 Stes Colas Est and others v. France, 16 Apri12002, App. No. 37971/97.
inviolability of domicile was applicable to the private residence of natural persons, but could not be
extended to commercial premises. For the Court of LuxembourgzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA'The p otective scope of that
article [article 8zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAJ is concerned with the development of man' s personal freedom and may not
therefore be extended to business premises. ,785
The problem of whether the right to environmental information applies to an artificial legal
person, will not arise when the right of information is based on article 3 (prohibition of inhuman or
degrading treatment) or article 2 (the right to life).786We do not believe that it could be reasonably
suggested that these two articles could apply to artificial legal persons. Artificial legal persons
cannot have a right to life or a right to protection from inhumane or degrading treatments; they are
not humans for a start. Consequently, in such cases when the right to receive information can only
be sustained under article 2 or 3, it seems that artificial persons cannot receive the benefice of this
right. So, English law and EC law in this respect grant more rights to information (via the
Environmental Information Directive and the implementing Regulations) than the European
Convention on Human Right's law.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
f) The possible use of article 1 of the First Protocol in azyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
G uerra style.
As we have seen, in Guerra the court of Strasbourg considered that in order for public
authorities to protect the right to home and family life, they are under a positive obligation in
certain circumstances to provide information on threats to these amenities. A similar reasoning
could be used for the right to protection of property, as guaranteed by article I of the First
additional Protocol to the ECHR. Thus, when there would be a possible threat to property, public
authorities could be held to be under a duty to provide information to the owners of the property
affected. For instance, this could happen in cases of contaminated land, where such contamination
may affect the financial value of property, thus engaging article 1, and consequently this could also
raise the question of a right to obtain information under article 1 of the First Protocol.
This reasoning could be used in order to recognise a right to information in cases where
there is no interference with any other Convention right like article 8 or 2 or 3. Thus, it could be
used for the least serious cases in matters of breach of human rights. Of course, it should be noted
that for the time being, there is neither a case on this point nor even a case suggesting that article 1
of the First Protocol could be used in the context of environmental information. However, we
believe such an interpretation could be possible in the current trend of the ECtHR to use article 1 in
785 Hoechst AGzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAv Commission of the European Communities (46/87), Dow Benelux NV v Commission of the
European Community (85/87), Dow Chemical Iberica SA v Commission of the European Community (97/87)
[1989] ECR 2859 at par. 18. It is possible, though, that the CFI will modify these precedents, in light of its
Akzo Nobel decision in which it ruled (without referring to the ECHR) that the protection of the
confidentiality of written communications between lawyer and client is an essential corollary to the full
exercise of the rights of the defence, even if the client is an artificial legal person. See Akzo Nobel Chemicals
Ltd v Commission of the European Communities (T125/03 R) [2004] 4 CMLR 15.
249
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order to protect environmental amenities."? It should be interesting to observe the judicial
developments in this area.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
3) The right to life (Article 2)
Paragraph 1 of article 2 of the ECHR guarantees the right to life to everyone, except when
convicted to death by a lawful court?" As explained before, we do not reasonably think that this
right may logically be recognised to artificial legal persons. Paragraph 2 lists the only permissible
exceptions to this right, which are irrelevant when this article is used for guaranteeing a right to
information. This article aims to avoid not only killings of individuals but also serious risks to life.
Admittedly, it seems a little odd to interpret article 2 on the right to life as creating a right to
receive environmental information. However, the Commission has held that article 2 could also be
engaged when there are severe environmental hazards or threats to the environment that may
threaten human lives.?"
The ECtHR has interpreted article 2 and the right to life as granting a right to
environmental information in two cases. The first such case is the one ofzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAL.CB. v. The United-
Kingdom,790 which concerned the nuclear tests performed by the British military forces on the
Christmas Islands. During the Christmas Island nuclear tests, the applicant's father was stationed
on the islands. The applicant, who had never participated in these tests, was diagnosed with
leukaemia. She was arguing that both the State's failure to warn her parents of the possible risk to
her health caused by her father's participation in the nuclear tests, and its earlier failure to monitor
her father's radiation dose levels, gave rise to violations of Article 2 of the Convention.
The ECtHR started by expressly referring to the Guerra case and interpreted article 2 as
not only creating a duty for States not to unlawfully take lives, but also to take positive steps in
order to safeguard life. The court then examined whether the UK should have been expected to take
positive steps to provide advice to the applicant's parents and to monitor her health. It ruled that the
State could only have been required on its own motion to provide advice to the applicant's parents
and to monitor the applicant's health 'ifit had appeared likely at that time that any such exposure
of her father to radiation might have engendered a real risk to her health'J" The Court, applied
this principle to the instant case and found that, given the information available at the time the
786 On the relevant case law recognising a right to information under article 3 and 2, see infra.
787 For a recent such example where article 1 of the First Protocol was used in order to protect neighbours
from unlawful planning activities, see Jean-Jacques Paradissis, Unlawful Planning Development and the
right to peaceful enjoyment of Possessions: the Antonetto Case, [2002] Journal of Planning & Environment
Law, June, pp. 674-683.
788 However, the death penalty has been abolished gradually first in peace time and very recently in all cases.
See the 6th Additional Protocol to the ECHR on the abolition of the capital penalty in peace time and also the
13th Protocol concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances.
789 On this point see Stefan Weber above n. 736 at page 181.
790L.C.B. v. The United-Kingdom, 09/06/1998, App. No. 23413/94, see above note n. 730.
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nuclear tests were performed, the UK could not have been reasonably expected to take on its own
motion any of these steps.
According to Margaret DeMerieux 'the LCB judgement may well countenance a duty on
the State under Article 2 to warn of risks to health from certain state activities or to monitor the
health of persons but only where the authorities know for a certainty or conclusively of the risk of
harm'."? We totally agree with this interpretation of the L.C.B. judgement. As long as
environmental information is concerned, this decision seems to indicate that when public
authorities engage themselves in risky activities and have some clear indication about what these
risks could be, they have to inform people who might face threats to their lives. To summarise, this
means that information that is 'vitally' important for one's life must not only be accessible but must
also actively be communicated by public authorities to interested people.
It is interesting to see that the Court used a very similar reasoning as it did in the Guerra
case but based it on a different article: article 2 rather than article 8. Moreover, the Court inzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAL.C.B.
refused to examine the case under article 8 since it had not been an issue raised in front of the
Commission. However, it stated that certain aspects of the claim raised under article 2, raised no
separate issue under article 8. This seems to suggest that certain aspects of article 8 may well
coincide with article 2.793 This is logical since when human life faces a threat, the family and
private life of the relevant individual should in most cases also be affected. But the contrary will
not always be true. If there is an interference with private and family life, there will not always be a
serious threat to life. Thus, it seems that the Court will reserve the use of article 2 only to the most
serious cases. This is restrictive, since recognising a right to information under article 2 only,
would reserve such right only when there are serious threats for life. Consequently, we believe that
the use of article 2 for establishing a right to environmental information might limit such
recognition. We therefore believe that the sole use of article 8 could lead to a more liberal and
flexible right to information under the Convention. Moreover, as already discussed, we do not see
how the right to life could be applied when artificial legal persons are involved in order to
recognise to them a right to information. This could be possible under article 8 as explainedzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAsupra.
Also, in the recent case of McShane v The United Kingdom'" the Court found that article 2
implies that public authorities are under a duty to conduct an effective and prompt official
investigation on their own motion in order to establish the circumstances of death of people. This
particular case involved the killing of a demonstrator in Northern Ireland due to the use of force by
the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the British Army. More importantly for our point, the Court
adds that: 'there must be a sufficient element of public scrutiny of the investigation or its results to
secure accountability in practice as well as in theory. The degree of public scrutiny required may
791 Ibid. at paragraph 38.
792 See above n. 731, at page 543.
793 See DeMerieux, above n. 731, at page 537.
794 McShane v The United Kingdom, Application n. 43290/98, 28/05/2002. Available from
http://hudoc.echr .coe.int
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well vary from case to case. In all cases, however, the next-of-kin of the victim must be involved in
the procedure to the extent necessary to safeguard his or her legitimate interests.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA,795 Thi seems to
indicate that when various activities result in the loss of human lives, public authorities are not only
under a duty to run an investigation on the circumstances of the deaths, but must also provide to the
general public access to information on the investigation. The degree of access varies depending on
the facts of each particular situation, however, relatives are to be involved in all cases.
In the similar case of Edwards v United Kingdom,196 the ECtHR ruled under article 2, that
when a prisoner dies in prison due to an attack from a co-prisoner, the state is under a duty to carry
out an effective investigation. On the basis of the Edwards case, was decided the English Court of
Appeal case of R. (on the application of Amin (Imtiaz)) v Secretary of State for the Home
Department'" which also concerned a murder in prison by a cellmate. The Home Secretary refused
the family's request that an independent public inquiry into the death should be set up, on the
grounds that such an inquiry would add nothing of substance to previous internal investigations and
would not be in the public interest. That decision was challenged by way of judicial review. The
Court of Appeal accepted that the state had a procedural duty to investigate deaths, where there had
been a breach of its positive substantive duty under article 2 to take steps to protect life in cases
where its servants were or ought reasonably to be aware that a particular individual who was in the
state's care was at immediate risk of death or serious injury. The Court accepted that while a
credible accusation of murder by state agents would call for an independent investigation of the
utmost rigour, an allegation of negligence leading to death in custody, bore a different quality. But
in any case, the court should look at each case on its own facts and balance them. In the present
case the Court found that there was no need of a public inquiry since the investigations carried out
were sufficient to fulfil the procedural information requirement of article 2. Thus the Court of
Appeal clearly indicated that there are no fixed requirements of publicity and public participation
and so each case has to tum on its own facts. These cases, although not directly related to
environmental information could be applied, mutatis mutandis, when death is caused by severe
environmental hazards.
Finally, a very important case is the one of Oneryildiz v. Turkey(98 which concerns a
Turkish applicant who was living with his family in a shanty town near Istanbul. The shanty town
comprised slums built on land surrounding a rubbish tip and no official measures had been taken to
prevent a possible explosion of the methane gas emanating from the decomposing refuse, even if a
report had mentioned that danger. Unfortunately, a methane gas explosion did occur on the waste-
collection site and the refuse erupting from the pile of waste buried 11 houses situated below it,
including the one belonging to the applicant, who lost nine members of his twelve-members family.
795 Ibid. at paragraph 98.
796Edwards v United Kingdom (App. No. 46477/99), 14 March 2002, (2002) 35 EHRR 19.
797 [2002] EWCA Civ 390 CA.
798Oneryildiz v. Turkeyi, application no. 48939/99, 18 June 2002, available from the ECtHR's website; a
summary can be foundzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAin [2002] 6 EHRLR 782.
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The applicant alleged various breaches of the Convention and the one that is relevant here is the
failure of the authorities to inform him of the risk he and his family faced by living in this shanty
town, under article 2.
The ECtHR first started by stating that the facts of the present case were similar to the ones
in thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAGuerra case and that the reasoning adopted in that case was a fortiori applicable to the
present case based on article 2. Then the Court considered that the information about the risk of a
methane explosion could not be deemed to have been directly available to the applicant, since the
ordinary citizen such as he, could not have been expected to know of the specific risks inherent in
the process of methanogenesis and of a possible landslide. Only the State authorities could have
knowledge of such risks. The Court also indicated that the information in question could not have
been imparted to the public other than by an action on the part of the administrative authorities,
which were in possession of that information, and therefore rejected the argument that for the
information to be disclosed, the applicant ought first to have complained of the harmful effects of
the environment in which he lived. As a consequence, the Court found a violation of article 2
because Turkish administrative authorities 'failed to comply with their duty to inform the
inhabitants of the Kaztm Karabekir area of those risks, which might have enabled the applicant -
without diverting State resources to an unrealistic degree - to assess the serious dangers for
himself and his family in continuing to live in the vicinity of the Hekimbast rubbish tip. ,799
This case is important, not only because it is a restatement that a right to receive
information might arise under article 2 when human life is at risk, but mainly because it sets the
limits of such a right. First, it seems to indicate that when information is directly accessible to the
applicant, then State authorities have no duty to provide such information. This is logical and in a
way reminds us of the exception found both in the FOIA 2000 and the Environmental Information
Regulations 2004 on information directly accessible to the applicant by other means.f" Second, the
usage of the phrase 'without diverting State resources to an unrealistic degree' seems to indicate
that an extreme financial burden for providing such information might be a justification for not
providing it. This could be criticised, since one could argue that when article 2 is engaged and
therefore human lives are at stake, then no financial burden can be unreasonable since a human life
has no price.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
4) The prohibition of inhumane or degrading treatments (Article 3)
799 Ibid. at par. 87 of the judgement.
800 Examined in details in Chapter 1.
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Article 3 of the ECHR prohibits torture and inhumane or degrading treatments in absolute
terms. This means that it is a right that States cannot derogate from. The ECtHR had considered
article 3 and the right to impart information in most of the cases already examined, but had not
found that such a right could arise under this article. However, in a recent inter-states case,"!
brought by Cyprus against Turkey, the Court seems to indicate that a right to information could be
sustained under article 3.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
a) The recognition of a right to information under
Article 3: the initial reluctance of the CourtzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
In the case ofzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBALopez Ostra examined a ove, the Court also examined whether article 3 had
been violated. The ECtHR ruled that there had not been any violation of article 3, even though the
conditions of the applicant's life due to severe environmental pollution were 'very difficult', since
they were not severe enough so as to be equivalent to a degrading treatment in the meaning of
article 3.802 According to Philippe Sands this particular finding shows that under certain
circumstances environmental pollution might lead to a breach of article 3.803 This finding also
demonstrates that the threshold for the application of article 3 in environmental cases is very high,
since in the Lopez Ostra case although there was an interference with the right to home and family
life caused by severe environmental pollution which also caused harm to the applicant's life, there
was not any degrading or inhumane treatment. A strict reading of article 3 ought to be the case. A
too extensive reading of article 3 could lead to illogical results where mere annoyances or illnesses
caused by environmental nuisances could be considered as inhuman or degrading treatments.
The Cases on the Christmas islands nuclear tests were also considered under article 3. In
the case ofzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAL.eB. the question whether there was an inhuman or degrading treatment was
considered, but no violation was found.
In the case of McGinley and Egan article 3 was also considered but the court found it was
inapplicable since the complaint, based on lack of access to documents, fell more appropriately
within the scope of the complaints made under articles 6, 8 and 13.
All these cases seem to indicate that article 3 could have been a ground on which a right to
information (and as a consequence environmental information) may have been sustained. However,
none of these cases where successful under article 3.
801 Apart from the examination of applications brought in front of the ECtHR by private individuals and
artificial legal persons against member states, the ECHR also provides in article 33 for inter-state
a~plications. They consist of proceedings brought by state parties to the Convention against one another.
82 See above n. 766, at paragraph 60. .
803 See Sands above n. 729, at page 613.
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b) A recognition of a right to infonnation based on
article 3?zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
The case ofzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBACypr s v. TurkelzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAO4 is imp rtant b cause not only it indicates that under certain
circumstances a right to information may arise under article 3, but also because the court actually
found a breach of article 3 due to lack of information concerning the fate of some missing Greek-
Cypriots.
This case was about the people gone missing and displaced during the 1974 Turkish
military operations in Cyprus and also about the minority of Greek-Cypriots living in the Turkish
part of Cyprus. The ECtHR found Turkey guilty of human rights violations in Cyprus concerning
most of the rights protected by the Convention. The court held that Turkey had violated 14 articles
of the convention, including the right to life, the prohibition against torture and inhumane and
degrading treatments, the right to liberty and security, the right to freedom of expression. Most
importantly for the right to information, the Court held that since Turkey had failed to make the
necessary investigations and thus had given no information about the fate of the missing persons
during the invasion of Cyprus in 1974 by Turkish forces, their relatives had been subjected to
inhuman treatment of the kind proscribed by article 3 (the fate of these 1,500 missing people is
officially still unknown). In these circumstances, the Court found that it was the lack of provision
of information that constituted an inhumane or degrading treatment, since living in continuous
anxiety about the fate of these missing people amounted to a violation of article 3, as long as
relatives of missing people were concerned. According to the Court 'the silence of the authorities
of the respondent State in the face of the real concerns of the relatives of the missing persons
attains a level of severity which can only be categorised as inhuman treatment within the meaning
of Article 3' .805 Interestingly, the fact that relatives could not perform any searches by themselves
due to their impossibility to travel to the North part of Cyprus made Turkey responsible for
providing such information.t" Finally the ECtHR held that it was not necessary to examine the
claims raised on the violation of articles 8 and 10 and based on the same facts, since it had
previously found a violation of article 3.
This case is not about environmental information and moreover the facts are extreme.
However, it can be contended that this reasoning could also be applied mutatis mutandis when
extremely serious environmental disasters are involved. For instance, if some people go missing
after a nuclear accident, relatives should be entitled to receive information concerning the accident
so as to understand what happened to them and to evaluate the chances of survival of the people
804 Cyprus v. Turkey, 10/05/2001, App. No. 25781194, (2002) 35 EHRR 30.
80S Ibid. at paragraph 157
806 Ibid. at paragraph 157: 'In the absence of any information about their fate, the relatives of persons who
went missing during the events of July and August 1974 were condemned to live in a prolonged state of acute
anxiety which cannot be said to have been erased with the passage of time. [ ... ] The fact that a very
substantial number of Greek Cypriots had to seek refuge in the south coupled with the continuing division of
Cyprus must be considered to constitute very serious obstacles to their quest for information. The provision
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affected. Such interpretations of article 3 may seem far stretched, but the case ofzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBACyprus v. Turkey
seems to indicate that they cannot be excluded.
This case is similar in a way to Guerra and the Christmas Islands nuclear tests cases: if due
to lack of information so much distress and anxiety is caused that it amounts to a violation of a
protected right (either articles 2, 3, or 8) then States' authorities are under a duty to provide such
information. Interestingly, in such cases both these 3 articles can be engaged simultaneously.
But according to the severity of the situation only the most appropriate would be considered.
In Cyprus v. Turkey, it was article 3 since the relative's lives could not have been threatened by
lack of information on the missing people. Consequently it seems that in the most serious cases it
will be article 2 that will be engaged, then article 3 and then article 8, this last article being engaged
in less serious situations.
In any case, the reasoning is totally similar. If the lack of proper information by the State
can lead to an interference with a protected convention right, then the public authorities involved
are under a positive duty to provide the information that could relieve the people involved.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
5) The right to a fair trial (article 6-1)
Article 6-1 applies whenever there is a determination of civil rights and obligations thus
giving procedural protection. It mainly provides for a fair trial. But it can be used indirectly in
order to achieve access to information, when the information sought is part of the documents
submitted to the Court by some other party.
A very relevant case linking the right to a fair trial with access to information is Kerojarvi
v.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAFtnlandf" Kerojarv had received compensation for an injury suffered during the war. When the
relevant public authorities rejected his request for the grant of a higher disability pension, he
appealed to an Insurance Tribunal and then further appealed to the Finnish Supreme Court. The
Finnish Supreme Court had a practice not to transmit to parties some of the files of cases, and it
didn't supply some of the files to the applicant. The applicant to the ECtHR did not raise any
complaints in front of Finnish courts on this point, but complained of a violation of article 6 in
front of the Court of Strasbourg. The ECtHR ruled that the procedure in front of the Supreme Court
violated art. 6-1 on a fair trial as it prevented the applicant's full participation in the proceedings.
This Case shows the important link that exists between effective information and access to
justice. As the ECtHR mentioned in its judgement, the Finnish Supreme Court ought to have taken
positive measures to make these documents available to the applicant.?" This seems to indicate that
of such information is the responsibility of the authorities of the respondent State. This responsibility has not
been discharged.'
807 Kerojdrvi v. Finland, 19 July 1995, Application No. 17506/90, (2001) 32 EHRR 8.
808 Ibid. at paragraph 42: ' ... the Supreme Court, which was competent to examine the merits of the case, did
not take any measures to make the documents available to him'.
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there is a duty on authorities hearing appeals to make sure that the appellants have had access to all
the necessary information that would allow a fair trial. Consequently, when someone is challenging
an administrative decision in courts or in front of a tribunal, he should be given access without even
having to ask for it, to the documents that are referred to Court by the other party. This duty may
even extend to the provision of any other information on which the court or tribunal relied on for its
decision.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
In thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAMcGinley a d Egan case (for the facts see supra), the Court found that article 6 was
also applicable. The applicants argued that they had been denied a fair hearing in front of the PAT
since they were not in possession of all relevant information in order to sustain their case.
However, the Court found that since there was a specific procedure provided that would have
allowed discovery of documents that the applicants did not use, the applicants had had a fair
hearing.
All these cases show how fundamental can be a specific procedure that will allow for
environmental information to be communicated to people and particularly to claimants to courts.
This is particularly important in the field of judicial review of administrative decisions, where the
applicant for an order must prove his claims. The ideas of access to Courts and access to
information are to be found, dealt with side by side, in the Aarhus Convention.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
B. The limitations posed by the Convention to a right to environmental information.
Today, most contracting states to the ECHR and all EEA states have introduced in their
national laws a right to environmental information of some sort. Irrespective of how this right is
implemented in each national legal system, it may conflict with some Convention rights, thus
limiting it.
Moreover, as we have seen, under certain circumstances, it is possible to induce a right to
environmental information from some articles of the ECHR. However, each of these articles
carries its own limitations, thus creating an overlap between all these different Convention
provisions.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
1) Limits set by Convention rights to a national right to environmental
information.
The right to receive information may conflict with a right to privacy of third parties. Such
rights are protected by the ECHR by mainly article 8. It can also conflict with a right to commercial
secrecy and a right to a protection of state and other protected secrets (military secrets, commercial
secrets etc). These secrets although not directly protected in the ECHR under stand-alone articles
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can be derived from other articles. Finally, the right to receive information may be subject to article
6.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
a) The right to personal privacy (article 8)
As we have seen, article 8 guaranteeszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAinter alia a right to priv te life. The importance of
this provision for protecting privacy is increased by the fact that before the Human rights Act 1998
according to Patrick Birkinshaw there was 'no statutory or common law right to privacy as
such' .809 Under article 8 the ECtHR has held numerous times that personal data has to be protected
as a component of one's private life. These cases concerned whether the obligation to provide
personal data, the dissemination of personal data without the concerned person's consent, the
collection and storage of personal data and the refusal to have inaccurate personal data held on
registers corrected, were a breach of the right to privacy and if such breach was legitimate.!"
According to Birkinshaw personal data means data which relates to a living individual which can
be identified to that data."! We are not going to examine in detail the abundant case-law on the
protection of personal data under the Convention since this would be more relevant in a work on
data protection than a work on environmental information. Nevertheless, we shall examine whether
the present legal framework for accessing environmental information protects private data.
First, as long as the Environmental Information Regulations are concerned (both the 1992
and the 2004 ones) they contain as we have seen an exemption to disclosure of personal
information. This seems to satisfy the requirements of article 8 of the Convention.
In any case, as the Court of Appeal in R. (on the application of S) v Plymouth City
Councif"? suggests, a balance between confidentiality and other interests in disclosure has to be
struck on a case by case basis. The Court indicated that at common law and under articles 6 and 8
of the ECHR it was necessary to strike a balance between maintaining confidentiality of
information and permitting or requiring that information to be disclosed in certain cases.
Second, matters are more complex as long as the different registers containing
environmental information are concerned. As we have seen, it all depends on the particular piece ofzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
809 See Patrick Birkinshaw, Government & Information - The Law Relating to Access, Disclosure & their
Regulation, 2nd edition, Butterworths, London 2001, at pp. 311-2. However, it seems that there is also a right
to privacy under English law, with which we are not going to deal. See on this point the relevant chapter in
Edwin Shorts and Claire de Than, Human rights law in the UK, Sweet & Maxwell, London 2001. Also, in
Douglas v. Hello! Ltd [2001] Q.B. 967, CA, the Court of Appeal mentioned that there is ' ... a right of
privacy which we will today recognise and protect and which was grounded in equity and the common law',
at page 1001. See also Developing key privacy rights, edited by Madeleine Colvin, Oxford: Hart, 2002.
810 On all of these points see the loose-leaf publication Human Rights Practice, Sweet & Maxwell, Chapter 8,
n. 8.010 - Personal Data. Also see Freedom of Information and Data Protection Acts: the interface, Data
Protection and Privacy Practice, 2001, 4(Mar), 30.
811 See Birkinshaw above n. 809, at page 280.
812 [2002] EWCA Civ 388. The facts of the case are irrelevant and concern an appeal against the dismissal of
an application for judicial review of the decision by the local social services to refuse to a mother of a child
with learning and behavioural difficulties, permission to see his social services files and other material upon
which guardianship decisions had been made by the Council under the Mental Health Act 1983.
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legislation, which enacts each register. Most of the registers contain exemptions to disclosure of
personal data when there is no consent of the people concerned. However, some of the older
registers (like the planning registers) do not contain such provisions. A recent case of the
Administrative Court concerning the electoral registers seems to be able to provide an answer to
this problem.
The case ofzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAR. (on the application of Robertson) v. Wakefield MDCSl3 concerned the refusal
of an electoral registration officer to exclude the petitioner's details from copies of the electoral
register given to commercial organisations for marketing purposes. Under the regulations that
govern the setting up and maintenance of the electoral registers, citizens have no explicit right to
object to personal data present on the register being sold to companies for marketing or other
purposes. The Court held inter alia that article 8 on the right to privacy had been engaged by the
disclosure of electors' personal details exposing them to invasive marketing strategies. Also it ruled
that the failure to afford electors a right of objection was disproportionate to the legitimate
economic aim of maintaining a commercially available register and hence, article 8 had been
breached.
The findings of this case could be applied mutatis mutandis to the case of registers
containing environmental information when there is no explicit provision for citizens to object to
personal data being circulated. For instance, as we have already seen.!" the register of planning
applications not only does contain some sort of personal data (like the name and addresses of
people making the applications) but also in some cases it can be widely accessible on the internet.
Consequently, it seems that article 8 might prevent circulation of personal data present on registers
containing environmental information.
This then raises the questionzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAof the ranking of the right to private life and the protection of
the environment. Could the public interest of protecting the environment allow a limited breach of
article 8 rights? The answer seems to be yes, as indicated in the Gypsy cases'" concerning
enforcement notices against Gypsy caravan owners. In these cases the ECtHR ruled that even
though enforcement notices against caravans owners could be a breach of article 8 even where
there was a breach of the planning law, these interferences were legitimate and necessary in a
democratic society since aimed at protecting the environment. These cases indicate without any
doubt that environmental concerns might justify a breach of article 8. Consequently, it seems that it
could be possible under Convention law to justify breaches of article 8 (for instance by
813 R. (on the application of Robertson) v Wakefield MDC [2001] EWHC Admin. 915.
814 See Chapter 2 on Registers.
815 The most important of these cases are: Chapman v. UK (2001) 33 EHRR 18; Buckley v. UK, 25/09/1996,
App no. 20348/92, available from the ECtHR's internet site, see above n. 730. The issue of whether Gypsies
are refused planning permission for their Caravans in breach of article 8 arises also very frequently in
national case-law. See among others Buckland v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the
Regions [2002] JPL 570. Also, for an analysis linking human rights, environmental protection and the rights
of minority communities and people to environmental protection, see Sevine Ercmann, "Human Rights,
Environment & Community: A Workshop Conference held at University at Buffalo Law School, April 17 &
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disseminating personal data, as mentioned above) in cases where this aims to protect the
environment.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIn such cases, a proportionate lance will have to be struck between the competing
protected amenities and this in turn can now be reviewed by the COurtS.816On this basis, we feel that
the concerns expressed by Pitt-Payne that to the extent that there is a conflict between freedom of
information and privacy'zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAthere is at present a serious risk that FO! will be undervalued' are unduly
alarmist at least as long as environmental information is concerned."?zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
b) The right to privacy and the protection of
commercial, industrial and professional secrets.
If the professional secrets (which we will consider as including commercial secrets and
industrial secrets) concern a natural legal person, then they are covered by the right to privacy."!
However, most of the times such secrets will belong to artificial legal persons. Even in these cases,
as analysed before, the jurisprudence of the Court of Strasbourg recognises that article 8 rights
apply to artificial legal persons, thus providing protection of professional secrets.
Moreover, the Convention refers in article 8(2) to two grounds for the restriction of rights
arising under article 8 which seem to be relevant. They are 'the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others' and 'national security'. Article 10(2) also refers to 'the protection of the
reputation or rights of others' and 'information received in confidence'. The Court of Strasbourg
has already applied in the McGinley and Egan case a limitation present in article 8(2) in order to
limit a right to access information that arises under article 8. In this particular case it was the
protection of national security that could have limited a right to information arising under article
8.819 The same reasoning could be applied for professional secrets under the justification based on
'the right of others'.
However, an infringement to professional secrecy might be justified by the proportionality
test under article 8(2), if it is 'necessary in a democratic society' for achieving a legitimate aim. For
instance, if supposedly there are lethal risks for health by certain activities (like in the McGinley
18, 1998: Linking Human Rights, Rights of Indigenous People and the Environment" [1999] 7 Buffalo
Environmental Law Journal 15.
816 About the increased review of administrative decisions in cases involving human rights, going farther than
the 'classic English public law concepts' of irrationality, illegality and procedural impropriety, see R. (on the
application of Daly) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 2 WLR 1622. Also Ben Pontin,
Human Rights and Judicial Review (editorial), E.L.M. 13 [2001] 5.
817 Timothy Pitt-Payne, Privacy versus freedom of information: isthere a conflict?, 2003 EHRLR Special
Issue: Privacy, 109, at p. 110.
818 See Kopp v. Switzerland (1999) 27 EHRR 91. This 1998 case concerned the monitoring of calls received
in a lawyer's office. The Court found a breach of article 8, since the monitoring of such calls was totally
~rohibited under national Swiss law provisions.
19 The court ruled at par. 100-101 that: 'The Court recalls that the Government have asserted that there was
no pressing national security reason for retaining information [... ] In these circumstances, given the
applicants' interest in obtaining access to the material in question and the apparent absence of any
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and EganzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAcase examined before), then it seems that professional secrecy could not be invoked
effectively to restrain disclosure.
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that in Ashdown v Telegraph Group Ltcf20 the Court of
Appeal concluded that under certain circumstances the public interest might require the verbatim
reproduction of copyright material. Thus human rights considerations might outweigh proprietary
interests in special circumstances. Such special circumstances might be when there is a duty to
provide vital information under one of the Convention articles examined before.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
c) The right to a fair trial. (article 6)
The question we shall try to answer is whether article 6 is applicable to proceedings
concerning environmental information provided by public bodies. This should only be the case if
the right of an individual to access environmental information is of a civil nature. Two situations
should be distinguished.
The first situation we shall examine is what is the case when the right to receive
environmental information arises due to the applicability of a Convention article conferring such a
right as analysed above, namely article 8 or 2 or 3 or even 10. When an article of the Convention is
engaged, then it is established case law of the ECtHR that article 6 is applicable too. Consequently,
in such cases, article 6 is applicable, thus providing procedural protection. Moreover, when
Convention rights are engaged, article 13 (providing an effective remedy when Convention rights
are violated) is also applicable, although the court will only apply one of them (either art. 6 or art.
13) since they are equivalent in this context.
Article 6 should also be engaged when an individual challenges the decision of a public
authority to provide environmental information that might contain personal data concerning him.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIn
such cases, as we have already seen, article 8 is engaged since personal data are protected as a
component of the right to privacy guaranteed by article 8.
Second, the situation is very different if the right to receive environmental information
arises only in relation of national law provisions. In such cases, the Commission decision in the
Clavel case seems to indicate that article 6 is not applicable at all. The Commission ruled in its
decision that due to the official nature of the land register maintained by Swiss state authorities in
order to ensure land publicity, the applicant's application for judicial review to the Swiss courts
against the refusal of the relevant authorities to allow him access to the registers was not a dispute
concerning the applicant's civil rights."! Thus, article 6, which is only engaged in the
countervailing public interest in retaining it, the Court considers that a positive obligation under Article 8
arose.' See above at n. 773
820 Ashdown v Telegraph Group Ltd [2001] HRLR 57. This case was about the publication of copyrighted
minutes of confidential political meetings by a newspaper. See also Louis Joseph, Human Rights Versus
Copyright: The Paddy Ashdown Case [2002] Entertainment Law Review 72.
821 This case concerned the refusal opposed to a journalist to access during his investigations information
present on a local land register in Switzerland. See above n. 743.
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determination of civil rights and obligations, was not applicable. Even though this decision is quite
old since it dates back to 1987, it does not seem that there are cases indicating this position has
been altered. Consequently, it seems that when the right of the public to access environmental
information arises only under national law, then it is not a right of civil nature for the purposes of
applying article 6 and thus this article is not applicable.
Interestingly, apart from article 6, it seems that article 8, even if taken independently, may
also provide procedural protection. InzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAGaskin'" the ECtHR ruled that the principle of
proportionality (under article 8) required that an independent authority should have been in
existence to determine the respective competing claims to confidentiality and to access. The
absence of such a procedure was found to be a violation of article 8. In the UK these requirements
seem to have been fulfilled by the creation of the Data Protection Commissioner, renamed by the
Freedom oflnformation Act 2000 into the Information Commissioner.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
2) The uncertain boundaries of a right to environmental information recognised
under the convention.
As we have seen when we analysed the case-law of the Court of Strasbourg, under some
convention rights it is possible to sustain a positive obligation for public authorities to provide
information, in order to protect the specific amenities that each article encompasses. This could
lead to difficulties for finding which specific article is applicable in each particular circumstance.
This is an important question since Convention rights carry limitations which can justify
interference, though limited, to the protected right. These limitations however, vary according to
the specific convention article engaged. So, it can be a cause of legal uncertainty, since different
provisions might be applicable simultaneously, each carrying its own limitations.
a) The overlap between various articles of the
Convention.
The human rights under which a right to information may be sustained are the right to
home and family life (article 8), the right to life (article 2) and the prohibition oftorture and similar
treatments (article 3). There could also be a right to access to information under article 10 (on
freedom of expression) in certain circumstances, however the Court of Strasbourg has never
indicated what these circumstances could be, except maybe in the Sunday Times case.
Unfortunately, the findings of this case were never confirmed as long as access to information is
concerned in subsequent cases, leaving it a standalone precedent. Sedley LJ has criticised the
822zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAOn the case of Gas in se supra no. 744.
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approach of the ECtHR as inconsistent, arguing that there is something odd in interpreting article 8
as recognising a right to information when this article says nothing about that and at the same time
refusing to find such a right in article 10.823Consequently, at the present time, for the recognition of
a human right to access information there seems to be an overlap only between articles 2, 3 and 8.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
In some very serious situations, these three articles can be engaged simultaneously, but in
other cases, like inzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBALopez Ostra, the int rferences to protected amenities might not be serious
enough to tantamount to more than a breach of article 8. Moreover, as already mentioned before,
the ECtHR stated in the L.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAC.B. case that certa n aspects of the claim brought under article 2, raised
no separate issue under article 8. This seems to indicate that the Court will reserve the use of article
2 only to the most serious cases, thus the use of article 2 would 'embrace' all claims that could
have been raised under article 8. A similar reasoning was used in the Cyprus v. Turkey case where
article 3 was applied. The court found that 'In view of its conclusion under Article 3, with its
emphasis on the effect which the lack of information had on thefamilies of missing persons, itfinds
it unnecessary to examine separately the complaints which the applicant Government have
formulated in terms of Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention'. 824 In this case it was article 3 that
'embraced' claims based on articles concerning less serious violations to human rights like articles
8 and 10.
Such an approach might not be effective, since recognising a right to information under
article 2 or 3, would reserve such right only when there are serious threats for life or degrading
treatments. Articles 2 and 3 require serious interferences with protected amenities in order for them
to be engaged. Consequently, it could lead to a restriction of the number of different situations in
which they could be used in order to recognise a right to access information. However, this seems
to be counterbalanced by the fact that when they are engaged, the ground on which interferences
with article 2 and 3 rights can be justified under the proportionality test, are more restricted than
under article 8(2), which provides various reasons for justification.f" In fact, it seems that none of
the restrictions present in the body of the text of article 2(2)826 (article 3 contains no exemptions at
all) may justify a restriction to a right to information that could stem from these articles. So, it
seems that in such cases, there will be no possibility for the application of a proportionality test,
since there could be no other countervailing interests to place on the other scale of the balance in
order to counterbalance a right to information arising under article 2 or 3. For the time being, there
823 See Sedley LJ 'Information as a Human Right', in Freedom of expression and freedom of information -
essays in honour of Sir David Williams, edited by Jack Beatson and Yvonne Cripps, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000, at p. 244.
824 Cyprus v.Turkey, Op. Cit. at par. 161.
825 Art. 8(2): 'There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such
as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security,
public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
Erotection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. '
26 Art. 2(2): 'Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article when it
results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: a) in defence of any person from
unlawful violence; b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained;
c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.'
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seems that there is no authority on this particular point.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIn fact, in all cases involving either article 2
or 3 and the right to access information, the proportionality test found no grounds for application
and the defendant states did not seem to have raised any such issue.
However, we still believe that the sole usage of article 8 could lead to a more liberal and
flexible right to information under the Convention, since article 2 and 3 rights could not be
reasonably applied to recognise to artificial legal persons a right to access information. This is
however possible under article 8 as analysedzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAsupra.
In any circumstances, this overlap creates legal uncertainty concerning the applicable
Convention article and an indication on a method to establish the applicable legal provision should
be welcomed. Having different articles providing rights to environmental information is a problem,
since it creates legal uncertainty, which is contrary to the rule of law as interpreted by the ECtHR.
The Court of Strasbourg has ruled that for the actions of public authorities to be legal, the
applicable provisions of domestic law on which they base their actions must be sufficiently
accessible, precise and foreseeable.f" The basis of this finding according to the Court ofStrasbourg
is the rule of law, a principle inherent to all Convention articles. It concerns domestic law, but it
could be a fortiori applied to ECHR law itself.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
b) A possible solution: a rationale based on the court's
jurisprudence.
It seems that a solution to this problem could be induced from a detailed examination of
how the Court of Strasbourg dealt with this overlap in the most recent of all of the aforementioned
cases.
This is the case of Cyprus v. Turkey, where although both articles 8 and 3 could have been
engaged simultaneously, only the claims under article 3 were considered by the Court since this
article was seen as the most appropriate. Consequently this might indicate that in the most serious
cases it will be article 2 that will be used, then article 3 and then article 8, this last article being
utilised in less serious situations. The criterion for determining under which article arises a right to
information could be the severity of the breach of human rights, depending on the particular facts
in each specific case.
However, in Guerra the Court found a violation of article 8 and so held that it was
unnecessary to consider the claim in relation to article 2, even though it seems that article 2 could
have been applicable. In fact, article 2 protects more crucial amenities than private life and home:
human life itself, without which the recognition of any other human rights to individuals would be
meaningless. The Court did not indicate why due to the finding of a violation of article 8 it was
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'unnecessary to consider the case under Article 2 also'828.This seems to be contrary to a criterion of
'severity' as described above. However, we do not think it could undermine our 'severity test'
analysis since thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBACypr s v. Turkey on which this analysis is based was a subsequent case, thus
demonstrating a turn in the Court's approach. Judges Walsh and Jambrek had welcomed such a
change by stating in their dissent in Guerra that:
'It may thereforebe time for the Court's case-lawon Article2 (the right to life) to
start evolving, to develop the respective implied rights, articulate situations of real and
seriousrisk to life, or differentaspectsof the right to life.Article2 also appearsrelevantand
applicable to the facts of the instant case in that 150 people were taken to hospital with
severearsenicpoisoning.'
For Kate Cook,829Guerra might demonstrate the reluctance of the ECtHR to consider
claims in relation to article 2 in an environmental context. However, it seems that in the subsequent
case ofzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAL.eB. which concerned the risks to health because of the Christmas Island nuclear tests and
thus was definitely an environmental case, the Court considered article 2 but found there had been
no breach of it. So, this case perhaps demonstrates that the ECtHR has since Guerra added article 2
to the articles under which a right to access information might arise in an environmental context.
C. The fundamental right to environmental information in an EC law context.
Even though, as discussed elsewhere in this work, in EC law there is a right recognised to
individuals'" to receive environmental information provided by the Directives 90/313 and 2003/4,
we are going to examine in this part if there exists in EC law a fundamental right to access
environmental information. In the present context, a "fundamental" right is a right of paramount
importance that is hierarchically higher that regular rights, in the sense that if a fundamental EC
legal norm conflicts with a non-fundamental EC legal norm, then the former prevails.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
1) The presence of human rights in general and fundamental environmental
rights in particular, in EC law.
827See the ECtHR cases of Hentrich v. France, 22/09/1994, paragraph 42; Lithgow and Others v, UK,
8/07/1986, paragraph 110; Beyeler v, Italy, paragraph 109. All available from the ECtHR website at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int
828See Guerra, above n. 747, at par. 62.
829See Cook above, n. 752, at page 207.
830See Joanne Scott, EC Environmental Law, Longman: London 1998, at page 159. On rights recognised to
individuals by substantive EC Environmental Law (as opposed to fundamental human rights) see Chris
Hilson, 'Community rights in Environmental Law', Chapter 4 in Jane Holder, The Impact of EC
Environmental Law in the UK, John Wiley& sons 1997, pages 51 et seq.
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Human rights have today become a substantial component of EC law following the
increase of community competencies and are now present both in the treaties of Amsterdam and
Maastricht but also in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union."! However,
initially, the Treaty of Rome which was the founding treaty of the EEC did not mention at all any
fundamental rights and did not make any reference to such rights.i" The ECJ considered in its
jurisprudence in the 60's that this lack of a catalogue of fundamental human rights could prevent
the Court from subjecting EC law to human rights review.f" This could be understandable when
treaties were granting strictly only economic competencies to the EEC, since situations of conflicts
between human rights and EEC rules would be rare in such a context, even though possible.f" With
the extension of EC capacities following the introduction of the second pillar (Common Foreign
and Security Policy) and third pillar (Justice and Home Affairs), possible human rights conflicts
could arise in every action of the EC,835thus making human rights control a necessity. However,
the ECJ did not wait for the increase in Community attributions in order to establish EC human
rights, since there had been strong reaction from the Italian and the German supreme courts to its
initial reluctance to subject community measures to a human rights control.f" Thus, in its landmark
case ofzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAInternationale Handelgesellschaft'" the ECJ ruled that fundamental rights form an integral
part of the general principles of Community law. In the subsequent case of Nolt/38 the ECJ referred
to international human rights instruments that member states had ratified as guidelines to be
followed in Community law, and finally in the Rutili839 case the Court referred for the first time
explicitly to the ECRR. It has been constantly referring both to the ECRR and the interpretation
given to its provisions by the ECtHR, in subsequent cases. All these cases, demonstrate that today
fundamental rights are a very important part of EC law and that human rights may reach national
831The Charter is a non-legally binding political declaration that contains fundamental principles contained
either in the ECHR or the EC treaties but also some new ones to the EC legal order. It has been published in
O.J.E.C. C364, 18-12-2000, p.l. See The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EC, Human Rights Law
Journal, Vol. 12,No. 1-2, 15 Sept. 2000, (The whole issue is dedicated to the Charter). The Charter has now
been incorporated in the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. See Agreement reached on the
EC Constitution (editorial) [2004] EC Focus 147,2-3.
832zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAOn the slow development of human rights in the Communities see hristiane Duparc, The European
Community and Human Rights, Commission of the European Communities, Office for Official Publications
of the European Communities: Luxembourg 1993.
833See Pavlos Z. Elefiheriadis, The Future of Environmental Rights in the European Union, in Philip Alstom
(edited by), The EC and Human Rights, Oxford University Press 1999, Chapter 16, at page 538 and the
Cases mentioned at footnote 35.
834See Jacqueline Dutheil de la Rochere, Introduction au Droit de l'Union Europeenne, 2nd ed., Hachette
Superieur: Paris 1998, at pages 102-3. (in French)
835See on the potential possible human rights conflicts in these areas, Deirde Curtin & Ige Dekker, The EC
as a 'Layered' International Organization: Institutional Unity in Disguise, in Paul Craig & Grainne de Burca
(edited by), The Evolution ofEC law, Oxford University Press 1999, Chapter 3, at pages 126-131.
836See Jacqueline Dutheil de la Rochere above n. 834 at page 103.
837ECJ Case 11/70,lnternationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Eirfuhr-und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und
Futtermittel, [1970] ECR 1125.
838ECJ Case 4/73, Noldv Commission [1974] ECR 491
839ECJ Case 36/75 Rutili v Minister for the Interior [1975] ECR 1219.
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law through the application ofEC law in member sates.t" However, the ECJ has only been raising
issues concerning human rights within its existing area of competence as defined by EC law. Acts
of member states that implement EC law'" but also national law derogations'? from EC
obligations allowed under EC law, can be reviewed for human rights violations as long as they
concern EC law and thus fall under the competence of the Court of Luxembourg.
Today EC law covers environmental law with both sectoral provisions (on water, soil,
fauna and flora, water, nuclear radiation, air) and general provisions that apply to all of these
particular areas (such as rules on Environmental Impact Assessments, access to information,
environmental information labels, EMAS schemes). Consequently, it appears that the environment
is an area where human rights are applicable through EC law.843
These human rights can be of two sorts. First, as we discussed above, the fundamental
rights and freedoms contained in the ECHR are applicable at EC level by the various institutions
and in particular by the ECJ and also apply to national state measures when they concern
implementation or derogation of Community law. The status of the ECHR law in EC law seems to
be that of general principles of law, as article 6(2) of the treaty on the European Union indicates.t"
The ECHR law is not in itself applicable in EC law. It is just anzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAauthoritative source for EC's
unwritten fundamental rights?" There has been an issue whether the Community could accede to
the ECHR. However in a 1996 opiniorr'" the ECJ found that a ratification of the ECHR by the
Community was legally impossible because of legal obstacles. These obstacles concerned both EC
law (the treaties are not a sufficient legal basis for granting authority to the EC to ratify the ECHR)
and the ECHR itself (article 59 of the ECHR allow for the accession of only member states of the
Council of Europe and article 4 of the Council of Europe statute opens membership only to
European States, thus not international' institutions). To avoid repetition we shall refer the reader to
what has been said previously in the present chapter on the law of the ECHR and the environment.
To sum it up, there is not in the ECHR as interpreted by the Court of Strasbourg such a thing as a
840 On this point see Nicholas Grief, The Domestic Impact of the European Convention on Human Rights as
Mediated through Community Law, [1991]zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAPublic Law 555.
841 See for an example the ECJ Case 5/88, Hubert Wachaufv Bundesamt fur Ernahrung und Forstwirtschaft
[1989] ECR 2609, at paragraph 19.
842 ECJ Case C-260/89, Elliniki Radiophonia Tileorassi AE and Panellinia Omospondia Syllogon
Prossopikou v Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas and Nicolaos Avdellas and others [1991]
ECR 1-2925. Also referred as the 'ERT case'.
843 See on this point Lammy BettenzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA& Nicholas Grief, EC Law and Human Rights, Longman: London 1998,
at pp. 108-110.
844 Article 6(2): 'The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as
they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of
Community law'. This position will change in the near future, when the new EC Constitutional Treaty will
have been ratified.
845 See Hans Christian Kruger and Jorg Polakiewicz, Proposals for a Coherent Human Rights Protection in
Europe - The European Convention on Human Rights and the EC Charter of Fundamental Rights, Human
Rights Law Journal, Vol. 22 No. 1-4, 1, at page 3.
846 Opinion of the ECJ of 28 March 1996. Accession by the Community to the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Opinion 2/94. [1996] ECR 1-1759.
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right to environmental protection. According to Pavlos Eleftheriadis,"? the recognition of such a
fundamental right should not be welcomed since its existence would be characterised by the
uncertainty of its contents and redundancy since there are already numerous international law
provisions that protect the environment even if they are not 'fundamental rights'. He considers that
the environment could be better protected by the incorporation of environmental concerns in
existing human rights, an approach adopted by the ECtHR. We cannot agree with such an
approach. On the one hand, most human rights are both uncertain in their boundaries and are also
protected by other non-fundamental international provisions."" On the other hand, using first
generation human rights for creating environmental rights leads (as analysed when reviewing the
ECtHRjurisprudence) to great uncertainty, due to the fact that since civil and political rights were
not initially conceived as being a means to protect environmental amenities, their scope of
protection when being applied to the environment cannot be foreseen at all.
Second, it seems that EC law contains its own human rights which even if they are similar
to those included in the ECHR, are different since they stem from different sources. Specific
human rights are present in the Treaties itself.!" The EC treaty does contain provisions on the
environment at articles 2 (on harmonious development and balanced expansion) and 176 (on
environmental protection in conformity with sustainable developmentj.f" However, we do not
think that they create or even imply such thing as azyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAfundamental right to a clean and healthy
environment. They are more guidelines for the Community's actions and a basis of the competence
of the EC on environmental matters. It should be mentioned that article 37 of the EC Charter of
Fundamental Rights states thatzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA'A high level of environmental protection and the improvement of
the quality of the environment must be integrated into the policies of the Union and ensured in
accordance with the principle of sustainable development'. First of all, it should be noted that the
Charter is not legally binding.!" Also, even if the Charter has now been incorporated into the
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, this Treaty has not yet entered into force. However,
even if it was in force, this statement does not seem to create any fundamental right to a decent
environment. It merely restates principles already present in the EC Treaty.t" Article 37 of the
847 See above n. 833, at pp. 530-533.
848 For instance, concerning the right to property, the numerous case law on article 1 of the first protocol to
the ECHR demonstrates its uncertainty, and there is also a multitude of international conventions protecting
foreign investments and on the prevention of double taxation, that cannot be reasonably construed as laying
down fundamental human rights.
849 For a list of such human rights see Vaughne Miller, Human Rights in the EC: the Charter of Fundamental
Rights, Research Paper 00/32, House of Commons Library Research Papers, London 2000, pp. 9-11. Also
available electronically at http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rpintro.htm
850 See Joanne Scott, above n. 830, atzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBApp. 4-10.
851 However, it has been suggested that UK courts could use the Charter so as to depart from the Court of
Strasbourg's jurisprudence and to enhance UK human rights jurisprudence, which it is suggested should not
be less protective than the protection of human rights offered by EC law. See Ian Rogers, 'From the Human
Rights Act to the Charter: Not another Human Rights Instrument to Consider', [2002] 3 EHRLR 343, at p.
353-354.
852 The Convention that drafted the Charter explains in a non-authoritative commentary under article 37 that
'The principles set out in this Article are based on Articles 2,6 and 174 of the EC treaty.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIt also draws on thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSR PONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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Charter is more an invitation to the EC policy maker to take the protection of the environment and
sustainable development into consideration before taking any action. It seems difficult that this
article creates any judicially defendable right. It seems that the drafters of the Charter made the
error to confuse human rights with policyzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAin general. As Pavlos El ftheriadis had warned,
'We are running the risk of forgetting the special and uncompromising nature of
human rights standards that can or ought to be protected judicially. Hence, there is a need to
define carefully those areas that matter most from the point of view of human rights, and
those that are open to the discretion of decision-makers' 853
We feel that article 37 of the Charter contains more policy based provisions than judicially
enforceable fundamental rights. In any case since this article is based on the EC treaties, it does not
change anything to the legal position existing before the Charter, since according to article 53 of
the Charter, rights based on the treaties are to be exercised under the conditions and within the
limits defined by the treaties.i" According to Kate Cook.t" it is not certain that article 37 of the
Charter will add any further individual dimension to the principle already present in the Treaties.
All in all, it seems quite clear that there is not in EC law a fundamental right protecting the
environmentzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAper se, or a right to live in a decent environment. There are only aggregates of such a
right, based on traditional civil and political rights and developed mostly by the jurisprudence of
the ECtHR. It remains to be seen whether EC law recognises a fundamental right to environmental
information.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
2) The absence of a fundamental right to environmental information in EC law.
Before answering the question whether there is a fundamental right to environmental
information in EC law, we shall distinguish the situation in ECHR law. As analysed before, ECHR
law is applicable in EC law. We shall therefore refer the reader to the previous section where the
existence of a fundamental right to environmental information in ECHR law was analysed, bearing
in mind that ECHR law is applicable in EC law too.
As long as EC law in itself is concerned, there seems to be no fundamental right to access
information and of course no fundamental right to access environmental information. The only ECJ
case that seems to indicate indirectly that such a fundamental right to access information might be
recognised at EC level, is the case of The Netherlands v EC Councili" This case concerned an
action of annulment brought by the Netherlands against the Code of Conduct concerning public
access to Council and Commission documents. The Court ruled that this document because it had
provisions of some national constitutions'. In document CHARTE 4473/00, under art. 37, available online at
http://www .consilium.eu.int
8S3 See Eleftheriadis above n. 833, at page 545.
8S4 On this point see Koen Lenaerts & Eddy de Smijter, A "Bill of Rights" for the European Union, [2001]
Common Market Law Review 38, 273, at page 289.
8SS See Kate Cook above n. 752, at page 198.
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not any legal effect, could not be attacked by way of an action of annulment and thus dismissed the
application as inadmissible. The ECJ, however, mentioned azyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA'trend, which disclos s a progressive
affirmation of individuals' right of access to documents held by public authortttes'i" but did not
expressly mention whether this right was a fundamental human right or a hierarchically lower right.
In his opinion the Advocate General Tesauro linked the right to access information with various
Council of Europe documents and with article 10 of the ECHR and article 19 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political rights (on the right to information). He concluded that 'It may be
considered that the right of access to information is increasingly clearly a fundamental civil
right' .8S8 However, the ECJ did not clearly reaffirmed this statement in its decision, thus making it
unclear whether in EC law there is such a fundamental human right.
In any case, there is no such thing as a fundamental right to receive environmental
information in EC law when examined on its own (Le. when the law of the ECHR is excluded).
Neither are there aggregates of such a right, based on other fundamental rights like the ECtHR has
recognised. As Pavlos Eleftheriadis has stated, the ECJ has not yet recognised fundamental human
rights regarding environmental protection, but such a movement should be welcomed.i" Of course,
there are ECJ cases on the right to access information held by Community institutions (examined in
Chapter 1), but they have not addressed the problem from a fundamental rights perspective.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
3) The reciprocal influences of ECzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAla and ECHR law.
Finally, it is interesting to examine the influences that EC and ECHR law can have on each
other. This demonstrates that these two legal systems are closely related to each other, thus making
any advance in one of them benefiting the other legal system too.
An example of the influence of EC law in ECHR law is the Guerra case. The Guerra case
concerned a breach of a Directive (the Major Accident Hazards of Certain Industrial Activitiesj'"
that uses dissemination of information on industrial hazards as a way to promote environmental and
health protection. The ECtHR in Guerra was influenced by the use of information made in the
Directive as a means to protect human health and used it itself as a means to protect amenities
guaranteed by article 8.861
856 ECJ Case C-58/94, Kingdom of the Netherlands v Council of the European Union, [1996] ECR 1-2169.
857 Ibid. at paragraph 36.
8S8 Opinion ofMr Advocate General Tesauro delivered on 28 November 1995 (concerning Case C-58/94), at
~aragraph 16.
59 See Eleftheriadis above n. 833, at page 549.
860 Council Directive 82/5011EEC of 24 June 1982 on the major-accident hazards of certain industrial
activities OJ.E.C. 230, 05/08/1982, p. 1. (Repealed and replaced by the Seveso II Directive)
861 According to Jean-Francois Renucci, Droit Europeen des Droits de l'Homme, Librairie Generale de Droit
et de Jurisprudence, 2nd edition, Paris 2001, at page 474. (In French)zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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However, there is also a possibility of conflicts between human rights recognised at EC
level and ECHR level. ThezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAHoechst case, discuss bove, in which the EC] found that article 8 is
inapplicable for protecting businesses, is such an example.t" Still, the rules laid down in article
52(3) and 53 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EC might provide a mechanism to avoid
any such conflicts in the future. These articles provide that in case of rights enshrined both in the
ECHR and the Charter, the most protective should prevail.t"zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
In any case we tend to agree with the view expressed by Margaret Delvlerieux'"
concerning the fact that the existence of 'environmental principles' in article 174 of the EC Treaty
(on sustainable development etc) might induce the ECtHR to recognise that some environmental
rights that already exist in EC law at different levels are in fact fundamental rights. Using the same
pattern as in the Guerra case, where the Court of Strasbourg recognised a right already present in
an EC Directive as being fundamental, the ECtHR could promote environmental policies present in
EC law and 'transform' them into fundamental rights.
Similarly, for Thornton and Tromans.i" a more broadly construed article 8 may help
overcome locus standi difficulties when bringing actions based on environmental directives with no
direct effect in national courts. Such a position might overcome the difficulty individuals face
when challenging national authorities not implementing or implementing incorrectly environmental
directives due to the fact that most environmental directives intend primarily to protect the
environment rather than individuals, thus having no direct effect. This position is convincing and
could be definitely applied to environmental information, since, as demonstrated, article 8 includes
such a right. Even though the Directive on Environmental information most probably has direct
effect.'" a supplementary fundamental liberties protection of rights enshrined in it should be
welcomed.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
D. Conclusions on whether there is a fundamental right to environmental
informationbased on the European Convention of Human Rights.
The law of the ECHR, which we examined in detail in the beginning of this chapter, is
particularly important both in EC law and British law and therefore we shall be drawing
conclusions based on the ECtHR jurisprudence on whether it grants a right to environmental
862 See supra note n. 785.
863 See Koen Lenaerts & Eddy de Smijter, above n. 854, at pp. 293-294.
864 See DeMerieux above n. 731, at page 557.
865 See Justine Thornton and Stephen Tromans, Human Rights and Environmental Wrongs - Incorporating
the European Convention on Human Rights: Some thoughts on the Consequences for UK Environmental
Law, [1999] Journal of Environmental Law 35, at page 53. See also DeMerieux, above n. 731, at page 524,
footnote 15.
866 See John Alder & David Wilkinson, Environmental Law & Ethics, Macmillan: London 1999, at page 377.
This analysis concerns the 1990 Environmental Information Directive but can be applied, similarly to the
2003 Directive.
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information. This question has been answered above, as far as EC law of human rights IS
concerned.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
1) Are environmental rights in general and a right to environmental information
in particular recognised in ECHR law?
First, we shall start by examining whether the law of the ECHR as reflected by the
dispositions of the Treaty of Rome and the Court of Strasbourg's jurisprudence, recognise any
environmental rights. We shall not going to examine whether environmental rights exist or ought to
exist or not."? For our purpose, we shall consider that environmental rights are legal rights
protecting amenities connected to the environment, but not necessarily the environment itself.868
This approach is large enough to cover both the anthropocentric and the ecocentric approach of
human rights, thus preventing us to engage in this debate.f"
There are various approaches on whether the ECHR encompasses environmental rights,
and some of them reach totally opposite conclusions.
According to Thornton and TromanszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA'it is not possible to conclude that any 'environmental
rights' have been established under the Convention' .870The authors seem to minimise the
significance of Guerra and Lopez Ostra by stating that they were 'only two cases' and that their
facts were extreme. We do not feel that these two arguments are very relevant with the question of
whether environmental rights are recognised or not under ECHR law. What is more relevant is
whether the principles established in these two cases have been considered as a precedent by
national courts and are being successfully used by litigants. This seems to be the case since in
Marcie v Thames Water Utilities Ltef7zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA! it was held, similarly to the Lopez Ostra case, that severe
back flow of foul water from a sewer system leaking onto someone's garden, constituted a breach
of the right to respect for home under article 8(1) and of the right to peaceful enjoyment of
possessions under article 1 of the first protocol.
Another scholar, Kate Cook, sustains that the ECHR covers 'environmental rights,
understood for these purposes as individual human rights with an environmental dtmension'F"
The fundamental right to environmental information as established in the jurisprudence of the
867On this endless discussion, see John AlderzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA& David Wilkinso , ibid., Chapter 12 - Environmental Rights,
at pages 354-361. See also Alexandre Kiss, "Environnement, droit international, droits fondamentaux", in
Cahiers du Conseil constitutionnel n? 15,2003, available from
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/cahiers/cccI5/env5.htm(in French).
868A largely accepted definition of 'environmental rights' has not been yet accepted. See Maurice Sunkin,
David M Ong, Robert Wight, Sourcebook on Environmental Law, 2nd edition 2002, Cavendish Publishing, at
Eage 746.
69See inter alia, Philip Sands above n. 729, at page 598.
870See Thornton and Tromans, above n. 865, at page 45.
871Marcie v Thames Water Utilities Ltd [2002] 2 All E.R. 55 (CA). This fmding in relation to the ECHR was
however reversed in the House of Lords, see [2003] 3 WLR 1603.
872See Kate Cook, above n. 752, at page 198.
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ECtHR is certainly such a right, since it is founded on individual rights (right to a home and family
life, right to life etc) and protects amenities related to the environment (a 'home' free from
pollution, a life free from environmental hazards etc). We tend to agree with this view, and believe
that the Convention does recognise environmental rights, as the term has been broadly defined
above. Even if it is individual civil-political rights that are contained in the ECHR, these rights are
stretched by the Court of Strasbourg so as to protect amenities related to the environment. This of
course should not be interpreted as meaning that the environment is protected in itself (we shall
come back on this point later on). It merely means that environmental amenities can be protected
indirectly by fundamental human values present in the Convention.
As long as the existence of a fundamental right to environmental information is concerned,
scholars are divided too. For Stephan Weber, writing in 1991 before thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAGuerra case, 'only a rough
outline of a right to environmental information can be derived from the present case law'Y" The
position since then has evolved and today we can certainly speak, as DeMerieux does, about a
procedural environmental right to environmental information.!" We do agree with this approach.
Undoubtedly, providing a right to environmental information when protected Convention rights are
at risk by environmental hazards, ends up protecting environmental amenities, even if only
indirectly.
Consequently, we can quite safely conclude from what precedes that today in ECHR law,
even if there is no right to a decent environment, there are aggregates of such a righr'" that protect
procedural rights as the right to information. Thus, the ECtHR seems to have recognised what is in
essence a fundamental right to environmental information, although it remains to be seen whether it
is a human right of the first generation (traditional civil-political rights), second generation (social
and economic welfare rights) or third generation (community and solidarity rightsj''" or even a sui
generis human right. We shall cover this next.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
2) In what category of human rights could environmental information be placed
?
873 See Stephan Weber above n. 736, at page 185.
874 See DeMerieux, above n. 731, at page 544.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
87S For Maria Gavouneli, it remains to be seen whether this piecemeal recognition of fundamental substantive
rights will be sufficient for the effective protection of newly arising human rights such as the right to a decent
environment. See Gavouneli above n. 781, at page 324. See also Sueli Giorgetta, The Right to a Healthy
Environment, Human Rights and Sustainable Development, [2002] 2 International Environmental
Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 173, at p. 184: "The procedural aspect of the right to a healthy
environment embodies the right to information, the right to participate and the right to effective remedies".
876 On the distinction of human rights and liberties into three 'generations', see inter alia Falk, R. Human
Rights Horizons: The Pursuit of Justice in a Globalizing World, London, Routledge, 2000.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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The ECHR, drafted after the end of the Second World War, contains civil-political rights
(first generation rights), protecting the individuals from State interventions. However, the Court of
Strasbourg adopted a very constructive jurisprudence and interpreted these rights in a manner that
would bring protection of second generation rights. The Court made clear its attitude in the case ofzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
Airey v. Ireland, where it stated that:
'Whilst the Convention sets forth what are essentially civil and political rights,
many of them have implications of a social or economic nature. The Court therefore
considers, like the Commission,that the mere fact that an interpretationof the Convention
may extend into the sphere of social and economic rights should not be a decisive factor
against such an interpretation;there is nowater-tightdivisionseparatingthat sphere fromthe
field coveredby the Convention.,877
However, this constructive approach, has not been used in order to create totally new
rights. Such an example is the right to a decent environment, which cannot reasonably be derived
from any Convention article. The Commission firmly established for the first time in X and Y v.
Federal Republic of Germany'" that there was no such right in the convention as a right to a decent
environment. The position is today unchanged. However, other rights were stretched so as to
encompass environmental concerns.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
In Lopez Ostra the Court for the first time used article 8 in a way that would bring similar
results: protect neighbouring amenities from environmental harms. The result is definitely more
limited than recognising a general right to a clean and safe environment, but that would be far
beyond the role of the Court, which is to interpret the wording of the ECHR in the light of recent
society changes. It would have been a rewrite of the ECHR. In Guerra the Court went a step further
by recognising a right to receive information on environmental hazards that could affect the right to
a peaceful family life. The jurisprudence of the ECtHR on the right to environmental information
has subsequently evolved with other cases (all analysed supra) leading to an expansion of the
boundaries of this right over more protected rights than the right to a home and family life.
In the Guerra case the court referred to the Council of Europe's resolution adopted after
the Chernobyl nuclear accident, 879in which public access to clear and full information is considered
as a 'basic human right,.880But in what category of human rights could the right to environmental
information recognised by the ECtHR case law could be put? According to Maljean-Dubois, the
right to know as laid down in Guerra is an extension of the economic and social rights. She
believes that the Court in Guerra, after having recognised economic and social rights based on
traditional political and civil rights present in the Convention, takes a step further by recognising a
877 Airey v Ireland (No.1) (Al32) European Court of Human Rights, 9 October 1979, (1979-80) 2 EHRR 305,
at paragraph 26.
878See above n. 737.
879See Guerra above n. 747, at paragraph 34.
880'... the Assembly believes that public access to clear and full information on this subject - and many
others for that matter - must be viewed as a basic human right'. Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly
Resolution 1087 (1996) on the consequences of the Chemoby1disaster, paragraph 4. Available electronically
at http://assembly.coe.inti
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new category of rights or at least in the extension of economic and social rights."! She seems to
agree with the view expressed by judge Greve in thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAHatton case, that the right to environmental
information could be a new sort of human right. He declared in his dissent that (speaking on article
8) 'The Convention being a living instrument, the provision has gradually been interpreted to
include also environmental rights ... These environmental rights are nonetheless of a different
character from the core right not to have one's home raided without a warrant'. He also adds that
'environmental rights represent a new generation of human rights'. 882
We tend to agree with this view. The fundamental right to environmental information
expressed by the ECtHR is too different from the rights expressed in the Convention, even if it is
based on them, to be considered as a first generation right. The right to environmental information
is a sort of hybrid right that certainly protects first generation rights (such as the right to life) but
also second generation rights (since it also ends up in increased environmental protection). It
cannot clearly be categorised in any of these two categories, so we believe it would be better
considered as a sui generis right, different from the rest. Moreover, even if we accept that there is a
fundamental right to the environmentper se (that some consider being a third generation right), the
fundamental right to environmental information cannot be considered as such, since it is clearly
linked to its civil and political origins. As we shall see below, the fundamental right to
environmental information aims to protect first generation rights (since it arises when such
Convention rights are engaged) and can only protect the environment indirectly. On the contrary, a
fundamental right to the environment would protect directly environmental amenities and this
could indirectly lead to the protection of individual rights too (right to life, family life and home
etc) or indeed limit such rights.
Thus, we believe that the fundamental right to environmental information is not similar to a
fundamental right to the environment.' Philippe Sands seems to agree883 with the finding that the
right to access information on the environment cannot be categorised with the rights that
substantively protect environmental standards. However, he considers that the right to access
information on the environment is a civil and political right, since this category includes procedural
rights of citizens that can also be used to protect the environment. We only partially agree with that
view. The general right to access information is definitely a procedural right and can thus be
categorised as a civil-political one. However, as we shall examine, the right to access
environmental information (which aims to protect the environment) should be distinguished from
thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAfundamental right to access environmental information as recognised by the ECtHR (which
aims to protect Convention-established values). They are of a different nature.
88! See Maljean-Dubois above n. 779, at page 1014.
882 Hatton and others v. The United Kingdom, ECtHR, 02110/2001, Application no. 36022/97, per Judge
Greve (in his dissent), available from http://hudoc.echr.coe.inti . The case concerned breaches of article 8 due
to noise generated by night flights to and from Heathrow airport.
883 See Philippe Sands above n. 729, at pages 603-607.
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3) The different nature of the fundamental right to environmental information
compared to its 'non-fundamental' equivalent.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
The right to access environmental information enshrined in the Information Directive and
in the Aarhus Convention might seem quite similar in nature to the fundamental right to receive
environmental information, as recognised by the Court of Strasbourg. However, these two rights
should not be confused, as they are different in nature.
The right to obtain environmental information, when arising under the Convention, is
necessarily linked to an interference with an individual's right enshrined in a specific article.
Convention articles define rights that give individuals some basic protection for their own sake. In
this context, when a right to information arises, it necessarily aims to protect Convention-protected
values and only those. Thus, the right to environmental information in an ECHR context is limited
by the scope of the Convention itself. In such a context, environmental information is viewed as a
procedural right, aiming to protect Convention-enshrined substantive rights. The Convention is
definitely as the Court of Strasbourg has said a 'living instrument', but when new rights are
developed on the basis of civil-political ones, these new rights are limited in their essence by the
initial right from which they stem. To summarise, environmental information in the European
human rights context intends to protect other individual rights enshrined in the ECHR.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIt aims to
protect individuals.
On the contrary, when the right to environmental information arises under EC law or the
Aarhus Convention, it is not intended to protect any individual rights whatsoever. Both the
Information Directivef" and the Aarhus Convention'" directly aim to protect the environment itself
by recognising new procedural rights for individuals. In this context, even though it is a right
granted to the individual, it aims to protect the environment and not any other substantive
individual right (as the right to life, family etc), even if these amenities can be also protected
indirectly.
These two rights might or might not coincide, but in any case they are of different nature,
since they aim to protect different things. Thus, we can safely conclude that the right to
environmental information as it is recognised in ECHR law (and in EC human right law), has
clearly a civil-political dimension. This is not the case when this right aims to protect the
environment, where there it is of social nature.
884 See the preamble to the DirectivezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA30/313: 'Whereas access to information on the environment held by
Eublic authorities will improve environmental protection'. .zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
8S The Aarhus Convention is the first binding international instrument to recognise a right to both every
person and future generations to a healthy environment, though it limits its protection to procedural rights.
See Thornton and Tromans, above n. 865, at page 37.
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Because the right to environmental information, in practice, encompasses these two
different natures, we believe it could be safely said that the fundamental right to environmental
information is azyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAsui generis right, not eing able to be categorisedzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAexcl sively in any o the three
generation of human rights.
What can the practical consequences of this finding be? This can be useful when public
authorities are weighting confidentiality concerns before granting or refusing access to information.
When fundamental human rights are at stake and information is to be given to protect such a right,
confidentiality concerns should be taken into consideration, but in most circumstances should not
be allowed to prevail. On the contrary, when information is to be disclosed "for the environment's
sake", confidentiality concerns should most of the times prevail, since they are protected by human
rights (right to home and family life as explained above) and in contrast the environment is not yet
being protected in Europe at human rights level. However, the situation might change if the right to
a decent environment is recognised directly as a human right, like article 37 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights is trying to do but incompletely. In such a case, when confidentiality concerns
would arise, there would be a conflict between two human rights: the fundamental right to a home
(or other similar provisions protecting confidentiality) and the fundamental right to a decent
environment, under which would arise the right to environmental information. This would be a
delicate conflicting situation of two human rights.
In any case, the fundamental right to environmental information, as it is today consecrated
in ECHR law, is more similar to a general right to access information than to the right to access
environmental information as recognised by the EC Information Directive and Aarhus.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
4) The similar aim of the fundamental right to environmental information and the
general right to access information.
As we have seen, the fundamental right to environmental information is quite different than
the right to environmental information present in EC, international and English national laws. We
feel the fundamental right to environmental information is more similar to the general right to
access information held by public authorities as recognised in England by the Freedom of
Information Act 2000.
When the right to access and receive information is based on articles of the ECHR (like
articles 2, 8 , or 3), the provision of information intends to relieve anxiety and suffering of people
whose fundamental rights are affected. Information is considered as a means that would help
affected people assess the risks they face in one of ECHR protected amenities (their, home, their
family, or their life). Information in this human rights context is an end in itself. It is granted in
order to minimise interferences with protected human rights. On the contrary, when the duty to
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provide environmental information arises under the Information Directive or the Aarhus
Convention, then this is considered as a means to an end: a mechanism that would increase
environmental protection.
This is the reason why ECtHR cases are so restricted and the right to environmental
information only arises when there is another individual human right at stake. As long as there is
not a fundamental right to a decent environment, environmental information will always be
dependent on individuals' human rights.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIn that sense, we believe that the fundamental right to
environmental information is closer to general Freedom of Information legislation than to the
Environmental Information Directives and Regulations, which aim to protect the environment.
Both the general right to access information and the fundamental one to environmental information
use the provision of information as an end in itself: it is the provision of information itself that is
the aim of the legal provisions, and not the protection of the environment.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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CHAPTER 4) The French Approach on Environmental
InformationzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
In this chapter we shall describe the difference between the legal rules regulating access to
environmental information that operate in France and England. More precisely, we shall compare
the differences in the transposition of the DirectivezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA90/313IEEC in French and English national
law. After doing this we shall consider which of these two transpositions was the most' successful' ,
by being the most compatible with the aim of the Information Directive. It should be noted that
although this 1990 Directive has been replaced by the new 2003/4/C Directive with effect from
January 1, 2005, the present chapter is still of interest, because beyond the technicalities of
transposing a directive in national law, one can notice a different understanding in France and
England in the role and aim of the right to environmental information. This different philosophy
will most probably remain after the 2003 Directive comes into full force and thus, it is still
interesting to examine the situation under the 1990 Directive. Although the UK Government has
now transposed the new 2003 Directive with the Environmental Information Regulations 2004, the
French one has not yet done so, so it would not have been correct to compare the 2004 Regulations
to the French system, as they are not equivalent. 886 Thus, in this chapter we focus on a comparison
of the French and English legal provisions that have transposed the 1990 directive, even if the
English provisions (the Environmental Information Regulations 1992) are no longer in force.
Sometimes, however, references will also be made to the new 2003 Directive and the
Environmental Information Regulations 2004, for the sake of clarity and completeness.
Various studies have already dealt with the transposition of the Environmental Information
Directive in the legal systems of member-states,"? though all these studies are outdated where
French and English law are concerned, since they do not take into consideration the legislative
modifications that have taken place in both countries during the last three years. Moreover, they do
not examine in a comparative perspective the English and French transposition of the Directive;
they just describe each legal system separately without making any comparisons.
886 See inter alia Konrad Zweigert, Hein Kotz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, Oxford 1992, Ch. III:
The Method of Comparative Law.
887 Ralph E. Hallo (ed.), Access to Environmental information in Europe - The Implementation and
Implications of Directive 901313IEEC,Kluwer Law 1996, and also M. Prieur (dir.), Le Droit Cll'information
en matiere d'environnement dans les pays de l'Union europeenne, Presses Universitaires de Limoges,
Limoges 1997 (in French).
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Both in France and in England the transposition of the 1990 Environmental Information
Directive introduced for the first time in national law a specific right to access environmental
information. The Directive was transposed in France in 2001, almost ten years after it was
transposed in England in 1992.
In this chapter, we shall not repeat in every detail the provisions of English law, since they
have already been described previously and in any case are now repealed. Instead we shall analyse
the transposition ofthe 1990 Directive in France and then try to show the differences of the French
approach with the English one.
A) Comparative overview of the French and English legal systems
Before examining in detail the difference between the legal rules regulating access to
environmental information that operate in France and England, it is important to analyse the two
different legal systems that are practiced in both countries, civil law in France and common law in
England, as this can help understand why the rules on environmental information are different.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
1) Civil law, common law and mixed legal systems.
Civil law systems can be defined as legal systems of countries with a private law
predominantly based or influenced by Roman law, as codified in the Corpus Juris Civilis of
Justinian.l" Civil law has been subsequently developed in Continental Europe and around the
world, especially through the French Civil Code of 1804, which was used as a source of inspiration
for other Civil Codes (like the German BGB). Civil law is highly systematized and structured and
relies on declarations of broad, general principles, often ignoring the details. Also, although civil
law sources apply to private law, the civil methodology and way of thinking permeates the whole
legal system. It is important to note that today the majority of EU member states follow the civil
law tradition and thus share the main characteristic of civil law: their law is extensively codified.
Of the 25 EU member states, only 4 are common law countries: the UK (as far as England and
Wales are concerned), Ireland, Cyprus and Malta.
Common law is the legal tradition that evolved in England from the 11th century
onwards.i" Common law is the foundation of private law, not only for England, Wales and Ireland,
but also in most countries, which first received that law as colonies of the British Empire and
which, in many cases, have preserved it as independent States. Its principles appear for the most
part in reported judgments, usually of the higher courts, in relation to specific fact situations arising
in disputes which courts have adjudicated. One of the main characteristics of the common law is
that it is usually much more detailed in its prescriptions than the civil law.
888 See William Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions: Common Law vs. Civil Law (Codified and Uncodified), (2000)zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
60 Louisiana Law Review 677-738, at 683.
889zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIbid., at 684.
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Alongside common law and civil law legal systems, there are some that can be described as
mixed legal system, which are the ones in which the law in force is derived from more than one
legal family. For example, the EU legal system was initially based on the civil law system (and
especially French and German law). However, since the UK joined in 1973, it has been influenced
by Common law, and thus could be referred to as a mixed legal system.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
2) Main differences between common law and civil law legal systems
Examining the main differences between common law and civil law legal systems is
important, as these also reflect the differences between the French civil legal system and the
English common law legal system.
a) Extensive and integrated codifications
Civil law systems can be identified through the presence of Codes (like the civil code,
commercial code, criminal code and others) containing the legal rules that are applicable. On the
contrary, in a common law system, the applicable legal rules are to be found in "precedents", which
are judicial decisions that create the law.
Although, in common law countries there are Codifying statutes which seem identical to
civil law codes, the basic difference is that most civil law codes are comprehensive documents
laying down general rules applicable to the whole of a legal area (i.e. the principles found in the
Civil Code are applicable to all private law). They are comprehensive general provisions that can
be complemented by subsequent more detailed legislation or by case law.
However, since the UK has joined the EU, EU legislation has had to be incorporated into
English law, and since European laws are most of the times general in nature, this has brought the
English legal system closer to the French one.
b) Different mode of legal thinking
This is probably the most important difference, as it can lead to incomprehension between
lawyers from a common law and a civil law background. The civil law is marked by a tendency to
use abstract legal nouns and to have a well-defined system of describing different areas of law. It
can be said that civil law is more based on logic that experience. The writings of legal authors are
also recognised as a source of law in civil law countries, whereas in the common law it is still not a
source of law, although things seem to be changing.
This is, of course, in great contrast to the situation in the common law legal family, which
is based more on experience than logic, since law has been created by judges. As a consequence,
civil lawyers tend to think deductively, whereas common law lawyers think empirically. However,
these differences have been shrinking, probably because of the influence of European law.
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c) The distinction between public and private law: the
existence of a special administrative court system.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
Another difference between the two legal systems is the distinction between public and
private law.
Public and private law have been separate for a long time in the civil law and administered
in different courts. For example in France, almost all public law cases are heard in specialised
administrative courts. Although there has always been administrative law in England, the recent
blossoming of this branch of the law may well be due to some extent to the educational function of
Community law. The concepts, for example of legitimate expectation and proportionality as
remedies in English public law, come from France and Germany respectively and were first
adopted by EU law before being incorporated into English Law.
d) Style of drafting of laws
Civil law codes and statutes are concise, stating principles in broad terms, while common
law statutes are precise and are very detailed and lengthy.
This difference in style is linked to the function of statutes. In civil law countries statutes
need to be broad because they are intended to be exhaustive. On the contrary, in common law
countries statutes must be precise and detailed, because the common law courts restrict rules to the
specific field of the law they are intended to cover.
e) The interpretation of statute law.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
In the civil law the doctrine of separation of powers, when taken to an extreme, led to the
conclusion that courts should be denied any interpretive function and should be required to refer
problems of statutory interpretation to the legislature itself for solution. The legislature would then
provide an authoritative interpretation to guide the judge. In this way, defects in the law would be
cured, courts would be prevented from making law, and the state would be safe from the threat of
judicial tyranny.
Nevertheless in practice, judges in civil law countries have departed from this traditional
understanding of their role towards statutes, and have been interpreting statutes in light of the
changing social needs by filling gaps and resolving conflicts in the legislative scheme. Like
common law judges, civil law judges have been adapting the law to changing social conditions.
f) Different sources of law: doctrine and jurisprudence
A major difference between the civil law and common law is that in civil law priority is
given to doctrine (writings oflegal scholars) over jurisprudence (case-lawj.F"zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
890zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIbid., at 701.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
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g) No rule ofzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAstare decis is in civil law countrieszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
In the civil law world, court decisions are not binding on lower courts but may be
looked to in order to identify trends, particularly in areas where there is scarce legislation. For
example, in French administrative law the decisions of the ErenchzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAConseil d'Etat, t e highest
administrative courts, are very important as there is no administrative law code. On the contrary,
the English doctrine of stare decisis compels lower courts to follow decisions rendered in higher
courts, referred to as "precedents".
3) Influences between the common law and the civil law systems and the
European Union Legal system
Today, it can be contended that there is a convergence under way in the EU between the
common law and civil law legal systems, fuelled by the influence of EU law which applies in the
same manner in all EU states regardless of their legal system.
These influences are evident in the style of judgments of the European Court of Justice.
The older judgments of the European Court are in the short, concise style of the French Courts,
whereas later judgements are more lengthy and refer to previous case law, similarly to judgements
in common law countries and in England.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
Bl The place granted to the community system of environmental information in
English and French law compared to the general right of access to information held
by public authorities.
One of the major differences between France and England with regard to the legal rules
resulting from the transposition of the 1990 Information Directive, is the pre-existence or not of
general freedom of information legislation prior to the transposition of the Directive.
In France, there had been for a long time a tradition of transparency when the 1990
Information Directive was adopted. On the contrary, in the United Kingdom, the Directive was the
first legal instrument to create a general right of access to the benefit of anyone, even if it was
limited to information concerning the environment.!" It was only in the year 2000 that the British
legislator enacted general freedom of information legislation, which only entered into force on the
1st January 2005.
Consequently, the general right of access to administrative information is governed, both in
France and in the United Kingdom, by specific legislative provisions. However, in France, these
891 Of course there existed a multitude of specific legislative provisions that grant access to specific pieces of
information, like the provisions on various registers examined in the relevant chapter.
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general freedom of information provisions include the right of access to information concerning the
environment (subject to certain adaptations), while in England environmental information is
detached from the general right of access to administrative information. We shall try to examine
this difference, which is one of the most interesting aspects concerning the way in which the 1990
Information Directive was transposed in France and England and is still present today, even after
the enactment of the 2003 Directive.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
1) In France: the use of a common set of rules regulating both the general right
of access to information and the environmental one.
In France, contrary to the United Kingdom, a general right to information had already been
adopted for more than ten years when the DirectivezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA90/313IEEC was en cted. Thus, it was
considered that because general freedom of information legislation was already in place, there was
no need to carry out any specific transposition in order to comply with the aims of the Directive.
France was nevertheless obliged to adapt its internal legislation to the Community
requirements in 2001, the Commission having started proceedings in front of the Court of Justice of
the European Communities.F"
a) The general right to access information held by public authorities.
The French Act of Parliament which regulates access to administrative information is Law
n? 78-753 of 17 July 1978893 which sets out the principle that any citizen can have access to any
administrative document (except those considered as exempt information), without having to
justify any personal interest. This law is also supplemented by a series of Decrees and Ministerial
Decisions taken for its application and regulating certain procedural details without modifying the
principles posed by the law.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA894
892 These proceedings concern the Commission v. France case (see above n.184) which was lodged at the
Court Registry on 13 June 2000.
893 Loi n" 78-753 du 17 juillet 1978 portant diverses mesures d'amelioration des relations entre
l'administration et le public, Official Journal of the French Republic (JO) 18 July 1978, page 2851. A recent
reform was carried out by the law n02000-321 of 12 April 2000, Loi no 2000-321 du 12 avril 2000 relative
aux droits des citoyens dans leurs relations avec les administrations, JO 88 du 13 avril 2000, page 5646. The
French Official Journal is available online at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr
894 These are: Decret n" 78-1136 du 6 decembre 1978 relatif Ii la Commission d'acces aux documents
administratifs; Decret n° 79-834 du 22 septembre 1979 portant application de l'article 9 de la loi n? 78-753
du 17 juillet 1978 en ce qui concerne la liberte d'acces aux documents administratifs; Decret n" 88-465 du
28 avril 1988 relatif Ii laprocedure d'acces aux documents administratifs ; Decret no 2001-493 du 6 juin 200 I
pris pour l'application de l'article 4 de la loi no 78-753 du 17 juillet 1978 et relatif aux modalites de
communication des documents administratifs ; Arrete du ministre du budget du 29 mai 1980.
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These rules are applicable to the State, local authorities, Publicly-owned companies, and
public or private bodies in charge of public services.
The law distinguishes two categories of documents: communicable documents and non-
communicable documents. It should be noted that even though the law speaks about documents,
these can be in any form (written, oral or computerised) thus the term document is equivalent to the
term information, used in England.
The documents that can be communicated are enumerated in the law in a non-exhaustive
way. These are all files, reports, studies, official reports, statistics, directives, instructions,
circulars, notes and ministerial answers which comprise an interpretation of the substantive law or
a description of the administrative procedures, opinions, forecasts and decisions.t"
With regard to the non-communicable documents, there are two categories of such
documents: confidential documents, and personal documents.
Confidential documents are enumerated in part I of article 6, and are totally excluded from
any sort of communication because they concern matters related to the correct operation of public
authorities or public interests, like national defence, public safety and in a general way, with
confidential matters.F" The authorities holding any of these documents are obliged to keep them
secret and not to disclose them. It is interesting to note that before a reform operated in 2001,
public authorities could exercise discretion over disclosing this kind of information. Thus, the
system became less liberal after 2001.897
As for personal documents, these can only be communicated to people who have an
interest in them. These are documents whose communication would undermine private life, the
medical secrecy and commercial and industrial secrecy, any personal files, as well as documents
carrying an evaluation or a value judgment on an identifiable individual
Parallel to the creation of a general right of access to administrative documents, the law of
17 July 1978 created a new independent administrative body, thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBACommission d'Acces aux
Documents Administratijs (CADA), competent for hearing appeals against refusals to disclose
documents under this law. We shall examine this institution in detail later on.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
b) The right to access information relating to the environment.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
In France, contrary to England, there was not, until very recently, any specific set of legal
rules transposing Directive 90/313/CEE and creating a general right to access information relating
895 « tous dossiers, rapports, etudes, comptes rendus, proces-verbaux, statistiques, directives, instructions,
circulaires, notes et reponses ministerielles qui comportent une interpretation du droit positif ou une
description des procedures administratives, avis, previsions et decisions ». According to article 1 of the Law
of 17 July 1978.
896 For details see infra, 3) Categories of information exempt from disclosure: the distinction between
absolute and discretionary exclusions.
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to the environment. The general freedom of information legislation also covers information
concerning the environment, as any other kind of information.
It was only in 2001 that the French law of 1978 underwent some adaptations in order to
conform to the requirements of the 1990 Environmental Information Directive.
The first legal instrument that mentions a right to access information concerning the
environment is the article LII0-l of the Environmental CodezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA(Code de !'Environnement). This
article states that the protection of the environment in French law is based on the "... principle of
participation, according to which each one has access to information relating to the environment,
including those relating to dangerous substances and activities, and the public is associated in the
development process of the projects having a significant incidence on the environment or regional
planning'V" This provision (enacted in 1995) establishes a principle which appears to lack any
binding effect, orzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAin any event, which does not appear to have any great practical applications.
This sole legal assertion of the right to environmental information in such general terms,
combined with the existence of the general freedom of information law of 1978, seemed to the
European Commission insufficient to constitute a correct transposition of directive 90/313. As a
consequence, the Commission brought enforcement proceedings in front of the Court of Justice of
the European Communities for incorrect transposition of the 1990 Environmental Information
Directive, and France had to enact specific legal provisions transposing the Directive, more than
ten years after the end of the time limit provided by the Directive for its transposition in national
law.899
It is title IV of the Ordinance No 2001-321 of 11 Apri12001900 which inserts a new chapter
in the Environmental Code entitled: "Right to access information relating to the environment" and
contains only one article, article L 124-1, that expressly transposes the Environmental Information
897 See on this point see Y. Gounin, L. Laluque, La reforme du droit d'acces aux documents administratifs,
Actualite Juridique - Droit Administratif, 2008, p. 486.
898 « ... principe de participation, selon lequel chacun a acces aux informations relatives a l'environnement, y
compris celles relatives aux substances et activites dangereuses, et le public est associe au processus
d'elaboration des projets ayant une incidence importante sur l'environnement ou l'amenagement du territoire
». This text first appeared in the Loi 95-101 du 2 fevrier 1995 relative au renforcement de la protection de
l'environnement, JO no. 29 du 3 fevrier 1995 p. 1840.
899 As mentioned in the Rapport au President de la Republique relatif a l'ordonnance n" 2001-321 du 11 avril
2001 relative a la transposition de directives communautaires et a la mise en eeuvre de certaines dispositions
du droit communautaire dans Ie domaine de l'environnement, JO du 14 avril 2001.This report presented to
the French President and concerning the transposition of the Information Directiveexplicitly mentions that
the Commission had brought an action for failure to transpose in front of the ECJ : « La corformite des
mesures nationales de transposition de la directive du 7 juin 1990 precitee fait l'objet d'un contentieux
engage par la Commission europeenne devant la Cour de justice des Communautes europeennes, qui sera
biemot clos. »
900 Ordonnance no 2001-321 du 11 avril2001 relative a la transposition de directives communautaires et a la
mise en eeuvre de certaines dispositions du droit communautaire dans Ie domaine de l'environnement, JO no.
89 du 14 avril 2001 page 5820. Ordinances (ordonnances) are pieces of legislation enacted by the French
President in cases of urgency and that have to be retrospectively approved by an Act of the French
parliament.
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Directive in French law. This article is divided into three parts and mainly refers to the provisions
of the law of 17 July 1978, while laying down some adaptations.'?'
The first part of this article mentions that access to information relating to the environment
and held by public authorities having responsibilities as regards the environment, is governed by
the provisions of the law of 1978 concerning the general right to access information held by public
authorities, subject to the provisions mentioned in the two other parts. It is also interesting to note
that no definition of the term "information relating to the environment" is given.902
The second part of article L 124-1 of the Environmental Code, as we shall see in detail
later on, mentions the categories of documents excluded from communication.
The third part of the article explicitly provides for partial communication of documents.
When it is possible to take out from a document the data that is exempt from communication, then
the rest of the document should be communicated.
It is therefore clear that the French legislator did not create as in England a specific set of
rules covering information relating to the environment, but rather made clear that the scope of
general freedom of information legislation applied to environmental information, while making
some necessary adaptations in order to conform to the Community requirements and thus to avoid a
negative ruling by the Court of Justice of the European Communities. However, France eventually
lost its case, as the ECJ ruled that the French Government had failed to transpose the 1990
Directive in the time limits provided for.903zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
2) In England: the overlap between the environmental information regulations
and general freedom of information legislation.
As we examined before, the first piece of legislation which created a right of access to
information relating to environmental matters, was the specific regulations that transposed in
901 Article Ll24-1 of the French Environmental Code reads as follows:zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA"I. - L'acces a l'infonnation r lative a
l'environnement detenue par les autorites publiques ayant des responsabilites en matiere d'environnement
s'exerce dans les conditions et selon 1es modalites definies au titre ler de la loi n? 78-753 du 17 juillet 1978
portant diverses mesures d'amelioration des relations entre l'administration et le public et diverses
dispositions d'ordre administratif, social et fiscal, sous reserve des dispositions ci-apres.
II. - Ne sont pas communicables les informations relatives a l'environnement dont la consultation ou la
communication porterait atteinte aux interets proteges enumeres aux sept premiers tirets du I de l'article 6 de
la loi susmentionnee du 17 juillet 1978.
L'autorite peut refuser de communiquer une information relative a l'environnement dont la consultation ou
la communication porterait atteinte :
1°A l'environnement auquel elle se rapporte ;
20 Aux interets d'un tiers qui a fourni l'infonnation demandee sans y avoir ete contraint par une disposition
legislative, reglementaire ou par un acte d'une autorite administrative, et qui ne consent pas a sa divulgation.
III. - Lorsque la demande d'acces porte sur une information relative a l'environnement qui contient des
donnees relatives aux interets proteges en application du II et qu'il est possible de retirer ces donnees, la
t'oartiede l'infonnation non couverte par les secrets proteges est communiquee au demandeur."
2 On this point seezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAinfra.
903 Commission of the European Communities v French Republic, Case C-233/00, 26 June 2003, Official
Journal C 184,02/08/2003 p. 2, discussed in detail in the previous chapters.
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English law DirectivezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA90/3131EEC, nam ly the Environmental Information Regulations 1992. Then
came the Freedom of Information Act 2000, which created a right for any person to access
information held by public bodies.
The Freedom of Information Act 2000 is applicable to all the information held by public
bodies or bodies considered as equivalent by the Act, with the exception of information contained
in the categories excluded from disclosure.
As we have seen, section 39 of the FOlA provides that information included in the field of
the specific regulation on access to information concerning the environment made under section 74
and adopted in order to transposezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAin national law the provisions on environmental information of
the Aarhus Convention, is exempt and thus cannot be disclosed under the Act. The aim of the
legislator is to prevent, as much as possible, any overlap between the Act and the Environmental
Information Regulations 2004. However, the FOlA preserves a subsidiary role on the matter.?"
This is because the exemption concerning information relating to the environment is not an
absolute exemption and thus public authorities must carry out a balancing test between the public
interest of disclosure and the public interest of secrecy, before taking any decision. If the
information asked for is communicable under the terms of the environmental information
regulations, then public authorities will have to disclose it in accordance with these regulations and
the aforementioned balance test of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 will not be applied.?" On
the other hand, if the information asked for cannot be communicated pursuant to the regulations,
then the authorities holders of information will still have to carry out this balancing test under s. 2
of the 2000 Act and according to the result of it, to proceed or not with disclosure. However, since
the exemptions under the Regulations are narrower than under the FOlA and since the weighing of
the public interest is similar, it is hard to see in which cases a request could be refused under the
Regulations but not under the FOlA.
In any case, section 39 of the FOlA does not completely exclude the applicability of the
Act when environmental information is concerned, thus allowing for an overlap to exist between
the Act and the applicable Environmental Information Regulations 2004.
It is therefore interesting to see that in French law there are no dangers of any overlap,
since access to information, both environmental and non-environmental, is governed by a single
piece of legislation: the law of 1978 as amended, to which the specific rules on environmental
information refer to.
Consequently, the French solution demonstrates that it is not necessary for the correct
transposition of the Information Directive to provide for two separate legal instruments and that the
Directive could have been transposed through the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act
2000. This would have made the system less complex and would have eliminated any danger of
overlap.
904 See Paul Stanley, Current Law Statutes, Vol. 2, 2000, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2000, p. 36-50.
m~ _
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The English approach can be explained by the fact that in Great Britain, the governmental
authority responsible for the right to environmental information, is the Department of the
Environment, Food and the Rural Affairs (DEFRA). However, it is the Home Office which laid
before Parliament the Freedom of Information Bill which resulted in the Freedom of Information
Act 2000. DEFRA for its part insisted that information concerning the environment would have to
be completely excluded from the applicability of the Act, because the Act was considered as too
limited compared to the Environmental Information Regulations.?" In consequence of these views,
section 39 of the Act was adopted, which creates the aforementioned overlap.
Cl The difTerent dermition of information relating to the environment in France and
England.
It has been shown that in France there is only a single legal instrument that governs access
to information, since the legislative provisions adopted in order to transpose Directive 90/313IEEC
almost entirely refer to the provisions of the general freedom of information legislation. In
England, on the contrary, the application of the Environmental Information Regulations almost
totally exclude the application of the Freedom ofInfonnation Act 2000.
Consequently, it is interesting to examine how in these two legal systems the concept of
"infonnation relating to the environment" was transposed in each national law since the existence
of such information in the hands of a public authority, conditions the application of the specific
provisions on access to environmental information.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
1) In France: the total absence of any definition.
French law is characterised by a total absence of a definition of the concept of information
relating to the environment. Indeed, article L124-1 of the Environmental Code refers only to
"access to information relating to the environment'V" without giving any additional explanation on
the extent and the contents of this concept.
This absence of any definition is explained by the fact that in France such a definition was
not considered to be necessary. As the Report presented to the President of the Republic before the
adoption of this Ordinance states, such a definition is not necessary because the concept of
environment is self-explanatory and that in the event of any difficulties, it will be interpreted in the
906 According to Daniel Wilsher, Right to environmentalzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAInformation: Recent Developments and Future
Prospects, 2001 European Public Law 671, p. 692-3.
907 In French: l'acces a l'information relative a l'environnement.
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light of the directive.?" However, the absence of a precise definition will certainly create
difficulties in practice, since it will be necessary to determine whether the specific exemptions to
disclosure which only apply to information relating to the environment are applicable or not.?"zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
2) In England: the use of the definition given by the Directive.
As we analysed before, the definition of environmental information adopted by the
Environmental Information Regulations almost completely repeats the terms of the definition given
by the Environmental Information Directive. This true for both the 1992 and the 2004
Environmental Information Regulations. ThiszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIt is th s clear that, contrary to France, in England
the government wanted to stick as close as possible to the definition given by the Directive.
A possible explanation for this might be that a clear and precise definition of the concept of
information relating to the environment is necessary in the English context, where contrary to the
French system, two different set of rules on access to information coexist which compete with each
other, since the application of the environmental information rules excludes the application of
general freedom of information legislation. In such a context, the extent of the concept of
information relating to the environment must be clear in order to make possible the delimitation of
the field of application of each set of rules. Consequently, it is interesting to note that a broad
definition of the concept of information relating to the environment, would lead, in the English
system, to an increase of the situations where the Environmental Information Regulations are
applicable, and automatically to a decrease of the applicability of the Freedom of Information Act
2000. This is also the casezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAvice ersa.
In the English system, where specific regulations on environmental information exclude
the general Act, the adoption of the French solution (i.e. the choice not to define the term
"environmental information"), would have led to a great uncertainty with regard to the applicable
legal rules.
On the contrary, in France, owing to the fact that there is only one set of rules, always the
same rules will be applicable (subject to certain minor distinctions with regards to information
excluded from disclosure) regardless of a broad or narrow definition of environmental information.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
D) The transposition in French and English law of the procedural provisions of
Directive 90/313IEEC.
90S On this Report see supra n. 899.
909 On this point see infra, 3) Categories of information exempt from disclosure: the distinction between
absolute and discretionary exclusions.
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It is also interesting to compare how the provisions of the 1990 Information Directive
concerning various procedural aspects of the exercise of the right to access environmental
information have been transposed into French and English law, since they present striking
differences.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
1) The payment of the costs of disclosure: the difficult question of the
reasonableamount
Both Directives 90/313 and 2003/4 provide that the States can require any communication
of information to be conditional on the payment of a sum, which cannot exceed a "reasonable
amount". It is undoubtedly a very vague term that can be interpreted in various ways.
The solution adopted by the English legislator in the Environmental Information
Regulations 1992 is simple: it is not to defme the term of reasonable amount, but to simply provide
that public authorities can require any communication of information to be conditional on the
payment of the reasonable costs caused by any disclosure of information. Consequently, it can be
noted that in England the problem of the defmition of this term is not solved but is simply 'passed
over' to the public authorities dealing with requests to access information. As already mentioned,
this solution has already led in different appreciations between various authorities of what sum can
be deemed as reasonable. As seen, the position is the same in the Environmental Information
Regulations 2004.
In France, quite to the contrary, the costs are fixed in a centralised way by the government.
The law of 17 July 1978 provides in its article 4 that the costs of reproduction of the required
documents are to be entirely covered by the applicant and that these costs cannot exceed the cost of
reproducing the documents. This article also provides that the details of this provision will be
regulated by a Decree. The decree No 2001-493 of 6 June 2001910 and taken for the application of
articlezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA4, of the law, provides that the expenses corresponding to the cost of reproduction and, if
necessary, for posting any documents "can" be billed to the applicant and that public authorities can
ask for an advance payment. This decree also provides that a Ministerial DecisionzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA(arretezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
ministeriely will determine the maximum amount of these reproduction costs, which cannot include
costs of personnel time, but only the expenses of reproduction on paper or electronic means. This
Ministerial Decision?" uniformly fixes the cost for each photocopied page at 0.18 euros per page,
at 1.83 euros for computer disks and at 2.75 euros per Cd-roms. It should be noted that the French
Conseil dEtat has accepted that it is lawful for public authorities to charge for postal costs and to
910 Decret no 2001-493 du 6 juin 2001 pris pour l'application de l'article 4 de la loi no 78-753 du 17 juillet
1978 et relatif aux modalites de communication des documents administratifs. J.O 133, 10 Juin 2001 page
9246.
911 Arr8te du 1er octobre 2001 relatif aux conditions de fixation et de determination du montant des frais de
copie d'un document administratif, J.O n? 228 2 octobre 2001 page 15496
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require advance payment of the costs.9l2 This clear solution has the merit to avoid diverging
interpretations of the term "reasonable amount" and thus avoids the disadvantages of the English
system.
The French solution, compared to the English one is simple and clear, though it does not
take into consideration the fact that for some public authorities the cost of providing the same
amount of information might be greater than for others, and that some disclosures might cost more
than others.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
2) Appeals procedures: the choice between an administrative or a jurisdictional
appeal.
Concerning appeals against rejections of requests for information, the 1990 Directive
provided that the dissatisfied applicants had to be allowed to bring a legal or administrative action
against any decisions, in accordance with the national legal order on the matter. The Directive thus
allowed the States to choose between organising an appeal procedure in front of an administrative
body (an administrative appeal) or in front of a judge (a jurisdictional appeal). The new Directive
on the contrary has removed this choice and obliges the States to organise both an administrative
procedure as well as a jurisdictional one.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
In England the Environmental Information Regulations 1992 did not expressly mention
any specific appeals procedure. Therefore, under these Regulations the only possibility of appeal
was the traditional jurisdictional procedure of judicial review. Thus, the English government opted
by its silence for the existence of a jurisdictional appeal only, under the 1992 Regulations.
Quite to the contrary in France, there always existed both an administrative appeal
procedure and a jurisdictional one. Administrative appeals are brought in front of thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBACommi sion
d'Acces aux Documents Administratijs (Commission for the Access to Administrative Documents,
hereinafter CADA)913which is an independent administrative authority being competent for the
correct application of freedom of information laws. Anyone confronted with difficulties of
communication, or any public body confronted with a request for communication, can seize the
CADA and ask for an opinion on the communicability or not of the required document or on the
methods of its communication. The opinions rendered by the CADA are not obligatory for public
authorities, which are free to ignore them.?" However individuals planning to initiate legal
912Conseil d'Etat, decision N° 237203', geme et lOemeSous-Sections reunites, 13 decembre 2002, Inedit au
Recueil Lebon. Available from http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr
913For more details on the role and powers of this administrative body, see its website at http://www.cada.fr .
See also the article by de J-P Costa,zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBALa CADA, Revue Francaise de Droit Administratif, 1996, page 184 (in
French).
914It should be noted that even if public authorities are legally free to take into consideration or not CADA's
opinions, as a matter of policy they usually do follow them. For instance between 1995-1998 74.3% of its
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proceedings in the administrative courts must first ask the CADA to render an opinion, otherwise
their appeal is inadmissible. Once the CADA has issued its opinion and independently of its
contents, in favour or not of disclosure, if the public body refuses to communicate a document, an
appeal is possible in front of the administrative judge.
While this solution seems very different to the English one, the new 2004 Environmental
Information Regulations, adopt the administrative procedure provided by the Freedom of
Information Act 2000: the possibility of appealing to the Information Commissioner. The powers
of the Information Commissioner are very wide, since contrary to the French CADA which only
renders non-mandatory opinions, it can substitute its decision for that of the public authority
concerned. Moreover, the Act grants to the Commissioner very strong powers of investigations and
even allows him to bring criminal actions against public authorities that fail to execute its
decisions. A jurisdictional appeal procedure is also instituted against the decisions of the
Information Commissioner in front of the Information Tribunal, a special administrative tribunal. A
further appeal is possible in front of the High Court on points of law. In this case, it is the
traditional procedure of the judicial review which is applicable.
Consequently, even if today in England as in France there is both an administrative appeal
procedure as well as a jurisdictional one, the English administrative procedure is different from the
French one, since the decisions taken within this framework in France are not mandatory for public
bodies.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
3) Categories of information exempt from disclosure: the distinction between
absolute and discretionary exclusions.
The right to access information does not apply to all the information held by public bodies.
The principle posed by the Directives is that all information is communicable except information
covered by a specific exemption to disclosure.
As we have already examined, the 1990 Directive contained in its article 3, paragraph 2, a
list of reasons being able to justify a refusal of communication (mainly state secrets and private life
secrets). The essential point is that the 1990 Directive indicated that the states "can" reject a request
for information when it involves information considered to be exempt from disclosure. Thus,
member states remain free to limit or not on these grounds the right to information.
Both France and England had adopted all of the reasons for refusal present in the 1990
Directive, even if they were formulated in a different way in their respective national legislation.
But what is interesting to note is that both countries created two types of exemptions: absolute
opinions were followed by public bodies and 65.7% in 2000 (Source:zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBARapport d'activite de la Commission
d'Acces aux Documents Administratifs dejuin 2001, page 73, available on www.cada.fr).
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exemptions and discretionary exemptions, a distinction not encountered in the 1990 Directive. The
difference is due to the discretion granted to public authorities. When these bodies receive a request
for access to information in relation to any discretionary exemption they are not obliged to refuse
disclosure but they have discretion as to disclose or not. On the contrary, concerning absolute
exemptions, they are bound to refuse disclosure.
Even if the two examined countries had adopted these two categories of exemptions to
communication, an attentive examination of the exceptions contained in each category shows that
the English system was more liberal.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
a) In France: a majority of absolute exemptions and a classification of exemptions
completely different from the English one.
The second part of article L 124-1 of the Environmental Code distinguishes the exceptions
to communication, as in the English Environmental Information Regulations 1992, in two
categories. The first category includes information exempt from any sort of disclosure (absolute
exemptions). The article states that these exceptions are the ones provided in the law of 1978 on the
general right to information. They are contained in article 6 of the law of 1978, and with the
exception of the exclusion of "secrets protected by the law", (considered by the Commission and
the EC] as extending to the discretion of the national legislator the right to access information) are
in the field of the exceptions expressly mentioned in the 1990 directive. These exclusions cover
information concerning the currency; public credit; commercial and industrial secrecy; research of
tax or customs offences; secrecy of deliberations of the Government and the authorities responsible
for the executive power; safety of the State; public safety or personal safety and the control of the
foreign policy of France.
It is interesting to note that while these exceptions are classified in France in the category
of absolute exemptions, in England they were all classified in the category of discretionary
exemptions. Thus the English system would have allowed in certain cases the disclosure of
information related to these exclusions.
The second category of exemptions provided by article L 124-1 relates to data provided by
a third party without being legally obliged to do so and for which he has not granted consent for
disclosure, and also to information whose disclosure could cause harm to the environment to which
it refers.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIn these two cases, public bodies "can" allow disclosure (discretionary exemptions). The
French legislator thus grants to the. authorities holding this type of information discretion whether
to communicate or not, but does not mention, as in the English Environmental Information
Regulations 1992, some criterion which could help in the exercise of this discretion.
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ItzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAis interesting to note that the French solution is totally opposed to the one adopted by the
Environmental Information Regulations 1992, which classify these two same exemptions as
absolute exclusions. Thus the English government wanted to protect in an absolute manner the
data provided by third parties and the environment itself, by denying any possibility for public
bodies of communicating these kinds of information.
b) Exceptions to disclosure under the Environmental Information Regulations 1992: a
greater number of discretionary exemptions.
As we have seen before, the Environmental Information Regulations 1992 distinguish two
categories of information excluded from communication.
The first category, contains information which is not to be disclosed in any case (absolute
exemptions). It consists of personal information contained on files relating to an individual;
information whose disclosure would have as a consequence the breach of a duty of confidentiality;
information provided by third parties without being legally bound to do so and finally information
whose disclosure could harm the environment.
The second category, contains information whose disclosure is possible at the discretion of
the public body holding it (discretionary exemptions). It consists of information concerning
international relations; national defence or public security; legal or other proceedings; confidential
deliberations of any relevant person or internal communications and information in the course of
completion.
It is clear from what has been said, that the 1992 English system of environmental
information contained less exceptions to disclosure than the French system. Even today, the
Environmental Information Regulations 2004 are very liberal, as they only contain discretionary
exemptions, all subject to a public interest test.
El Conclusion: the different approach of each national legal system, analysed under
the prism of environmental protection.
In conclusion, after having examined the way in which the 1990 Environmental
Information Directive was transposed in English and French law, one arrives at two significant
conclusions. These conclusions, are still valid today, even after the enactment of thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA2003/4IEC
Directive.
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1) The use of a distinct set of legal rules from the ones establishing a general
right to access information: towards a better protection of the environment in
England than in France.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
AnzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAe amined before, the leg l basis of the Information Directives, articles 174 and 175 of
the EC Treaty, show that the purpose of these directives is to increase environmental protection.
This legal basis of the right to access to environmental information is the fundamental element,
which distinguishes the right to environmental information from its general equivalent.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAAzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBApriori,
one could estimate it is merely a formal difference.
However, even if in both cases information obtained on the basis of either regime (either
the one on environmental information or the general one) can be used by its holders in a way that
will protect the environment, the existence of legal rules specific to environmental information is a
better guarantee for environmental protection than the sole existence of legislation on a general
right to access information held by public bodies. This is due to the fact that when national judges
will be asked to interpret the national provisions founded on the Information Directives, they will
have to use the provisions of articles 174 and following of the EC Treaty and thus will be brought
to adopt an interpretation of national law in conformity with the aim encompassed by the Directive:
environmental protection. Thus, between different possible interpretations of national legal rules
transposing the Directive, they will have to choose the solutions which will be the most beneficial
for the environment, even if they can lead to a restriction of the right to information itself. Such an
approach would be unthinkable in respect of general freedom of information legislation which does
not aim to protect the environment and which does not take it into account. The best illustration of
this idea is the exemption from disclosure of information whose communication would rather cause
harm to the environment to which it refers. First, it should be noted that such an exception does not
exist in general freedom of information legislation (neither French nor English). Moreover, as
examined before, there is a principle that exceptions to the right to access information must be
interpreted in a restrictive way in order not to deprive this right of its substance. However, this
specific exception which aims to protect the environment must be interpreted in a broad way since
the substance of the environmental right to access information is the protection of the environment.
Consequently, it becomes clear that a specific right to access information applying only to
environmental information allows a better protection of the environment than a general right to
access information, as was the case in France at least till 2001. In France, the legislator waited until
the Commission initiated legal action in front of the European Court of Justice before transposing
Directive 90/313. This transposition. took place almost ten years after the time-limit fixed by the
Directive.
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Previously, the French government considered that the general law of 1978 was sufficient
in order to transpose the objectives of Directive 90/313 into French law. However, the Commission
had the last word.
If this French approach is analysed under the prism of' environmental protection, one can
conclude that the law of 1978 was insufficient to include the protection of the environment, since
this general statute is not based on the specific provisions of the EC treaties on environmental
protection. Moreover, the French system of 1978 does not contain an exemption for information
whose disclosure is likely to harm the environment.t" Therefore, the non-transposition of the
Directive on environmental information during more than one decade, shows that environmental
protection was regarded as less important than the establishment of a general right to access
information. Interestingly, Roseline Letteron had considered in a article published in 1995,916that
the community Directive on environmental information posed a threat to the French system of
access to information as established in 1978, since the latter is more liberal than the Directive. This
point of view demonstrates an attitude according to which the existence of a general right to access
information should prevail over environmental considerations.
On the contrary, in England, the government estimated that environmental protection was
to be the intrinsic element of any set of rules on freedom of information. As examined before thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA,
legislator expressly refused to include access to environmental information in the scope of the
Freedom of Information Act 2000, even if undoubtedly it would have been much simpler than
having two distinct legal instruments overlapping each other. However, such as solution was
justified in the name of environmental protection. This English approach, compared with the
French attitude described above, shows how the right to environmental information always took
precedence over the general right to. access information and ultimately, how environmental
protection was regarded as more important than the dedication of a right to access to administrative
information.
Another illustration of this different approach, is the exemption from disclosure of
information whose communication could harm the environment. In France, it is a discretionary
exclusion, which means that public bodies can decide that the disclosure of information can
override considerations of environmental protection. On the contrary, in England, since it was an
absolute exemption in the Environmental Information Regulations 1992, it means that the
protection of the environment must always take precedence over freedom of information. Indeed,
one should not forget that in the context of Directive 90/313 the right to access information is just
an instrument whose only reason of existence is environmental protection.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
91S Of course it should be noted that since the Information Directive is EC law, the Act of 1978 would had to
be interpreted in conformity with EC law principles, though having a specific transposition is a source of
Wteater certainty.
16 See Roseline Letteron, Le modele francais de transparence administrative a l'epreuve du droit
communautaire, Revue Francaise de Droit Administratif, 11 (1) janv-fevr. 1995, p. 183 (in French).
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This difference in approach still exists today in England, even after the enactment of the
Environmental Information Regulations 2004, as it is DEFRA who is responsible for these
Regulations and who has insisted (as seen before) that environmental information should be totally
removed from the scope ofthe FOIA 2000.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
2) A transposition more in conformity with the aim of the 1990 Directive in
England than in France.
The major disadvantage of the English approach is the increased complexity ofthe system,
since there is no uniform legal instrument that governs access to information. Thus there is also a
risk of overlaps between the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and the Environmental Information
Regulations. This seems to be the view of HugheszyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAet a. according to whi h 'there is much to be
said for the practice of some countries of maintaining a single regime for access to information,
whether environmental information or otherwise. Their implementation of the 1990 directive
extended to all information and avoids the fragmented and over-complex range of regimes
available in the UK,.9l7
However, as a whole, the transposition carried out in England can be considered as being
more in conformity with the aim of the Information Directive (which is environmental protection)
than the French transposition, and this for several reasons.
Firstly, the English solution establishes a more liberal and more open right to access to
environmental information than the French solution. Indeed, this right in England is limited by a
smaller number of absolute exemptions, contrary to the French system where the great majority of
exemptions to communication are absolute. So, public authorities receiving requests for
communication maintain the possibility in the major part of cases to exercise their discretion to
disclose the information required even if it is covered by an exemption.
Secondly, in France before starting legal action against a decision of refusal of disclosure,
it is necessary first to seize the CADA, an administrative authority whose decisions are not
mandatory. Consequently, even if the CADA decides in favour of the applicant, the public body
concerned is free to persist in its refusal and the applicant must still go in front of the administrative
judge to dispute the decision of refusal. So, the administrative procedure in front of the CADA only
results in unnecessary delays before the aggrieved citizen can obtain a mandatory decision for the
public body.
On the contrary, in the English system under the 1992 Regulations, the citizen can directly
bring judicial review proceedings in the event of difficulties, a process which is faster and
917 David Hughes, Tim Jewel, Jason Lowther, Neil Parpworth, Paula de Prez, EnvironmentalLaw, 4th
edition, London: Butterworths 2002, at page 160. .
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effective. In any case, after the enactment of the 2004 Environmental Information Regulations,
even if an appeal to the Information Commissioner is obligatory before any appeal to a court of
law, its decisions are mandatory for public authorities.
Thirdly, as already considered, the French system does not give any definition of the
concept "environmental information" contrary to the English system which adopts the definition of
the Directive. This creates a strong element of uncertainty with regard to the limits of the right to
environmental information, going in the opposite direction wanted by the Community legislator
which is to ensure an identical right to environmental information through the various Member
States.
Thus, the national transposing measures of the 1990 Directive are more in conformity with
the aim and the spirit of this Directive in England than in France. It remains to be seen whether this
will change as far as the 2003 Directive is concerned, especially since we have identified many
aspects of the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 that seem to breach the requirements
of this new Directive. However, at the present time, it is too early to compare the French to the
English solution, as there has been no transposition yet of the 2003 Directive in France.
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
A) Overview of our examination
We have by now examined the legal rules that govern access to environmental information
at UK level, EC level and international level.
In our introductory chapter we set the limits of our examination by stating that we would
mainly examine the legal rules that grant a right to individuals to access information about the
environment upon request. It was also made clear that, although our examination would include EC
law, we would not analyse the EC law provisions on access to documents held by the EC
institutions and thus, we would only examine the legal rules creating a duty for state public
authorities to grant access to environmental information to any person requesting it.
Moreover, in the introductory chapter we have examined the historical evolution of the
right to access to environmental information. Although, in the 19zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAth cent ry secrecy of information
held by public bodies was the general rule, it has been gradually evolving towards the current
position, which is that access to environmental information is not simply a right, but sometimes it
can be a right of a Constitutional rank. We also examined the policy reasons in favour and against
granting a right to access environmental information upon request to anybody. Our conclusion was
that, although there are valid arguments for both sides, today national and international legislators
undoubtedly favour openness, which is an indication that the arguments in favour of openness have
prevailed, at least for the time being.
Then, in Chapter 1, which is the core chapter of the present work, we have explained in
detail the substantive provisions of the legal instruments granting a right to access environmental
information upon request: the Aarhus convention, thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA2003/4IEC Environmental Information
Directive on public access to Environmental Information and the Environmental Information
Regulations 2004, which transpose into UK law this Directive and the information provisions of
the Aarhus convention. It should be stressed that we have analysed in parallel the equivalent
provisions of EC law, international law and UK law, thus avoiding repeating the identical parts of
these instruments. This parallel examination of all legal rules that grant a right to access
environmental information is also a feature that renders the present work original, since there is no
other written work on the subject adopting such an approach. .we also examined how the 2004
Regulations try to stay as close as possible to the equivalent provisions ofthe FOIA 2000.
In chapter 2 we have examined other specific UK enactments that grant a right to access
specific kinds of environmental information. Our analysis has highlighted one problem: that
although there is one general enactment regulating access to environmental information (the
Environmental Information Regulations 2004), these specific enactments on registers containing
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environmental information remain as they have not been repealed. So, although the 2004
Regulations prevail as they stem from EC law, this goes against the principle of legal certainty in
EC Law,918as it is not always certain and clear which rules should be applied. This is especially
true for registers which also contain information that is not environmental information. Moreover,
we have highlighted the fact that the statutory provisions on registers serve a different function than
the environmental information regulations, as they also create a statutory duty for some public
authorities to collect and compile certain types of environmental information and place it on
registers.
In chapter 3 we have examined the relevant ECHR articles which have been interpreted by
the Court of Strasbourg as including a right to access environmental information. Thus, we
examined how in some limited circumstances the right to access environmental information can be
of a fundamental nature. We also concluded that the fundamental human right to access
environmental information implied under certain ECHR articles, is different from the right to
access environmental information enshrined in the Aarhus Convention and the 2003 Environmental
Information Directive. This is because the former is a means to protect specific human rights (such
as the right to life, to respect for private and family life and the prohibition of inhuman or
degrading treatments), whereas the latter aims to protect the environment.
Finally, in chapter 4 we analysed how thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA90/313IEEC Directive was transposed in French
law, in comparison with England. We concluded that the English method of transposition has been
more in conformity with the aim of the right to access environmental information: environmental
protection. We also concluded that this important finding is also of some relevance today, even
after the enactment of the 2003 Directive and the Environmental Information Regulations 2004.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
Bl The problem with trying to align the Environmental Information Regulations
2004 with the Freedom of Information Act 2000
As we analysed before, the UK Government decided that the best way to implement the
2003/4IEC Directive was to align the transposing Regulations, as far as practicable, with the
equivalent provisions of the FOIA 2000. This is why the procedural provisions on access to
information and the appeal procedures of the FOIA 2000 were almost copied in the Environmental
Information Regulations 2004.
In chapter 1 we found that the new Environmental Information Regulations 2004, by trying
to stay as close as possible with the FOIA 2000, have adopted some provisions that are not
compatible with the equivalent provisions of the Directive. This result is logical since the 2003
Directive is more liberal than the FOIA 2000.
918See Juha Raitio, The Principle of Legal Certainty in EC Law, Kluwer Academic Publishers: Dordrecht,
2003.
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However, although one can only agree that it is positive to align as much as possible the
new Regulations with the FOIA for the sake of simplicity when applying these two regimes, this
should not have been done at the expense of a correct transposition of the 2003 Directive. This not
only leads to a violation of EC law, but also of the Aarhus Convention, as the 2003 Directive also
aims to transpose this Convention in EC law. Of course, it could be argued that the inconsistencies
with EC law that have arisen by trying to model the Environmental Information Regulations 2004
with the FOIA were unavoidable if one wanted to preserve the coherence and similarity between
these two instruments. However, this approach fails to acknowledge the fundamental difference
between a general access to information regime and one on environmental information, which is
the fact that the latter aims to protect the environment. Thus, by trying to bring as close as possible
the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 to the FOIA 2000, the Government failed to
recognise, at least to some extent, that the protection of the environment might not be compatible
with the provisions of the FOIA.
In consequence, if the Government had wanted to act in conformity with the central goal of
Aarhus and the 2003 Directive, it should have tried to draft the 2004 Regulations as closely as
possible to these instruments, instead of trying to adapt the access to information scheme created by
the FOIA to the requirements of the 2003 Directive. Alternatively, the Government could have
tried to modify the FOIA itself by bringing it to the Aarhus and the 2003 Directive's standards of
openness. However, it has been sufficiently demonstrated this would have required opening up the
files of public bodies even more, something that the Government has been constantly trying to
avoid, despite many declarations to the contrary.
In any case, the current approach of the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 has
the disadvantage of breaching in many points the 2003 Directive, thus allowing possible challenges
in the Courts based on the principles of direct effect of EC law and of state liability for breaches of
EC law.
ClzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAThe problem of legal complexity
Another issue with the current regime on access to environmental information as stemming
from the Environmental Information Regulations 2004, is that their correct application is extremely
complex in practice because of the huge amount of other texts that have to be read in conjunction
with these Regulations. These texts can be put into two categories: binding legal texts, and non-
binding ones.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
1) Legal complexity because of overlapping legal instruments
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There is an issue that the current English regime on access to environmental information is
extremely complex. This is first due to the Environmental Information Regulations 2004
themselves. These Regulations cannot be read independently of the FOIA 2000, because of the
constant references to the relevant sections of this Act that have to be applied under the
Regulations, either with or without modifications. To this extent, the draft Environmental
Information Regulations issued by the Government in 2002 were different, because instead of
containing a reference to the section of the FOIA that is also applicable under the Regulations
followed by the necessary modifications (as in the 2004 Regulations), they repeated these sections
in the Regulations with all modifications incorporated in the text. So, the draft 2002 Regulations
could have been used as a sort of 'codifying statute' without the need to constantly refer back to
the FOIA in order to understand each provision, as in the Environmental Information Regulations
2004.
Moreover, the 2004 Regulations have also to be read in conjunction with the 2003
Directive, since reg. 2(3) mentions that 'expressions in these Regulations which appear in the
Directive have the same meaning in these Regulations as they have in the Directive'. Thus, to
correctly understand the 2004 Regulations, one has to constantly refer to the FOIA 2000 and the
2003 Directive. Still, this would not be enough to understand the applicable English regime on
access to environmental information, as one would still have to examine the relevant enactments on
registers containing environmental information. Even then, one would still need to see whether
some of the ECHR articles are not applicable in order to get the full picture.
Although it can be contended that the human rights issues are nowadays unavoidable
because of the importance that the ECHR has acquired not only in UK law but also in the whole of
EC law, it is certain that the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 could have been drafted
in a less complicated manner. This could have been certainly possible, by incorporating the
provisions of the FOIA in the 2004 Regulations, instead of merely containing references to
specific sections that have to be read in conjunction with the Regulations. Even though legal norms
always tend to be complex, there is no reason to try and avoid this fact whenever this is possible.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
2) Legal complexity because of overlapping non-binding instruments
Understanding the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 is also rendered
unnecessarily complex by the multitude of non-binding texts that accompany these Regulations and
try to explain them in simpler terms to officials of public authorities that have to apply them in
practice.
These texts are: 1) the Explanatory Note accompanying the Environmental Information
Regulations 2004, as with any UK enactment.
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2) the Code of Practice providing guidance to public authorities as to the practice which it
would, in the Secretary of State's opinion, be desirable for them to follow in connection with the
discharge of their functions under the 2004 Regulations. This Code of Practice is still in draft form.
3) the Governmental Guidance to the Environmental Information Regulations 2004. This
Guidance is still in draft form. Although the Government acknowledges this text is not legally
binding, it considers it is a statement on the approach public authorities will be expected to follow
when applying the 2004 Regulations. The Government also indicates that this Guidance should be
read alongside the Code of Practice accompanying the 2004 Regulations."?
It should be noted that since the 2004 Regulations can only be applied in conjunction with
the FOIA 2000, one has, therefore, to also refer to the non-binding instruments that explain this
Act: the Code of Practice accompanying the FOIA 2000 and the Explanatory Notes to this Act.
The Government has impliedly recognised that all this can be very confusing, as it has
proposed that it might be possible to have a single Code of Practice for the FOIA 2000 and the
Environmental Information Regulations 2004, with separate paragraphs only where unavoidable
differences exist.920
Of course, one could argue that all the aforementioned instruments can safely be ignored
by public authorities who focus on the applicable binding legal provisions, the Environmental
Information Regulations 2004 and the FOIA 2000, provided they apply them correctly. However,
such a position is not an option, as if the Codes of Practice are not followed, then the Information
Commissioner can issue practice recommendations, something that public authorities will
undoubtedlyzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAtry to avoid.
Finally, it should be stressed that all the aforementioned texts, are not very useful as, first,
they tend to repeat each other, and second, they do not provide any real help in solving the
fundamentally important issue arising when applying the Regulations: how the public interest test
has to be applied when environmental information is concerned. This is especially difficult, since
this test cannot be the same as under the FOIA 2000, since when applying this test under the 2004
Regulations, the aim of the environmental information regime, which is environmental protection,
has to be taken into account.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
D) The right to access environmental information upon request: a 'multi-layered'
right
Before ending the present ,work, one idea that underpins it from the first page to the last
page should be stressed. We have not just been examining how the 2003 Directive and the Aarhus
919 See paragraphs 1.7 and 1.9 of the Draft Governmental Guidance on the 2004 Environmental Information
Regulations (as of24 July 2004), http://www.defra.gov.ukJcorporate/consultienvinfo/index.htm
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international Convention (both creating a right to access upon request environmental information
held by public authorities) have been transposed into English law by the Environmental
Information Regulations 2004. Rather, we have demonstrated that this right of access to
environmental information is what could be called a 'multi-layered' right, which stems from
various legal instruments of different levels (the EC level, international level and UK national
level). This is the reason why the right to environmental information is a right with uncertain
boundaries and content, since, although all these instruments go into the same direction of
recognising a right to access environmental information to any person, they all contain different
limitations and exceptions to the scope of this right.
Additionally, as shown all along the present work, it should be acknowledged that the right
to access environmental information is fundamentally different from the general right to access
information held by public bodies, since it aims at achieving better environmental protection.
Similarly, the right to access environmental information enshrined in the Aarhus Convention and
the 2003 Environmental Information Directive, is different from the fundamental human right to
access environmental information recognised under certain ECHR articles, since its aim is to
protect the environment.
As a consequence, it is clear that the correct approach to any analysis of the right to access
environmental information is to understand and acknowledge that, first, this right stems from
various European, national and international legal instruments, and second, that although it is a
right similar to the general right to access information, it is conceptually different as it aims to
protect the environment since access to information is used as a means to achieve the goal of
environmental protection.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
920 See the public consultation paper on thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBADraft Environmental Information Regulations Code of Practice,
DEFRA, July 2004, at Annex B, available at http://www.defra.gov.uk!corporate/consultlenvinfo/index.htm
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ANNEX 1: TABLES OF EQUIVALENCE OF PROVISIONSzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
The Environmental Information Regulations The Environmental Information Regulations
1992 [Applicable to Great Britain (reg.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA1(3»] (Northern Ireland) 1993
S.1.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA1992/3240 S.R. 1993/45
REGULATION No: REGULATION No:
1 Citation, commencement and extentzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA1 Citation and commencement







3 Obligation to make environmental 4 Obligation to make environmental














5 Existing rights to information 6 Existing rights to information
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Council Directive 90/313IEEC of7 June 1990 Directive 2003/4IEC of the European
on the freedom of access to information on Parliament and of the Council of28 January
the environment [Official Journal L 158 of 2003 on public access to environmental
23.06.1990] information and repealing Council Directive
90/313IEEC [Official Journal L 41 of
14.02.20031
Article 1 Article l(a)
Article 1(b)
Article 2(a) Article 2( 1)





Article 3(1) Article 3(1) and Article 3(5)
Article 3(2) Article 4(2) and Article 4(4)
Article 3(3) Article 4(1 )(b), (c), (d) and (e)




Article 4 Article 6(1) and Article 6(2)
- Article 6(3)
Article 5 Article 5(1)
- Article 5(2)
- Article 5(3)
Article 6 Article 2(2)(c), Article 3(1)









Article 8 Article 9
Article 9 Article 10












Article 2: Definitions. ReQulations2 and 3.
Comment
Article 3: Access to Regulation 7.
environmental
information. Paragraph
(2)(b) - extension of
time to comply with
request






Article 3: Access to Regulation 6.
Article 3: Access to
environmental
information. Paragraphs







(4) - form and format of
information.
Article 3: Access to
environmental
information. Paragraph










Regulations 8(4) and (5)
(advance payment
required) and 12 t014.
1. To the extent that the
information requested is





Regulations and falls to
be dealt with under
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provides that to the
extent that the
information requested is
the personal data of a
person other than the
applicant then those
data shall not be
disclosed otherwise




equivalent to those in






personal data may be
disclosed are provided
for in compliance with
Directive 95/46!EC of
the European
Parliament and of the
Council of 24 October
1995 on the protection
of individuals with
regard to the processing
of personal data and on
the free movement of
such data (the Data
Protection Directive).
Article 5: Charues RegulationzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA8.
Article 6: Access to
justice.
Regulations 11 and 18. Regulation 18(3) applies
the enforcement and
appeal provisions in
















States by 14 February
2005.
made onzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA~H~ 2004 and
come into force on '.. Id<
2005.
Source: EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM accompanying the Environmental
Information Regulations 2004 and submitted to Parliament on thezyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA221712004.
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ANNEX 2: REGISTERS CONTAINING ENVIRONMENTAL
INFORMATION MAINTAINED BY LOCAL AUTHORITIESzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
Register of stray dogs seized by local authorities
Environmental Protection Act 1990 S. 149(8)
Register of Litter Control Areas (LCAs)
Environmental Protection Act 1990 S. 95
Register of Street Litter Control Notices (SLCNs)
Environmental Protection Act 1990 S. 95
Noise Abatement Zone Register
Control of Noise (Measurement and registers) Regulations 1976 in respect of the Control of
Pollution Act 1974
Integrated Pollution Control (IPC) Register
The Environmental Protection (Applications, Appeals and registers) Regulations 1991 (in respect
of Section 20 Part 1 of the Environmental Protection Act 1990)
Local Authority Air pollution Control (LAAPC) Register
The Environmental Protection (Applications, Appeals and registers) Regulations 1991 (in respect
ofS. 20 Part 1 of the Environmental Protection Act 1990)
Register of improvement and prohibition notices having environmental implications
Environmental Safety Information Act 1988, in respect of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act
1974, Food and Environment Protection Act 1985, Fire Precautions Act 1971.
Register of radioactive substances
Radioactive Substances Act 1993
Register of Private Water Supplies .
Water Industry Act 1991, Private Water Supplies Regulations 1991
Register of licensed waste disposal sites
Environmental Protection Act 1990 S 64
Register of Common LandzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA& Village Gree s
Commons Registration Act 1965 S3(1) and (2)
Environmentally Sensitive Areas (ESAs)
The Agriculture Act 1986
ESAs appear as land charges in the Local Land Charges Register
Register of Hazardous Substances Consents
Planning (Hazardous Substances) Act 1990 S28
Register of details of manufacturers/sites subject to the CIMAH Regulations
Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazards (CIMAH) Regulations 1984
Register of enforcement notices concerning Pesticides
Food and Environmental Protection Act 1985; The Control of Pesticides Regulations 1986.
Maintained by Local authorities and the Health and Safety Executive
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Register of maps, statements and orders relating to public rights of way
Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 S57(5)
Register of Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSIs)
Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981
Maintained in the Local Land Charges Register
Register of Notifications of intended Works on Trees in Conservation Areas
Section 4(2) of the Model Order contained in the Town and County Planning (Tree Preservation
Order) Regulations 1969
Register of applications for Work on Trees covered by Tree Preservation Orders (TPO)
Town and Country Planning Act 1990 S 214
Register of drinking water quality in 'supply zones'
Water Supply (Water Quality) Regulations 1989zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
ANNEX 3: REGISTERS CONTAINING ENVIRONMENTAL
INFORMATION MAINTAINED BY THE ENVIRONMENT AGENCY
The following list has been provided by the Environment Agency, and is an extract from the
documentzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA"The Environment Agency's Freedom of Information Publication Scheme - Approval
Documentation" which sets out how the Environment Agency is meeting its statutory requirement
to provide a Publication Scheme under the Freedom of Information Act 2000. It is available also on
the Environment Agency Website at:
http://www.environment-agency.gov.uklotherlhelp/31 0 1511310367 1319450I?version=I&lang= _e
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Access to Medical Reports Act 1988
Access to Personal Files Act 1987
Administration of Justice Act 1960
Audit Commission Act 1998
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988
Courts and Legal Services Act 1990
Criminal Justice Act 1982
Data Protection Act 1998
Environment and Safety Information Act 1988
Environmental Protection Act 1990
European Communities Act 1972
Fire Precautions Act 1971
Food and Environment Protection Act 1985
Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002
Freedom of Information Act 2000
Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974
Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977
Intelligence Services Act 1994
Interpretation Act 1978
Local Government (Access to Information) Act 1985
Local Government Act 1972
Local Government Act 1974
Local Land Charges Act 1975
Local Land Charges Act 1977
Mental Health Act 1983
Mental Health Service Commissioners Act 1993
Merchant Shipping Act 1995
Official Secrets Act 1911
Official Secrets Act 1989
Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967
Pensions Schemes Act 1993
Public Health Act 1961
Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998
Public Records Act 1958
Safety of Sports Grounds Act 1975
Scotland Act 1998
Supreme Court Act 1981
Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1972
Town and Country Planning Act 1990
Tribunal and Inquiries Act 1992
Water Consolidation (Consequential Provisions) Act 1991
Water Resources Act 1991zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
TABLE OF STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS
Control of Pollution (Applications, Appeals and Registers) Regulations 1996 (SI 1996/2971)
Control of Pollution (Registers) Regulations, 1989 (SI 198911160)
Copyright (Material Open to Public Inspection) (Marking of Copies of Plans and Drawings) Order 1990 (SI
1990/1427)
Copyright (Material Open to Public Inspection) (Marking of Copies of Maps) Order 1989 (SI 1989/1099)
Data Protection Tribunal (Enforcement Appeals) Rules 2000 (SI 2000/189)
Data Protection Tribunal (National Security Appeals) Rules 2000 (SI 2000/206)
Environmental Information (Amendment) (Northern Ireland) Regulations 1998 (SR 1998/238)
Environmental Information (Amendment) Regulations 1998 (SI 1998/1447)
Environmental Information (Northern Irel~d) Regulations 1993 (SR 1993/45)
Environmental Information Regulations 1992 (SI 1992/3240)
Environmental Protection (Applications, Appeals and Registers) (Amendment) Regulations 1996 (SI
1996/667)
Environmental Protection (Applications, Appeals and Registers) Regulations 1991 (SrI9911507)
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European Communities (Designation) (No.2) Order 1992 (SIzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA1992/1711)
European Communities (Designation) (No.4) Order 2003 (SI 2003/2901)
Freedom ofInformation Act 2000 (Commencement No. I) Order 2001 (SI200111637)
Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Commencement No.2) Order 2002 (SI 2002/2812)
Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Commencement No.3) Order 2003 (SI 2003/2603)
Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Commencement No.4) Order 2004 (SI 2004/1909)
Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 (Commencement No.1) Order 2002 (SSI 2002/437)
Genetically Modified Organisms (Contained Use) (Amendment) Regulations 2002 (SI 2002/63)
Genetically Modified Organisms (Contained Use) Regulations 2000 (SI 2000/2831)
Genetically Modified Organisms (Deliberate Release) Regulations 2002 (SI 2002/2443)
Genetically Modified Organisms (Deliberate Releases) Regulations 1992 (SI 1992/3280)
Information Tribunal (Enforcement Appeals) (Amendment) Rules 2002 (SI 2002/2722)
Local Government (Inspection of Documents) (Summary of Rights) Order 1986 (SI 1986/854)
Local Land Charges (Amendment) Rules 1998 (SI 1998/1190)
Local Land Charges Rules 1977 (SI 1977/985)
Plant Protection Products Regulations 1995 (SI 1995/887)
Public Health (Freedom of Access to Information on the Environment) Rules 1992 (Legal Notice No. 143 of
1992, Gibraltar Gazette No. 2,697 of 1211111992 Legal Notices Second Supplement)
Telecommunications (Data Protection and Privacy) Regulations 1999 (SI 1999/2093)
Town and Country Planning (Assessment of Environmental Effects) Regulations (SI 1988, No. 1199)
Town and Country Planning (Enforcement) (Determination by Inspectors) (Inquiries Procedure) (England)
Rules 2002 (SI 2685/2002)
Town arid Country Planning (Enforcement) (Inquiries Procedure) (England) Rules 2002 (SI 2686/2002)
Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) (England and Wales) Regulations 1999 (SI
1999/293)
Town and Country Planning (General Development Procedure) Order 1995 (SI 1995/419)
Town and Country Planning (Major Infrastructure Project Inquiries Procedure) (England) Rules 2002 (SI
1223/2002)
Town and Country Planning (Trees) Regulations 1999 (SI 1999/1892)
Transfer of Functions (Miscellaneous) Order 2001 (SI200113500)
Waste Management Licensing Regulations 1994 (SI 1994/1056)
Water Supply (Water Quality) Regulations 1989 (SI 198911147)
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Council Directive 9116921EEC) (notified under document number C(1999) 1395), OJ 1999 Ll48/39
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Amended proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the incineration of waste OJ 2000
CI50E/I
Amended Proposal for a European Parliament and Council recommendation providing for minimum criteria
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Commission's Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the application of
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